Kabila’s Goma Interview Exposes a Weak Return, and Rwanda’s Struggles

• Former President Joseph Kabila’s interview from rebel-held Goma exposes contradictions, selective memory, and dangerous rhetoric, revealing a political comeback strategy that undermines Congolese sovereignty while unintentionally exposing Rwanda’s reliance on proxy forces and narrative control.

  
  

Why This Interview?

When Joseph Kabila sat down with Belgium’s La Libre for his first on‑the‑record interview in years, he chose to do so from Goma, a city that was, by May 2025, under the control of the Rwanda‑backed M23 rebel movement. That decision alone raised eyebrows. The former president’s immunity had just been lifted, and he faced accusations of aiding the very rebels occupying Goma. By granting an interview from their stronghold, Kabila signaled that his words would be part of the Eastern Congo crisis rather than commentary on it. The interview’s real import lies not in its attack on President Félix Tshisekedi but in what it reveals about Kabila’s own ambitions and the broader geopolitical struggle.

Why Goma? A Former President’s Calculated Venue

Kabila insists he returned to Goma because it is “my home” and because he has a mission to speak with all Congolese for unity and peace. Yet Goma is currently M23’s base of operations; AFP journalists observed him meeting local religious figures in the presence of M23 spokesperson Lawrence Kanyuka. Sources close to Kabila acknowledged that, even if there is no formal alliance, his entourage and M23 share the “same goal” of ending Tshisekedi’s rule. In other words, Kabila’s choice of venue is not neutral. By sitting in a rebel‑held city and criticizing Kinshasa, he legitimizes M23’s grip on eastern Congo, effectively normalizing Rwanda’s proxy force as a political actor.

This location also matters because M23’s atrocities are well‑documented. Amnesty International reported in May 2025 that the group committed torture, killings, and enforced disappearances in areas under its control and that M23 captured Goma and Bukavu earlier in the year. A confidential UN expert’s report described Rwanda as exercising “command and control” over the rebels and providing high‑tech military systems to give them a decisive tactical advantage. The same report accused Rwanda of deploying thousands of troops in Congo and directing M23 to seize or relinquish territory. The UN Security Council later passed a resolution condemning Rwanda’s support for M23 and urging it to withdraw its troops. Kabila’s refusal to mention these facts while lamenting a “dictatorship” in Kinshasa is telling.

The Man Who Ruled for 18 Years Rewrites History

Throughout the interview, Kabila casts himself as a wise peacemaker who once reunited Congo and now witnesses a “dictatorship” and “Sudanization” under Tshisekedi. He claims to have bequeathed a reconciled country in 2019 and says the current crisis stems from tribalism and nepotism in the regime. This narrative glosses over his own authoritarian record. Human Rights Watch documented that, during the 2016 protests demanding his exit, government repression escalated; security forces killed at least 66 protesters in September 2016 and arbitrarily arrested scores of activists. The Guardian reported that police and soldiers rounded up demonstrators across Congo and that protests were met with live ammunition and mass arrests. Freedom House noted that Kabila repeatedly postponed elections, stayed in power after his mandate expired, and that security forces used live ammunition and arbitrary arrests to suppress demonstrations. Under Kabila, corruption was endemic and civil liberties were severely restricted.

In light of this history, Kabila’s accusation that Tshisekedi has instituted a “dictatorship” appears hypocritical. He criticizes proposals to revise the constitution, yet forgets that he remained in office past his constitutional term through a controversial court ruling and tried to delay elections again and again. The constitution he now calls “sacred” was trampled by his own regime when it suited him. His reference to tribalism and nepotism ignores allegations that his own family profited from state resources and that governance under his rule was characterized by patronage networks. The interview is, therefore, less a defense of democratic principles than an attempt to whitewash his legacy.

Article 64: Dangerous Rhetoric in a Fragile Context

Perhaps the most alarming part of Kabila’s interview is his invocation of Article 64 of the constitution, which obliges citizens to resist any individual who seizes power by force. He frames this as a call for mobilization to end Tshisekedi’s “tyranny.” This is incitement, not analysis. The eastern DRC is awash with armed groups; Amnesty International estimates that more than seven million people are displaced by the conflict. A UN report says Rwanda has deployed thousands of troops to support M23. In such a volatile environment, a former commander‑in‑chief suggesting people take up resistance can spark violence or provide cover for armed rebellions. It is especially cynical given that Kabila himself once banned protests and ordered security forces to suppress dissent. He now points to a constitutional article he ignored when citizens demanded he leave office.

The Secret Agreement: A Self‑Indictment, Not Evidence of Fraud

Kabila reveals that in 2019, his political family signed a secret agreement with Tshisekedi’s CACH coalition to ensure peaceful governance because Tshisekedi lacked a parliamentary majority. He claims that Tshisekedi later denied the agreement and “bought” a majority. Yet this admission undermines his argument. The deal shows that Kabila tried to retain de facto control after formally stepping down, leveraging his parliamentary majority to constrain the new president. When Tshisekedi outmaneuvered him and built his own coalition, Kabila cried foul. Moreover, Belgium, which colonized Congo and maintains political ties, congratulated Tshisekedi on his 2023 re‑election with 73 percent of the vote after the Constitutional Court confirmed the results. The Belgian foreign ministry praised the “democratic impetus” shown by Congolese voters despite logistical problems. Kabila’s allegation of a sham election looks like sour grapes from a man whose political network lost control.

Tshisekedi: Legitimacy, Diplomacy and Reform

While Kabila paints Kinshasa as a “dictatorship,” the evidence suggests a more complicated picture. Tshisekedi won re‑election in December 2023 with over 70 percent of the vote, according to the national election commission. Belgium and other partners recognized the result despite irregularities. The U.S. State Department’s 2025 investment climate report notes that Tshisekedi has reaffirmed commitments to economic reform, anti‑corruption measures, and infrastructure development. His administration prioritizes job creation, stabilization of the exchange rate, and securing national territory. To attract investors, he created a Business Climate Cell in the presidency and launched a Strategic Business Climate Plan in March 2025.

Perhaps most significantly, Tshisekedi has embraced diplomacy to address the eastern crisis. In December 2025, he signed the Washington Accords with Rwandan President Paul Kagame, witnessed by the U.S. president, committing both countries to peaceful relations, mutual respect and cooperation on security and economic integration. The declaration affirms their shared determination to address security concerns, foster economic integration, and work with regional partners to implement the accord. The accords also include a Regional Economic Integration Framework to develop mining, infrastructure, and national parks. This diplomatic initiative shows that Tshisekedi seeks negotiated solutions, contrary to Kabila’s claim that Kinshasa wants only war.

Tshisekedi has also pursued anti‑corruption reforms. In March 2026, he signed a decree creating a specialized financial and economic crimes court to prosecute corruption, money laundering, and embezzlement. The court will have a primary jurisdiction and an appeals chamber and aims to strengthen the judiciary’s capacity to handle complex economic cases. Such institutional reforms contrast sharply with Kabila’s tenure, during which corruption was endemic, and courts were frequently manipulated. Rather than undermining the constitution, Tshisekedi’s government is establishing mechanisms to enforce it.

Rwanda’s Shadow: The Real Driver of Eastern Congo’s Crisis

Kabila repeatedly warns of “Sudanization” yet avoids mentioning Rwanda’s role in the current crisis. UN experts, Amnesty International, and the UN Security Council all affirm that Rwanda has armed and commanded M23. The confidential UN report says Rwanda deployed high‑tech military systems and thousands of troops, hosted M23 leaders, and directed the rebels’ strategic decisions. Amnesty notes that M23’s capture of Goma and Bukavu displaced hundreds of thousands and that Rwanda’s backing has prolonged the conflict. The UNSC resolution urged Rwanda to withdraw and condemned its destabilizing role. By framing the crisis solely as a result of Tshisekedi’s governance, Kabila mirrors Kigali’s talking points and diverts attention from foreign aggression.

Who Benefits from Kabila’s Message?

It is tempting to dismiss Kabila’s interview as sour grapes, but the stakes are higher. His rhetoric undermines Kinshasa’s legitimacy at a time when the government is engaged in difficult peace talks. By calling the regime a dictatorship, floating conspiracy theories about the constitution, and urging citizens to resist, he emboldens opposition forces and legitimizes the narrative that the central state has failed. This narrative aligns with Paul Kagame’s strategic interests. Rwanda wants to frame the conflict as a result of Congolese misgovernance rather than its own military intervention, thereby reducing international pressure. When Kabila sits in an M23‑controlled city and declares that peace requires negotiating with all armed actors, he effectively normalizes a rebel group accused of war crimes. When he claims there is no constitution in Kinshasa, he echoes Kigali’s portrayal of Congo as a failed state.

It is very reasonable to infer that Kabila’s interventions objectively benefit Kagame’s agenda. They weaken Tshisekedi domestically and internationally, complicate peace efforts, and provide political cover for continued Rwandan involvement. They also obscure Kabila’s own responsibility for Congo’s structural problems and his attempts to retain power through backroom deals. In this sense, Kabila functions as a spoiler: a politician who failed to manage Congo’s crises now leveraging those crises to regain relevance, even if it means amplifying narratives that harm national sovereignty.

Conclusion: A Political Own Goal that Strengthens Kigali

Joseph Kabila’s interview with La Libre is not a sober analysis of Congo’s crisis but a self‑serving manifesto. By positioning himself as the savior of Congo, he glosses over his repression of protests, postponement of elections, and endemic corruption. By accusing Tshisekedi of dictatorship, he ignores reforms such as the creation of a specialized financial crimes court, economic diversification efforts, and diplomatic initiatives like the Washington Accords. By invoking Article 64 from an M23 stronghold, he indulges in dangerous rhetoric that could inflame violence. And by failing to mention Rwanda’s documented support for M23, he tacitly advances Kigali’s narrative.

In the end, Kabila’s interview tells us more about his ambitions than about Tshisekedi’s government. His contradictions and selective memory expose a political comeback strategy that relies on destabilizing Congo’s governance and aligning, intentionally or not, with Rwanda’s agenda. For a country that has suffered decades of war and political manipulation, the last thing it needs is a former leader stoking division from a rebel‑held city. The Congolese people deserve a unified government committed to reforms, sovereignty, and peace. Kabila’s gambit does the opposite; it turns his legacy into a liability and hands Kagame a narrative victory.