SARS e@syFile Employer beta testing runs from 24 August to 11 September 2026. Check the 2026 EMP501 interim filing dates and requirements. SARS has opened its 2026 e@syFile Employer beta-testing period from 24 August to 11 September 2026. The test precedes the formal e@syFile release for the Employer Interim Reconciliation filing season in September. The beta version is intended only for selected employers invited to participate. SARS has not published a public beta-download link; access details are being provided separately to approved testers. The current SARS timetable lists the 2026 Employer Interim Reconciliation filing window as 21 September to 31 October 2026. It covers payroll information for the first six months of the 2027 tax year. Important SARS EMP501 dates for 2026 Employers should monitor SARS announcements in case the filing dates or software-release timetable changes. What is the e@syFile Employer beta test? The beta period allows selected employers and payroll stakeholders to test changes before SARS releases the production version for the interim filing season. According to SARS, the beta includes: A new ITREG source code intended to reduce duplicate employee Income Tax registrations Source-code validation changes Continue Reading Full Article GOVERNMENT SERVICES SARS e@syFile Employer 2026: Beta and EMP501 Dates By Wilson Munezero Government Services & Opportunities Expert Wilson Munezero Home Comment Aug 24, 2026 Aug 24, 2026 11 min read Copy link Facebook X (Twitter) WhatsApp Published Updated: SARS has opened its 2026 e@syFile Employer beta-testing period from 24 August to 11 September 2026. The test precedes the formal e@syFile release for the Employer Interim Reconciliation filing season in September. The beta version is intended only for selected employers invited to participate. SARS has not published a public beta-download link; access details are being provided separately to approved testers. The current SARS timetable lists the 2026 Employer Interim Reconciliation filing window as 21 September to 31 October 2026. It covers payroll information for the first six months of the 2027 tax year. Important SARS EMP501 dates for 2026 Event Date e@syFile Employer beta testing opens 24 August 2026 Beta testing closes 11 September 2026 Employer Interim Reconciliation opens 21 September 2026 Employer Interim Reconciliation closes 31 October 2026 2027 annual employer reconciliation 1 April–31 May 2027 Employers should monitor SARS announcements in case the filing dates or software-release timetable changes. What is the e@syFile Employer beta test? The beta period allows selected employers and payroll stakeholders to test changes before SARS releases the production version for the interim filing season. According to SARS, the beta includes: A new ITREG source code intended to reduce duplicate employee Income Tax registrations Source-code validation changes Updated field or validation descriptions Testing of employer-reconciliation processes before the formal September release The beta build is not the general production version of e@syFile Employer. Can every employer download the beta version? No. SARS describes this as a restricted trade-testing exercise for selected employers. The public announcement does not contain an open download link. SARS says the access link will be supplied separately to participating testers. Employers should not download software from unofficial websites or links circulated through unverified messages. If your organisation was not invited to the beta test, prepare payroll information for the live filing season and wait for the official production release. ADVERTISEMENT Can employers submit a live EMP501 during beta testing? No. The beta environment is for testing, not live filing. SARS says the testing application defaults to offline mode and that online functions are disabled. Selected functions and options may also be unavailable in the beta build. Do not treat a beta test or test export as a successful live EMP501 submission. Employers must use the formal production release and approved SARS filing channel during the official filing period. What is the new ITREG source code? The new ITREG source code is intended to help prevent duplicate employee Income Tax registrations. Duplicate registrations can occur when employee identity or tax-registration information is submitted inconsistently. Employers and payroll administrators should therefore review employee identity numbers, Income Tax reference numbers, names and other identifying fields before generating reconciliation files. SARS' detailed Business Requirement Specification should be used for the authoritative technical validation rules. When is the SARS Employer Interim Reconciliation for 2026? SARS currently lists the filing period as: 21 September to 31 October 2026 The reconciliation covers the period from 1 March to 31 August 2026, which is the first six months of the 2027 tax year. During the interim reconciliation, employers reconcile: PAYE deducted from employees Skills Development Levy contributions Unemployment Insurance Fund contributions Monthly Employer Declarations submitted on EMP201 forms Payments made to SARS Employee payroll and tax-certificate information ADVERTISEMENT Trending Now Kindu Nurses’ Strike Disrupts Care and Childhood Vaccination . Healthcare System EAC Preparedness Plan: What Must Be Ready Before Floods . Regional Blocs (AU, SADC, EAC, ECOWAS) DR Congo's Juliana Lumumba Seeks to Reshape the Francophonie . Francophone River Offin Girls’ Rights Decision: What Must Change? . Education Popular Today Tax and Revenue How to Check if You Must Submit a SARS Tax Return . Tax and Revenue How to Check if SARS Owes You a Refund . Tax and Revenue How to Update Your Banking Details With SARS . Tax and Revenue How to Get Your SARS Tax Number Online . Tax and Revenue SARS Auto Assessment 2026: How to Check and What to Do . Who must submit an EMP501? Registered employers required to deduct or account for PAYE must generally submit employer reconciliations to SARS for the applicable period. The process normally includes: An EMP501 reconciliation declaration Employee tax-certificate data Payroll totals for PAYE, SDL and UIF EMP201 declarations and payment information Corrections for discrepancies identified during reconciliation Employers should confirm their specific obligations through SARS or a qualified payroll or tax professional. How to submit the 2026 interim EMP501 Eligible employers will generally use the production version of e@syFile Employer or the relevant SARS eFiling function once the live filing period opens. Before submission: Install or update to the official production version released by SARS. Back up the existing e@syFile Employer database. Update payroll software and apply the latest SARS validation rules. Verify employee identity and Income Tax reference information. Reconcile payroll totals against EMP201 declarations and payments. Correct discrepancies before generating the submission file. Validate the EMP501 and employee tax-certificate data. Submit through the authorised SARS channel. Save the submission confirmation and final reconciliation reports. Employer preparation checklist Employers and payroll teams should prepare the following before 21 September 2026: EMP201 declarations for March to August 2026 Proof of PAYE, SDL and UIF payments Payroll reports for the six-month period Employee identity numbers or passport details Employee Income Tax reference numbers Correct names, dates of birth and contact details Taxable-income and deduction codes Fringe-benefit information Medical-aid and retirement-fund contribution data Employment start and termination dates Current payroll-software updates A secure backup of the e@syFile database What selected beta testers should do Invited participants should: Use only the beta link supplied through an authorised SARS communication Keep the test installation separate from the live production environment where instructed Back up data before testing Test employee-registration and reconciliation workflows Check the new ITREG source code and changed validations Record errors with enough detail to reproduce them Submit feedback through the channel specified by SARS Avoid treating beta output as a live filing confirmation What happens if an employer misses the EMP501 deadline? Late, incomplete or inaccurate employer reconciliations can result in penalties and may delay or prevent the correct processing of employee tax certificates. If an employer identifies a problem, it should reconcile and submit the outstanding information as soon as possible, review SARS notices and obtain professional help where necessary. ADVERTISEMENT Frequently asked questions When does the 2026 e@syFile Employer beta test run? The beta-testing period runs from 24 August to 11 September 2026. Where can I download the e@syFile beta? There is no public beta-download link on the SARS announcement page. SARS says access will be supplied separately to selected participants. Can I use the beta version to submit my EMP501? No. The beta is a testing build with online functions disabled. Use the official production release during the formal filing season. What is the EMP501 deadline for the 2026 interim reconciliation? SARS currently lists 31 October 2026 as the closing date. The window is scheduled to open on 21 September 2026. What period does the interim EMP501 cover? It covers 1 March to 31 August 2026, the first six months of the 2027 tax year. What is ITREG in e@syFile Employer? ITREG refers to employee Income Tax registration functionality. The new source code is intended to help prevent duplicate employee Income Tax registrations. Should employers wait until the deadline to reconcile payroll? No. Employers should reconcile payroll records, EMP201 declarations and payments before the filing window opens so that discrepancies can be corrected early. Official SARS sources Updated e@syFile Employer beta release for trade testing SARS trade-testing letter SARS PAYE filing timetable SARS employer reconciliations PAYE Employer Reconciliation Business Requirement Specification V25.3.0 ADVERTISEMENT Related Articles Tax and Revenue How to Check if You Must Submit a SARS Tax Return Use the official SARS checker and 2026 rules to see if you must file an ITR12. . Tax and Revenue How to Check if SARS Owes You a Refund Use your ITA34 and Statement of Account to see if SARS owes you, or if you owe SARS. . Tax and Revenue How to Update Your Banking Details With SARS Change your SARS bank account on eFiling or the MobiApp, then confirm with an OTP. . Tax and Revenue How to Get Your SARS Tax Number Online Get a new SARS tax number or recover a forgotten one on eFiling, SOQS, USSD, WhatsApp or SMS. . Tags SARS Updates SARS Updates South Africa Gov Services South Africa Gov Services South Africa South Africa SARS eFiling SARS eFiling

An analysis of how Kabila’s Goma interview echoes Rwanda’s narrative, exposes his weak political return, and risks undermining Congo’s sovereignty and reform agenda. Former President Joseph Kabila’s interview from rebel-held Goma exposes contradictions, selective memory, and dangerous rhetoric, revealing a political comeback strategy that undermines Congolese sovereignty while unintentionally exposing Rwanda’s reliance on proxy forces and narrative control. Why This Interview? When Joseph Kabila sat down with Belgium’s La Libre for his first on‑the‑record interview in years, he chose to do so from Goma, a city that was, by May 2025, under the control of the Rwanda‑backed M23 rebel movement. That decision alone raised eyebrows. The former president’s immunity had just been lifted, and he faced accusations of aiding the very rebels occupying Goma. By granting an interview from their stronghold, Kabila signaled that his words would be part of the Eastern Congo crisis rather than commentary on it. The interview’s real import lies not in its attack on President Félix Tshisekedi but in what it reveals about Kabila’s own ambitions and the broader geopolitical struggle. Why Goma? A Former President’s Calculated Venue Kabila insists he returned to Goma because it is “my home” and because he has a mission to speak with all Congolese for unity and peace. Yet Goma is currently M23’s base of operations; AFP journalists observed him meeting local religious figures in the presence of M23 spokesperson Lawrence Kanyuka . Sources close to Kabila acknowledged that, even if there is no formal alliance, his entourage and M23 share the “same goal” of ending Tshisekedi’s rule. In other words, Kabila’s choice of venue is not neutral. By sitting in a rebel‑held city and criticizing Kinshasa, he legitimizes M23’s grip on eastern Congo, effectively normalizing Rwanda’s proxy force as a political actor. This location also matters because M23’s atrocities are well‑documented. Amnesty International reported in May 2025 that the group committed torture, killings, and enforced disappearances in areas under its control and that M23 captured Goma and Bukavu earlier in the year. A confidential UN expert’s report described Rwanda as exercising “command and control” over the rebels and providing high‑tech military systems to give them a decisive tactical advantage. The same report accused Rwanda of deploying thousands of troops in Congo and directing M23 to seize or relinquish territory. The UN Security Council later passed a resolution condemning Rwanda’s support for M23 and urging it to withdraw its troops. Kabila’s refusal to mention these facts while lamenting a “dictatorship” in Kinshasa is telling. The Man Who Ruled for 18 Years Rewrites History Throughout the interview, Kabila casts himself as a wise peacemaker who once reunited Congo and now witnesses a “dictatorship” and “Sudanization” under Tshisekedi. He claims to have bequeathed a reconciled country in 2019 and says the current crisis stems from tribalism and nepotism in the regime. This narrative glosses over his own authoritarian record. Human Rights Watch documented that , during the 2016 protests demanding his exit, government repression escalated; security forces killed at least 66 protesters in September 2016 and arbitrarily arrested scores of activists. The Guardian reported that police and soldiers rounded up demonstrators across Congo and that protests were met with live ammunition and mass arrests. F reedom House noted that Kabila repeatedly postponed elections , stayed in power after his mandate expired, and that security forces used live ammunition and arbitrary arrests to suppress demonstrations. Under Kabila, corruption was endemic and civil liberties were severely restricted. In light of this history, Kabila’s accusation that Tshisekedi has instituted a “dictatorship” appears hypocritical. He criticizes proposals to revise the constitution, yet forgets that he remained in office past his constitutional term through a controversial court ruling and tried to delay elections again and again. The constitution he now calls “sacred” was trampled by his own regime when it suited him. His reference to tribalism and nepotism ignores allegations that his own family profited from state resources and that governance under his rule was characterized by patronage networks. The interview is, therefore, less a defense of democratic principles than an attempt to whitewash his legacy. Article 64: Dangerous Rhetoric in a Fragile Context Continue Reading Full Article WAR IN EASTERN DRC Kabila’s Goma Interview Exposes a Weak Return, and Rwanda’s Struggles By Serge Kitoko Tshibanda Political Analyst Serge Kitoko Tshibanda Home Comment Mar 23, 2026 May 15, 2026 10 min read Copy link Facebook X (Twitter) WhatsApp Published Updated: Former President Joseph Kabila’s interview from rebel-held Goma exposes contradictions, selective memory, and dangerous rhetoric, revealing a political comeback strategy that undermines Congolese sovereignty while unintentionally exposing Rwanda’s reliance on proxy forces and narrative control. Why This Interview? When Joseph Kabila sat down with Belgium’s La Libre for his first on‑the‑record interview in years, he chose to do so from Goma, a city that was, by May 2025, under the control of the Rwanda‑backed M23 rebel movement. That decision alone raised eyebrows. The former president’s immunity had just been lifted, and he faced accusations of aiding the very rebels occupying Goma. By granting an interview from their stronghold, Kabila signaled that his words would be part of the Eastern Congo crisis rather than commentary on it. The interview’s real import lies not in its attack on President Félix Tshisekedi but in what it reveals about Kabila’s own ambitions and the broader geopolitical struggle. Why Goma? A Former President’s Calculated Venue Kabila insists he returned to Goma because it is “my home” and because he has a mission to speak with all Congolese for unity and peace. Yet Goma is currently M23’s base of operations; AFP journalists observed him meeting local religious figures in the presence of M23 spokesperson Lawrence Kanyuka . Sources close to Kabila acknowledged that, even if there is no formal alliance, his entourage and M23 share the “same goal” of ending Tshisekedi’s rule. In other words, Kabila’s choice of venue is not neutral. By sitting in a rebel‑held city and criticizing Kinshasa, he legitimizes M23’s grip on eastern Congo, effectively normalizing Rwanda’s proxy force as a political actor. This location also matters because M23’s atrocities are well‑documented. Amnesty International reported in May 2025 that the group committed torture, killings, and enforced disappearances in areas under its control and that M23 captured Goma and Bukavu earlier in the year. A confidential UN expert’s report described Rwanda as exercising “command and control” over the rebels and providing high‑tech military systems to give them a decisive tactical advantage. The same report accused Rwanda of deploying thousands of troops in Congo and directing M23 to seize or relinquish territory. The UN Security Council later passed a resolution condemning Rwanda’s support for M23 and urging it to withdraw its troops. Kabila’s refusal to mention these facts while lamenting a “dictatorship” in Kinshasa is telling. The Man Who Ruled for 18 Years Rewrites History Throughout the interview, Kabila casts himself as a wise peacemaker who once reunited Congo and now witnesses a “dictatorship” and “Sudanization” under Tshisekedi. He claims to have bequeathed a reconciled country in 2019 and says the current crisis stems from tribalism and nepotism in the regime. This narrative glosses over his own authoritarian record. Human Rights Watch documented that , during the 2016 protests demanding his exit, government repression escalated; security forces killed at least 66 protesters in September 2016 and arbitrarily arrested scores of activists. The Guardian reported that police and soldiers rounded up demonstrators across Congo and that protests were met with live ammunition and mass arrests. F reedom House noted that Kabila repeatedly postponed elections , stayed in power after his mandate expired, and that security forces used live ammunition and arbitrary arrests to suppress demonstrations. Under Kabila, corruption was endemic and civil liberties were severely restricted. ADVERTISEMENT In light of this history, Kabila’s accusation that Tshisekedi has instituted a “dictatorship” appears hypocritical. He criticizes proposals to revise the constitution, yet forgets that he remained in office past his constitutional term through a controversial court ruling and tried to delay elections again and again. The constitution he now calls “sacred” was trampled by his own regime when it suited him. His reference to tribalism and nepotism ignores allegations that his own family profited from state resources and that governance under his rule was characterized by patronage networks. The interview is, therefore, less a defense of democratic principles than an attempt to whitewash his legacy. Article 64: Dangerous Rhetoric in a Fragile Context Perhaps the most alarming part of Kabila’s interview is his invocation of Article 64 of the constitution, which obliges citizens to resist any individual who seizes power by force. He frames this as a call for mobilization to end Tshisekedi’s “tyranny.” This is incitement, not analysis. The eastern DRC is awash with armed groups; Amnesty International estimates that more than seven million people are displaced by the conflict. A UN report says Rwanda has deployed thousands of troops to support M23. In such a volatile environment, a former commander‑in‑chief suggesting people take up resistance can spark violence or provide cover for armed rebellions. It is especially cynical given that Kabila himself once banned protests and ordered security forces to suppress dissent. He now points to a constitutional article he ignored when citizens demanded he leave office. The Secret Agreement: A Self‑Indictment, Not Evidence of Fraud Kabila reveals that in 2019, his political family signed a secret agreement with Tshisekedi’s CACH coalition to ensure peaceful governance because Tshisekedi lacked a parliamentary majority. He claims that Tshisekedi later denied the agreement and “bought” a majority. Yet this admission undermines his argument. The deal shows that Kabila tried to retain de facto control after formally stepping down, leveraging his parliamentary majority to constrain the new president. When Tshisekedi outmaneuvered him and built his own coalition, Kabila cried foul. Moreover, Belgium, which colonized Congo and maintains political ties, congratulated Tshisekedi on his 2023 re‑election with 73 percent of the vote after the Constitutional Court confirmed the results. The Belgian foreign ministry praised the “democratic impetus” shown by Congolese voters despite logistical problems. Kabila’s allegation of a sham election looks like sour grapes from a man whose political network lost control. Tshisekedi: Legitimacy, Diplomacy and Reform While Kabila paints Kinshasa as a “dictatorship,” the evidence suggests a more complicated picture. Tshisekedi won re‑election in December 2023 with over 70 percent of the vote, according to the national election commission. Belgium and other partners recognized the result despite irregularities. The U.S. State Department’s 2025 investment climate report notes that Tshisekedi has reaffirmed commitments to economic reform, anti‑corruption measures, and infrastructure development. His administration prioritizes job creation, stabilization of the exchange rate, and securing national territory. To attract investors, he created a Business Climate Cell in the presidency and launched a Strategic Business Climate Plan in March 2025. ADVERTISEMENT Trending Now Kindu Nurses’ Strike Disrupts Care and Childhood Vaccination . Healthcare System EAC Preparedness Plan: What Must Be Ready Before Floods . Regional Blocs (AU, SADC, EAC, ECOWAS) DR Congo's Juliana Lumumba Seeks to Reshape the Francophonie . Francophone River Offin Girls’ Rights Decision: What Must Change? . Education Popular Today Politics & Diplomacy Tshisekedi Champions Peace, Jobs and Africa’s Voice in Moscow . Justice & Crime M23 → AFC → FRN: Has Anything Really Changed? . Justice & Crime Kagame's Failed Justifications for His Military Presence in the DRC . Justice & Crime From AFDL to FRN: Analysts Question Rwanda's Rebel Rebranding . Peace For DRC Now DRC Takes Rwanda Compliance Dispute to UNGA Over Resolution 2773 . Perhaps most significantly, Tshisekedi has embraced diplomacy to address the eastern crisis. In December 2025, he signed the Washington Accords with Rwandan President Paul Kagame, witnessed by the U.S. president, committing both countries to peaceful relations, mutual respect and cooperation on security and economic integration. The declaration affirms their shared determination to address security concerns, foster economic integration, and work with regional partners to implement the accord. The accords also include a Regional Economic Integration Framework to develop mining, infrastructure, and national parks. This diplomatic initiative shows that Tshisekedi seeks negotiated solutions, contrary to Kabila’s claim that Kinshasa wants only war. Tshisekedi has also pursued anti‑corruption reforms. In March 2026, he signed a decree creating a specialized financial and economic crimes court to prosecute corruption, money laundering, and embezzlement. The court will have a primary jurisdiction and an appeals chamber and aims to strengthen the judiciary’s capacity to handle complex economic cases. Such institutional reforms contrast sharply with Kabila’s tenure, during which corruption was endemic, and courts were frequently manipulated. Rather than undermining the constitution, Tshisekedi’s government is establishing mechanisms to enforce it. Rwanda’s Shadow: The Real Driver of Eastern Congo’s Crisis Kabila repeatedly warns of “Sudanization” yet avoids mentioning Rwanda’s role in the current crisis. UN experts, Amnesty International, and the UN Security Council all affirm that Rwanda has armed and commanded M23. The confidential UN report says Rwanda deployed high‑tech military systems and thousands of troops, hosted M23 leaders, and directed the rebels’ strategic decisions. Amnesty notes that M23’s capture of Goma and Bukavu displaced hundreds of thousands and that Rwanda’s backing has prolonged the conflict. The UNSC resolution urged Rwanda to withdraw and condemned its destabilizing role. By framing the crisis solely as a result of Tshisekedi’s governance, Kabila mirrors Kigali’s talking points and diverts attention from foreign aggression. ADVERTISEMENT Who Benefits from Kabila’s Message? It is tempting to dismiss Kabila’s interview as sour grapes, but the stakes are higher. His rhetoric undermines Kinshasa’s legitimacy at a time when the government is engaged in difficult peace talks. By calling the regime a dictatorship, floating conspiracy theories about the constitution, and urging citizens to resist, he emboldens opposition forces and legitimizes the narrative that the central state has failed. This narrative aligns with Paul Kagame’s strategic interests. Rwanda wants to frame the conflict as a result of Congolese misgovernance rather than its own military intervention, thereby reducing international pressure. When Kabila sits in an M23‑controlled city and declares that peace requires negotiating with all armed actors, he effectively normalizes a rebel group accused of war crimes. When he claims there is no constitution in Kinshasa, he echoes Kigali’s portrayal of Congo as a failed state. It is very reasonable to infer that Kabila’s interventions objectively benefit Kagame’s agenda. They weaken Tshisekedi domestically and internationally, complicate peace efforts, and provide political cover for continued Rwandan involvement. They also obscure Kabila’s own responsibility for Congo’s structural problems and his attempts to retain power through backroom deals. In this sense, Kabila functions as a spoiler: a politician who failed to manage Congo’s crises now leveraging those crises to regain relevance, even if it means amplifying narratives that harm national sovereignty. Conclusion: A Political Own Goal that Strengthens Kigali Joseph Kabila’s interview with La Libr e is not a sober analysis of Congo’s crisis but a self‑serving manifesto. By positioning himself as the savior of Congo, he glosses over his repression of protests, postponement of elections, and endemic corruption. By accusing Tshisekedi of dictatorship, he ignores reforms such as the creation of a specialized financial crimes court, economic diversification efforts, and diplomatic initiatives like the Washington Accords. By invoking Article 64 from an M23 stronghold, he indulges in dangerous rhetoric that could inflame violence. And by failing to mention Rwanda’s documented support for M23, he tacitly advances Kigali’s narrative. In the end, Kabila’s interview tells us more about his ambitions than about Tshisekedi’s government. His contradictions and selective memory expose a political comeback strategy that relies on destabilizing Congo’s governance and aligning, intentionally or not, with Rwanda’s agenda. For a country that has suffered decades of war and political manipulation, the last thing it needs is a former leader stoking division from a rebel‑held city. The Congolese people deserve a unified government committed to reforms, sovereignty, and peace. Kabila’s gambit does the opposite; it turns his legacy into a liability and hands Kagame a narrative victory. ADVERTISEMENT Related Articles Politics & Diplomacy Tshisekedi Champions Peace, Jobs and Africa’s Voice in Moscow At the 2026 Russia–Africa Summit in Moscow, Tshisekedi calls for peace in eastern Congo... . Justice & Crime M23 → AFC → FRN: Has Anything Really Changed? XTRAfrica examines Joseph Kabila's leadership of the FRN, its continuity with AFC/M23 and ... . Justice & Crime Kagame's Failed Justifications for His Military Presence in the DRC UN findings, U.S. sanctions and the reported FRN launch raise questions about Kigali's military role . Justice & Crime From AFDL to FRN: Analysts Question Rwanda's Rebel Rebranding FRN's reported emergence in Goma revives debate over Rwanda's links to successive Congo rebellions. . Tags Featured News Featured News DR.Congo DR.Congo Rwanda Rwanda Paul Kagame Paul Kagame Felix Tshisekedi Felix Tshisekedi Joseph Kabila Joseph Kabila

Somalia's disaster agency issued a warning on Tuesday about the impending Tropical Cyclone Ialy, expected to make landfall in the southwestern and southern regions, including the capital, Mogadishu. The Somali Disaster Management Agency (SDMA) advised people living near coastal areas to be on high alert and exercise extreme caution. Heavy rains and flash floods have caused significant damage and displacement across Somalia since the beginning of the year. According to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (Ocha) , as of May 14, approximately 225,760 people have been affected by the heavy rains and flooding of the Gu season, which spans from April to June. This includes nearly 38,730 people who have been displaced or relocated. The adverse weather conditions have led to the loss of livelihoods, including livestock and cropland, and the destruction of small businesses. The damage to water sources and water, sanitation, and hygiene facilities is exacerbating a cholera outbreak. The World Health Organization (WHO) has recorded at least 10,640 cholera cases, including 120 deaths, across seven states. Continue Reading Full Article By Author Name Author Name Home Comment May 22, 2024 May 15, 2026 2 min read Copy link Facebook X (Twitter) WhatsApp Published Updated: Raging storm in the Indian ocean Somalia's disaster agency issued a warning on Tuesday about the impending Tropical Cyclone Ialy, expected to make landfall in the southwestern and southern regions, including the capital, Mogadishu. The Somali Disaster Management Agency (SDMA) advised people living near coastal areas to be on high alert and exercise extreme caution. Heavy rains and flash floods have caused significant damage and displacement across Somalia since the beginning of the year. ADVERTISEMENT According to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (Ocha) , as of May 14, approximately 225,760 people have been affected by the heavy rains and flooding of the Gu season, which spans from April to June. This includes nearly 38,730 people who have been displaced or relocated. The adverse weather conditions have led to the loss of livelihoods, including livestock and cropland, and the destruction of small businesses. The damage to water sources and water, sanitation, and hygiene facilities is exacerbating a cholera outbreak. The World Health Organization (WHO) has recorded at least 10,640 cholera cases, including 120 deaths, across seven states. ADVERTISEMENT Trending Now Kindu Nurses’ Strike Disrupts Care and Childhood Vaccination . Healthcare System EAC Preparedness Plan: What Must Be Ready Before Floods . Regional Blocs (AU, SADC, EAC, ECOWAS) DR Congo's Juliana Lumumba Seeks to Reshape the Francophonie . Francophone River Offin Girls’ Rights Decision: What Must Change? . Education Popular Today ADVERTISEMENT ADVERTISEMENT Related Articles Tags

Several media outlets are facing backlash for using a photograph of Bukayo Saka to illustrate England's recent defeat to Iceland. Saka, who came on as a substitute in the 65th minute during the game at Wembley, was prominently featured on the back pages of newspapers like The Star and The Sun. The Telegraph used his image for a player ratings post, and BBC Sport's live text also displayed Saka's picture during the match. Former England striker Ian Wright criticized the choice, suggesting the editors knew the implications of their decisions. Kick It Out chief executive Tony Burnett penned an open letter to editors, emphasizing the media's responsibility to avoid reinforcing negative stereotypes and discrimination. Burnett highlighted the ongoing issue of racism in football, despite progress with prosecutions and the Online Safety Bill. Delroy Corinaldi, executive director of the Black Footballers Partnership, called the use of Saka's image "divisive," referencing similar past incidents involving players like Raheem Sterling. Sterling had previously accused the media of fueling racism by unfairly targeting young black footballers. Saka, along with Marcus Rashford and Jadon Sancho, was subjected to severe online abuse following England's Euro 2020 final loss, where they missed penalties. Wright and football journalist Darren Lewis both called for greater media responsibility and support for players. BBC Sport has sought responses from The Sun, The Star, The Telegraph, the Independent Press Standards Organisation (Ipso), and the News Media Association. Continue Reading Full Article By Author Name Author Name Home Comment Jun 10, 2024 May 15, 2026 2 min read Copy link Facebook X (Twitter) WhatsApp Published Updated: Several media outlets are facing backlash for using a photograph of Bukayo Saka to illustrate England's recent defeat to Iceland. Saka, who came on as a substitute in the 65th minute during the game at Wembley, was prominently featured on the back pages of newspapers like The Star and The Sun. The Telegraph used his image for a player ratings post, and BBC Sport's live text also displayed Saka's picture during the match. Former England striker Ian Wright criticized the choice, suggesting the editors knew the implications of their decisions. Kick It Out chief executive Tony Burnett penned an open letter to editors, emphasizing the media's responsibility to avoid reinforcing negative stereotypes and discrimination. Burnett highlighted the ongoing issue of racism in football, despite progress with prosecutions and the Online Safety Bill. ADVERTISEMENT Delroy Corinaldi, executive director of the Black Footballers Partnership, called the use of Saka's image "divisive," referencing similar past incidents involving players like Raheem Sterling. Sterling had previously accused the media of fueling racism by unfairly targeting young black footballers. Saka, along with Marcus Rashford and Jadon Sancho, was subjected to severe online abuse following England's Euro 2020 final loss, where they missed penalties. Wright and football journalist Darren Lewis both called for greater media responsibility and support for players. ADVERTISEMENT Trending Now Kindu Nurses’ Strike Disrupts Care and Childhood Vaccination . Healthcare System EAC Preparedness Plan: What Must Be Ready Before Floods . Regional Blocs (AU, SADC, EAC, ECOWAS) DR Congo's Juliana Lumumba Seeks to Reshape the Francophonie . Francophone River Offin Girls’ Rights Decision: What Must Change? . Education Popular Today BBC Sport has sought responses from The Sun, The Star, The Telegraph, the Independent Press Standards Organisation (Ipso), and the News Media Association. ADVERTISEMENT ADVERTISEMENT Related Articles Tags

In a move highlighting the complexities of international asylum agreements, RwandAir, the national airline of Rwanda, has rejected an offer from the United Kingdom to conduct flights aimed at removing migrants under a new asylum deal. This decision was made amidst apprehensions that participating in such an operation might tarnish the airline's reputation. Despite this setback, the refusal by the airline, a state-owned entity of Rwanda, has not hindered the progression of the UK's asylum strategy. The UK government's approach involves a comprehensive plan to manage irregular migration, with the anticipated "Safety of Rwanda Bill" playing a central role. Prime Minister Rishi Sunak has expressed confidence in the bill's ability to address legal challenges and facilitate the commencement of removal flights. Expected to receive final endorsement shortly, this legislation paves the way for a collaborative framework involving multiple operators for the execution of removal flights. In an unexpected twist, the UK's Ministry of Defence (MoD) emerges as a pivotal participant in the asylum program. This partnership raises the possibility of utilizing military aircraft for deportations if commercial agreements falter. The Home Office, maintaining confidentiality regarding specific partnerships, acknowledges the MoD's significant role in the logistical aspects of migrant removals. The decision by RwandAir underscores the sensitivities and potential repercussions for carriers involved in such operations. Previous instances, such as the withdrawal of Mallorca-based Privilege Style from a similar agreement due to activist pressure, illustrate the challenges faced by airlines in balancing business operations with socio-political considerations. With the first removal flights to Rwanda anticipated in the coming months, the UK government may have to rely on its military resources as a contingency plan. This development emphasizes the multifaceted nature of implementing asylum policies, involving not just legal and political dimensions, but also the engagement of various stakeholders, including commercial and military aviation sectors. Continue Reading Full Article By Author Name Author Name Home Comment Apr 11, 2024 May 15, 2026 2 min read Copy link Facebook X (Twitter) WhatsApp Published Updated: Rwanda air staff In a move highlighting the complexities of international asylum agreements, RwandAir, the national airline of Rwanda, has rejected an offer from the United Kingdom to conduct flights aimed at removing migrants under a new asylum deal. This decision was made amidst apprehensions that participating in such an operation might tarnish the airline's reputation. Despite this setback, the refusal by the airline, a state-owned entity of Rwanda, has not hindered the progression of the UK's asylum strategy. The UK government's approach involves a comprehensive plan to manage irregular migration, with the anticipated "Safety of Rwanda Bill" playing a central role. Prime Minister Rishi Sunak has expressed confidence in the bill's ability to address legal challenges and facilitate the commencement of removal flights. Expected to receive final endorsement shortly, this legislation paves the way for a collaborative framework involving multiple operators for the execution of removal flights. ADVERTISEMENT In an unexpected twist, the UK's Ministry of Defence (MoD) emerges as a pivotal participant in the asylum program. This partnership raises the possibility of utilizing military aircraft for deportations if commercial agreements falter. The Home Office, maintaining confidentiality regarding specific partnerships, acknowledges the MoD's significant role in the logistical aspects of migrant removals. ADVERTISEMENT Trending Now Kindu Nurses’ Strike Disrupts Care and Childhood Vaccination . Healthcare System EAC Preparedness Plan: What Must Be Ready Before Floods . Regional Blocs (AU, SADC, EAC, ECOWAS) DR Congo's Juliana Lumumba Seeks to Reshape the Francophonie . Francophone River Offin Girls’ Rights Decision: What Must Change? . Education Popular Today The decision by RwandAir underscores the sensitivities and potential repercussions for carriers involved in such operations. Previous instances, such as the withdrawal of Mallorca-based Privilege Style from a similar agreement due to activist pressure, illustrate the challenges faced by airlines in balancing business operations with socio-political considerations. With the first removal flights to Rwanda anticipated in the coming months, the UK government may have to rely on its military resources as a contingency plan. This development emphasizes the multifaceted nature of implementing asylum policies, involving not just legal and political dimensions, but also the engagement of various stakeholders, including commercial and military aviation sectors. ADVERTISEMENT ADVERTISEMENT Related Articles Tags

Ruud Krol, a key figure in the legendary Dutch "Total Football" team of the 1970s, has a fascinating story that transcends his on-field brilliance. Known initially for his nightlife escapades, Krol's journey to becoming a disciplined and inspiring leader under the guidance of Rinus Michels is both intriguing and motivational. In this interview, Krol shares his experiences, insights, and reflections on his career, the Dutch national team, and the enduring legacy of Total Football . God gave us two ears and one mouth,” you once warned Pim van Dord. How did that transition happen? “Rinus Michels found it amusing. The ungovernable partygoer had become an inspiring preacher.” Tell us about your nightlife during your early days with Ajax. "The night before games, while my teammates were in bed, I would be out in Amsterdam’s trendiest nightspots, dressed in silk shirts, double-breasted jackets, and velvet pants. Eventually, Michels' patience ran out. One evening, he sent a staff member to retrieve me from a discotheque. The encounter resulted in a classic Krol response: ‘Would your wife like to dance?’ Everyone laughed, but Michels didn't find it funny. Despite this, he knew my potential and saw I could be central to the team’s success.” How did your playing style contribute to the team? “My primary position was on the left side of the defense, but I often ventured into midfield, the wing, and even the opposition’s box. I would slalom past opponents like Ingemar Stenmark and deliver precise long passes like Roger Staubach. My powerful shots even left Johan Cruyff awestruck. Michels’ patience paid off as I eventually settled down, got married, and focused more on my game. My partnership with Wim Suurbier, nicknamed ‘Snabbel and Babbel,’ became legendary.” You were quite superstitious and wore the No. 5 shirt for Ajax. How did you feel about wearing No. 12 at the 1974 World Cup, and how did Johan Cruyff get his preferred No. 14? “It was our first World Cup since 1938. We didn’t know how it worked. They did it alphabetically, and I ended up with No. 12. I wanted No. 5, the shirt I wore for Ajax and made my Netherlands debut in. By 1978, I knew how it worked and made sure I got No. 5 in Argentina. Cruyff, as the captain, found out about the alphabetical order and secured No. 14.” Was there ever any tension between Ajax and Feyenoord players on international duty? Continue Reading Full Article By Author Name Author Name Home Comment Jul 4, 2024 May 15, 2026 6 min read Copy link Facebook X (Twitter) WhatsApp Published Updated: Ruud Krol, a key figure in the legendary Dutch "Total Football" team of the 1970s, has a fascinating story that transcends his on-field brilliance. Known initially for his nightlife escapades, Krol's journey to becoming a disciplined and inspiring leader under the guidance of Rinus Michels is both intriguing and motivational. In this interview, Krol shares his experiences, insights, and reflections on his career, the Dutch national team, and the enduring legacy of Total Football . God gave us two ears and one mouth,” you once warned Pim van Dord. How did that transition happen? “Rinus Michels found it amusing. The ungovernable partygoer had become an inspiring preacher.” Tell us about your nightlife during your early days with Ajax. "The night before games, while my teammates were in bed, I would be out in Amsterdam’s trendiest nightspots, dressed in silk shirts, double-breasted jackets, and velvet pants. Eventually, Michels' patience ran out. One evening, he sent a staff member to retrieve me from a discotheque. The encounter resulted in a classic Krol response: ‘Would your wife like to dance?’ Everyone laughed, but Michels didn't find it funny. Despite this, he knew my potential and saw I could be central to the team’s success.” How did your playing style contribute to the team? “My primary position was on the left side of the defense, but I often ventured into midfield, the wing, and even the opposition’s box. I would slalom past opponents like Ingemar Stenmark and deliver precise long passes like Roger Staubach. My powerful shots even left Johan Cruyff awestruck. Michels’ patience paid off as I eventually settled down, got married, and focused more on my game. My partnership with Wim Suurbier, nicknamed ‘Snabbel and Babbel,’ became legendary.” You were quite superstitious and wore the No. 5 shirt for Ajax. How did you feel about wearing No. 12 at the 1974 World Cup, and how did Johan Cruyff get his preferred No. 14? ADVERTISEMENT “It was our first World Cup since 1938. We didn’t know how it worked. They did it alphabetically, and I ended up with No. 12. I wanted No. 5, the shirt I wore for Ajax and made my Netherlands debut in. By 1978, I knew how it worked and made sure I got No. 5 in Argentina. Cruyff, as the captain, found out about the alphabetical order and secured No. 14.” Was there ever any tension between Ajax and Feyenoord players on international duty? “No, never. When we played against each other, yes, but on the national team, there was no tension. Under Fadrhonc and Michels, there was always respect between us and for our top coaches.” How did you handle the pressure going into the 1974 World Cup? “We felt no pressure because the World Cup was new to us. We hadn’t been since 1938. Our pre-tournament performances weren't great, but when Michels joined us permanently, things improved. A 4-1 friendly win over Argentina boosted our confidence significantly.” What do you remember about Johan Cruyff's famous turn against Sweden? “There was a huge reaction, but for us, it was normal. We’d seen him do it before, but it was the first time on a big international stage.” How did it feel to score your first World Cup goal against Argentina? “That wasn’t my first World Cup goal. My first was an own-goal against Bulgaria! (laughs) The tension was high, but it was ‘our’ weather, which I think gave us an advantage.” Brazil were the defending champions. What was the mindset going into that game? “We loved Brazilian football. Playing against the world champions was like a final. It was a tough game, but we were motivated and won, though it could have gone either way.” What are your thoughts on the final against Germany? ADVERTISEMENT Trending Now Kindu Nurses’ Strike Disrupts Care and Childhood Vaccination . Healthcare System EAC Preparedness Plan: What Must Be Ready Before Floods . Regional Blocs (AU, SADC, EAC, ECOWAS) DR Congo's Juliana Lumumba Seeks to Reshape the Francophonie . Francophone River Offin Girls’ Rights Decision: What Must Change? . Education Popular Today “We were a better team than Germany, but in football, a weaker team can win. We were unlucky with the penalty decision in the first half and Maier’s inspired form in the second.” Is it true some Ajax players tried to recruit West German Horst Blankenburg? “That was just newspaper talk. We had good central defenders. Our only issue was left-back, which is why Michels put me there.” The Dutch team kept five clean sheets in seven matches in 1974. Do you think the team’s defensive ability is underrated? “Yes, we were very strong defensively, thanks to Michels. His philosophy was that if you could attack, you could defend, and vice versa.” What was the reception like when you returned to the Netherlands after the World Cup? “The reception was amazing. We weren’t world champions, but the reception was truly exceptional, something I’ll remember for the rest of my life.” What do you think about playing every minute possible at the 1974 and 1978 World Cups? “It’s a fantastic statistic, but I’d prefer to have played less and won a gold medal! (laughs) But it’s exceptional.” Do you consider yourself among the top long-range passers in football history? ADVERTISEMENT “Yes, especially considering the heavier ball back then. Cruyff always encouraged me, and Michels had me practice a lot.” What do you think of Michels as a coach? “He was brilliant. He took our football to the highest level, always pushing us to move the ball forward and work hard in training.” What are your thoughts on Johan Cruyff as a player? “Extraordinary. He was Michels’ right-hand man on the field, with unbelievable skills and intelligence. He ranks up there with Pele and Maradona.” What do you think of the legacy of ‘Total Football’? “‘Total Football’ was revolutionary. Everyone talks about it even now. It’s a testament to Michels’ philosophy and the team’s execution.” Where do you think the Dutch side of the 1970s ranks among the greatest teams in international football history? “I think we were the greatest of the 1970s. We were unlucky, but we were definitely the best team of that era.” Ruud Krol's journey from a nightlife enthusiast to a pivotal figure in the "Total Football" revolution is a testament to his talent and the visionary guidance of Rinus Michels. Krol's reflections provide a unique insight into one of football's most celebrated eras, highlighting the discipline, skill, and teamwork that defined the Dutch national team of the 1970s. His story continues to inspire and captivate football fans around the world. 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Switzerland hosts DRC–M23 talks as mediation expands beyond Doha amid security concerns. Switzerland is positioning itself as a new diplomatic hub in efforts to resolve the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo conflict, with negotiations between Kinshasa and the AFC/M23 movement now taking place in Montreux under the broader Doha mediation framework . The talks, held between April 13 and 17, 2026, brought together representatives from the DRC government, AFC/M23, and international facilitators including Qatar, the United States, the African Union, and Switzerland as host, according to a joint statement released after the meetings.The shift to Switzerland reflects an expansion of the diplomatic format beyond the Middle East while maintaining continuity with the Doha peace process . Progress in Montreux has centered on concrete measures, including protocols for humanitarian access, judicial protection, and the operationalization of a ceasefire monitoring mechanism. These steps are intended to stabilize conditions in eastern DRC and support civilian protection amid ongoing insecurity. The United Nations peacekeeping mission, MONUSCO , confirmed that the talks held from April 13 to 18 within the Doha framework produced advances toward implementing verification mechanisms and facilitating humanitarian assistance, while urging parties to sustain momentum in negotiations. Additional reporting also indicates that both sides agreed to improve aid delivery, release prisoners, and move forward with ceasefire oversight arrangements following the Switzerland discussions, highlighting incremental progress despite the broader conflict remaining unresolved . The emergence of Switzerland as a recurring venue introduces a wider strategic layer to the peace process. By hosting negotiations in Europe while preserving Doha’s mediation structure, the framework now spans multiple diplomatic centers, potentially offering greater flexibility as regional and global conditions evolve. This development reflects an increasingly internationalized approach to resolving the eastern DRC crisis, where progress depends not only on agreements reached but on sustained coordination between regional actors and global partners. Continue Reading Full Article WAR IN EASTERN DRC Switzerland Emerges as Regional Hub for DRC Peace Talks By Serge Kitoko Tshibanda Political Analyst Serge Kitoko Tshibanda Home Comment May 4, 2026 May 15, 2026 2 min read Copy link Facebook X (Twitter) WhatsApp Published Updated: Switzerland is positioning itself as a new diplomatic hub in efforts to resolve the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo conflict, with negotiations between Kinshasa and the AFC/M23 movement now taking place in Montreux under the broader Doha mediation framework . The talks, held between April 13 and 17, 2026, brought together representatives from the DRC government, AFC/M23, and international facilitators including Qatar, the United States, the African Union, and Switzerland as host, according to a joint statement released after the meetings.The shift to Switzerland reflects an expansion of the diplomatic format beyond the Middle East while maintaining continuity with the Doha peace process . ADVERTISEMENT Progress in Montreux has centered on concrete measures, including protocols for humanitarian access, judicial protection, and the operationalization of a ceasefire monitoring mechanism. These steps are intended to stabilize conditions in eastern DRC and support civilian protection amid ongoing insecurity. The United Nations peacekeeping mission, MONUSCO , confirmed that the talks held from April 13 to 18 within the Doha framework produced advances toward implementing verification mechanisms and facilitating humanitarian assistance, while urging parties to sustain momentum in negotiations. ADVERTISEMENT Trending Now Kindu Nurses’ Strike Disrupts Care and Childhood Vaccination . Healthcare System EAC Preparedness Plan: What Must Be Ready Before Floods . Regional Blocs (AU, SADC, EAC, ECOWAS) DR Congo's Juliana Lumumba Seeks to Reshape the Francophonie . Francophone River Offin Girls’ Rights Decision: What Must Change? . Education Popular Today Health News Uganda HIV Self-Test Assembly: Prices, Jobs and Exports . Banking and Finance Absa Dubai Office: Services, Eligibility and Contacts . Business & Investment 5 Best Citizenship by Investment Programs for Africans . Scholarships 120 EAC Master’s Scholarships Open to EAC Students — How to Apply . Scholarships UCT Mastercard Foundation Scholarship 2027 Opens to Africans . Additional reporting also indicates that both sides agreed to improve aid delivery, release prisoners, and move forward with ceasefire oversight arrangements following the Switzerland discussions, highlighting incremental progress despite the broader conflict remaining unresolved . The emergence of Switzerland as a recurring venue introduces a wider strategic layer to the peace process. By hosting negotiations in Europe while preserving Doha’s mediation structure, the framework now spans multiple diplomatic centers, potentially offering greater flexibility as regional and global conditions evolve. ADVERTISEMENT This development reflects an increasingly internationalized approach to resolving the eastern DRC crisis, where progress depends not only on agreements reached but on sustained coordination between regional actors and global partners. ADVERTISEMENT Related Articles Health News Uganda HIV Self-Test Assembly: Prices, Jobs and Exports Mukono factory assembles OraQuick kits, but the UGX 7,000 price remains a target . Banking and Finance Absa Dubai Office: Services, Eligibility and Contacts What African businesses and Gulf investors need to know about Absa’s new DIFC office. . Business & Investment 5 Best Citizenship by Investment Programs for Africans Compare five Caribbean second-passport programs, their investment costs, family benefits.... . Scholarships 120 EAC Master’s Scholarships Open to EAC Students — How to Apply Up to 120 EAC Master’s scholarships are open to nationals of eight East African countries, . Tags Africa Africa DR.Congo DR.Congo Wazalendo DRC Wazalendo DRC Felix Tshisekedi Felix Tshisekedi M23 Conflict Updates M23 Conflict Updates

DRC allocates another $40 million to the Kananga–Kalamba-Mbuji road, where 35 km is reported paved, strengthening Kasaï Central's route toward Angola. The Congolese government has announced an additional $40 million to keep construction moving on the strategic Kananga-Kalamba-Mbuji road, a route designed to improve Kasai Central's access to Angola and the Lobito Corridor. KANANGA - September 21, 2026 - The Democratic Republic of the Congo has allocated an additional $40 million for the modernization of the Kananga-Kalamba-Mbuji road as the government seeks to maintain construction momentum on one of Kasai Central's most important regional transport links. The announcement followed an inspection by Infrastructure and Public Works Minister John Banza Lunda in the Kasai region on Sunday, September 20. According to DosEco , the additional financing is intended to prevent an interruption of works and support continued modernization of the route. Zoom Eco also reported the $40 million allocation, saying it is intended to ensure continuity of construction. 35 kilometres reported paved The latest government figures cited by both outlets say 35 kilometres have already been paved on the Kalamba-Mbuji road. During his inspection, Banza Lunda visited Bakua Tshikota, in the Bakua Ntumba grouping, Musuasua sector of Kazumba territory, to assess construction progress and requirements for continuing the project. The wider road project stretches roughly 230 kilometres toward Kalamba-Mbuji near the Angolan border. The route is considered strategically important because it is expected to give Kasai Central a more efficient connection toward Angola and the Lobito Corridor, improving regional movement and trade. The latest reports do not specify when the additional $40 million will be disbursed or provide a final completion date for the entire road. Continue Reading Full Article DEVELOPMENT DRC Adds $40 Million for Strategic Kananga–Kalamba-Mbuji Road By Neema Asha Mwakalinga Travel & Culture Expert Neema Asha Mwakalinga Home Comment Sep 21, 2026 Sep 21, 2026 5 min read Copy link Facebook X (Twitter) WhatsApp Published Updated: The Congolese government has announced an additional $40 million to keep construction moving on the strategic Kananga-Kalamba-Mbuji road, a route designed to improve Kasai Central's access to Angola and the Lobito Corridor. KANANGA - September 21, 2026 - The Democratic Republic of the Congo has allocated an additional $40 million for the modernization of the Kananga-Kalamba-Mbuji road as the government seeks to maintain construction momentum on one of Kasai Central's most important regional transport links. The announcement followed an inspection by Infrastructure and Public Works Minister John Banza Lunda in the Kasai region on Sunday, September 20. According to DosEco , the additional financing is intended to prevent an interruption of works and support continued modernization of the route. Zoom Eco also reported the $40 million allocation, saying it is intended to ensure continuity of construction. 35 kilometres reported paved The latest government figures cited by both outlets say 35 kilometres have already been paved on the Kalamba-Mbuji road. During his inspection, Banza Lunda visited Bakua Tshikota, in the Bakua Ntumba grouping, Musuasua sector of Kazumba territory, to assess construction progress and requirements for continuing the project. The wider road project stretches roughly 230 kilometres toward Kalamba-Mbuji near the Angolan border. ADVERTISEMENT The route is considered strategically important because it is expected to give Kasai Central a more efficient connection toward Angola and the Lobito Corridor, improving regional movement and trade. The latest reports do not specify when the additional $40 million will be disbursed or provide a final completion date for the entire road. A route toward Angola and the Lobito Corridor The Kananga-Kalamba-Mbuji road is part of efforts to reduce the isolation of Kasai Central and improve its connections with regional commercial networks. Once completed and supported by functioning cross-border and connecting infrastructure, the road could make it easier to move people, agricultural products, imported goods and other merchandise between central DRC and Angola. Its connection toward Angola also gives the project wider importance because of the Lobito Corridor, the transport network linking the Atlantic port of Lobito with inland markets and production areas. DosEco notes that the project's eventual economic impact will depend not only on completing the road but also on sustained financing, maintenance and the quality of connecting road and logistics infrastructure on both sides of the border. ADVERTISEMENT Trending Now Kindu Nurses’ Strike Disrupts Care and Childhood Vaccination . Healthcare System EAC Preparedness Plan: What Must Be Ready Before Floods . Regional Blocs (AU, SADC, EAC, ECOWAS) DR Congo's Juliana Lumumba Seeks to Reshape the Francophonie . Francophone River Offin Girls’ Rights Decision: What Must Change? . Education Popular Today Infrastructure DRC Signs Contracts to Modernise 13 Airports, First Deliveries in 2028 . Infrastructure DRC: Three Universities Modernized Under Félix Tshisekedi . Infrastructure Grand Inga Moves Forward as RDC-US Committee Meets in Paris . Infrastructure Congolese engineers head to France to prepare Grand Inga workforce . Infrastructure DRC Signs $877m MetroKin Airport Rail Agreement . Kaluebo bridge reopens to traffic The ministerial inspection also covered progress on the Tshikapa-Kananga road. According to Zoom Eco's September 21 construction update , 22 kilometres of the first section between the Kaluebo bridge and Mbulungu have been fully asphalted. Another 30 kilometres are undergoing drainage and roadbed preparation, while 13 kilometres are awaiting the start of earthworks. The tour also included the Kaluebo bridge, near the boundary between Kasai and Kasai Central provinces. The completed bridge has now been officially reopened to traffic. Construction is also continuing on a mixed bridge over the Miyao River. The final assembly of its metal structure is expected by the end of October 2026, according to the latest project update. Government seeks to keep construction moving The fresh $40 million allocation is intended to maintain progress on the Kalamba-Mbuji route rather than allow financing gaps to interrupt construction. ADVERTISEMENT Banza Lunda is also expected to hold a technical meeting in Kananga involving contractors, the project supervision team and the funder to review implementation challenges and determine the next stages of work. The latest announcement provides a new financing commitment and visible construction milestones, but important questions remain about the timetable for disbursement, the completion schedule and the precise status of individual sections. Recent reports cite 35 kilometres as already paved on the Kalamba-Mbuji road. Earlier project updates have cited different surfaced-road totals, which may reflect different reporting dates, sections or construction standards. Until those figures are reconciled by the implementing authorities, the latest 35-kilometre figure is the current figure reported by the ministry and carried by multiple Congolese outlets. For Kasai Central, the larger objective remains completing a reliable road connection from Kananga toward the Angolan border and opening the region more directly to the Lobito Corridor and regional markets. ADVERTISEMENT Related Articles Infrastructure DRC Signs Contracts to Modernise 13 Airports, First Deliveries in 2028 Four firms will rebuild runways and terminals from Kalemie to Muanda under a Treasury-funded plan . Infrastructure DRC: Three Universities Modernized Under Félix Tshisekedi New and renovated campuses in Kinshasa, Kananga and Mbuji-Mayi aim to improve higher education . Infrastructure Grand Inga Moves Forward as RDC-US Committee Meets in Paris Officials meet with the World Bank to coordinate financing, project governance and electricity . Infrastructure Congolese engineers head to France to prepare Grand Inga workforce A Congolese delegation visits Grenoble to develop hydropower training and technical partnerships . 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Kinshasa plans to challenge Louise Mushikiwabo’s third-term bid at OIF, citing neutrality concerns amid DRC–Rwanda tensions. The International Organisation of the Francophonie (OIF) is heading into a politically charged succession contest, with the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) indicating it will put forward an alternative candidate to replace Secretary-General Louise Mushikiwabo, the Rwandan diplomat who has led the organization since her election in 2018 and re-election in 2022. For Kinshasa, the move is less about personalities than a public test of whether the Francophonie can remain a credible, unifying platform when member states are locked in an escalating regional dispute. A leadership challenge rooted in “neutrality” disputes At the center of Kinshasa’s case is a long-running complaint about how the OIF has been managed under Mushikiwabo specifically, whether the Secretary-General has maintained sufficient impartiality as tensions between the DRC and Rwanda have deepened. Mushikiwabo’s mandate places her at the heart of the Francophonie’s institutional machinery, including chairing key bodies and coordinating the organization’s work as reported by Africa Press . Congolese officials, according to the original report, argue that OIF leadership has not reflected what they see as the gravity of the security crisis in eastern Congo and the regional tensions that accompany it. Their criticism is framed as a governance and credibility question: if the Francophonie claims shared values and political dialogue among members, Kinshasa wants the institution to demonstrate that those principles apply even when conflicts involve influential member states. The eastern Congo conflict is the unspoken driver The DRC–Rwanda relationship has been strained for years, but the conflict in eastern DRC has intensified mistrust. Kinshasa has repeatedly accused Kigali of supporting the M23 rebel movement an allegation Rwanda has denied. The political significance for the OIF is that this dispute is no longer confined to bilateral channels; it is increasingly shaping how the DRC engages with multilateral bodies where Rwanda is also present. Independent reporting and diplomatic statements have pointed to UN expert findings on the eastern DRC conflict, which have been cited internationally in discussions about M23 and regional dynamics . This wider context helps explain why Kinshasa is treating the OIF succession as a consequential decision: the Secretary-General is not expected to arbitrate a war, but the DRC is signaling that perceived institutional “silence” or “imbalance” can carry diplomatic costs. The 2023 Kinshasa Francophonie Games episode became symbolic The disagreement did not start with the current succession season. It was already visible in public moments most notably around the 2023 Francophonie Games hosted in Kinshasa. Mushikiwabo did not attend the opening, and competing accounts circulated about the circumstances, including questions of protocol and invitations. While the Games were not an OIF political summit, the controversy became a proxy for the broader relationship: Kinshasa interpreted it as another sign of strained ties within the Francophonie ecosystem at a time when the DRC wanted stronger institutional solidarity. Continue Reading Full Article DIPLOMACY Why Kinshasa Is Challenging Mushikiwabo’s Leadership at OIF By Serge Kitoko Tshibanda Political Analyst Serge Kitoko Tshibanda Home Comment Feb 2, 2026 May 15, 2026 5 min read Copy link Facebook X (Twitter) WhatsApp Published Updated: The International Organisation of the Francophonie (OIF) is heading into a politically charged succession contest, with the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) indicating it will put forward an alternative candidate to replace Secretary-General Louise Mushikiwabo, the Rwandan diplomat who has led the organization since her election in 2018 and re-election in 2022. For Kinshasa, the move is less about personalities than a public test of whether the Francophonie can remain a credible, unifying platform when member states are locked in an escalating regional dispute. A leadership challenge rooted in “neutrality” disputes At the center of Kinshasa’s case is a long-running complaint about how the OIF has been managed under Mushikiwabo specifically, whether the Secretary-General has maintained sufficient impartiality as tensions between the DRC and Rwanda have deepened. Mushikiwabo’s mandate places her at the heart of the Francophonie’s institutional machinery, including chairing key bodies and coordinating the organization’s work as reported by Africa Press . Congolese officials, according to the original report, argue that OIF leadership has not reflected what they see as the gravity of the security crisis in eastern Congo and the regional tensions that accompany it. Their criticism is framed as a governance and credibility question: if the Francophonie claims shared values and political dialogue among members, Kinshasa wants the institution to demonstrate that those principles apply even when conflicts involve influential member states. The eastern Congo conflict is the unspoken driver The DRC–Rwanda relationship has been strained for years, but the conflict in eastern DRC has intensified mistrust. Kinshasa has repeatedly accused Kigali of supporting the M23 rebel movement an allegation Rwanda has denied. The political significance for the OIF is that this dispute is no longer confined to bilateral channels; it is increasingly shaping how the DRC engages with multilateral bodies where Rwanda is also present. ADVERTISEMENT Independent reporting and diplomatic statements have pointed to UN expert findings on the eastern DRC conflict, which have been cited internationally in discussions about M23 and regional dynamics . This wider context helps explain why Kinshasa is treating the OIF succession as a consequential decision: the Secretary-General is not expected to arbitrate a war, but the DRC is signaling that perceived institutional “silence” or “imbalance” can carry diplomatic costs. The 2023 Kinshasa Francophonie Games episode became symbolic The disagreement did not start with the current succession season. It was already visible in public moments most notably around the 2023 Francophonie Games hosted in Kinshasa. Mushikiwabo did not attend the opening, and competing accounts circulated about the circumstances, including questions of protocol and invitations. While the Games were not an OIF political summit, the controversy became a proxy for the broader relationship: Kinshasa interpreted it as another sign of strained ties within the Francophonie ecosystem at a time when the DRC wanted stronger institutional solidarity. ADVERTISEMENT Trending Now Kindu Nurses’ Strike Disrupts Care and Childhood Vaccination . Healthcare System EAC Preparedness Plan: What Must Be Ready Before Floods . Regional Blocs (AU, SADC, EAC, ECOWAS) DR Congo's Juliana Lumumba Seeks to Reshape the Francophonie . Francophone River Offin Girls’ Rights Decision: What Must Change? . Education Popular Today Health News Uganda HIV Self-Test Assembly: Prices, Jobs and Exports . Banking and Finance Absa Dubai Office: Services, Eligibility and Contacts . Business & Investment 5 Best Citizenship by Investment Programs for Africans . Scholarships 120 EAC Master’s Scholarships Open to EAC Students — How to Apply . Scholarships UCT Mastercard Foundation Scholarship 2027 Opens to Africans . A contest shaped by the OIF’s consensus culture The succession process is complicated by how the OIF traditionally reaches decisions often through consensus and coalition-building rather than straightforward bloc voting. That means the DRC’s strategy must go beyond rallying Francophone African states and extend to member governments in Europe, North America, and elsewhere that carry influence within the organization. The original report notes that Mushikiwabo’s campaign is already active and is believed to benefit from support in several major capitals. That dynamic raises the bar for Kinshasa: to win, it must present a candidate who can be framed as broadly acceptable not merely as an “anti-Rwanda” choice. What Kinshasa is trying to achieve From Kinshasa’s perspective, the challenge serves multiple objectives at once: Reassert influence as the largest Francophone country. The DRC has long argued its demographic and cultural weight should translate into stronger leadership standing in Francophone institutions. Force a debate about institutional credibility. By pushing the leadership question, the DRC is effectively asking whether the OIF can maintain unity and legitimacy when members face severe regional conflict. Create leverage in a broader diplomatic contest. Even if Kinshasa does not ultimately secure the top job, mounting a serious challenge can shift negotiations, alliances, and the tone of engagement inside the OIF. ADVERTISEMENT Some diplomats referenced in the original reporting also float a third possibility: if polarization deepens, the organization could turn toward a compromise candidate from a third country to avoid an open rupture. Why this matters beyond one office The OIF is primarily a cultural and linguistic organization, but its members also present it as a community of shared political values. The DRC’s challenge highlights a recurring tension: when security crises implicate member states, institutions built for cooperation and cultural diplomacy can struggle to serve as credible venues for political mediation. For that reason, the next OIF summit’s leadership decision will be read as more than an internal appointment. It will signal whether Kinshasa can translate national weight into multilateral influence and whether Kigali can sustain backing for Mushikiwabo’s continued leadership in a shifting diplomatic landscape. Source: Africa press ADVERTISEMENT Related Articles Health News Uganda HIV Self-Test Assembly: Prices, Jobs and Exports Mukono factory assembles OraQuick kits, but the UGX 7,000 price remains a target . Banking and Finance Absa Dubai Office: Services, Eligibility and Contacts What African businesses and Gulf investors need to know about Absa’s new DIFC office. . Business & Investment 5 Best Citizenship by Investment Programs for Africans Compare five Caribbean second-passport programs, their investment costs, family benefits.... . Scholarships 120 EAC Master’s Scholarships Open to EAC Students — How to Apply Up to 120 EAC Master’s scholarships are open to nationals of eight East African countries, . Tags Africa Africa African Union African Union Rwanda Invasion in DRC Rwanda Invasion in DRC DRC Peace Efforts DRC Peace Efforts DRC Politics DRC Politics

Patrick Muyaya challenges international partners after Tito Rutaremara urged Banyamulenge youth to take up arms and support M23 against the DRC. DRC government spokesperson Patrick Muyaya has challenged the international community to consider how it would react if a senior Congolese figure openly encouraged Rwandan citizens to take up arms against their own government, following controversial remarks by veteran Rwandan politician Tito Rutaremara concerning the Banyamulenge and M23. KINSHASA — Democratic Republic of Congo government spokesperson Patrick Muyaya has turned the controversy surrounding remarks by veteran Rwandan politician Tito Rutaremara into a direct challenge to the international community: what would happen if the roles were reversed? Speaking after Rutaremara’s controversial intervention at a commemoration of the Gatumba massacre, Muyaya asked international partners to imagine a senior Congolese official addressing a Rwandan community and openly encouraging its young people to take up arms against Rwanda’s government. “Imagine if a Congolese minister or a Congolese notable took the floor to ask a Rwandan community to take up arms and fight the Rwandan government or Rwandan institutions.” Muyaya said he would be “very interested” to see how Congo’s international partners would react. The question has particular significance because international officials have previously reacted swiftly when inflammatory rhetoric came from the Congolese side. What Tito Rutaremara said The controversy began after remarks delivered by Rutaremara , a longtime RPF figure who has held several senior positions in Rwanda, during commemorations marking 22 years since the 2004 Gatumba massacre, in which more than 160 Congolese refugees, predominantly Banyamulenge, were killed in Burundi. In circulating footage of his remarks, Rutaremara addresses Banyamulenge youth and encourages them to take up arms and help M23 “liberate Congo.” Continue Reading Full Article WAR IN EASTERN DRC Muyaya Challenges World Over Rutaremara’s Call to Banyamulenge By Neema Asha Mwakalinga Travel & Culture Expert Neema Asha Mwakalinga Home Comment Aug 18, 2026 Aug 20, 2026 11 min read Copy link Facebook X (Twitter) WhatsApp Published Updated: DRC government spokesperson Patrick Muyaya has challenged the international community to consider how it would react if a senior Congolese figure openly encouraged Rwandan citizens to take up arms against their own government, following controversial remarks by veteran Rwandan politician Tito Rutaremara concerning the Banyamulenge and M23. KINSHASA — Democratic Republic of Congo government spokesperson Patrick Muyaya has turned the controversy surrounding remarks by veteran Rwandan politician Tito Rutaremara into a direct challenge to the international community: what would happen if the roles were reversed? Speaking after Rutaremara’s controversial intervention at a commemoration of the Gatumba massacre, Muyaya asked international partners to imagine a senior Congolese official addressing a Rwandan community and openly encouraging its young people to take up arms against Rwanda’s government. “Imagine if a Congolese minister or a Congolese notable took the floor to ask a Rwandan community to take up arms and fight the Rwandan government or Rwandan institutions.” Muyaya said he would be “very interested” to see how Congo’s international partners would react. The question has particular significance because international officials have previously reacted swiftly when inflammatory rhetoric came from the Congolese side. What Tito Rutaremara said Rwandan Senator Tito Rutaremara The controversy began after remarks delivered by Rutaremara , a longtime RPF figure who has held several senior positions in Rwanda, during commemorations marking 22 years since the 2004 Gatumba massacre, in which more than 160 Congolese refugees, predominantly Banyamulenge, were killed in Burundi. In circulating footage of his remarks, Rutaremara addresses Banyamulenge youth and encourages them to take up arms and help M23 “liberate Congo.” His intervention also focused heavily on identity. Rutaremara portrayed Banyamulenge as Rwandans living in Congo and challenged the community’s use of the Banyamulenge identity. At one point, according to the Kinyarwanda remarks reviewed for this article, he says: “It makes me laugh when I hear Banyamulenge calling themselves Congolese. They are Rwandans, just like me.” The remarks triggered anger among Banyamulenge organizations and community voices who insist that they are Congolese citizens and reject attempts to redefine them from Kigali. “Imagine the gravity” Muyaya argued that Rutaremara’s remarks should not be treated merely as provocative political commentary. He described them as spreading what he called the “poison of division” and accused the Rwandan figure of effectively encouraging an insurrection against Congolese institutions. For Muyaya, reversing the scenario demonstrates the seriousness of what was said. What, he asked, would happen if Kinshasa publicly told young Rwandans to acquire weapons and fight their government? “Imagine the gravity of such remarks.” Muyaya also challenged international partners over what he sees as an inconsistency in responses to inflammatory rhetoric involving Rwanda and the DRC. That argument has a recent precedent. ADVERTISEMENT When a Congolese general crossed the line, Belgium reacted On December 28, 2025, Belgian Foreign Minister Maxime Prévot publicly condemned remarks made by FARDC spokesperson Major General Sylvain Ekenge targeting the Tutsi community. Prévot said he was “extremely shocked” and described the comments as “absolutely unworthy” of an official representative. His message was unequivocal: hate speech must be rejected regardless of circumstances, and national cohesion requires the inclusion of every community. The reaction did not stop with international condemnation. The Congolese military publicly distanced itself from Ekenge's comments, saying they did not represent the position of the FARDC, the Congolese government or President Félix Tshisekedi. Ekenge was subsequently suspended from his duties. That response now forms an important backdrop to Muyaya's challenge. If a Congolese military spokesperson could be publicly condemned internationally and sanctioned domestically for inflammatory rhetoric involving the Tutsi community, Kinshasa is asking what standard should apply when an influential Rwandan political figure encourages Congolese Banyamulenge youth to take up arms against their own state. Muyaya's argument is therefore not that international condemnation of Ekenge was wrong. It is that the principle invoked then should be applied consistently now. “Banyamulenge are Congolese” At the center of the controversy is a much deeper question: who has the authority to define the Banyamulenge? Kinshasa's answer is categorical. “No, the Banyamulenge are not the ‘Rwandans of Congo.’ They are Congolese, just like all the other communities in our country,” Muyaya said in an earlier response to the controversy. Muyaya pointed to the backlash from Banyamulenge themselves as evidence that Rutaremara's characterization does not speak for the entire community. Several Banyamulenge organizations and community figures have rejected attempts to portray them simply as Rwandans and opposed calls for their youth to participate in armed conflict against the Congolese state. Muyaya stressed that Banyamulenge have “never given a mandate” to anyone to speak in their place, redefine their identity or call them to war against their own country. For Kinshasa, that distinction matters enormously. Banyamulenge grievances concerning security, discrimination and historical violence are real political questions. But the Congolese government argues that those grievances cannot be appropriated by another state or used as justification for armed intervention. ADVERTISEMENT Trending Now Kindu Nurses’ Strike Disrupts Care and Childhood Vaccination . Healthcare System EAC Preparedness Plan: What Must Be Ready Before Floods . Regional Blocs (AU, SADC, EAC, ECOWAS) DR Congo's Juliana Lumumba Seeks to Reshape the Francophonie . Francophone River Offin Girls’ Rights Decision: What Must Change? . Education Popular Today Justice & Crime M23 → AFC → FRN: Has Anything Really Changed? . Justice & Crime Tshisekedi's FDLR Diplomacy Challenges Rwanda's Security Case . Justice & Crime Patrick Muyaya Calls for Stronger Sanctions Against Rwanda . Justice & Crime EU Aligns AFC and Four Armed-Group Figures With UN Sanctions . Justice & Crime M23 Spokesman Says Eastern DRC Gold and Coltan Pass Through Rwanda . Muyaya praises Banyamulenge who rejected Rutaremara Muyaya welcomed what he described as the firm reaction from members of the Banyamulenge community following Rutaremara's speech. He praised those who publicly distanced themselves from the remarks and said Banyamulenge are already participating within Congolese institutions in efforts to restore peace in the High Plateaus. That pushback complicates a narrative that automatically associates Banyamulenge political interests with Kigali or M23. For Muyaya, the community must instead be recognized as part of Congo's national fabric. His message was that Banyamulenge are not foreigners whom Rwanda can politically reclaim when convenient. They are Congolese citizens. Kinshasa says the rhetoric is “not by chance” Muyaya went further by arguing that Rutaremara's remarks should be viewed within the wider history of Rwanda's justification for involvement in eastern DRC. “These declarations are not the fruit of chance,” he said. He described them as part of a “persistent rhetoric” that, according to Kinshasa, uses the Banyamulenge and wider Tutsi security question to justify Rwanda's actions across the border. Muyaya accused Kigali of instrumentalizing the community in two ways: first by reinforcing divisions between Congolese communities, and second by using those tensions as justification for continued intervention. Rwanda has consistently presented its security concerns in eastern DRC differently, particularly emphasizing the threat posed by the FDLR, a militia founded by elements linked to forces responsible for the Rwandan Genocide in 1994. Kinshasa acknowledges that the FDLR issue must be addressed but rejects the argument that it provides justification for Rwanda's military presence or support for armed groups inside Congolese territory. Muyaya repeats allegations over M23 and other armed groups During his intervention, Muyaya also repeated broader Congolese government allegations concerning Rwanda's support for armed organizations operating in eastern DRC. He accused Rwanda of arming M23 as well as other groups and said Kinshasa holds Rwanda responsible for instability in affected areas. Those allegations are serious and should remain clearly attributed to the Congolese government where independent evidence has not established individual claims. The wider allegation of substantial Rwandan military support for M23, however, has been documented repeatedly by UN experts and has become central to international diplomacy surrounding the conflict. ADVERTISEMENT For Muyaya, Rutaremara's appeal for young Banyamulenge to support M23 adds another political dimension to that existing dispute. Washington peace commitments now enter the controversy The timing is particularly sensitive because the DRC and Rwanda are supposed to be implementing commitments reached through internationally mediated peace processes. Muyaya argued that rhetoric encouraging Congolese citizens to take up arms risks undermining the spirit of the Washington process and efforts to de-escalate the conflict. He confirmed that mediators would be informed about Rutaremara's declarations. Kinshasa wants the statements considered not simply as an isolated controversy on social media but within the diplomatic framework governing Rwanda's commitments toward the DRC. Muyaya emphasized that the dispute must not distract from what Kinshasa considers a central requirement of the peace process: the withdrawal of Rwandan forces from Congolese territory. The international community now faces Muyaya's question The controversy ultimately leaves international partners with the hypothetical Muyaya deliberately placed before them. When General Ekenge made inflammatory remarks involving the Tutsi community, Belgium condemned them publicly and Congo suspended him. Now an influential veteran RPF figure has been recorded urging members of a Congolese community to take up arms and help M23 “liberate Congo.” What happens next? For Muyaya, consistency means that dangerous rhetoric should be condemned regardless of whether it originates in Kinshasa or Kigali. That is what makes his challenge more consequential than a simple diplomatic counterattack. The Congolese government is effectively asking international partners to apply a standard they have already established: ethnic identity should not be weaponized, communities should not be pushed toward violence, and political figures should not encourage citizens of another country to take up arms against their own state. And behind that diplomatic argument lies an equally important message from Kinshasa to the Banyamulenge themselves: You are Congolese. Your citizenship and future belong in Congo, and no foreign political figure has the authority to redefine your identity or call you to war against your own country. ADVERTISEMENT Related Articles Justice & Crime M23 → AFC → FRN: Has Anything Really Changed? XTRAfrica examines Joseph Kabila's leadership of the FRN, its continuity with AFC/M23 and ... . Justice & Crime Tshisekedi's FDLR Diplomacy Challenges Rwanda's Security Case DRC takes its FDLR disarmament initiative to regional leaders and the UN, pressing for RDF withdrawal . Justice & Crime Patrick Muyaya Calls for Stronger Sanctions Against Rwanda DRC spokesperson says diplomatic agreements need enforcement as Kinshasa presses for implementation . Justice & Crime EU Aligns AFC and Four Armed-Group Figures With UN Sanctions EU moves AFC and four armed-group figures from autonomous listings into its UN-linked DRC sanctions . 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Check SARS trust final demands, overdue ITR12T returns, monthly penalties and remission options. The current trust filing deadline is 22 January 2027. SOUTH AFRICA, 19 October 2026 — Trustees facing a SARS final demand should check which income-tax returns remain outstanding and the response period stated in the notice. Tax Consulting SA reports renewed final demands during October, following earlier penalty reversals. Those demands concern overdue obligations; the current trust filing season still runs until 22 January 2027 . The distinction is important for trustees preparing an ITR12T: having time to file the current return does not remove an obligation to submit an older outstanding return. A demand, a penalty assessment and the annual filing deadline require separate checks. What should trustees do about SARS trust penalties? Check the trust’s official correspondence, identify the outstanding tax periods, and act within the final demand’s response period. Submit overdue returns and review any penalty assessment. The current trust filing deadline is 22 January 2027; it does not extend deadlines for older overdue returns. Older outstanding returns need their own response Tax Consulting SA’s commentary says final demands issued in October followed the reversal of certain earlier penalties. Its account was published by Polity on 13 October and subsequently covered by BusinessTech on 18 October. The practitioner’s central warning is that cancellation of a penalty does not cancel the underlying filing obligation. Trustees should therefore check both their outstanding returns and whether any previously reversed amounts remain on the account. The relevant Government Gazette notice, published on 27 March 2026 , identifies failure by a trust to file required returns for years of assessment commencing on or after 1 March 2023. It specifies a qualifying final demand referring to the notice, followed by failure to submit within 21 business days of the demand’s issue date . That is a notice-specific period. Trustees should use the actual document and issue date when checking what action is due. The current trust deadline remains 22 January 2027 SARS’s trust filing-season announcement gives a filing period of 19 September 2026 to 22 January 2027 , covering both provisional and non-provisional trust taxpayers. Continue Reading Full Article GOVERNMENT ANNOUNCEMENTS SARS Trust Penalties: What Trustees Should Check By Kamau Bahati Entertainment Editor Kamau Bahati Home Comment Oct 19, 2026 Oct 19, 2026 4 min read Copy link Facebook X (Twitter) WhatsApp Published Updated: SOUTH AFRICA, 19 October 2026 — Trustees facing a SARS final demand should check which income-tax returns remain outstanding and the response period stated in the notice. Tax Consulting SA reports renewed final demands during October, following earlier penalty reversals. Those demands concern overdue obligations; the current trust filing season still runs until 22 January 2027 . The distinction is important for trustees preparing an ITR12T: having time to file the current return does not remove an obligation to submit an older outstanding return. A demand, a penalty assessment and the annual filing deadline require separate checks. What should trustees do about SARS trust penalties? Check the trust’s official correspondence, identify the outstanding tax periods, and act within the final demand’s response period. Submit overdue returns and review any penalty assessment. The current trust filing deadline is 22 January 2027; it does not extend deadlines for older overdue returns. Older outstanding returns need their own response Tax Consulting SA’s commentary says final demands issued in October followed the reversal of certain earlier penalties. Its account was published by Polity on 13 October and subsequently covered by BusinessTech on 18 October. The practitioner’s central warning is that cancellation of a penalty does not cancel the underlying filing obligation. Trustees should therefore check both their outstanding returns and whether any previously reversed amounts remain on the account. The relevant Government Gazette notice, published on 27 March 2026 , identifies failure by a trust to file required returns for years of assessment commencing on or after 1 March 2023. It specifies a qualifying final demand referring to the notice, followed by failure to submit within 21 business days of the demand’s issue date . ADVERTISEMENT That is a notice-specific period. Trustees should use the actual document and issue date when checking what action is due. The current trust deadline remains 22 January 2027 SARS’s trust filing-season announcement gives a filing period of 19 September 2026 to 22 January 2027 , covering both provisional and non-provisional trust taxpayers. This deadline has not passed. It should not be confused with the 23 October 2026 deadline for non-provisional individuals, or treated as permission to delay responding to a demand for an older return. XTRAfrica’s 2026 SARS filing-date guide sets out the different taxpayer categories. Check the return type and assessment period before applying any headline deadline to a trust. ADVERTISEMENT Trending Now Kindu Nurses’ Strike Disrupts Care and Childhood Vaccination . Healthcare System EAC Preparedness Plan: What Must Be Ready Before Floods . Regional Blocs (AU, SADC, EAC, ECOWAS) DR Congo's Juliana Lumumba Seeks to Reshape the Francophonie . Francophone River Offin Girls’ Rights Decision: What Must Change? . Education Popular Today Elections Monitoring South Africa Declares Election Results: What Comes Next? . Elections Monitoring South Africa Election Results: How to Read the Count . Elections Monitoring South Africa Elections 2026: Voting Hours, IDs and Ballots . Justice & Crime Julius Mkhwanazi, Kagiso Lerutla: Court Case Explained . Sports Trends Khanyisa Mayo Return Update: What Da Cruz Has Said . Read the penalty assessment and account together SARS’s administrative-penalty guidance explains that an AP34 penalty assessment identifies imposed penalties, outstanding returns and corrective action. Fixed monthly penalties range from R250 to R16,000 , depending on the applicable category; R16,000 is not a universal charge. SARS says penalties can recur while non-compliance continues, up to 35 months. It advises submitting outstanding returns even when disputing a penalty, to stop further administrative penalties. Request the Administrative Penalty Statement of Account, or APSA, to check transactions alongside the assessment. Keep the demand, assessment and submission acknowledgements together so that each period and amount can be reconciled. A remission request needs reasons SARS’s remission guidance allows a Request for Remission when a taxpayer disputes a non-compliance penalty. The request must explain the reasons for non-compliance; remission is not automatic. The official eFiling dispute guide also covers trust administrative penalties and suspension-of-payment requests. Follow the procedure relevant to the notice received. XTRAfrica’s tax-dispute guide provides related background, while the current SARS instructions govern the process. ADVERTISEMENT Inactive trusts should check their registration status In its February trust-compliance notice , SARS says annual filing requirements apply to economically active and passive trusts, including every registered resident trust and certain qualifying non-resident trusts. The September announcement also explains that deregistration with the Master of the High Court does not automatically deregister a trust with SARS. A terminated trust requires the appropriate SARS process as well. Before closing the matter, confirm the outstanding periods, submit the necessary returns, check the account and retain the resulting correspondence. For access and navigation help, see XTRAfrica’s SARS eFiling guide . ADVERTISEMENT Related Articles Elections Monitoring South Africa Declares Election Results: What Comes Next? The IEC’s declaration moves attention to council leadership, coalition talks and unresolved contests. . Elections Monitoring South Africa Election Results: How to Read the Count A practical guide to partial tallies, projections, ward winners and municipal council seats. . Elections Monitoring South Africa Elections 2026: Voting Hours, IDs and Ballots South Africans vote on 4 November. Check polling times, voter details, IDs and ballot rules. . Justice & Crime Julius Mkhwanazi, Kagiso Lerutla: Court Case Explained The Ekurhuleni fraud and corruption case returned to the news on 3 November 2026. . Tags Southern Africa News Southern Africa News Breaking News Breaking News South Africa South Africa