Waiting for a SARS tax refund? See seven common reasons for delays, how to check your refund status and when to lodge a complaint A tax assessment showing money owed to you does not always mean SARS will pay it immediately. Your refund may be held while SARS checks your return, validates your bank account, waits for old returns or applies part of the credit to tax debt. SARS says it aims to pay nine out of every ten refunds due within 72 hours when the refund exceeds R100. That is a service target, not a guarantee. It applies only when the refund has passed the required checks and there is nothing else blocking payment. This guide explains the seven main reasons a SARS refund may be delayed, how to identify the problem and what to do next. Quick answer: Check the refund through the SARS MobiApp or the official SARS WhatsApp service on 0800 11 7277 . Then open your Income Tax Statement of Account and SARS correspondence on eFiling. These should show whether the delay involves bank verification, return verification, an audit, outstanding returns or tax debt. How long should a SARS refund take? The normal 72-hour target should not be confused with the time allowed for verification or an audit. The clock normally depends on SARS receiving all requested documents in a complete and correct form. Merely uploading a file is not enough if you did not click Submit or if SARS later asks for more information. Seven reasons your SARS refund is delayed 1. Your banking details are incorrect SARS cannot pay a refund into an invalid account. Problems may arise when an account number or branch code is wrong, an account is closed, or the account is not registered in the taxpayer's name. Continue Reading Full Article STUDENTS GUIDE SARS Refund Delayed? 7 Reasons and What to Do By Wilson Munezero Government Services & Opportunities Expert Wilson Munezero Home Comment Aug 21, 2026 Aug 21, 2026 15 min read Copy link Facebook X (Twitter) WhatsApp Published Updated: A tax assessment showing money owed to you does not always mean SARS will pay it immediately. Your refund may be held while SARS checks your return, validates your bank account, waits for old returns or applies part of the credit to tax debt. SARS says it aims to pay nine out of every ten refunds due within 72 hours when the refund exceeds R100. That is a service target, not a guarantee. It applies only when the refund has passed the required checks and there is nothing else blocking payment. This guide explains the seven main reasons a SARS refund may be delayed, how to identify the problem and what to do next. Quick answer: Check the refund through the SARS MobiApp or the official SARS WhatsApp service on 0800 11 7277 . Then open your Income Tax Statement of Account and SARS correspondence on eFiling. These should show whether the delay involves bank verification, return verification, an audit, outstanding returns or tax debt. How long should a SARS refund take? The normal 72-hour target should not be confused with the time allowed for verification or an audit. Situation SARS guidance Refund is cleared, exceeds R100 and has no blocker SARS aims to pay within 72 hours Bank details selected for verification Up to 21 business days after all requested documents are received Income-tax return selected for verification Up to 21 business days after all requested documents are received Several tax years selected for verification Up to 90 business days after complete documents for all years are received Return selected for audit SARS prioritises completion within 90 business days after complete documents are received, but complex audits can take longer The clock normally depends on SARS receiving all requested documents in a complete and correct form. Merely uploading a file is not enough if you did not click Submit or if SARS later asks for more information. Seven reasons your SARS refund is delayed 1. Your banking details are incorrect SARS cannot pay a refund into an invalid account. Problems may arise when an account number or branch code is wrong, an account is closed, or the account is not registered in the taxpayer's name. For individuals, a valid account is generally a South African cheque, savings or transmission account with a valid bank and branch number. It cannot be a credit-card, bond or ordinary foreign-bank account. What to do: Sign in to SARS eFiling and check the registered bank details. If they are wrong, update them through the RAV01 form or the relevant ITR12 process. You may also use Profile Management in the SARS MobiApp. Upload any bank-verification documents SARS requests. Do not try to change bank details by telephone, fax or post; SARS says those channels cannot be used for the change. 2. SARS is verifying your banking details Even correct or newly updated bank details may be placed in Pending Verification . SARS may create a case and ask for supporting documents before releasing the refund. SARS says bank-detail verification can take up to 21 business days from the date it receives all required supporting documents. Once validation is complete, the refund should ordinarily be paid within 72 hours if no other block remains. What to do: Open your eFiling letters and casework, submit every requested document and keep the submission confirmation. Make sure the account holder's name matches the taxpayer's details. Do not count the 21 business days from the date you changed the account if SARS requested documents later; count from the date the complete documents were received. 3. Your return was selected for verification Verification is a check of the information on your return against supporting documents, third-party data and other records. It is not the same as a full audit. SARS may request IRP5/IT3(a) certificates, medical-scheme certificates, retirement-annuity certificates, travel records, invoices, proof of deductions or other relevant material. It aims to conclude an income-tax verification within 21 business days after receiving all requested documents. ADVERTISEMENT What to do: Read the verification letter carefully and use its checklist. Upload clear, complete documents on eFiling or through the SARS Online Query System. Click Submit to SARS after uploading. A document left in an uploaded-but-unsubmitted state has not been sent for review. Check eFiling for a completion letter, revised assessment or referral-for-audit notice. If verification changes your assessment and you disagree, use the correction or formal dispute route that applies. A service complaint is not a substitute for an objection. 4. You filed several tax years at once Filing a backlog of returns can create a longer review. If multiple years are submitted and selected for verification, SARS says the process may take up to 90 business days from the date it receives all required documents for all the years under review. What to do: Check each tax year separately. A missing document or unanswered request for one year may hold up the overall process. Keep a simple list showing each year, the SARS letter date, what was requested and when you submitted it. 5. Your return was selected for audit An audit is more detailed than verification. SARS may examine financial records, supporting documents and third-party information before deciding whether the declared tax position is correct. SARS says audits can take from 30 business days to 12 months, depending on complexity, transaction volume and taxpayer cooperation. Although it prioritises finalising an audit within 90 business days after receiving the requested documents, complicated matters can take longer. SARS also says it generally provides audit progress reports every 90 calendar days after the Notification of Audit, subject to limited exceptions. What to do: Read the Notification of Audit, note the assigned auditor's details and submit the material requested by the deadline. Ask the named auditor for a progress update if the expected period passes. Do not assume that a referral-for-audit letter means the audit has already started; SARS says it starts formally when the Notification of Audit is issued. 6. You have outstanding tax returns SARS will not pay a refund while required returns remain outstanding. The missing return may be from an earlier year and may be unrelated to the assessment that created the refund. What to do: Check your eFiling profile and compliance status for every outstanding return. Submit anything legitimately due. If eFiling marks a return outstanding that you believe was already filed or was not required, contact SARS and obtain a case number rather than submitting incorrect information simply to remove the warning. 7. You owe SARS money When your tax account has outstanding debt, SARS may use a process commonly described as debt equalisation or set-off. Part or all of the refund can be applied to the debt before any remaining credit is released. What to do: Request an Income Tax Statement of Account and compare the refund credit with tax, penalties and interest owed. If the refund was fully used against the debt, there may be no cash payment. If you dispute the underlying assessment or penalty, follow the applicable request-for-remission, objection or dispute process; do not use a delayed-refund complaint to challenge the tax decision itself. ADVERTISEMENT How to check your SARS refund status You can use any of these official methods: Option 1: SARS WhatsApp Save 0800 11 7277 as the SARS WhatsApp number. Send “Hi” or “Hello”. Select Refund Status . Enter the identity and tax-reference information requested for authentication. Use the cellphone number registered on your SARS profile. The WhatsApp service is for individual taxpayers and is not available to tax practitioners. Option 2: SARS MobiApp Open the app, select Refund Status on the home screen and follow the prompts. Option 3: eFiling On eFiling, check: Your Income Tax Statement of Account (ITSA) . SARS says the amount and date next to Electronic refund show the expected refund payment. Your Notice of Assessment (ITA34) to confirm that the assessment actually produced a refund. SARS Correspondence for a verification, audit or bank-validation letter. Your supporting-document work page to confirm the documents show as submitted. Your compliance position for outstanding returns or debt. Menu wording may change as eFiling is updated, but the ITSA, ITA34 and correspondence are the key records. What to do if the stated payment date has passed Follow this order: Check the status and records. Confirm the ITSA payment date, bank details, outstanding returns, debt and any open verification or audit. Contact SARS. Call the SARS Contact Centre on 0800 00 7277 or use an official digital channel. Explain the issue and ask for a case number. Follow up on the case. Keep the case number, dates, letters and proof of every submission. Lodge a SARS service complaint if the applicable turnaround time has expired. On eFiling, go to Services → Complaints → New Complaint . A delayed refund will usually fall under quality and speed of service or an unresolved operational matter. These categories require an existing case number. You can also contact the SARS Complaints Management Office on 0800 12 12 16 or visit a branch. Approach the Office of the Tax Ombud if SARS does not resolve the complaint. The Ombud normally requires you to exhaust the SARS complaints process first, unless compelling circumstances justify earlier intervention. SARS says the maximum resolution date for a complaint is 21 business days after it is logged. The Tax Ombud says it aims to resolve accepted complaints within 15 business days, although some matters may take longer. Complaint or tax dispute: which one do you need? Use a complaint when SARS has exceeded a service period, lost documents or failed to resolve an operational issue. Use a Request for Correction, objection, remission request or other dispute process when you disagree with the amount assessed, a penalty or a SARS decision. Filing a complaint does not extend a legal deadline for lodging an objection. Beware of fake SARS refund messages Refund season attracts phishing messages. SARS says it will never ask for your password, OTP, banking PIN or eFiling login details by email, SMS, social media or telephone. It also says it will not request banking details through an unsolicited email or SMS or send a link to a bank's website. Do not pay anyone to “release” a refund. Open eFiling, the MobiApp or the official SARS website yourself instead of using a link in a message. Trending Now Hyron Andrews Biography: His Rugby Career and Lions Tributes . Biography F1 Will Polish Kagame’s Authoritarian Image” — Kayikwamba Wagner . Justice & Crime Oluku Market Tanker Explosion: Death Toll Still Unconfirmed, 8 Injured . Accident News Fannie Masemola Reinstated as South Africa's Police Chief, Back Monday . Social Service Popular Today Tax and Revenue How to Check if You Must Submit a SARS Tax Return . Tax and Revenue How to Check if SARS Owes You a Refund . Tax and Revenue How to Update Your Banking Details With SARS . Tax and Revenue How to Get Your SARS Tax Number Online . Tax and Revenue SARS Auto Assessment 2026: How to Check and What to Do . ADVERTISEMENT Frequently asked questions Does an ITA34 showing a refund mean the money has been released? No. It means the assessment has calculated a credit, but payment may still be subject to bank validation, verification, audit, outstanding-return and debt checks. Check the ITSA for an electronic-refund entry and payment date. Is SARS verification the same as an audit? No. Verification checks the return against supporting information. An audit is a more extensive examination and may take substantially longer. When does the 21-business-day verification period begin? SARS measures it from the date it receives all required supporting documents. If documents are incomplete or SARS requests more information, the practical timeline may extend. Can SARS take my refund for old tax debt? SARS may apply some or all of the credit to outstanding tax debt before releasing any remaining amount. Check the ITSA for the transactions and balances. Can a refund be delayed because I did not file an old return? Yes. SARS states that a refund will not be paid until all outstanding required returns have been submitted. What is the SARS refund contact number? The SARS Contact Centre number is 0800 00 7277 . The separate Complaints Management Office number is 0800 12 12 16 . Obtain a case number before escalating an overdue operational issue. Can I go directly to the Tax Ombud? Normally, you must first use SARS's complaints-resolution mechanism. The Ombud may accept a matter earlier only where compelling circumstances apply, such as undue hardship, a systemic issue or an unreasonable prospect of resolution through the normal process. The bottom line Start with the ITSA and refund-status service, not the amount on the assessment alone. Most delayed refunds can be traced to one of seven issues: wrong bank details, bank verification, return verification, multiple-year review, audit, outstanding returns or tax debt. Respond to official document requests promptly, keep proof of submission and get a SARS case number if the relevant service period has passed. Escalate a service delay through the complaints process, but use the formal dispute route if the real disagreement is with the assessment itself. Official sources SARS: What could delay my refund? SARS: How to check your tax refund status SARS: Being audited or selected for verification SARS: Adding or changing banking details SARS: Refund amount and payment date on eFiling SARS: Lodge a complaint Office of the Tax Ombud: Submit a complaint SARS: Scams and phishing Information checked against official SARS and Office of the Tax Ombud guidance on 21 August 2026. This guide provides general information, not personalised tax or legal advice. ADVERTISEMENT Related Articles Tax and Revenue How to Check if You Must Submit a SARS Tax Return Use the official SARS checker and 2026 rules to see if you must file an ITR12. . Tax and Revenue How to Check if SARS Owes You a Refund Use your ITA34 and Statement of Account to see if SARS owes you, or if you owe SARS. . Tax and Revenue How to Update Your Banking Details With SARS Change your SARS bank account on eFiling or the MobiApp, then confirm with an OTP. . Tax and Revenue How to Get Your SARS Tax Number Online Get a new SARS tax number or recover a forgotten one on eFiling, SOQS, USSD, WhatsApp or SMS. . Tags SARS Updates SARS Updates South Africa Gov Services South Africa Gov Services South Africa South Africa SARS eFiling SARS eFiling

TotalEnergies and QatarEnergy have recently finalized a significant deal to acquire stakes in the offshore Block 3B/4B, situated off the South African coast, from Africa Oil South Africa, Azinam, and Ricocure. Post-acquisition, TotalEnergies will become the operator, holding a 33% interest in Block 3B/4B, while QatarEnergy secures a 24% stake. The rest will be distributed among the original licensees: Africa Oil SA with 17%, Ricocure at 19.75%, and Azinam holding a 6.25% interest. This strategic move awaits the green light from the relevant regulatory bodies. Block 3B/4B, sprawling over 17,581 square kilometers, is strategically positioned in the fertile Orange Basin, about 200 kilometers from South Africa's western coastline. This area is notable for its proximity to the DWOB license, where TotalEnergies (50%) collaborates with QatarEnergy (30%) and Sezigyn (20%). Kevin McLachlan, TotalEnergies' Senior VP of Exploration, emphasized the company's commitment to expanding its exploration initiatives in the Orange Basin. This follows the notable success in Namibia's Venus project, marking TotalEnergies' continued growth in strategic exploration licenses within South Africa . Continue Reading Full Article By Author Name Author Name Home Comment Mar 7, 2024 May 15, 2026 2 min read Copy link Facebook X (Twitter) WhatsApp Published Updated: TotalEnergies and QatarEnergy Secure Key Stakes in South Africa's Orange Basin: A Bold Step Forward in Offshore Energy Exploration TotalEnergies and QatarEnergy have recently finalized a significant deal to acquire stakes in the offshore Block 3B/4B, situated off the South African coast, from Africa Oil South Africa, Azinam, and Ricocure. Post-acquisition, TotalEnergies will become the operator, holding a 33% interest in Block 3B/4B, while QatarEnergy secures a 24% stake. ADVERTISEMENT The rest will be distributed among the original licensees: Africa Oil SA with 17%, Ricocure at 19.75%, and Azinam holding a 6.25% interest. This strategic move awaits the green light from the relevant regulatory bodies. Block 3B/4B, sprawling over 17,581 square kilometers, is strategically positioned in the fertile Orange Basin, about 200 kilometers from South Africa's western coastline. ADVERTISEMENT This area is notable for its proximity to the DWOB license, where TotalEnergies (50%) collaborates with QatarEnergy (30%) and Sezigyn (20%). Kevin McLachlan, TotalEnergies' Senior VP of Exploration, emphasized the company's commitment to expanding its exploration initiatives in the Orange Basin. This follows the notable success in Namibia's Venus project, marking TotalEnergies' continued growth in strategic exploration licenses within South Africa . Trending Now Hyron Andrews Biography: His Rugby Career and Lions Tributes . Biography F1 Will Polish Kagame’s Authoritarian Image” — Kayikwamba Wagner . Justice & Crime Oluku Market Tanker Explosion: Death Toll Still Unconfirmed, 8 Injured . Accident News Fannie Masemola Reinstated as South Africa's Police Chief, Back Monday . Social Service Popular Today ADVERTISEMENT ADVERTISEMENT Related Articles Tags

Kim Kardashian is reportedly linked to Formula 1 champion Lewis Hamilton following claims of a private weekend getaway. According to the source article, Kim Kardashian is at the centre of fresh dating speculation after being linked to seven-time Formula 1 world champion Lewis Hamilton Kanye West approved Kim Kardash… . The reality television star and businesswoman has reportedly spent a private weekend with Hamilton at a country club in Witney, Oxfordshire. Sources cited in the report claim the pair shared accommodations and were seen spending time together at spa and leisure facilities during the stay. Neither Kardashian nor Hamilton has publicly commented on the reports, and no official confirmation of a relationship has been made. Kardashian’s personal life has remained a topic of public interest since her high-profile divorce from rapper Kanye West, which was finalised in 2022 after nearly seven years of marriage. The former couple share four children: North, Saint, Chicago and Psalm. The report also notes that following their separation, Kardashian agreed to a personal boundary requested by West, which involved not dating other rappers. Sources suggested she respected this request in consideration of their children. In past interviews, Kardashian has spoken openly about challenges during her marriage, including feeling emotionally and financially insecure, as well as dealing with West’s unpredictable social media behaviour. Since the divorce, Kardashian has previously been linked to comedian Pete Davidson and NFL wide receiver Odell Beckham Jr. As of now, the reported connection with Hamilton remains unconfirmed, with public interest continuing amid the lack of official statements from either party. Source : Geo News Continue Reading Full Article ENTERTAINMENT Kim Kardashian Linked to Lewis Hamilton Amid Dating Rumours By Witty Pascal Entertainment Editor Witty Pascal Home Comment Feb 2, 2026 May 15, 2026 2 min read Copy link Facebook X (Twitter) WhatsApp Published Updated: According to the source article, Kim Kardashian is at the centre of fresh dating speculation after being linked to seven-time Formula 1 world champion Lewis Hamilton Kanye West approved Kim Kardash… . The reality television star and businesswoman has reportedly spent a private weekend with Hamilton at a country club in Witney, Oxfordshire. Sources cited in the report claim the pair shared accommodations and were seen spending time together at spa and leisure facilities during the stay. Neither Kardashian nor Hamilton has publicly commented on the reports, and no official confirmation of a relationship has been made. ADVERTISEMENT Kardashian’s personal life has remained a topic of public interest since her high-profile divorce from rapper Kanye West, which was finalised in 2022 after nearly seven years of marriage. The former couple share four children: North, Saint, Chicago and Psalm. The report also notes that following their separation, Kardashian agreed to a personal boundary requested by West, which involved not dating other rappers. Sources suggested she respected this request in consideration of their children. ADVERTISEMENT In past interviews, Kardashian has spoken openly about challenges during her marriage, including feeling emotionally and financially insecure, as well as dealing with West’s unpredictable social media behaviour. Since the divorce, Kardashian has previously been linked to comedian Pete Davidson and NFL wide receiver Odell Beckham Jr. As of now, the reported connection with Hamilton remains unconfirmed, with public interest continuing amid the lack of official statements from either party. Trending Now Hyron Andrews Biography: His Rugby Career and Lions Tributes . Biography F1 Will Polish Kagame’s Authoritarian Image” — Kayikwamba Wagner . Justice & Crime Oluku Market Tanker Explosion: Death Toll Still Unconfirmed, 8 Injured . Accident News Fannie Masemola Reinstated as South Africa's Police Chief, Back Monday . Social Service Popular Today Biography Poco Lee Biography: Age, Real Name, Dance Career and Songs . Biography Eric Omondi Biography: Comedy, Activism and Public Life . Biography Who Is Snit Habteab, Eritrea’s Miss World Trailblazer? . Entertainment Poco Lee UK Case Sparks Consent Debate Among Nigerian Stars . Entertainment FOLA Leads 2026 Headies Nominations Ahead of Toronto . ADVERTISEMENT Source : Geo News ADVERTISEMENT Related Articles Biography Poco Lee Biography: Age, Real Name, Dance Career and Songs Inside the Nigerian dancer’s rise from Ojo street shows to Afrobeats stages, music and global fame. . Biography Eric Omondi Biography: Comedy, Activism and Public Life How Eric Omondi rose through Churchill Show and became a prominent Kenyan activist. . Biography Who Is Snit Habteab, Eritrea’s Miss World Trailblazer? The neuroscientist and educator became Eritrea’s first Miss World entrant and reached the Top 6 . Entertainment Poco Lee UK Case Sparks Consent Debate Among Nigerian Stars The dancer faces five sexual offence charges and returns to court on September 15. . Tags Entertainment Entertainment United States United States

Reggae artistes in Kigali will headline a Bob Marley tribute concert celebrating his music and legacy. Rwandan reggae artistes including Mighty Popo , Ras Kayaga , Lion Imanzi and Imena Band are set to headline a special concert in Kigali to honour reggae legend Bob Marley. The “Bob Marley Tribute Show” is scheduled to take place at Kigali Universe on May 9, 2026, as part of activities marking the legacy of the Jamaican musician, who died on May 11, 1981. According to organisers, the event aims to celebrate Marley’s contribution to global music, African identity and messages of unity and peace that continue to resonate decades after his death. Speaking to InyaRwanda, musician and Nyundo School of Music director Mighty Popo said Bob Marley played a major role in helping many Africans better understand their heritage and culture through music. “His songs helped shape us and taught us about Africa and our identity,” Mighty Popo said, adding that Marley’s music extended beyond entertainment to messages about unity, justice and social awareness. Songs such as No Woman No Cry , One Love , Buffalo Soldier , Redemption Song and Three Little Birds remain among Marley’s most influential works and continue to inspire audiences across generations. Organisers said the concert will also serve as a platform to unite reggae fans in Rwanda while promoting the values of peace, solidarity and cultural appreciation associated with Marley’s legacy. The show is expected to attract reggae lovers from across Kigali and celebrate the continued influence of reggae music in Rwanda’s entertainment scene. Source: InyaRwanda Continue Reading Full Article ENTERTAINMENT Kigali to Host Bob Marley Tribute Reggae Concert By Witty Pascal Entertainment Editor Witty Pascal Home Comment May 8, 2026 May 15, 2026 2 min read Copy link Facebook X (Twitter) WhatsApp Published Updated: Rwandan reggae artistes including Mighty Popo , Ras Kayaga , Lion Imanzi and Imena Band are set to headline a special concert in Kigali to honour reggae legend Bob Marley. The “Bob Marley Tribute Show” is scheduled to take place at Kigali Universe on May 9, 2026, as part of activities marking the legacy of the Jamaican musician, who died on May 11, 1981. According to organisers, the event aims to celebrate Marley’s contribution to global music, African identity and messages of unity and peace that continue to resonate decades after his death. ADVERTISEMENT Speaking to InyaRwanda, musician and Nyundo School of Music director Mighty Popo said Bob Marley played a major role in helping many Africans better understand their heritage and culture through music. “His songs helped shape us and taught us about Africa and our identity,” Mighty Popo said, adding that Marley’s music extended beyond entertainment to messages about unity, justice and social awareness. ADVERTISEMENT Songs such as No Woman No Cry , One Love , Buffalo Soldier , Redemption Song and Three Little Birds remain among Marley’s most influential works and continue to inspire audiences across generations. Organisers said the concert will also serve as a platform to unite reggae fans in Rwanda while promoting the values of peace, solidarity and cultural appreciation associated with Marley’s legacy. The show is expected to attract reggae lovers from across Kigali and celebrate the continued influence of reggae music in Rwanda’s entertainment scene. Trending Now Hyron Andrews Biography: His Rugby Career and Lions Tributes . Biography F1 Will Polish Kagame’s Authoritarian Image” — Kayikwamba Wagner . Justice & Crime Oluku Market Tanker Explosion: Death Toll Still Unconfirmed, 8 Injured . Accident News Fannie Masemola Reinstated as South Africa's Police Chief, Back Monday . Social Service Popular Today Biography Poco Lee Biography: Age, Real Name, Dance Career and Songs . Biography Eric Omondi Biography: Comedy, Activism and Public Life . Biography Who Is Snit Habteab, Eritrea’s Miss World Trailblazer? . Entertainment Poco Lee UK Case Sparks Consent Debate Among Nigerian Stars . Entertainment FOLA Leads 2026 Headies Nominations Ahead of Toronto . ADVERTISEMENT Source: InyaRwanda ADVERTISEMENT Related Articles Biography Poco Lee Biography: Age, Real Name, Dance Career and Songs Inside the Nigerian dancer’s rise from Ojo street shows to Afrobeats stages, music and global fame. . Biography Eric Omondi Biography: Comedy, Activism and Public Life How Eric Omondi rose through Churchill Show and became a prominent Kenyan activist. . Biography Who Is Snit Habteab, Eritrea’s Miss World Trailblazer? The neuroscientist and educator became Eritrea’s first Miss World entrant and reached the Top 6 . Entertainment Poco Lee UK Case Sparks Consent Debate Among Nigerian Stars The dancer faces five sexual offence charges and returns to court on September 15. . Tags Entertainment Entertainment Rwandan Entertainment Rwandan Entertainment Rwanda Rwanda

Guinea’s military junta sets 2025 election dates amid criticism over political repression and concerns about the credibility of its transition to civilian rule. Guinea’s military government, which seized power in September 2021 under Gen. Mamady Doumbouya, has unveiled key institutions and a timeline for returning to civilian rule, though rights groups remain skeptical. The regime has created a Directorate General of Elections (DGE) to oversee a constitutional referendum scheduled for September 21, 2025, followed by legislative and presidential elections in December 2025. The DGE will manage voter registration, ensure electoral fairness, and liaise with regional and international electoral bodies. However, its two leadership positions will be filled directly by presidential decree, raising concerns about independence. The junta initially pledged a civilian transition by December 31, 2024, but missed the deadline, sparking nationwide protests and prompting criticism of its credibility. Although Doumbouya later promised a referendum and election in 2025, logistics remain vague. Since taking power, the junta has dissolved more than 50 political parties, claiming to “clean up the political chessboard”, and imposed restrictive media controls. Independent outlets and social networks have repeatedly faced shutdowns, while journalists and opposition figures report harassment and arrests . The Guardian elaborates that posters of Doumbouya line Conakry's streets alongside a broader crackdown on dissent, with key activists missing or detained. A draft of the new constitution, unveiled in July 2024, could enable Doumbouya to run in the upcoming elections. Observers fear the referendum may erode existing limits or entrench military influence. Prime Minister Amadou Oury Bah emphasized the transition timeline while appealing for investor confidence, particularly citing progress on the Simandou iron-ore project and a promise of its first train before the elections. With Guinea among the West African nations that have experienced coups in recent years, regional bodies like ECOWAS and the African Union are closely watching developments. The stance of these groups regarding the election process and constitutional rewrite could significantly impact Guinea’s legitimacy and integration. By Author Name Author Name Home Comment Jun 15, 2025 May 15, 2026 2 min read Copy link Facebook X (Twitter) WhatsApp Published Updated: Guinea’s military government, which seized power in September 2021 under Gen. Mamady Doumbouya, has unveiled key institutions and a timeline for returning to civilian rule, though rights groups remain skeptical. The regime has created a Directorate General of Elections (DGE) to oversee a constitutional referendum scheduled for September 21, 2025, followed by legislative and presidential elections in December 2025. The DGE will manage voter registration, ensure electoral fairness, and liaise with regional and international electoral bodies. However, its two leadership positions will be filled directly by presidential decree, raising concerns about independence. ADVERTISEMENT The junta initially pledged a civilian transition by December 31, 2024, but missed the deadline, sparking nationwide protests and prompting criticism of its credibility. Although Doumbouya later promised a referendum and election in 2025, logistics remain vague. Since taking power, the junta has dissolved more than 50 political parties, claiming to “clean up the political chessboard”, and imposed restrictive media controls. Independent outlets and social networks have repeatedly faced shutdowns, while journalists and opposition figures report harassment and arrests . ADVERTISEMENT The Guardian elaborates that posters of Doumbouya line Conakry's streets alongside a broader crackdown on dissent, with key activists missing or detained. A draft of the new constitution, unveiled in July 2024, could enable Doumbouya to run in the upcoming elections. Observers fear the referendum may erode existing limits or entrench military influence. Trending Now Guinea Landfill Landslide Kills 30 as Search Continues . Natural Disasters What Is Noradala? Guinea’s Ancient Fishing Festival Explained . African Culture Mamady Doumbouya takes oath as Guinea’s civilian president . Politics & Diplomacy Meagan Good and Jonathan Majors Granted Guinean Citizenship . Entertainment Buzz Popular Today Natural Disasters Guinea Landfill Landslide Kills 30 as Search Continues . African Culture What Is Noradala? Guinea’s Ancient Fishing Festival Explained . Politics & Diplomacy Mamady Doumbouya takes oath as Guinea’s civilian president . Entertainment Buzz Meagan Good and Jonathan Majors Granted Guinean Citizenship . . ADVERTISEMENT Prime Minister Amadou Oury Bah emphasized the transition timeline while appealing for investor confidence, particularly citing progress on the Simandou iron-ore project and a promise of its first train before the elections. With Guinea among the West African nations that have experienced coups in recent years, regional bodies like ECOWAS and the African Union are closely watching developments. The stance of these groups regarding the election process and constitutional rewrite could significantly impact Guinea’s legitimacy and integration. ADVERTISEMENT Related Articles Natural Disasters Guinea Landfill Landslide Kills 30 as Search Continues Rescuers are searching for survivors after a massive waste collapse buried homes in Conakry. . African Culture What Is Noradala? Guinea’s Ancient Fishing Festival Explained A 700-year-old fishing festival celebrating Manding culture and community unity. . Politics & Diplomacy Mamady Doumbouya takes oath as Guinea’s civilian president Junta leader takes oath under new seven-year constitution after disputed election . Entertainment Buzz Meagan Good and Jonathan Majors Granted Guinean Citizenship Hollywood stars receive Guinean nationality after DNA tests traced their African ancestry. . Tags Guinea Guinea Elections & Democracy Elections & Democracy Military & Security Military & Security

Kogi, Nigeria - In a disturbing development, at least nine students were forcibly taken from their classrooms by armed assailants at the Confluence University of Science and Technology in Kogi, Northern Nigeria. The incident, which occurred late Thursday night, has heightened fears as the nation struggles with ongoing insecurity issues. The Kogi State Government, via Information Commissioner Kingsley Femi Fanwo, confirmed the kidnappings on Friday. He detailed that the students were in the midst of their studies when the gunmen launched their attack. A collaborative search and rescue operation involving local security forces and hunters familiar with the terrain is currently in progress. This alarming event is part of a broader pattern of kidnappings by criminal gangs in Northern Nigeria. These groups, often heavily armed and lacking any ideological motives, frequently target villagers, students, and motorists to demand ransoms. Despite efforts, security forces have struggled to curb these violent acts. The tactic of kidnapping school students was notoriously pioneered by the jihadist group Boko Haram, which famously abducted over 200 girls from a school in Chibok, Borno State, nearly a decade ago. This method has since been adopted by various criminal factions across the region, exacerbating the security crisis. The community is on high alert, and authorities are urging citizens to report any suspicious activities and cooperate with law enforcement agencies. Educational institutions across Kogi State are being advised to enhance security measures to safeguard students and staff. The recurring kidnappings have drawn international concern, calling for more effective interventions to protect vulnerable populations, especially in educational settings. The Nigerian government faces increasing pressure to address these security challenges and ensure the safety of its citizens. Continue Reading Full Article By Author Name Author Name Home Comment May 12, 2024 May 15, 2026 2 min read Copy link Facebook X (Twitter) WhatsApp Published Updated: Residents are fleeing Boko Haram attacks and seeking refuge in Bosso, Niger. Kogi, Nigeria - In a disturbing development, at least nine students were forcibly taken from their classrooms by armed assailants at the Confluence University of Science and Technology in Kogi, Northern Nigeria. The incident, which occurred late Thursday night, has heightened fears as the nation struggles with ongoing insecurity issues. The Kogi State Government, via Information Commissioner Kingsley Femi Fanwo, confirmed the kidnappings on Friday. He detailed that the students were in the midst of their studies when the gunmen launched their attack. A collaborative search and rescue operation involving local security forces and hunters familiar with the terrain is currently in progress. This alarming event is part of a broader pattern of kidnappings by criminal gangs in Northern Nigeria. These groups, often heavily armed and lacking any ideological motives, frequently target villagers, students, and motorists to demand ransoms. ADVERTISEMENT Despite efforts, security forces have struggled to curb these violent acts. The tactic of kidnapping school students was notoriously pioneered by the jihadist group Boko Haram, which famously abducted over 200 girls from a school in Chibok, Borno State, nearly a decade ago. This method has since been adopted by various criminal factions across the region, exacerbating the security crisis. ADVERTISEMENT The community is on high alert, and authorities are urging citizens to report any suspicious activities and cooperate with law enforcement agencies. Educational institutions across Kogi State are being advised to enhance security measures to safeguard students and staff. The recurring kidnappings have drawn international concern, calling for more effective interventions to protect vulnerable populations, especially in educational settings. The Nigerian government faces increasing pressure to address these security challenges and ensure the safety of its citizens. Trending Now Hyron Andrews Biography: His Rugby Career and Lions Tributes . Biography F1 Will Polish Kagame’s Authoritarian Image” — Kayikwamba Wagner . Justice & Crime Oluku Market Tanker Explosion: Death Toll Still Unconfirmed, 8 Injured . Accident News Fannie Masemola Reinstated as South Africa's Police Chief, Back Monday . Social Service Popular Today ADVERTISEMENT ADVERTISEMENT Related Articles Tags

Darest has legally married his partner Iradukunda Souvenir in Kigali, with a formal wedding set for December 7, 2025. Ishimwe Prince, popularly known as Darest and formerly a member of the music group Juda Muzik, has legally married his partner, Iradukunda A. Souvenir, who resides in the United States. The civil marriage ceremony took place at the Nyarugenge Sector offices on November 27, 2025. Following the legal union, the couple is expected to hold their traditional wedding ceremony on December 7, 2025. Darest proposed to Souvenir on January 10, 2025, formally expressing his intention to spend his life with her. Their relationship began after they met at a mutual friend's event, where they exchanged phone numbers and started communicating regularly. This connection gradually grew into a strong romantic relationship. Darest rose to prominence as part of Juda Muzik alongside Mbaraga Alex, now known as Malo Junior. The duo parted ways in 2023. In April 2025, Darest released his album titled Souvenir53 , revealing that the name was inspired by his partner and dedicated to her as they prepared for marriage. Continue Reading Full Article RWANDAN ENTERTAINMENT Former Juda Muzik member Darest weds longtime partner Souvenir By Witty Pascal Entertainment Editor Witty Pascal Home Comment Nov 28, 2025 May 15, 2026 1 min read Copy link Facebook X (Twitter) WhatsApp Published Updated: Ishimwe Prince, popularly known as Darest and formerly a member of the music group Juda Muzik, has legally married his partner, Iradukunda A. Souvenir, who resides in the United States. The civil marriage ceremony took place at the Nyarugenge Sector offices on November 27, 2025. Following the legal union, the couple is expected to hold their traditional wedding ceremony on December 7, 2025. Darest proposed to Souvenir on January 10, 2025, formally expressing his intention to spend his life with her. ADVERTISEMENT Their relationship began after they met at a mutual friend's event, where they exchanged phone numbers and started communicating regularly. This connection gradually grew into a strong romantic relationship. Darest rose to prominence as part of Juda Muzik alongside Mbaraga Alex, now known as Malo Junior. The duo parted ways in 2023. In April 2025, Darest released his album titled Souvenir53 , revealing that the name was inspired by his partner and dedicated to her as they prepared for marriage. ADVERTISEMENT Trending Now Hyron Andrews Biography: His Rugby Career and Lions Tributes . Biography F1 Will Polish Kagame’s Authoritarian Image” — Kayikwamba Wagner . Justice & Crime Oluku Market Tanker Explosion: Death Toll Still Unconfirmed, 8 Injured . Accident News Fannie Masemola Reinstated as South Africa's Police Chief, Back Monday . Social Service Popular Today Entertainment Rema Kigali Concert Moves Forward as Early-Bird Tickets Sell Out . War in DR Congo Rema Faces Calls to Cancel Rwanda Show After Tems’ Withdrawal . Entertainment Bruce Melodie Sparks Talk of Tension With Coach Gael . Entertainment Kigali to Host Bob Marley Tribute Reggae Concert . Entertainment Miss Muyango, DJ Brianne End Professional Partnership . ADVERTISEMENT ADVERTISEMENT Related Articles Entertainment Rema Kigali Concert Moves Forward as Early-Bird Tickets Sell Out Discounted tickets are gone, while regular sales continue despite calls for Rema to reconsider. . War in DR Congo Rema Faces Calls to Cancel Rwanda Show After Tems’ Withdrawal Congolese users urge Rema to reconsider his Kwita Izina concert as debate over the DRC . Entertainment Bruce Melodie Sparks Talk of Tension With Coach Gael The Rwandan star’s Summer Country Tour has fueled fresh debate around his management team. . Entertainment Kigali to Host Bob Marley Tribute Reggae Concert Mighty Popo says Bob Marley helped many Africans reconnect with their identity . Tags Rwandan Entertainment Rwandan Entertainment Musics Musics

Understand Genocost, Congo’s decades of war, its victims, armed groups, Rwanda’s documented role, conflict minerals and the long search for justice. Genocost: Understanding the Human Cost of Decades of War in the Democratic Republic of the Congo The term "Genocost" connects mass death and atrocity with the economic systems that have profited from disorder and illegal exploitation. But Congo’s wars have never been caused by minerals alone. They have also involved the aftermath of the 1994 Rwandan Genocide in Rwanda, armed groups based across borders, struggles over land and citizenship, state weakness, local political disputes, foreign military interventions, ethnic persecution, competition for power and decades of impunity. This article follows the evidence wherever it leads. It records abuses attributed to foreign armies, and foreign armed groups. It includes Rwanda’s security arguments and official responses, while setting them beside findings made by United Nations investigators, international courts and sanctions authorities. Genocost at a Glance Table of contents What is Genocost? How the Congo wars began Timeline: 1994 to July 2026 The human cost Massacres and atrocity sites Continue Reading Full Article JUSTICE & CRIME Genocost: The Human Cost of Congo’s Decades of War By Neema Asha Mwakalinga Travel & Culture Expert Neema Asha Mwakalinga Home Comment Jul 11, 2026 Jul 31, 2026 66 min read Copy link Facebook X (Twitter) WhatsApp Published Updated: Genocost: Understanding the Human Cost of Decades of War in the Democratic Republic of the Congo The term "Genocost" connects mass death and atrocity with the economic systems that have profited from disorder and illegal exploitation. But Congo’s wars have never been caused by minerals alone. They have also involved the aftermath of the 1994 Rwandan Genocide in Rwanda, armed groups based across borders, struggles over land and citizenship, state weakness, local political disputes, foreign military interventions, ethnic persecution, competition for power and decades of impunity. This article follows the evidence wherever it leads. It records abuses attributed to foreign armies, and foreign armed groups. It includes Rwanda’s security arguments and official responses, while setting them beside findings made by United Nations investigators, international courts and sanctions authorities. Genocost at a Glance Question Answer What does Genocost mean? CAYP and Congolese institutions commonly explain it as “genocide for economic gain” or “Congolese genocide for economic gain.” More broadly, it names the human, social and economic cost of mass violence and exploitation. Who developed the campaign? The London-based Congolese Action Youth Platform (CAYP) developed and popularized it in the early 2010s. CAYP pages differ on whether the initiative began in 2011 or 2013; annual August 2 commemorations are documented from 2013. What period does it cover? Activists sometimes connect it to exploitation dating to the colonial era. The national remembrance focuses especially on atrocities and conflicts from the 1990s to the present. Where has harm been concentrated? North Kivu, South Kivu, Ituri, Maniema, Tshopo and Tanganyika have suffered heavily, but serious violations have occurred in many other provinces. What forms has the harm taken? Killings, disappearance, displacement, rape and other sexual violence, forced recruitment, forced labour, pillage, destruction of homes and services, hunger, disease, lost education and livelihoods. Why August 2? It marks the beginning of the Second Congo War on 2 August 1998. Article 28 of DRC Law No. 22/065 of 26 December 2022 makes August 2 a national day honouring victims of conflict-related sexual violence and crimes against peace and the security of humanity, called “Genocost.” The law also honours those who assisted victims. Table of contents What is Genocost? How the Congo wars began Timeline: 1994 to July 2026 The human cost Massacres and atrocity sites Who has committed violence in the DRC? Rwanda’s documented role M23/AFC: rebellion, administration and territorial control Minerals, money and the war economy Sexual violence as a method of war Children and the war Occupation, displacement and daily life Justice delayed Why the world has paid too little attention Why Congolese people commemorate Genocost Why the victims must be honoured What accountability would look like Frequently asked questions Key individuals and decision-makers Evidence archive Fact-checking appendix 1. What is Genocost? The Congolese Action Youth Platform , a diaspora-led organization based in London, created the Genocost campaign to demand remembrance, truth, justice and recognition. Its own explanation defines Geno-Cost as “genocide for economical gains” and calls for August 2 to commemorate those lost in Congo’s long history of violence. The word combines genocide and cost . Its advocates argue that violence in Congo cannot be separated from the price imposed on human beings when land, minerals, trade routes and political influence are pursued through armed force. “Cost” includes deaths, but also bodies injured, children denied education, villages erased, property stolen, families dispersed and public institutions weakened. The term became part of national law in 2022. It is now used by the Presidency, the Government and FONAREV, alongside civil society and diaspora organizations. Official ceremonies have included memorial services, speeches, moments of silence and events at the Six-Day War cemetery in Kisangani. The state’s use of the term gives Genocost formal standing as a national commemorative day and public policy framework . Terminology Term Plain-language meaning Genocost A Congolese commemorative and advocacy term linking mass violence and human loss to economic exploitation; also the name of the national remembrance day on August 2. Genocide Certain acts committed with the specific intent to destroy, wholly or partly, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group. Crimes against humanity Specified acts- including murder, rape, torture, enslavement and forced transfer, committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against civilians. An armed conflict is not required. War crimes Serious violations of international humanitarian law connected to an armed conflict. Ethnic cleansing A descriptive, not standalone treaty-crime, term for making an area ethnically homogeneous through force or intimidation; the underlying acts may be crimes. Mass atrocity A policy term generally covering genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and ethnic cleansing. Conflict-related sexual violence Rape, sexual slavery, forced pregnancy, forced marriage and comparable sexual violence directly or indirectly linked to conflict. Impunity The failure to investigate, prosecute and punish those responsible, and to provide truth and remedy to victims. Congolese know very well, that their suffering has been internationally marginalized because the violence is treated as permanent, complicated and therefore almost normal. Genocost challenges that normalization. It asks the world to see a succession of identifiable decisions, perpetrators, victims and failures, not an inexplicable “tribal war.” 2. How the Congo wars began The story did not begin in 1994. Colonial rule built an economy designed to extract wealth rather than protect Congolese life. Independence in 1960 was followed by crisis, foreign intervention, the murder of Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba and, eventually, Mobutu Sese Seko’s long authoritarian rule. Under Mobutu, state institutions weakened, corruption became systemic and citizenship and land disputes in the east were repeatedly manipulated. The regional order changed violently in 1994. The genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda killed more than 800,000 people, overwhelmingly Tutsi as well as Hutu who opposed the genocide. When the Rwandan Patriotic Front took power, roughly 1.2 million Rwandan Hutu refugees crossed into eastern Zaire. Among the civilians were members of the former Rwandan army and Interahamwe militia implicated in genocide. Armed leaders controlled parts of the camps, rearmed and launched attacks into Rwanda. This created a genuine security crisis for the new Rwandan government and a humanitarian crisis for refugees and Congolese communities. It did not remove civilian protection. The presence of génocidaires in camps did not turn every Hutu refugee into a combatant, nor did it legally justify indiscriminate or ethnically targeted killings. In 1996, Rwanda and Uganda backed the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (AFDL), led publicly by Laurent-Désiré Kabila. Burundi also participated in parts of the campaign. The coalition dismantled refugee camps, pursued former Rwandan forces and overthrew Mobutu in May 1997. Zaire became the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The 2010 UN Mapping Report documented attacks both against Tutsi and Banyamulenge civilians and against Hutu refugees and Congolese Hutu. It described 617 alleged serious incidents across the country from March 1993 to June 2003, each supported by at least two independent sources. The report was a mapping exercise, not a criminal trial; it did not determine individual guilt. Relations between Kabila and his former Rwandan and Ugandan allies collapsed. On 2 August 1998, soldiers rebelled and the Second Congo War began. Rwanda and Uganda backed the Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie (RCD) and other forces. Angola, Zimbabwe and Namibia intervened for Kabila’s government. Uganda supported the Mouvement de libération du Congo (MLC) and factions in the northeast. Burundi and numerous foreign and Congolese armed groups were also involved. At one point, at least eight national armies and 21 irregular armed groups were reported in the conflict. The war formally wound down through the 1999 Lusaka ceasefire, bilateral withdrawal agreements and the 2002–2003 settlement that created a transitional government. But the settlement integrated former belligerents into institutions without resolving many command networks, local land conflicts or the culture of impunity. Foreign armed groups remained. Congolese security forces were fragmented. In Ituri and the Kivus, war continued under different names. The CNDP rebellion led by Laurent Nkunda emerged in the mid-2000s, claiming to protect Congolese Tutsi and fight the FDLR. UN investigators documented recruitment and military support linked to Rwanda. A 23 March 2009 agreement converted the CNDP into a political party and integrated fighters into the army. Some CNDP networks retained parallel command structures. In 2012, former CNDP officers mutinied and formed M23, named after that agreement. The UN Group of Experts documented recruitment, weapons, troop reinforcement and other support from Rwanda. M23 captured Goma in November 2012, withdrew, and was militarily defeated in 2013 by the FARDC with the UN Force Intervention Brigade. Fighters fled mainly to Rwanda and Uganda. M23 resumed attacks in November 2021. This phase became steadily more regionalized. Rwanda cited the continued FDLR threat, persecution of Congolese Tutsi and failures to honour earlier agreements. Kinshasa accused Rwanda of aggression and plunder. UN-mandated experts documented a large RDF presence, operational control, advanced weapons, training and logistics. 3. Timeline: 1994 to July 2026 Date Place and actors What happened and civilian impact Source Apr-Jul 1994 Rwanda; eastern Zaire Genocide against the Tutsi; about 1.2 million Hutu refugees, including armed génocidaires, entered eastern Zaire, militarizing camps and destabilizing border areas. UN Mapping Report Oct 1996-May 1997 Eastern Zaire to Kinshasa; AFDL, APR/Rwandan forces, UPDF, others First Congo War. Mobutu fell. UN investigators documented attacks on Tutsi/Banyamulenge civilians and a campaign of killings against Hutu refugees and Congolese Hutu. UN Mapping Report 1 Mar 1997 Tingi-Tingi and Lubutu, Maniema; AFDL/APR UN mapping investigators reported that remaining camp occupants, including sick people and unaccompanied minors, were killed; fleeing refugees were also shot near the Lubilinga bridge. Mapping Report, paras. 236–237 2 Aug 1998 Goma and eastern DRC; RCD/Rwandan and Ugandan forces, Congolese government and allies Second Congo War began. This date later became the Genocost commemoration day. DRC Law No. 22/065 24 Aug 1998 Kasika area, South Kivu; ANC/APR named by Mapping Report Mapping investigators reported more than 1,000 civilians killed in Kilungutwe, Kalama and Kasika after a Mai-Mai ambush. Mapping Report, para. 353 30 Dec 1998-2 Jan 1999 Makobola area, South Kivu; ANC/APR/FAB named by Mapping Report More than 800 people were reported killed in Makobola II and nearby villages; victims included women, children, Red Cross volunteers and clergy. Mapping Report, para. 354 10 Jul 1999 Lusaka Six states signed a ceasefire providing for foreign withdrawal, disarmament and an inter-Congolese dialogue. Fighting and violations continued. UN Peacemaker 5–10 Jun 2000 Kisangani; Rwandan APR and Ugandan UPDF The “Six-Day War” killed an estimated 244–760 civilians, wounded more than 1,000 and damaged more than 400 homes and public facilities. Mapping Report, para. 363 2002-2003 Pretoria and Sun City Peace agreements established a transition and integrated belligerents, but local wars and armed networks survived. Sun City Final Act 4-5 Nov 2008 Kiwanja, North Kivu; CNDP and Mai-Mai Around 150 people were killed; Human Rights Watch found most were summarily executed by CNDP forces. HRW 23 Mar 2009 Goma; DRC and CNDP CNDP agreed to transform into a political party and integrate personnel; later disputes over implementation gave M23 its name. Agreement record Apr-Nov 2012 North Kivu; M23, Rwanda accused by UN investigators M23 formed, captured territory and took Goma. UN experts reported extensive Rwandan military and political support; UN S/2012/843 Nov 2013 North Kivu FARDC and the UN Force Intervention Brigade defeated M23; fighters crossed into Rwanda and Uganda. UN sanctions history Nov 2021 onward North Kivu M23 resumed combat and expanded. New fighting displaced hundreds of thousands and revived interstate tension. HRW background 29-30 Nov 2022 Kishishe and Bambo; M23 A UN preliminary inquiry confirmed at least 131 civilian killings; a later annual UNJHRO count documented at least 171 people killed over the broader period. MONUSCO/UNJHRO 30 Apr 2024 Rubaya, North Kivu; M23/AFC M23 seized the strategic coltan-mining area and imposed control and taxation. UN S/2026/466 3 May 2024 Goma displacement sites Rockets struck civilian sites. UN agencies initially reported at least 12 killed; HRW later documented at least 17, including 15 children, and attributed the strike to Rwandan or M23 forces. Rwanda and M23 denied responsibility and blamed Congolese forces. UNHCR/UNICEF , HRW 27-28 Jan 2025 Goma; M23/RDF, and allies M23 and RDF captured Goma after heavy urban fighting. WHO recorded 939 hospital deaths by 11 February; UN experts referred to nearly 3,000 bodies and remains recovered in and around Goma. These counts overlap and should not be added. WHO , OHCHR 14 Feb 2025 Bukavu; M23/RDF The UN Security Council later condemned M23’s capture of Bukavu with RDF support. Resolution 2773 21 Feb 2025 UN Security Council Resolution 2773 unanimously demanded that M23 cease hostilities and withdraw, that Rwanda stop supporting M23 and that RDF withdraw from DRC; it also condemned support to FDLR. UN text 27 Jun 2025 Washington; DRC and Rwanda Peace agreement created security and monitoring mechanisms and linked FDLR neutralization to lifting Rwanda’s “defensive measures.” Agreement text 19 Jul & 15 Nov 2025 Doha; DRC and AFC/M23 Declaration of Principles followed by a framework agreement, ceasefire-monitoring and prisoner-release mechanisms. Required protocols and withdrawals remained incomplete. AU/Doha Framework 10 Dec 2025-18 Jan 2026 Uvira and Ruzizi Plain; AFC/M23 and RDF UN experts reported more than 8,000 RDF troops supported the offensive that captured Uvira. Forces withdrew after international pressure but redeployed nearby. Wazalendo committed looting and abuses on return. UN S/2026/466 2 Mar 2026 United States US sanctioned the RDF and four senior officials, alleging direct combat, training and support to M23. Rwanda rejected one-sided sanctions and defended its security measures. US Treasury , Rwanda response 5 Jun 2026 UN Group of Experts Latest final report estimated 14,000–18,000 RDF personnel in eastern DRC in Dec. 2025, with no significant withdrawal documented; it estimated AFC/M23 combat strength at about 30,000. S/2026/466 26 Jun 2026 International Court of Justice DRC filed a new case against Rwanda alleging treaty violations. These are claims in pending proceedings, not findings. ICJ case 202 29 Jun 2026 UN Human Rights Council mechanism The Independent Commission of Inquiry warned of an exceptionally grave human-rights situation in North and South Kivu. OHCHR DRC page 11 Jul 2026 Reporting cut-off AFC/M23 continued to control Goma, Bukavu and substantial territory, while fighting, displacement and peace negotiations continued. Any control map must carry a date. UN Group of Experts reports 4. The human cost There is no single reliable number that captures three decades of Congolese loss. Different datasets measure different things: direct violent deaths, excess mortality, verified incidents, reported sexual violence, current displacement stocks or cross-border refugees. Human-impact indicators Indicator Verified figure or range Period/reporting date Source Serious incidents mapped 617 Mar 1993–Jun 2003 OHCHR Mapping Exercise Excess deaths 5.4 million estimate Aug 1998–Apr 2007 International Rescue Committee Internally displaced people 5.7 million in an OCHA March 2026 dashboard; 7.8 million on WFP’s 2026 emergency page 2026 OCHA , WFP Congolese refugees in Africa over 1.2 million UNHCR outlook based on Sep 2025 UNHCR Global Appeal 2026 Acute food insecurity 26.5 million at crisis level or worse projected early 2026 WFP Sexual violence against children recorded administratively more than 35,000 cases Jan–Sep 2025 UNICEF Goma battle deaths 939 hospital deaths by 11 Feb; nearly 3,000 bodies/remains recovered cited by UN experts Jan–Feb 2025 WHO , OHCHR AFC/M23 force estimate about 30,000 elements UN investigation through spring 2026 S/2026/466 RDF deployment estimate 8,000-10,000 South Kivu plus 6,000-8,000 North Kivu Dec 2025, with no significant withdrawal documented by report cut-off S/2026/466 Why the death toll is disputed The most repeated figure, 5.4 million, comes from five household mortality surveys conducted by the International Rescue Committee. The surveys compared observed mortality with an assumed “normal” baseline and extrapolated the difference to a large population. Most estimated excess deaths were from malaria, diarrhoea, pneumonia, malnutrition and other preventable conditions made deadlier by displacement, insecurity and collapsed services. Fewer than 10 percent were attributed directly to violence. The estimate powerfully demonstrated that war kills far beyond the battlefield. It should not be rewritten as “5.4 million people were massacred,” and it should not automatically be extended from 2007 to the present. Demographers have challenged the baseline and extrapolation. Alternative studies have produced much lower excess-mortality estimates because pre-war mortality in Congo was already very high and census data were weak. That disagreement does not mean the crisis was small. It means no nationwide civil-registration system or complete victim list exists, and statistical conclusions depend on counterfactual assumptions about how many people would otherwise have died. Responsible remembrance should therefore use several layers of evidence: named victims where ethically possible; incident-level investigations; hospital and burial records; missing-person files; direct-death datasets; and clearly labelled excess-mortality estimates. 5. Massacres and atrocity sites Atrocity sites matter because they return the history to a place, a date and a community. The examples below represent different periods and perpetrators. They are not a complete list. Incident Evidence and attributed actor Victims and uncertainty Accountability and significance Tingi-Tingi/Lubutu, 1–2 Mar 1997 UN Mapping Report attributed reported killings to AFDL/APR units after the camp’s armed elements had dispersed. Several hundred remaining occupants and fleeing refugees were reported killed; exact total unknown. No comprehensive prosecution. Central to debate over whether attacks on Hutu refugees should be judicially investigated as possible genocide. Kasika area, 24 Aug 1998 Mapping Report named ANC/APR soldiers and described retaliation after a Mai-Mai ambush. More than 1,000 civilians reported killed; figure is an investigative estimate, not a judicial count. No adequate accountability. Memorialized as an emblem of civilian punishment and sexual violence. Makobola and nearby villages, 30 Dec 1998-2 Jan 1999 Mapping Report named ANC/APR/FAB elements. More than 800 reported killed, including women, children, aid volunteers and clergy. Limited domestic proceedings did not establish full responsibility. The site shows how “reprisal” became collective punishment. Kisangani Six-Day War, 5-10 Jun 2000 APR and UPDF fought each other with heavy weapons in a populated city. Sources estimated 244–760 civilians killed; more than 1,000 wounded. The ICJ later held Uganda internationally responsible for unlawful intervention and abuses and awarded DRC reparations; no equivalent merits judgment against Rwanda. Kiwanja, 4-5 Nov 2008 HRW found CNDP forces summarily executed most victims; Mai-Mai also killed civilians. About 150 killed, including children. Ten years later HRW reported no meaningful justice. Demonstrates both rebel abuses and peacekeeping failure. Kishishe/Bambo, Nov 2022 UNJHRO/MONUSCO attributed reprisal killings to M23. Initial verified minimum 131; later UN annual reporting gave at least 171 over a broader date/location frame. M23 rejected government accounts and disputed figures. No completed independent trial. Goma displacement sites, 3 May 2024 UN agencies confirmed civilian sites were hit. HRW’s weapons and trajectory analysis attributed at least three rockets to Rwandan or M23 forces; Rwanda and M23 denied responsibility. UN first reported 12 dead; HRW later at least 17, 15 of them children; DRC later buried 35 people linked to the wider attack. A case study in why preliminary and later totals must remain separately attributed. Goma, Jan-Feb 2025 UN fact-finding found all parties failed to protect civilians. M23/RDF used heavy weapons; WHO documented 939 hospital deaths; UN experts referred to nearly 3,000 bodies/remains. Evidence collection was disrupted and bodies risked burial without identification. The ICC’s renewed North Kivu investigation is relevant. 6. Who has committed violence in the DRC? The record does not support a story with one perpetrator. It supports a story of recurring foreign intervention, proxy warfare, abusive state forces and armed groups that prey on civilians. Actor Origin, aims and area Abuses or support documented by credible investigators Status/response APR/RDF (Rwanda) Rwanda’s army; intervened in both Congo wars and the current conflict, citing FDLR threats. Mapping Report attributed incidents to APR with allies. Later UN reports document support to CNDP and M23 and, in 2026, RDF troops, command and advanced weapons. Rwanda now acknowledges defensive “security coordination” with AFC/M23 but disputes unlawful-intervention claims. UPDF (Uganda) Intervened in the Second Congo War; now fights ADF with FARDC. ICJ found unlawful intervention, occupation in Ituri, abuses and illegal exploitation. Uganda owes ICJ-ordered reparations; present operations are partly invited, though their scope is disputed. AFDL Rwanda/Uganda-backed coalition that overthrew Mobutu. Mapping Report records AFDL/APR/FAB attacks on Hutu refugees and other civilians, amid attacks on Tutsi/Banyamulenge civilians by opponents. Dissolved into the new state; little senior accountability. RCD factions Rwanda- and Uganda-backed rebellions in the Second Congo War. Mapping Report attributes killing, sexual violence, detention, pillage and recruitment to factions and allies. Entered the transition; networks survived. CNDP Laurent Nkunda’s North Kivu rebellion, later linked to Bosco Ntaganda. UN documented Rwandan-linked support; HRW attributed most Kiwanja executions to CNDP. Integrated in 2009; breakaway officers formed M23. M23/AFC M23 formed in 2012; Nangaa created AFC in 2023. UN, OHCHR and HRW document killing, rape, torture, disappearance, forced recruitment/labour, parallel rule and mineral taxation with RDF support. Controls major areas; asserts minority protection and reform, and rejects many findings. ADF/ISCAP Ugandan-origin Islamist group active in Beni, Ituri and Lubero. UN reported more than 1,000 documented civilian deaths in 2025, plus abduction and sexual violence. Targeted by UPDF operations but remains lethal. CODECO/CRP/FRPI Ituri coalitions tied to land, power and communal conflicts. UN reports massacres, camp attacks, recruitment, extortion and gold interference. Fragmented; never equate factions with whole communities. 7. Rwanda’s documented role in the Congolese conflicts Rwanda’s role must be divided by period. It is both historically connected to a real security threat and extensively documented as a source of unauthorized military intervention and support to Congolese rebellions. The First and Second Congo Wars Rwanda’s post-genocide government faced armed ex-FAR and Interahamwe networks in eastern Zaire. Its forces helped plan and execute the 1996 AFDL campaign, dismantled camps, pursued armed networks and helped overthrow Mobutu. The Mapping Report also documents attacks on civilians, including Hutu refugees. In 1998, Rwanda supported the RCD rebellion after relations with Laurent Kabila collapsed. Rwandan troops operated across Congo and fought Uganda’s army in Kisangani. Rwanda justified intervention through self-defence and threats based in Congo. The DRC described it as aggression. The war’s formal settlements required foreign withdrawal and action against ex-FAR/Interahamwe forces. The ICJ reached the merits against Uganda, but its 2006 DRC v. Rwanda judgment ended for lack of jurisdiction and made no factual exoneration or merits finding. CNDP and the first M23 rebellion UN experts reported Rwandan-linked CNDP recruitment and support in 2008. In 2012, the Group described recruitment networks and direct M23 assistance, saying the de facto chain reached then defence minister James Kabarebe. Rwanda denied the findings and challenged the methodology. The M23 resurgence From 2022 onward, UN reports documented RDF troops, training and recruitment, weapons, intelligence, logistics, artillery, air defence, GPS jamming and drones. Resolution 2773 expressly condemned M23’s offensive with RDF support and demanded withdrawal. ADVERTISEMENT The June 2026 report estimated 8,000–10,000 RDF personnel in South Kivu and 6,000–8,000 in North Kivu in December 2025, with no significant withdrawal documented. It reported forward positions, mixed RDF-M23 battalions, supervision of M23 units and a structured chain from Kigali. The report said Army Chief of Staff Vincent Nyakarundi oversaw operations and James Kabarebe served as principal liaison and helped coordinate the Uvira offensive. These are investigator findings, not convictions. For Uvira, the Group reported more than 8,000 RDF troops with rocket launchers, guided mortars, jamming systems and drones, including operations where it identified no direct FDLR threat. Rwanda’s position Kigali long denied supporting M23 as alleged. In 2026, Ambassador Mathilde Mukantabana stated that Rwanda “does engage in security coordination with AFC/M23,” describing it as defensive, conditional and due to end with verified FDLR neutralization. Disputes remain over scale, command, territorial rule and minerals. UN experts said Kigali dictated which territories AFC/M23 should seize, hold or leave; Rwanda rejects this portrayal. International measures The United States sanctioned James Kabarebe in February 2025. In March 2026, it sanctioned the RDF as an entity and four senior officers, Vincent Nyakarundi, Ruki Karusisi, Mubarakh Muganga and Stanislas Gashugi, alleging direct support, training and combat alongside M23. The EU sanctioned M23 figures, RDF officers and Gasabo Gold Refinery in March 2025. The UK restricted high-level engagement, trade promotion, defence cooperation and certain aid to Rwanda. Canada publicly condemned the RDF presence and support to M23. Sanctions are administrative measures, not criminal convictions. Their evidentiary standards and consequences differ from a court judgment. 8. M23/AFC: rebellion, administration and territorial control M23’s core came from former CNDP fighters integrated into FARDC after the March 23, 2009 agreement. In 2012 they mutinied, saying Kinshasa had failed to implement commitments on status, security, refugees and political integration. Sultani Makenga became the central military commander; Bertrand Bisimwa became a political leader. After its 2013 defeat, the organization survived in exile and networks inside the region. When it returned in 2021, it again presented itself as a defender of Congolese Tutsi and as an answer to the FDLR and discriminatory governance. Those grievances cannot justify crimes against civilians or foreign intervention. Corneille Nangaa, a former chair of DRC’s electoral commission, announced the Alliance Fleuve Congo in 2023. AFC broadened M23’s agenda from a Kivu insurgency into a national movement openly seeking political transformation and, according to the UN and US sanctions authorities, regime change. M23 became its dominant military arm. The 2026 Group of Experts placed overall military command with Makenga and political leadership with Bisimwa and Nangaa. It described three defence zones covering the occupied areas and estimated about 30,000 AFC/M23 elements , a figure including core cadres, diaspora and refugee-camp recruits, new local units, captured or defecting FARDC and police, and Wazalendo elements. Territorial capture became governance. AFC/M23 appointed administrators and customary authorities, absorbed provincial tax services, introduced personal and corporate taxes, controlled water and electricity utilities, facilitated a private insurance monopoly and enabled unlicensed financial providers. In Goma and Bukavu, this meant that residents faced a new fiscal and security authority without constitutional legitimacy or meaningful accountability. UN and rights investigators have documented summary execution, arbitrary detention, torture, sexual violence, disappearance, intimidation of journalists and human-rights defenders, forced recruitment and forced labour. A 2025 UN fact-finding mission found reasonable grounds to believe M23 members may have committed crimes against humanity including murder, rape, sexual slavery, severe deprivation of liberty, torture, enslavement, disappearance and forcible transfer. Human Rights Watch’s June 2026 report, based on 102 former detainees and other sources, documented thousands of captured combatants and civilians held at Rumangabo and Tshanzu. Interviewees described starvation, beatings, executions, forced labour and coerced recruitment, including children. HRW said the conduct amounted to war crimes and should be investigated as possible crimes against humanity. It asked M23 and Rwanda for responses; HRW reported that they did not reply before publication. M23 rejects many accusations, describes detainees as surrendered combatants or volunteers, and says it restores order in areas abandoned by the state. Its spokespeople invoke minority protection, corruption and unimplemented agreements. Those positions belong in the record, but they do not erase independently documented abuses or the prohibition on forced recruitment. 9. Minerals, money and the war economy Minerals are an accelerant and source of finance, not a complete explanation for war. Eastern Congo produces gold and the “3Ts”: tin ore (cassiterite), tantalum ore (coltan) and tungsten ore (wolframite). Cobalt and copper dominate the economy farther south, especially in Lualaba and Haut-Katanga; they should not be casually described as the principal minerals of every Kivu battlefield. Armed profit occurs through several mechanisms: taking a mine; taxing miners; forcing labour; charging at roadblocks; controlling transport; requiring traders to use approved routes; selling protection; manipulating traceability tags; smuggling across borders; and mixing illicit production into legal exports. Rubaya: a documented chain M23/AFC took Rubaya on 30 April 2024. UN experts estimated production around 120 tonnes per month in 2024 and assessed from 2026 satellite imagery that activity had increased. The movement charged a commercialization tax of $4 per kilogram of coltan and $2 per kilogram of cassiterite . The 2026 Group of Experts documented approved transporters, inspections at Mubambiro, per-kilogram invoices and payments after delivery in Rwanda. It named Kigali-based exporters and traders based on customs records, invoices, audio and testimony. It reported more than 84 tonnes exported by Rani Mining and at least 70 tonnes of coltan exported by Kanzamin in 2025; these figures describe company records reviewed by investigators, not all Rubaya output. The Group found that Rwanda’s cassiterite exports rose 58 percent , from 4,859 tonnes in 2024 to 7,700 tonnes in 2025, without a documented domestic production change sufficient to explain the increase. It said the timing and volume were consistent with smuggling from AFC/M23-controlled areas. Rwanda had not replied to the Group’s April 2026 request for clarification by the report’s drafting cut-off. The United States sanctioned a smuggling network and Gasabo Gold Refinery in June 2026. Treasury alleged that at least 60 kilograms of gold moved from occupied South Kivu to the refinery in early 2026. The EU had previously sanctioned the refinery. These are sanctions findings and should be described as such. The supply chain Mine → armed control or taxation → local trader/approved transporter → roadblock or border route → exporter/refinery → international smelter and manufacturer At each stage, legal and illegal material can be mixed. Traceability programmes such as the International Tin Supply Chain Initiative and OECD due-diligence guidance can reduce risk, but only if mines are honestly validated, tags are secure, exporters disclose beneficial ownership and buyers investigate anomalies rather than treating paperwork as proof. Not all Rwandan mineral exports are Congolese or illicit. Rwanda has domestic production and a legal trading sector. The evidence-led claim is narrower: UN investigators documented significant smuggling routes, specific transactions and export anomalies consistent with minerals leaving M23-controlled Congo and entering Rwandan supply chains. Gold also moves through Uganda and other neighbours. The 2026 Group reported Uganda exported roughly 62 tonnes of gold worth $6.4 billion in 2025 and assessed that much of the surge was attributable to Congolese-origin gold, citing trade inconsistencies and longstanding smuggling patterns. This shows why the war economy is regional rather than reducible to a single border. 10. Sexual violence as a method of war Sexual violence in Congo is not an inevitable expression of culture. It is a crime enabled by weapons, command failure, displacement, inequality and impunity. Armed actors have used rape, gang rape, sexual slavery and other forms of violence to terrorize communities, punish suspected support for an opponent, force people from land, assert control and destroy social bonds. Women and girls are disproportionately affected, but men, boys and LGBTQ people have also been victimized. Survivors may face injury, HIV and other infections, unwanted pregnancy, rejection, poverty and loss of education. Children born of rape can be denied identity, inheritance and family acceptance. ADVERTISEMENT The 2010 Mapping Report documented sexual violence by state and non-state actors across the 1993–2003 period. Recent UN findings show continuity. The 2025 fact-finding mission identified widespread sexual violence by M23 during searches and detention. The 2026 Group of Experts said AFC/M23 was the leading perpetrator among cases documented and verified by the UN in the period it referenced, while also reporting sexual violence by other groups. Administrative service data and UN-verified conflict-related data must not be mixed. UNICEF reported more than 35,000 recorded cases of sexual violence against children from January to September 2025 , a national service-based figure covering more than conflict cases. Separately, the UN Secretary-General’s 2026 global conflict-related sexual-violence report verified 9,788 cases across 21 situations worldwide in 2025; verified counts are a small subset of real prevalence. The needs are medical, psychosocial, legal and economic. Care should include emergency treatment, reproductive health, trauma support, safe shelter, legal assistance, schooling and livelihoods, without forcing survivors to repeat testimony. Evidence must be preserved with informed consent. At the UN Security Council on 8 July 2026, Prime Minister Judith Suminwa described conflict-related sexual violence as both individual tragedy and a language of war. She highlighted FONAREV and service centres, and called for legal identity, education, reparations and protection from stigma for children born of wartime rape. Her speech was an official national position, not a substitute for independent investigation. 11. Children and the war Children have been recruited as fighters, guards, porters, spies, cooks and domestic labour. Some are abducted; others join because families are hungry, schools are closed or armed control makes refusal dangerous. The Mapping Report documented child recruitment by AFDL, RCD factions, MLC, Mai-Mai, Ituri groups and others. Thomas Lubanga’s ICC conviction concerned the conscription and enlistment of children under 15 and their use in hostilities. Bosco Ntaganda was later convicted of 18 counts of war crimes and crimes against humanity, including crimes against child soldiers and civilians. The current pattern is severe. UNICEF reported that grave violations in eastern DRC tripled during the January 2025 escalation. The 2026 UN Group described child recruitment and conflict-related sexual violence at unprecedented levels. HRW interviewed former M23 detainees as young as 12. In Minembwe, the Group reported that Twirwaneho compelled boys aged 10–12 and able-bodied men to join, while civilians were trapped by siege conditions and restrictions imposed by armed actors. Schools are attacked, occupied, damaged or turned into recruitment sites. Displaced children lose records and exam access. Separated children face trafficking and exploitation. Reintegration therefore requires more than taking away a weapon: family tracing, education, psychosocial care, documentation, disability support and protection from re-recruitment are essential. 12. Occupation, displacement and daily life Territorial capture changes the authority governing ordinary life. A resident may need permission to travel, pay a new tax, accept a new customary chief or hide previous work for the state. A journalist must decide whether reporting is safe. A former soldier, police officer or civil servant may be detained on suspicion. Young men may avoid public places for fear of recruitment. After taking Goma and Bukavu, AFC/M23 absorbed revenue agencies, utilities and policing functions. HRW documented roundups at homes, streets, schools, churches and meetings. Tens of thousands of people were ordered out of displacement sites around Goma and told to return to areas that were not necessarily safe. Documents, shelters and community networks were lost again. Markets suffer when roads close, armed groups tax food and farmers cannot reach fields. Hospitals lose staff, electricity and supplies. Goma’s water interruption in early 2025 pushed people toward unsafe lake water and increased cholera danger. The airport’s closure disrupted humanitarian logistics. 13. Justice delayed The Mapping Report recommended a broad transitional-justice strategy: criminal accountability, truth-seeking, reparations, institutional reform and mechanisms combining Congolese and international capacity. Sixteen years after publication, most recommendations remain unimplemented. Congolese military courts have tried some atrocity cases, including sexual-violence prosecutions. Their work matters, but courts face insecurity, poor funding, political interference, witness risk and limited reach over senior suspects. Military jurisdiction over civilians raises fair-trial concerns. The ICC opened its first investigation in DRC. It secured convictions of Thomas Lubanga, Germain Katanga and Bosco Ntaganda; Mathieu Ngudjolo was acquitted; charges against Callixte Mbarushimana were not confirmed; Sylvestre Mudacumura remained at large and was later reported killed. These cases addressed important crimes, mainly in Ituri, but only a small fraction of national atrocities. In October 2024, the ICC Prosecutor renewed investigative focus on crimes allegedly committed in North Kivu since January 2022. The Court investigates individuals, not states, and its jurisdiction does not replace Congolese courts. The ICJ deals with state responsibility. In 2005 it held Uganda responsible for unlawful force, occupation and violations in Congo. In 2022 it ordered $325 million in compensation: $225 million for damage to persons, $40 million for property and $60 million for natural resources. The award was far below the DRC’s claim and illustrates the evidentiary difficulty of valuing mass harm decades later. The 2006 case against Rwanda ended for lack of jurisdiction, not because the alleged conduct was found lawful. On 26 June 2026, DRC filed a new ICJ application invoking the Genocide Convention and other treaties. The application contains allegations that Rwanda will contest. Until the Court rules on jurisdiction and merits, it must be described as pending litigation. Sanctions can freeze assets and restrict travel, but they do not prove criminal guilt. Political responsibility concerns decisions and policies. Criminal responsibility concerns an individual’s conduct and intent, proved to the applicable standard. State responsibility concerns breaches attributable to a state. Keeping these categories separate prevents both impunity and overclaiming. 14. Peace processes and repeated ceasefire failures Agreement/process Date and participants Main commitments Implementation and failure Lusaka Ceasefire 10 Jul 1999; DRC, Angola, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda, Zimbabwe; armed groups later joined Ceasefire, foreign withdrawal, disarmament, joint commission, dialogue Created a framework and UN role, but fighting and foreign deployments continued. Pretoria DRC–Rwanda 30 Jul 2002 Rwandan withdrawal; dismantling/repatriation of ex-FAR and Interahamwe Helped formal withdrawal; FDLR survived and proxy networks endured. Global and Inclusive Agreement / Sun City Dec 2002–Apr 2003; Congolese belligerents and parties Power-sharing transition, integrated army, elections Ended formal interstate war but rewarded armed elites, left parallel commands and produced weak security integration. 23 March Agreement 23 Mar 2009; DRC and CNDP CNDP political transformation, army/police integration, refugee and displacement issues, reconciliation Partial integration; disputes and retained chains of command contributed to M23 mutiny. Nairobi Declarations 12 Dec 2013; DRC and M23 M23 ended rebellion; demobilization, amnesty within limits, return and reintegration Slow repatriation, disagreement over amnesty and security; M23 cited failures when it returned. Nairobi Process From Apr 2022; EAC, DRC, Congolese armed groups Dialogue, disarmament and regional force M23’s inclusion/exclusion was contested; EAC force withdrew in 2023 after Kinshasa said it failed to confront M23. Luanda Process 2022–2024; Angola mediating DRC–Rwanda Ceasefires, M23 disengagement, FDLR plan, RDF withdrawal discussions Multiple ceasefires broke down; sequencing of FDLR neutralization and Rwanda’s measures remained disputed. UN Resolution 2773 21 Feb 2025; Security Council M23 withdrawal, end RDF support and presence, end support to FDLR, protect civilians Unanimous political/legal demand; not implemented in controlled cities by July 2026. Washington Peace Agreement/Accords 27 Jun and 4 Dec 2025; DRC and Rwanda, US mediation Territorial integrity, end support to armed groups, FDLR neutralization, lifting Rwandan defensive measures, joint security and economic framework Monitoring created, but UN experts found incomplete RDF/AFC-M23 withdrawal. Doha Declaration and Framework 19 Jul and 15 Nov 2025; DRC and AFC/M23, Qatar mediation Ceasefire, prisoner release, monitoring, negotiations and six follow-on protocols Direct dialogue began, but Uvira was captured after the framework; final political and security arrangements remained incomplete. Agreements repeatedly fail for familiar reasons: ambiguous sequencing; denial of facts on the ground; armed actors benefiting from territory; exclusion of communities; weak verification; no enforcement; fragmented command; impunity; and disagreement over whether armed-group integration is reconciliation or a reward for rebellion. 15. Why the world has paid too little attention Congo is difficult to summarize, and complexity becomes an excuse for neglect. More than a hundred armed groups do not produce one clean front line. Casualty estimates are fragmented. Places change hands while access is restricted. Foreign governments have security, aid, peacekeeping, investment and mineral interests that do not always align. International reporting often spikes when Goma falls and fades when violence returns to rural areas. Editors may see recurring Congo stories as old news. Global crises compete for attention. Victims without names or images become abstract numbers. The critical-mineral transition adds another tension. Governments and companies want stable access to tantalum, tin, cobalt and copper. That demand can encourage supply-chain reform, but it can also reward willful blindness when exporters present clean paperwork despite obvious production anomalies. There is no evidence of one coordinated global conspiracy to ignore Congo. There is evidence of inconsistent diplomacy, limited reporting, selective accountability and a habit of describing Congolese death as chronic instability rather than preventable human loss. 16. Why Congolese people commemorate Genocost August 2 transforms a date associated with renewed war into a national day of memory. Law No. 22/065 specifies that it honours victims of conflict-related sexual violence and crimes against peace and the security of humanity, as well as people who helped them. Civil society observances preceded the law. CAYP and diaspora communities organized memorial events, advocacy and education. The state held its first official national commemoration in 2023. In 2024, ceremonies in Kisangani centred the Six-Day War cemetery. FONAREV describes remembrance through truth, dignity, reparation and non-repetition. Candles, memorial clothing, names, testimony and silence all serve the same purpose: to restore individuality to people whom war reduced to totals. Survivor testimony must be used with consent, protection and control over how it is edited. Memorialization should never demand that survivors perform pain for an audience. Genocost is also a demand: investigate graves, preserve archives, identify missing people, teach the history, compensate victims and prevent repetition. Its strongest form is not hostility toward another nationality. It is disciplined memory grounded in evidence and equal protection. Trending Now Hyron Andrews Biography: His Rugby Career and Lions Tributes . Biography F1 Will Polish Kagame’s Authoritarian Image” — Kayikwamba Wagner . Justice & Crime Oluku Market Tanker Explosion: Death Toll Still Unconfirmed, 8 Injured . Accident News Fannie Masemola Reinstated as South Africa's Police Chief, Back Monday . Social Service Popular Today Genocost Denise Nyakeru Urges Congolese to Sign GENOCOST Recognition Petition . Genocost Tshisekedi Funds GENOCOST Strategy, Advances Museum . Justice & Crime Genocost: The Human Cost of Congo’s Decades of War . Diplomacy Tshisekedi in New York: Engages U.S. Media on Congo, Rwanda & GENOCOST . Genocost Tshisekedi at the UN: Congo Demands Recognition of GENOCOST . ADVERTISEMENT 17. Why the victims must be honoured The dead were not born as evidence. They were children with nicknames, traders who knew the road to market, farmers who understood the seasons, teachers, nurses, musicians, mechanics, parents and grandparents. They belonged to communities with disagreements, humour, ceremonies and ordinary plans. Some were killed by foreign soldiers. Some by Congolese soldiers. Some by rebels claiming protection, liberation, patriotism, revolution or faith. Some died because a clinic had no medicine, a road was blocked or a family was driven from its fields. Some survived an attack but lost health, home, income or the ability to feel safe. Recognition should not depend on turning every victim into proof of one political narrative. Congolese Tutsi and Banyamulenge civilians threatened by hate are part of the memory. Congolese Hutu civilians associated without evidence with the FDLR are part of it. Nande, Hunde, Nyanga, Hema, Lendu, Bembe, Shi, Fuliru, Nyindu, Lega and many other communities are part of it. Rwandan Hutu refugees who were civilians were protected persons. So were families attacked by the FDLR and other genocidal or ethnically motivated groups. Honouring Congolese victims requires no hatred of ordinary Rwandans. It requires precision about governments, armies, commanders, armed organizations and business networks. Collective blame repeats the logic that has endangered civilians for decades. Remembrance resists denial. Justice tells a survivor that what happened was not normal. Reparation says the loss created an obligation. Reform says institutions must change. Prevention says future Congolese children should not inherit a war presented as inevitable. Congolese victims deserve the same dignity the world promises to victims of every mass atrocity: the dignity of names, evidence, graves, truth, lawful judgment and public memory. 18. What accountability would look like Accountability is not one tribunal or one sanction list. It is a system. Preserve evidence: secure archives, satellite imagery, command records, hospital files and mass graves; create protected missing-person and victim registries. Investigate independently: resource the UN Commission of Inquiry, ICC and credible Congolese investigations; guarantee access to controlled areas. Prosecute individuals: follow evidence through direct perpetrators, commanders, financiers and those who knowingly provide essential support. No prosecution should be based on ethnicity or association. Determine state responsibility: use competent courts and agreed claims mechanisms where attribution and jurisdiction are established. Provide reparations: combine compensation, rehabilitation, restitution, satisfaction and guarantees of non-repetition. Prioritize survivor-designed processes and transparent FONAREV administration. Support survivors now: fund medical, psychosocial, legal and livelihood services, including for male survivors and children born of rape. Make return safe: restore documents and property, clear explosive hazards, resolve land claims and ensure returns are voluntary and sustainable. Reform security forces: vet commanders, end proxy support, improve military justice and civilian oversight, and make child screening routine. End external support to armed groups: verify RDF withdrawal and the end of support to M23. Clean mineral supply chains: publish mine ownership, taxes, transport permits, exporter ownership and trade statistics; investigate anomalies; sanction proven trafficking networks while protecting lawful miners. Teach and memorialize: create a national archive, curriculum and locally governed memorials that include the diversity of victims. Prevent ethnic hatred: prosecute direct incitement consistent with human-rights law while protecting journalism, research and peaceful political speech. 19. Frequently asked questions 1. What does Genocost mean? It is commonly explained as “genocide for economic gain.” Congolese activists and institutions use it to remember the human and economic cost of mass violence, foreign intervention, armed groups, impunity and exploitation. 2. Is Genocost legally recognized as genocide? Congolese law recognizes August 2 as the national day called Genocost. 3. Why is August 2 commemorated? The Second Congo War began on 2 August 1998. Article 28 of Law No. 22/065 establishes the annual national day for victims and those who assisted them. 4. How many people have died in the Congo wars? No definitive total exists. The famous 5.4 million figure is an IRC estimate of excess deaths from August 1998 to April 2007, 5. Why did Rwanda enter Congo? Rwanda says it acted against ex-FAR and Interahamwe forces that fled after the 1994 genocide and continued to threaten Rwanda. The UN Investigators documented attacks on civilians, political intervention, proxy support, territorial objectives and economic interests that went beyond narrowly targeted self-defence. 6. Is Rwanda still involved in eastern DRC? Yes, according to the UN Security Council, Group of Experts, United States and EU. The June 2026 UN report estimated 14,000–18,000 RDF personnel in eastern DRC in December 2025, with no significant withdrawal documented by its cut-off. 7. What is M23? An armed group formed in 2012 by former CNDP fighters who had been integrated into FARDC. It takes its name from the March 23, 2009 agreement and now controls extensive territory with documented RDF support. 8. What is AFC? Alliance Fleuve Congo is a political-military coalition announced by Corneille Nangaa in 2023. M23 is its main armed component. 9. What is the FDLR? An armed group formed in 2000 from Rwandan Refugees 10. What does the UN say about Rwanda’s support for M23? Successive expert reports document troops, command and control, training, recruitment, weapons, intelligence, drones, artillery, logistics and political direction. Resolution 2773 demanded that Rwanda stop supporting M23 and withdraw RDF forces. 11. Has anyone been prosecuted? Yes. Congolese courts have tried some cases, and the ICC convicted Lubanga, Katanga and Ntaganda. But these cases cover only a small part of the crimes. Many senior Rwandan suspects have never faced trial. 12. How many Congolese people are displaced? Current estimates vary. OCHA reported more than 5.7 million internally displaced in its March 2026 dashboard; WFP’s 2026 emergency page gives 7.8 million. Differences reflect dates and methods. UNHCR projected more than 1.2 million Congolese refugees across Africa. 13. What can the international community do? Enforce withdrawal and ceasefire commitments, stop support to armed groups, fund humanitarian and survivor services, protect investigations, prosecute crimes, enforce mineral due diligence and support reparations and security reform. 14. How can people Honor Congolese victims? Learn and share verified history, observe August 2, support Congolese survivor-led services, reject ethnic hatred, preserve names and testimony with consent, and press governments and companies for lawful accountability. 20. Key individuals and decision-makers These profiles distinguish office, allegation, sanction and conviction. Inclusion is not guilt by association. Person Role and connection Findings, response and status as of 11 Jul 2026 Paul Kagame President of Rwanda and commander-in-chief. Central decision-maker during Rwanda’s interventions since the 1990s. Rwanda says its measures defend against FDLR and protect threatened communities. UN experts attribute centralized control of RDF deployments and AFC/M23 operations to the Rwandan state. Kagame has not been convicted by an international court for Congo crimes. James Kabarebe Senior Rwandan defence and security adviser; former defence minister and senior commander. Named in UN reporting on the First Congo War, 2012 M23 chain of command and 2025–26 liaison/coordination. US sanctioned him in Feb 2025. He and Rwanda reject the underlying characterization. No criminal conviction for these allegations. Sultani Makenga Overall AFC/M23 military commander. UN-sanctioned since 2012; UN listing attributes grave violations involving women and children. 2026 experts identify him in current command and Uvira operations. Not convicted by an international court. Bertrand Bisimwa Political president of M23. Identified by the 2026 Group as a political leader receiving Rwandan instructions and support. Sanctioned by several jurisdictions. M23 denies being a Rwandan proxy and rejects many abuse findings. Corneille Nangaa Former DRC electoral commission chair; leader of AFC. US sanctioned AFC and Nangaa in 2024; Treasury describes the coalition as seeking to overthrow the government. UN experts identify him as a political leader. Bernard Maheshe Byamungu Senior M23 commander; led AFC/M23’s South Kivu defence zone in the 2026 UN report. UN listed him in 2023 for undermining peace as a leader of an externally supported militia. Experts named him in command of the Uvira offensive. No relevant international criminal conviction. Vincent Nyakarundi RDF Army Chief of Staff. 2026 UN report said he oversaw operations in eastern DRC. US sanctioned him in Mar 2026. Rwanda rejects the sanctions framing and calls its measures defensive. Mubarakh Muganga RDF Chief of Defence Staff. US sanctioned him and the RDF in Mar 2026 for alleged leadership of an entity supporting M23. Administrative designation, not criminal conviction. Gustave Kubwayo FDLR intelligence/special-operations commander. US sanctioned him in Jun 2026, citing leadership in an already designated group and a history of abuse. 21. Evidence archive Foundational UN material Report of the Mapping Exercise, DRC 1993–2003 — OHCHR, August 2010. Maps 617 alleged serious incidents, legal classifications and transitional-justice options; it is not a criminal judgment. DRC Mapping Report portal — OHCHR. Includes methodology, state comments and thematic notes. Final report S/2026/466 — UN Group of Experts, 5 June 2026. Current findings on AFC/M23, RDF, FDLR,, ADF, Ituri, weapons and minerals. UN Group of Experts report index — Security Council. Direct archive from 2004 to 2026. S/2012/348/Add.1 — UN Group of Experts, June 2012. Evidence on Rwandan support and recruitment for M23. S/2012/843 — UN Group of Experts, November 2012. M23 command, external support and war economy. Resolution 2773 (2025) — UN Security Council, 21 February 2025. Demands M23 cessation/withdrawal and an end to RDF and FDLR support. Resolution and sanctions-report archive — UN Security Council. Includes Resolution 2825 (2026), extending the regime and Group mandate. 2025 North and South Kivu Fact-Finding Report — OHCHR, 2025. Findings on possible war crimes and crimes against humanity by multiple parties. Independent Commission of Inquiry updates — OHCHR, 2026. Ongoing investigation and evidence preservation. Courts and accountability DRC v. Uganda — International Court of Justice. 2005 merits judgment and 2022 reparations. 2022 ICJ reparations summary — ICJ. Fixes $325 million compensation. DRC v. Rwanda, 2002 application — ICJ. Dismissed for lack of jurisdiction in 2006; no merits ruling. DRC v. Rwanda, new 2026 proceedings — ICJ. Pending application filed 26 June 2026. ICC Democratic Republic of Congo situation — ICC. Cases, convictions, acquittal and current investigation. Bosco Ntaganda case — ICC. Conviction on 18 counts of war crimes and crimes against humanity. Humanitarian and survivor data OCHA DRC 2026 plan — Humanitarian needs, targets and funding. OCHA March 2026 dashboard — Response and displacement snapshot. UNHCR DRC Global Appeal 2026 — Forced-displacement and refugee outlook. WFP DRC emergency — Food insecurity and displacement indicators. UNICEF, Hidden Scars of Conflict and Silence — Sexual violence against children, 2022–2025. WHO 2025 DRC appeal — Goma casualties, injuries and health-system impacts. IRC mortality survey — 5.4 million excess-mortality estimate and methodology. Human-rights investigations “Death Was Everywhere” — Human Rights Watch, 10 June 2026. Forced recruitment, detention and abuse at Rumangabo and Tshanzu. Killings in Kiwanja — Human Rights Watch, 11 December 2008. Rwandan/M23 shelling near Goma — Human Rights Watch, 26 September 2024. Kishishe and Bambo preliminary investigation — MONUSCO/UNJHRO, 7 December 2022. Peace agreements Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement — 10 July 1999. DRC–Rwanda Pretoria withdrawal agreement — 30 July 2002. Sun City Final Act — 2 April 2003. DRC–CNDP Agreement — 23 March 2009. Washington DRC–Rwanda Peace Agreement — 27 June 2025. Doha Framework — DRC and AFC/M23, 15 November 2025. Sanctions and official positions US sanctions James Kabarebe and Lawrence Kanyuka — 20 February 2025. EU March 2025 designations — M23 leaders, RDF officers and Gasabo Gold Refinery. US sanctions RDF and four officers — 2 March 2026. US sanctions M23 and FDLR commanders — 2 June 2026. US sanctions mineral-smuggling network — 25 June 2026. Rwanda’s 2026 statement on coordination with AFC/M23 — Official Rwandan position on FDLR, defensive measures and phased drawdown. Rwanda’s response to sanctions — Official denial/response. Genocost and Congolese law Law No. 22/065 of 26 December 2022 — Victim protection, reparations and August 2 commemoration. FONAREV — National reparations institution and official Genocost material. CAYP explanation of Genocost — Campaign’s stated meaning and goals. Genocost campaign history — CAYP material on origins and commemoration. Last updated: July 30, 2026 ADVERTISEMENT Related Articles Genocost Denise Nyakeru Urges Congolese to Sign GENOCOST Recognition Petition First Lady says every signature can break the silence, defend victims and advance justice. . Genocost Tshisekedi Funds GENOCOST Strategy, Advances Museum New measures place victim recognition, national memory and justice at the centre of state policy. . Justice & Crime Genocost: The Human Cost of Congo’s Decades of War Genocost is the Congolese name for the human and economic cost of decades of mass violence. . Diplomacy Tshisekedi in New York: Engages U.S. Media on Congo, Rwanda & GENOCOST In New York, Tshisekedi engaged U.S. media on Congo’s crisis, accused Rwanda and M23 of massacres . 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Africa is witnessing a transformative era in its high fashion industry, led by a vibrant generation of young African designers. These creatives are redefining the continent's narrative by blending rich African heritage with modern aesthetics, showcasing their work on global platforms. Africa's potential as a fashion leader is undeniable, with its significant role as a producer of raw materials like cotton, and its substantial exports and imports in the textile sector. The "Buy Kenya, Build Kenya" initiative exemplifies the continent's move towards nurturing local talent and markets. Cities like Nairobi, Lagos, Casablanca, and Abidjan are emerging as epicenters of fashion and design, contributing significantly to the continent's economic landscape. The UNESCO report on Africa's fashion industry highlights the sector's burgeoning success and its role as a catalyst for the "made-in-Africa" movement. The rise of fashion weeks across 32 African countries and the growth of e-commerce are testament to the dynamic expansion of the fashion sector, which not only fosters creativity and innovation but also offers significant economic opportunities, particularly for women and the youth. Despite its promise, the industry faces challenges such as limited investment, inadequate infrastructure, and the need for sustainable practices. Addressing these issues requires concerted efforts from governments, industry stakeholders, and the international community to support a sustainable and inclusive fashion ecosystem that honors Africa's cultural diversity and textile traditions . As Africa continues to navigate these challenges, the future of its fashion industry looks bright, promising a new chapter of innovation, cultural expression, and sustainable development. Continue Reading Full Article By Author Name Author Name Home Comment Apr 1, 2024 May 15, 2026 2 min read Copy link Facebook X (Twitter) WhatsApp Published Updated: The UNESCO report on Africa's fashion industry highlights the sector's burgeoning success Africa is witnessing a transformative era in its high fashion industry, led by a vibrant generation of young African designers. These creatives are redefining the continent's narrative by blending rich African heritage with modern aesthetics, showcasing their work on global platforms. Africa's potential as a fashion leader is undeniable, with its significant role as a producer of raw materials like cotton, and its substantial exports and imports in the textile sector. The "Buy Kenya, Build Kenya" initiative exemplifies the continent's move towards nurturing local talent and markets. Cities like Nairobi, Lagos, Casablanca, and Abidjan are emerging as epicenters of fashion and design, contributing significantly to the continent's economic landscape. ADVERTISEMENT The UNESCO report on Africa's fashion industry highlights the sector's burgeoning success and its role as a catalyst for the "made-in-Africa" movement. The rise of fashion weeks across 32 African countries and the growth of e-commerce are testament to the dynamic expansion of the fashion sector, which not only fosters creativity and innovation but also offers significant economic opportunities, particularly for women and the youth. ADVERTISEMENT Despite its promise, the industry faces challenges such as limited investment, inadequate infrastructure, and the need for sustainable practices. Addressing these issues requires concerted efforts from governments, industry stakeholders, and the international community to support a sustainable and inclusive fashion ecosystem that honors Africa's cultural diversity and textile traditions . As Africa continues to navigate these challenges, the future of its fashion industry looks bright, promising a new chapter of innovation, cultural expression, and sustainable development. Trending Now Hyron Andrews Biography: His Rugby Career and Lions Tributes . Biography F1 Will Polish Kagame’s Authoritarian Image” — Kayikwamba Wagner . Justice & Crime Oluku Market Tanker Explosion: Death Toll Still Unconfirmed, 8 Injured . Accident News Fannie Masemola Reinstated as South Africa's Police Chief, Back Monday . Social Service Popular Today ADVERTISEMENT ADVERTISEMENT Related Articles Tags

Cameroon confirms 16 nationals killed in Ukraine and signals steps after foreign recruitment concerns. Cameroon is taking steps to address foreign enlistment risks after confirming that 16 of its nationals were killed while serving in Russia’s military operations in Ukraine , according to a government memo shared with the Russian Embassy cited by AP News . The Ministry of Foreign Affairs said arrangements had been made to contact the families of the deceased, marking a formal response to the confirmed deaths. Authorities also issued a separate notice inviting the families of six other Cameroonian nationals residing in Russia to report to the ministry over “urgent matters,” though no further details were provided. The development comes amid broader concerns about the involvement of African nationals in the Ukraine conflict . Ukraine has previously stated that more than 1,700 Africans may have been recruited to fight for Russia, with some reportedly misled by offers of employment or training opportunities. Similar cases have been cited in Kenya and Nigeria, where nationals were found to have joined or been drawn into the war effort. Cameroon had already signaled concern over such movements. In March 2025, the country’s defense minister instructed military leadership to take emergency measures aimed at preventing defections among active and former soldiers, reflecting growing awareness of the risks linked to foreign recruitment. The situation highlights ongoing challenges faced by African governments in monitoring and responding to citizens becoming involved in external conflicts under unclear or informal arrangements. Continue Reading Full Article INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS Cameroon to act after 16 nationals killed in Ukraine war By Serge Kitoko Tshibanda Political Analyst Serge Kitoko Tshibanda Home Comment Apr 8, 2026 May 15, 2026 2 min read Copy link Facebook X (Twitter) WhatsApp Published Updated: Cameroon is taking steps to address foreign enlistment risks after confirming that 16 of its nationals were killed while serving in Russia’s military operations in Ukraine , according to a government memo shared with the Russian Embassy cited by AP News . The Ministry of Foreign Affairs said arrangements had been made to contact the families of the deceased, marking a formal response to the confirmed deaths. Authorities also issued a separate notice inviting the families of six other Cameroonian nationals residing in Russia to report to the ministry over “urgent matters,” though no further details were provided. ADVERTISEMENT The development comes amid broader concerns about the involvement of African nationals in the Ukraine conflict . Ukraine has previously stated that more than 1,700 Africans may have been recruited to fight for Russia, with some reportedly misled by offers of employment or training opportunities. Similar cases have been cited in Kenya and Nigeria, where nationals were found to have joined or been drawn into the war effort. Cameroon had already signaled concern over such movements. In March 2025, the country’s defense minister instructed military leadership to take emergency measures aimed at preventing defections among active and former soldiers, reflecting growing awareness of the risks linked to foreign recruitment. ADVERTISEMENT The situation highlights ongoing challenges faced by African governments in monitoring and responding to citizens becoming involved in external conflicts under unclear or informal arrangements. Trending Now Hyron Andrews Biography: His Rugby Career and Lions Tributes . Biography F1 Will Polish Kagame’s Authoritarian Image” — Kayikwamba Wagner . Justice & Crime Oluku Market Tanker Explosion: Death Toll Still Unconfirmed, 8 Injured . Accident News Fannie Masemola Reinstated as South Africa's Police Chief, Back Monday . Social Service Popular Today Scholarships 120 EAC Master’s Scholarships Open to EAC Students — How to Apply . Scholarships UCT Mastercard Foundation Scholarship 2027 Opens to Africans . Scholarships Chevening Scholarships 2027–2028 Open Across Africa — How to Apply . African Culture Himba Clothing and Adornment: Meaning of Traditional Dress . International Relations Ndayishimiye Backs Leopards After Historic Draw With Portugal . ADVERTISEMENT ADVERTISEMENT Related Articles Scholarships 120 EAC Master’s Scholarships Open to EAC Students — How to Apply Up to 120 EAC Master’s scholarships are open to nationals of eight East African countries, . Scholarships UCT Mastercard Foundation Scholarship 2027 Opens to Africans UCT Mastercard Foundation Scholars Program 2027 is open to African students with ... . Scholarships Chevening Scholarships 2027–2028 Open Across Africa — How to Apply Chevening Scholarships 2027–2028 are open to eligible African applicants. See funding, . African Culture Himba Clothing and Adornment: Meaning of Traditional Dress What otjize, jewelry, hairstyles, and clothing represent in Himba culture . Tags Africa Africa Cameroon Cameroon Associated Press Associated Press African Union African Union Xtrafrica News Xtrafrica News Wazalendo DRC Wazalendo DRC

JAMB has moved the 2027 UTME first-session arrival time to 7:30am, with the exam running from 8:30am to 10:30am. ABUJA, Nigeria — 15 September 2026: The Joint Admissions and Matriculation Board has moved the arrival time for candidates assigned to the first session of the 2027 Unified Tertiary Matriculation Examination from 6:30am to 7:30am. Under the revised arrangement, the first examination will start at 8:30am and end at 10:30am. JAMB said the one-hour shift responds to safety and logistical concerns about candidates travelling to CBT centres before dawn. What is the new JAMB 2027 UTME first-session time? Candidates assigned to the first session should report to their designated CBT centres by 7:30am. The examination is scheduled to begin at 8:30am and finish at 10:30am. JAMB has not yet released the complete 2027 UTME timetable, so candidates should await further official communication. The new first-session schedule The change applies specifically to the first examination session. The Sun reported the following revised sequence: Candidate arrival at the assigned CBT centre: 7:30am Examination begins: 8:30am Examination ends: 10:30am Other sessions are expected to continue under JAMB’s established scheduling arrangements. The board advised candidates to wait for its complete timetable and related instructions before making final travel plans. TVC News also reported that the decision followed JAMB’s 2026 Management and Information Technology Retreat, held in Ikot Ekpene, Akwa Ibom State, from 6 to 11 September. Participants included management, state coordinators, heads of outstation offices and other stakeholders involved in examination operations. The schedule change does not mean registration has opened, examination dates have been released or candidates have received centre assignments. Those are separate steps. Applicants should rely on notices published through JAMB’s official website and verified channels. Continue Reading Full Article EDUCATION JAMB 2027 UTME Time: First Session Moves to 8:30am By Kamau Bahati Entertainment Editor Kamau Bahati Home Comment Sep 15, 2026 Sep 15, 2026 4 min read Copy link Facebook X (Twitter) WhatsApp Published Updated: ABUJA, Nigeria — 15 September 2026: The Joint Admissions and Matriculation Board has moved the arrival time for candidates assigned to the first session of the 2027 Unified Tertiary Matriculation Examination from 6:30am to 7:30am. Under the revised arrangement, the first examination will start at 8:30am and end at 10:30am. JAMB said the one-hour shift responds to safety and logistical concerns about candidates travelling to CBT centres before dawn. What is the new JAMB 2027 UTME first-session time? Candidates assigned to the first session should report to their designated CBT centres by 7:30am. The examination is scheduled to begin at 8:30am and finish at 10:30am. JAMB has not yet released the complete 2027 UTME timetable, so candidates should await further official communication. The new first-session schedule The change applies specifically to the first examination session. The Sun reported the following revised sequence: Candidate arrival at the assigned CBT centre: 7:30am Examination begins: 8:30am Examination ends: 10:30am Other sessions are expected to continue under JAMB’s established scheduling arrangements. The board advised candidates to wait for its complete timetable and related instructions before making final travel plans. TVC News also reported that the decision followed JAMB’s 2026 Management and Information Technology Retreat, held in Ikot Ekpene, Akwa Ibom State, from 6 to 11 September. Participants included management, state coordinators, heads of outstation offices and other stakeholders involved in examination operations. ADVERTISEMENT The schedule change does not mean registration has opened, examination dates have been released or candidates have received centre assignments. Those are separate steps. Applicants should rely on notices published through JAMB’s official website and verified channels. Why JAMB moved the time JAMB said the earlier 6:30am arrival requirement created practical and safety concerns, particularly for candidates who must travel long distances to reach assigned CBT centres. A pre-dawn journey can be harder to arrange, and transport delays may increase the risk of missing the first sitting. Legit.ng ’s report on the bulletin says the board expects the later arrival to improve safety and convenience and potentially reduce absence linked to early travel. The change gives candidates an extra hour, but it does not remove the need to arrive before the test begins. ADVERTISEMENT Candidates should treat 7:30am as the reporting time, not the start of the examination. Identity checks, biometric verification and other admission procedures at the CBT centre take place before the 8:30am start. Arriving at 8:30am could therefore be too late to complete entry checks. What candidates should do now The immediate step is simple: note the revised first-session time and wait for the full official timetable. Candidates do not need to pay anyone to “change” their session or reserve an early slot based on this announcement. When registration details are released, use official systems and accredited CBT centres. XTRAfrica’s guide to generating a JAMB profile code with a NIN explains the recognised SMS method and common errors. The existing JAMB admission-status guide is for current admissions, not 2027 UTME registration. The schedule update also has no connection to the separate policy requiring JAMB to centralise Higher National Diploma admissions. XTRAfrica’s HND admissions explainer covers that directive and the implementation details still awaited from JAMB and the National Board for Technical Education. Trending Now Hyron Andrews Biography: His Rugby Career and Lions Tributes . Biography F1 Will Polish Kagame’s Authoritarian Image” — Kayikwamba Wagner . Justice & Crime Oluku Market Tanker Explosion: Death Toll Still Unconfirmed, 8 Injured . Accident News Fannie Masemola Reinstated as South Africa's Police Chief, Back Monday . Social Service Popular Today Accident News Oluku Market Tanker Explosion: Death Toll Still Unconfirmed, 8 Injured . Education Nigeria Polytechnic Degree Bill: Who Qualifies and What Happens Next? . Biography Toluwanisings Biography and Obituary: Songs, Wife and Death . Biography Charlyne Brumskine Biography: Age, Family and ECOWAS Court Chief . Education Ihugh School and Hospital Closures: Next Steps for Pupils and Patients . ADVERTISEMENT Candidates and parents should be cautious about unofficial timetables, registration links and payment requests. A genuine schedule change does not validate every social-media graphic that repeats JAMB’s name. Confirm the web address before entering a NIN, phone number, registration number or payment-card information. Details still awaiting release JAMB had not published the full 2027 UTME calendar on the public bulletin index reviewed at the cutoff. The board still needs to provide registration dates, examination dates, session allocation procedures, approved fees and any new digital pre-registration instructions through accessible official notices. The board may issue more operational guidance as preparations continue. Until then, the confirmed change is limited to the first session: arrive at 7:30am for an examination scheduled from 8:30am to 10:30am. Candidates assigned to later sessions should follow the time printed on their official examination slip when it becomes available. ADVERTISEMENT Related Articles Accident News Oluku Market Tanker Explosion: Death Toll Still Unconfirmed, 8 Injured Edo police report eight burn injuries as conflicting accounts leave the final death toll unresolved. . Education Nigeria Polytechnic Degree Bill: Who Qualifies and What Happens Next? The Senate has backed B.Tech degrees, but legal approval and programme accreditation still matter. . Biography Toluwanisings Biography and Obituary: Songs, Wife and Death Remembering Olayemi Bayonile Bolaji, the Nigerian gospel singer behind A Very Big God. . Biography Charlyne Brumskine Biography: Age, Family and ECOWAS Court Chief Liberian lawyer and former vice-presidential candidate now leads West Africa's regional court. . Tags Nigeria News Nigeria News Breaking News Breaking News Nigeria Nigeria

Peter Joseph Blackmore, the star rider for Israel Premier Tech, clinched victory in Tour du Rwanda 2024 with a triumphant ride to the Kigali Convention Centre during Sunday's final stage. The 21-year-old Briton, who seized the yellow jersey on Friday by winning Stage Six from Musanze to Mount Kigali, maintained his lead with a stellar performance. Blackmore's success marks a notable achievement, succeeding Eritrean Henok Mulueberhane, the 2023 champion who was unable to defend his title due to a shoulder injury that forced him to withdraw from the competition. The rider's journey to the Kigali Convention Centre was accompanied by jubilant celebrations, solidifying his Tour du Rwanda 2024 glory and establishing him as a rising talent in the cycling world. Continue Reading Full Article By Author Name Author Name Home Comment Feb 25, 2024 May 15, 2026 1 min read Copy link Facebook X (Twitter) WhatsApp Published Updated: Peter Joseph Celebrating past the finish line. IMAGE by IGIHE Peter Joseph Blackmore, the star rider for Israel Premier Tech, clinched victory in Tour du Rwanda 2024 with a triumphant ride to the Kigali Convention Centre during Sunday's final stage. The 21-year-old Briton, who seized the yellow jersey on Friday by winning Stage Six from Musanze to Mount Kigali, maintained his lead with a stellar performance. Blackmore's success marks a notable achievement, succeeding Eritrean Henok Mulueberhane, the 2023 champion who was unable to defend his title due to a shoulder injury that forced him to withdraw from the competition. ADVERTISEMENT The rider's journey to the Kigali Convention Centre was accompanied by jubilant celebrations, solidifying his Tour du Rwanda 2024 glory and establishing him as a rising talent in the cycling world. ADVERTISEMENT Trending Now Hyron Andrews Biography: His Rugby Career and Lions Tributes . Biography F1 Will Polish Kagame’s Authoritarian Image” — Kayikwamba Wagner . Justice & Crime Oluku Market Tanker Explosion: Death Toll Still Unconfirmed, 8 Injured . Accident News Fannie Masemola Reinstated as South Africa's Police Chief, Back Monday . Social Service Popular Today ADVERTISEMENT ADVERTISEMENT Related Articles Tags