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DRC honors Banyamulenge Gen. Rugabisha, rejecting Rwanda’s “genocide” claims & showing national unity against divisive propaganda. Kinshasa - Government spokesperson Patrick Muyaya has firmly rejected allegations of discrimination against the Banyamulenge community, stressing that such claims risk feeding Rwanda’s propaganda and justifying external aggression against the Democratic Republic of Congo. Muyaya made the remarks following the funerals of General Peter Cirimwami and Colonel Alexis Rugabisha, the latter a Munyamulenge officer who was honored posthumously for his sacrifice under the national flag. Muyaya underlined that the Republic recognizes service and sacrifice without ethnic distinction. He emphasized that the Banyamulenge, like other communities, are an integral part of DR Congo’s national life. President Félix Tshisekedi has echoed the same message. “There are Banyamulenge who have died for this Republic and under the flag,” the president said, adding: “I am tired of this discourse that seeks to stigmatize them, giving barbaric regimes like Rwanda an excuse to intervene under false pretenses.” Rwanda’s Narrative For years, Rwanda has accused the Congolese state of committing “genocide” against the Banyamulenge and Tutsi communities, a claim it has used to justify repeated interventions and the arming of the M23 rebellion. But Kinshasa insists these narratives are political manipulation. The posthumous honoring of Col Alexis Rugabisha, a Munyamulenge, highlights how the Congolese state recognizes the loyalty and sacrifice of all its citizens, directly undermining Kigali’s claims of ethnic exclusion. The government spokesperson highlighted that members of the Banyamulenge community have held senior roles in government, parliament, and the armed forces. This, he said, demonstrates their full participation in Congolese society. He cautioned against framing conflicts through the lens of ethnic marginalization in a nation of more than 450 ethnic groups, arguing that such discourse misrepresents reality and risks division. The real danger,” Muyaya added, “is that such discourse opens the door to manipulation by those seeking to destabilize Congo. Our fight is for unity and against those who exploit divisions.” Continue Reading Full Article DRC PEACE EFFORT Kinshasa Rejects Claims of Discrimination Against Banyamulenge By Serge Kitoko Tshibanda Political Analyst Serge Kitoko Tshibanda Home Comment Sep 3, 2025 May 15, 2026 2 min read Copy link Facebook X (Twitter) WhatsApp Published Updated: Kinshasa - Government spokesperson Patrick Muyaya has firmly rejected allegations of discrimination against the Banyamulenge community, stressing that such claims risk feeding Rwanda’s propaganda and justifying external aggression against the Democratic Republic of Congo. Muyaya made the remarks following the funerals of General Peter Cirimwami and Colonel Alexis Rugabisha, the latter a Munyamulenge officer who was honored posthumously for his sacrifice under the national flag. ADVERTISEMENT Muyaya underlined that the Republic recognizes service and sacrifice without ethnic distinction. He emphasized that the Banyamulenge, like other communities, are an integral part of DR Congo’s national life. President Félix Tshisekedi has echoed the same message. “There are Banyamulenge who have died for this Republic and under the flag,” the president said, adding: “I am tired of this discourse that seeks to stigmatize them, giving barbaric regimes like Rwanda an excuse to intervene under false pretenses.” ADVERTISEMENT Rwanda’s Narrative For years, Rwanda has accused the Congolese state of committing “genocide” against the Banyamulenge and Tutsi communities, a claim it has used to justify repeated interventions and the arming of the M23 rebellion. But Kinshasa insists these narratives are political manipulation. The posthumous honoring of Col Alexis Rugabisha, a Munyamulenge, highlights how the Congolese state recognizes the loyalty and sacrifice of all its citizens, directly undermining Kigali’s claims of ethnic exclusion. The government spokesperson highlighted that members of the Banyamulenge community have held senior roles in government, parliament, and the armed forces. This, he said, demonstrates their full participation in Congolese society. Trending Now Uganda HIV Self-Test Assembly: Prices, Jobs and Exports . Health News DR Congo and Russia Establish Permanent Economic Commission . Economic Policies DRC Exits FATF Grey List After Completing Reform Plan . Economic Reports Tshisekedi Champions Peace, Jobs and Africa’s Voice in Moscow . Politics & Diplomacy Popular Today Economic Policies DR Congo and Russia Establish Permanent Economic Commission . Economic Reports DRC Exits FATF Grey List After Completing Reform Plan . Politics & Diplomacy Tshisekedi Champions Peace, Jobs and Africa’s Voice in Moscow . Infrastructure DRC: Three Universities Modernized Under Félix Tshisekedi . War in DR Congo Tshisekedi: Sanctions Forced Kagame to Pull Kabila From His Cave . ADVERTISEMENT He cautioned against framing conflicts through the lens of ethnic marginalization in a nation of more than 450 ethnic groups, arguing that such discourse misrepresents reality and risks division. The real danger,” Muyaya added, “is that such discourse opens the door to manipulation by those seeking to destabilize Congo. Our fight is for unity and against those who exploit divisions.” ADVERTISEMENT Related Articles Economic Policies DR Congo and Russia Establish Permanent Economic Commission A new bilateral commission will coordinate trade, technology, technical cooperation... . Economic Reports DRC Exits FATF Grey List After Completing Reform Plan The October 30 decision recognizes reforms to combat money laundering and strengthen.... . Politics & Diplomacy Tshisekedi Champions Peace, Jobs and Africa’s Voice in Moscow At the 2026 Russia–Africa Summit in Moscow, Tshisekedi calls for peace in eastern Congo... . Infrastructure DRC: Three Universities Modernized Under Félix Tshisekedi New and renovated campuses in Kinshasa, Kananga and Mbuji-Mayi aim to improve higher education . Tags DR.Congo DR.Congo

From cross-border justice and UN diplomacy to critical minerals, Lobito rail and state reform, the evidence behind the DRC’s expanding reach under Félix Tshisekedi. For anyone still accustomed to treating the Democratic Republic of the Congo as a country to be ignored, bypassed, exploited or underestimated, Kinshasa is changing the calculation—and the world is beginning to respond. For three decades, the Democratic Republic of the Congo has often been described through what others did to it: invasion, rebellion, mineral plunder, displacement, foreign interference and institutional weakness. But under Félix Tshisekedi, a different question is beginning to emerge: what happens when Congo starts making others respond to it? In the last weekend of August 2026, that question acquired a human face. Tanzanian authorities arrested Congolese social-media personality Denise Mukendi Dusauchoy on their territory. They did so, according to the Congolese justice ministry, in execution of a warrant issued by Congolese judicial authorities through international-cooperation mechanisms. She was swiftly transferred to Kinshasa; on 2 September, prosecutors presented her to the public ministry and placed her under a provisional arrest warrant, Radio Okapi reported . Government spokesman Patrick Muyaya distilled the political message into a sentence: “Wherever you are in the world, justice will reach you.” That sentence is larger than the case—but the law must come before its symbolism. An arrest is not a conviction. The allegations reported by judicial sources remain allegations, the provisional warrant remains a procedural act, and Dusauchoy retains the presumption of innocence and the right to challenge both the accusations and the manner of her transfer. Those safeguards are not qualifications to Congolese sovereignty. They are among its tests. The episode nevertheless opens a window onto something real. A Congolese warrant produced an action by another sovereign state, outside Congolese territory, followed by a rapid return to Kinshasa. That is what institutional reach looks like in its most elemental form: a decision taken in Congo changes the choices available somewhere else. The more important investigation is whether the same pattern can be found beyond one arrest—in the eastern war, in international courts, in minerals negotiations, in rail concessions, in public finance and in the construction of alliances. Is the DRC becoming a state that is harder to ignore, bypass, exploit or underestimate? 1. The long arm of Congo The public record begins before Tanzania. In October and November 2025, the prosecutor-general at the Court of Cassation sent three international letters rogatory to Belgian judicial authorities concerning criminal files opened at the Kinshasa/Gombe prosecutor’s office. International arrest warrants were also issued in those proceedings, according to the [Congolese justice ministry statement reported by Xtrafrica] ). On 30 August 2026, Tanzanian authorities acted. The ministry thanked them for what it called diligent and effective cooperation. Congolese reporting, citing RFI , said Dusauchoy was transferred to Kinshasa that night. By 2 September, the domestic prosecutorial phase was visibly under way. Continue Reading Full Article INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE The Long Arm of Congo: How Tshisekedi Is Expanding DRC Power By Serge Kitoko Tshibanda Political Analyst Serge Kitoko Tshibanda Home Comment Sep 6, 2026 Sep 20, 2026 31 min read Copy link Facebook X (Twitter) WhatsApp Published Updated: For anyone still accustomed to treating the Democratic Republic of the Congo as a country to be ignored, bypassed, exploited or underestimated, Kinshasa is changing the calculation—and the world is beginning to respond. For three decades, the Democratic Republic of the Congo has often been described through what others did to it: invasion, rebellion, mineral plunder, displacement, foreign interference and institutional weakness. But under Félix Tshisekedi, a different question is beginning to emerge: what happens when Congo starts making others respond to it? In the last weekend of August 2026, that question acquired a human face. Tanzanian authorities arrested Congolese social-media personality Denise Mukendi Dusauchoy on their territory. They did so, according to the Congolese justice ministry, in execution of a warrant issued by Congolese judicial authorities through international-cooperation mechanisms. She was swiftly transferred to Kinshasa; on 2 September, prosecutors presented her to the public ministry and placed her under a provisional arrest warrant, Radio Okapi reported . Government spokesman Patrick Muyaya distilled the political message into a sentence: “Wherever you are in the world, justice will reach you.” That sentence is larger than the case—but the law must come before its symbolism. An arrest is not a conviction. The allegations reported by judicial sources remain allegations, the provisional warrant remains a procedural act, and Dusauchoy retains the presumption of innocence and the right to challenge both the accusations and the manner of her transfer. Those safeguards are not qualifications to Congolese sovereignty. They are among its tests. The episode nevertheless opens a window onto something real. A Congolese warrant produced an action by another sovereign state, outside Congolese territory, followed by a rapid return to Kinshasa. That is what institutional reach looks like in its most elemental form: a decision taken in Congo changes the choices available somewhere else. The more important investigation is whether the same pattern can be found beyond one arrest—in the eastern war, in international courts, in minerals negotiations, in rail concessions, in public finance and in the construction of alliances. Is the DRC becoming a state that is harder to ignore, bypass, exploit or underestimate? 1. The long arm of Congo The public record begins before Tanzania. In October and November 2025, the prosecutor-general at the Court of Cassation sent three international letters rogatory to Belgian judicial authorities concerning criminal files opened at the Kinshasa/Gombe prosecutor’s office. International arrest warrants were also issued in those proceedings, according to the [Congolese justice ministry statement reported by Xtrafrica] ). On 30 August 2026, Tanzanian authorities acted. The ministry thanked them for what it called diligent and effective cooperation. Congolese reporting, citing RFI , said Dusauchoy was transferred to Kinshasa that night. By 2 September, the domestic prosecutorial phase was visibly under way. What can be verified is narrower—and more useful—than some of the triumphalist commentary that followed. The disclosed chain runs from Congolese prosecutors and warrants, through Tanzanian cooperation, to Congolese prosecutors again. No official account reviewed for this feature identifies a separate operational role for a Congolese cyber unit or intelligence service. Nor has the government published the full Tanzanian surrender order, the complete charging instrument or the underlying interstate request. Congolese lawyers have publicly disagreed over whether all transfer safeguards were followed; a legal review carried by Radio Okapi recorded arguments on both sides. That matters because a capable state does not merely reach across borders. It creates a record that can survive judicial scrutiny. The strongest official statement in the file was therefore not Muyaya’s warning but the justice ministry’s reminder that the arrest “does not prejudge” guilt and that innocence is presumed until a final decision. Even within those limits, the operation demonstrates a change in practical possibility. Congolese legal decisions need no longer stop automatically at a Congolese border. Where treaties, reciprocal arrangements or state-to-state cooperation permit, Kinshasa can ask another government to locate and surrender a wanted person—and sometimes obtain a response in days. The reach of a sovereign state is measured not by the volume of its declarations, but by whether institutions beyond its borders act on them. 2. From a country acted upon to a country that acts The modern history of Congo supplied abundant reasons for defensive statecraft. From the wars that followed the 1994 Rwandan genocide to the multinational conflict that began in 1998 and the succession of armed movements in the east, outsiders often discussed the DRC as terrain: a vast place across which neighbours, militias, commodity networks and international missions moved. The UN’s history of the MONUC mission records the ceasefire effort, foreign forces and armed groups that followed. The emerging record does not erase that history. It changes the verbs. Kinshasa petitioned the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights against Rwanda in 2023. In June 2025, the court rejected Rwanda’s preliminary objections and held that it had jurisdiction and that the interstate case was admissible. The court referred to UN reporting when finding enough evidence of Rwandan armed-force involvement for the threshold question of extraterritorial jurisdiction, while expressly declining at that stage to decide state responsibility. The merits and any reparations remained for later determination . That is not victory on the merits. It is proof that the DRC placed a sovereignty claim before a continental tribunal and kept it there. At the United Nations, Congolese diplomacy helped turn the eastern crisis into a question on which the Security Council had to name actors and specify obligations. In June 2025, the DRC was then elected to a 2026–27 non-permanent Council seat with 183 of 187 votes, according to its foreign ministry . Membership does not confer a veto. It does give Kinshasa a daily seat inside the institution whose decisions it had been demanding others enforce. Regionally, the DRC joined the East African Community in 2022, adding an eastern commercial and political architecture to its existing central- and southern-African ties. The EAC records a country with a narrow Atlantic frontage, borders with nine states, extensive navigable waterways and a huge but thinly connected interior. Membership cannot substitute for roads or peace. It increases the number of tables at which Congo can negotiate them. This is the shift in its least romantic form: petitions filed, votes won, mandates written, committees occupied, contracts negotiated. A state that acts is not a state that always prevails. It is one whose demands acquire procedures, counterparties and consequences. 3. The diplomatic war over eastern Congo Kinshasa’s clearest diplomatic gain came on 21 February 2025. The Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 2773 under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The resolution did more than express alarm. It condemned Rwanda-Backed M23’s advances—including the seizure of Goma and Bukavu—stated that those advances had the direct support and participation of the Rwanda Defence Force, demanded that M23 cease hostilities and withdraw, and called on Rwanda to stop supporting the movement and withdraw its forces from Congolese territory without preconditions. The resolution called for action against illicit mineral trafficking, stronger traceability and due diligence, and restoration of Congolese state authority. Recording those provisions is not artificial “balance.” It is what makes 2773 powerful for Congo: sovereignty was affirmed inside a binding framework that also defined the state’s own responsibilities. The resolution altered the diplomatic vocabulary. What had often been treated abroad as another opaque rebellion was set out by the Council as an international peace-and-security file involving territorial integrity, a neighbouring army, parallel administrations and conflict minerals. ADVERTISEMENT Pressure followed through national and regional instruments. One day before the vote, the US Treasury sanctioned Rwanda’s then minister of state for regional integration, James Kabarebe, and AFC/M23 spokesperson Lawrence Kanyuka, along with two Kanyuka-linked companies. Treasury alleged that Kabarebe was central to Rwanda’s support for M23 and involved in managing mineral revenues from occupied Congolese areas. In March, the European Union listed nine people and the Gasabo Gold Refinery , citing responsibility for the conflict or illicit mineral trade. Britain suspended most direct bilateral aid to Rwanda, limited trade promotion and paused defence consultations, explicitly linking its measures to M23 and RDF actions in eastern DRC, in a February 2025 government statement . Their significance for Kinshasa was diplomatic attribution: names, entities and material consequences had entered official instruments. Washington became a negotiating venue as well as a pressure centre. The Congolese and Rwandan foreign ministers signed a US-facilitated peace agreement on 27 June 2025 . In December, the presidents endorsed a wider Washington architecture that included the earlier Declaration of Principles, the peace agreement and a Regional Economic Integration Framework. Tshisekedi’s own Washington statement insisted that economic integration must rest on reciprocal non-interference, the end of support to armed groups and respect for borders. The parallel Doha track brought Kinshasa and AFC/M23 representatives into direct negotiations under Qatari mediation. By August 2026, the parties had established a secretariat for an expanded joint verification mechanism and scheduled a first ceasefire-verification mission around Minembwe. But the Qatari foreign ministry’s joint statement also made clear that remaining protocols were still being negotiated. That limitation is decisive. The IMF reported in June 2026 that fighting and ceasefire violations persisted despite the Washington accords. Diplomatic leverage has not yet produced comprehensive peace or restored state authority across all occupied areas. The demonstrated achievement is more exact: Kinshasa moved Congo’s territorial claim into a binding UN resolution, sanctions regimes, an interstate African case and two internationally backed negotiation tracks. The world may still struggle to enforce the file. It can no longer plausibly say it does not know what the file contains. 4. Washington: Congo becomes strategic The new mineral strategy is not to ask the world to want less from Congo. It is to require that what the world wants builds more inside Congo. For decades, foreign powers wanted access to Congo’s minerals. The question inside Kinshasa is whether access can now be made conditional on things Congo needs: security, transport, energy, processing, skills, employment and investable institutions. The clearest formal answer so far is the US–DRC Strategic Partnership Agreement , signed and brought into force on 4 December 2025. Its language is unusually explicit. The United States recognises the DRC as a strategic partner; the two sides set objectives covering defence, protection of critical infrastructure and territorial integrity, responsible mineral flows, domestic value addition, industrialisation, geological data and formalisation of artisanal mining. The bargain has structure. Congo is to designate critical-mineral and gold assets for a Strategic Asset Reserve. Eligible US companies receive a first right to offer on projects in that reserve, while the final choice of proposal remains with the DRC under the agreement’s procedures. Kinshasa may also designate strategic projects based on local processing, jobs, infrastructure, state authority and livelihoods. A joint steering committee—five officials from each country—is charged with implementation and must meet twice a year. Its inaugural meeting took place in February 2026, according to the joint communiqué . The agreement is reciprocal, not an aid-only instrument: it states the US interest in secure supply for defence, energy, automobiles and advanced technology. It is also not a blanket transfer of Congo’s subsoil. The reserve creates preferential negotiating access, but Congolese law applies and Kinshasa retains the final selection. The sovereignty-first test is whether Congolese negotiators enforce the reciprocal side of the text: beneficiation, infrastructure, labour standards, transparent allocation and durable public benefit. Implementation has begun, but it remains early. In April 2026, US-based Virtus Minerals announced that it had received Congolese regulatory approval to acquire Chemaf’s copper-and-cobalt assets and had started inventory verification, technical assessments and restart planning. Reuters reported that production timelines still depended on completion of those preparations. It is evidence of an approved transaction under the new relationship—not evidence that the mines had already restarted or that promised volumes and jobs had been delivered. Development finance supplies another concrete layer. In 2024, the US International Development Finance Corporation announced a commitment of up to $553 million for the Lobito Atlantic Railway, covering rehabilitation and operation of the mineral port and roughly 1,300 kilometres of railway in Angola. The DFC’s own description makes the geography clear: that money supports the Angolan rail-and-port spine, not the still-to-be-modernised Congolese line. Its value to Congo is access—if Kinshasa completes its connection and secures fair operating terms. Washington’s growing attention follows industrial arithmetic. A July 2026 US presidential determination described import dependence and concentrated critical-mineral supply chains as national-security vulnerabilities. Congo can use that demand as leverage only if it has enough regulatory competence to compare offers, protect data and negotiate across competing partnerships. Tshisekedi signalled that boundary in June 2026 when an American aviation company proposed national geophysical mapping: the presidency said mineral data and resource sovereignty were a “red line,” while inviting a formal proposal. That was a discussion, not a contract . 6. The Lobito Corridor and the geography of power Congo’s scale is an asset on a map and a tax in a ledger. The country covers about 2.35 million square kilometres, yet the EAC profile records only a few thousand kilometres of paved roads and a fragmented rail network. Minerals produced around Kolwezi and Lubumbashi must cross borders and long distances before they reach a deep-water port. Transport cost is therefore not a secondary economic issue; it determines who can sell, what can be processed and where value accumulates. The Lobito Corridor is designed to change the western equation. Angola’s rehabilitated Benguela line runs from the Atlantic port of Lobito to the Congolese border. From there, Congo needs a reliable rail spine through Dilolo, Kolwezi, Tenke and the copper belt toward Lubumbashi and Sakania, with Zambia linked into a wider regional network. If synchronized, the system gives Congolese exporters an Atlantic route and gives Kinshasa bargaining room beyond older southern and eastern channels. In August 2026, Congo moved the domestic leg from negotiation to signature. The government approved—and then signed with Mota-Engil Africa—a concession covering financing, rehabilitation, modernisation, operation, maintenance and eventual transfer of the 1,004.5-kilometre Dilolo–Sakania railway. The announced investment estimate was $1.258 billion and the long-term capacity target 13.7 million tonnes a year, according to Actualite.cd ’s account of the cabinet approval and the Congolese Press Agency’s report of the signing . Lobito is larger than rail because a corridor coordinates systems. The bilateral US–DRC minerals agreement links Sakania–Lobito to open access, development finance and export-credit mobilisation. DFC financing supports the Angolan port and rail. The wider multi-party corridor memorandum also covers digital access and agricultural value chains , but those elements are at different stages and should not be presented as one completed megaproject. The wager is geographic. Atlantic access can shorten some export routes; Zambia adds regional volume; rail can support copper, cobalt and zinc as well as commercial freight; power and connectivity can make processing more viable along the route. The deeper prize is optionality. A Congo with several usable corridors can negotiate access. A Congo dependent on one bottleneck has access negotiated for it. ADVERTISEMENT 7. Minerals: from curse to negotiating power The DRC’s mineral leverage begins with concentration. US Geological Survey commodity summaries estimate 2025 Congolese mine production at 230,000 tonnes of cobalt —roughly three quarters of the global total—and about 3.2 million tonnes of copper , second only to Chile. The country also has important gold, coltan, tin and emerging lithium production. Those resources do not automatically create power. Market organisation, certification, logistics and negotiation do. The cobalt intervention of 2025 showed Kinshasa testing direct market power. After prices fell amid oversupply, the government suspended cobalt exports in February, later replacing the moratorium with quotas from mid-October. The regulator set 96,600-tonne export ceilings for both 2026 and 2027, well below 2024 output; the Financial Times reported that prices had already risen as supply tightened. Quotas impose costs and planning uncertainty on producers, and price movement has multiple causes. But the episode demonstrated a basic fact: a regulatory decision in Kinshasa could alter expectations across a global battery market. Lithium offers a second, earlier-stage example. On 22 July 2026, the Congolese mineral-certification authority, CEEC, certified the first Manono Lithium lots intended for export. Reporting from LePoint.cd said the agency had inspected supply sources and processing arrangements and was preparing laboratories in Manono and Kalemie plus a traceability office. This was certification of initial cargo, not proof of a mature national lithium industry. It nonetheless placed a Congolese public authority at the gate of a new export chain. Traceability is where sovereignty meets credibility. The CEEC’s statutory description gives it responsibility for testing origin, characteristics and lawful provenance under national and regional mechanisms. Resolution 2773, EU sanctions on a Rwandan gold refinery and the US–DRC partnership all converge on the same problem: minerals that move invisibly across borders can finance armed power while depriving Congo of revenue. Certification, customs data, mine-site control and enforceable due diligence make the state legible inside supply chains. Local processing remains the harder frontier. The DRC and Zambia’s battery-and-electric-vehicle initiative has identified land and produced a draft pre-feasibility study, with UN Economic Commission for Africa support; the UNECA record does not show a completed battery plant. Tshisekedi’s government has nevertheless succeeded in writing beneficiation and industrialisation into the US partnership and the Lobito logic. The task now is conversion: from negotiating language to refineries, precursor materials, skilled jobs, power supply and Congolese equity. The old “resource curse” frame treated geology almost as destiny. Congo’s new strategy treats concentration as a negotiating position. Its success will be measured by the domestic value captured after the signatures, not by the number of foreign delegations that arrive before them. 8. Building the state at home International influence is fragile when citizens encounter an absent administration, an impassable road or an analogue border. The domestic evidence under Tshisekedi is uneven, but it is increasingly concrete—and easiest to understand when each project is labelled honestly. Operational: On 1 September 2026, the transport ministry launched SYGREM, a digital freight-management platform developed through OGEFREM and PADS Corporation. It digitises freight documents including FERI and FERE, adds end-to-end shipment geolocation and online payment, and centralises some acts, receipts and accounts. The ministry describes fraud reduction and faster processing as objectives. Launch is verified; savings and additional revenue still need measured publication. Operational reform: The IMF says the General Directorate of the Treasury and Public Accounting became operational in February 2026, while spending authority was decentralised to four pilot ministries. It also cited a newly established economic and financial tribunal, continued work on a Treasury single account and the need to reduce emergency spending. In June, the IMF board completed programme reviews and released about $348.5 million, bringing disbursements under the Extended Credit Facility to roughly $1.03 billion. It estimated real GDP growth at 5.7% in 2025 and projected 5.6% in 2026. Those numbers document macroeconomic resilience, not universal prosperity; the IMF still called for faster governance and public-finance reform . Under construction: DP World appointed Mota-Engil to develop the first phase of the deep-water Port of Banana, planned with a 600-metre quay and annual capacity of 450,000 containers. DP World reported about 500 construction jobs in 2025. Its project announcement and employment update support construction, not completion. A functioning Banana terminal would give the DRC direct deep-water handling capacity; for now, it is a work site. Financed and effective, early implementation: The $400 million IDA credit for the DRC Digital Transformation Project became effective in June 2025. A World Bank status report found implementation “moderately satisfactory” in November 2025, with only $20 million disbursed, strategies and tenders for fibre links still being prepared, and technical assistance being mobilised for shared government platforms. The same report did confirm that the Universal Service Fund’s management and staff had been appointed. Targets such as 10,000 kilometres of new fibre and a unified e-services portal belong to 2029; they are not current results. Completed, local: In May 2026, Tshisekedi inaugurated a new municipal building in Ndjili while inspecting ongoing Kinshasa road works, including the Kabambare and Luemba–Maître Croquet axes. The presidency’s report distinguishes the completed civic building from roads still being worked on. It is not a national transformation by itself. It is a practical unit of state presence. Preparatory, not construction: The proposed Kinshasa–Brazzaville road-and-rail bridge remained at the concession-tender stage in May 2026. The two governments had concluded a tax-and-customs agreement and planned to relaunch the search for a private concessionaire. The estimated cost exceeded $800 million. The Congolese presidency did not claim that the bridge was being built. Financed preparation, not a new dam: The World Bank approved $250 million for the first phase of a wider Grand Inga development programme. The money is for studies, institutions, local infrastructure and safeguards—not construction of a new 42-gigawatt complex. Existing Inga 1 and 2 have combined installed capacity of 1,775 megawatts and operate at about 80% of that capacity, while only about one in five Congolese had electricity access when the World Bank published its project factsheet . These are not interchangeable achievements. Together, however, they show a state attempting to gain command over freight data, treasury operations, ports, municipal administration, rail, fibre and power planning. Capacity is built twice: first as an institution or asset, then as reliable service. Congo has examples on both sides of that divide. 9. Congo as an economic heart of Africa The economic-hub argument starts with scale but cannot end there. The World Bank estimates a population of 112.8 million in 2025, with 3.2% annual growth. It records 2025 GDP growth of 5.8%, 22.5% electricity access in 2024 and internet use at 20%. The same country data describe both a vast market and the infrastructure deficit suppressing it. Congo also possesses one of the continent’s most unusual combinations of routes: an Atlantic outlet, the Congo River and tributaries, access toward East Africa through its eastern borders, southern links into Zambia and Angola, and membership across overlapping regional communities. Its estimated 80 million hectares of arable land, recorded in the EAC country profile , and enormous hydropower potential add agriculture and energy to the mineral base. The evidence of movement is not one grand hub already in existence. It is the alignment of components: Banana under construction; Dilolo–Sakania signed; the Angolan Lobito spine financed; an EAC market relationship in force; a US agreement that explicitly links minerals to power, transport and processing; initial digital-transformation finance effective; and Grand Inga preparation restarted under a phased programme. Trending Now Uganda HIV Self-Test Assembly: Prices, Jobs and Exports . Health News DR Congo and Russia Establish Permanent Economic Commission . Economic Policies DRC Exits FATF Grey List After Completing Reform Plan . Economic Reports Tshisekedi Champions Peace, Jobs and Africa’s Voice in Moscow . Politics & Diplomacy Popular Today Economic Policies DR Congo and Russia Establish Permanent Economic Commission . Politics & Diplomacy Tshisekedi Champions Peace, Jobs and Africa’s Voice in Moscow . Investment Deals DRC Creates Task Force to Accelerate U.S. Minerals Deal . Peace For DRC Now Congo’s Minerals Are Global Power and Kinshasa should set the terms . International Justice The Long Arm of Congo: How Tshisekedi Is Expanding DRC Power . ADVERTISEMENT The logic is circular in the productive sense. Better corridors lower input costs. Lower costs make local processing more competitive. Processing creates a larger electricity market. Power supports digital services and industry. A population above 110 million turns infrastructure from an extraction route into a consumer network—if policy allows Congolese firms and households to connect to it. 10. Tourism and national image The global image of Congo is narrower than Congo. Five UNESCO-listed natural sites—Virunga, Kahuzi-Biega, Garamba, Salonga and the Okapi Wildlife Reserve—contain volcanoes, great apes, endemic species and some of the planet’s most consequential rainforest. UNESCO runs a dedicated biodiversity-conservation programme across them. The river, Congolese rumba, visual art, fashion and the creative economies of Kinshasa offer an identity that war reporting rarely captures. The government is trying to widen that frame. In July 2025, Tshisekedi opened the first World Music and Tourism Festival in Kinshasa, organised around a “rumba route for peace,” according to the presidency . The national tourism office lists a destination-image campaign and investment mapping under way. Football partnerships have put the “R.D. Congo – Coeur d’Afrique” mark on global platforms: FC Barcelona’s four-year agreement includes training-shirt branding and planned sports programmes; AC Milan’s agreement combines destination promotion with a planned academy and community facilities. Brand reach is real; tourism transformation is not yet complete. Conservation areas in the east still face security and access constraints, and UNESCO’s 2026 review kept Virunga under danger monitoring. Marketing cannot substitute for safe roads, aviation links, visitor services and protected ecosystems. But national image is itself an arena of sovereignty. A country perpetually represented by somebody else’s crisis loses tourists, investors and narrative authority. Congo’s effort is to make biodiversity and culture visible without denying conflict—to insist that the Republic is larger than the footage by which the world learned its name. 11. The Tshisekedi doctrine Congo’s transformation is not a finished condition. It is the accumulation of instruments with which a sovereign state can pursue one. There is no formally proclaimed state doctrine bearing Tshisekedi’s name. “The Tshisekedi doctrine,” as used here, is an analytical description of a pattern visible across otherwise separate files. Its first element is sovereignty through international law . Kinshasa is not abandoning moral protest; it is attaching protest to warrants, UN resolutions, sanctions submissions, interstate litigation and verification mechanisms. Its second is partnership without single alignment . Washington may offer development finance and security cooperation; Angola, Atlantic logistics; Qatar, mediation; Israel, technology and security discussions; African and UN institutions, judicial and diplomatic platforms. The aim is a network in which Congo has alternatives. Its third is mineral leverage tied to infrastructure . Cobalt quotas show a willingness to influence supply. The US agreement and Lobito concession attempt a more durable exchange: access for corridors, power, processing, data and jobs. Its fourth is regional integration from a continental centre . Congo’s nine borders, Atlantic opening, river system and EAC/SADC/ECCAS positions can be liabilities when the state is weak. Connected infrastructure can turn them into commercial reach. Its fifth is institutional visibility . SYGREM makes freight traceable; CEEC certification makes an export legible; a treasury directorate centralises public accounting; a joint steering committee converts a bilateral announcement into scheduled oversight. None guarantees integrity. Each creates a point at which performance can be measured. And its final element is reciprocity . Tshisekedi’s diplomatic language repeatedly asks that peace precede or accompany regional commerce and that mineral access produce local value. In Washington, Jerusalem and Davos , the vocabulary is “mutually beneficial” partnership. The phrase will matter only where contracts, budgets and output data make the mutual benefit visible. The doctrine’s strength is that it treats Congo’s scale as leverage. Its vulnerability is execution. The peace tracks are incomplete, sections of the east remain outside effective state control, major infrastructure is unfinished and millions still lack power and connectivity. Those facts do not negate the pattern. They identify the distance between newly acquired bargaining capacity and the Republic that bargaining is supposed to build. 12. The Republic the world can no longer afford to underestimate A Tanzanian authority executes a Congolese warrant. The UN Security Council names the external dimension of the eastern war and demands withdrawal. Sanctions authorities attach costs to people and companies. The African Court keeps Congo’s interstate case alive. Washington signs peace and strategic-minerals instruments in which Congolese territory, processing and infrastructure are written into the bargain. Angola and Congo advance an Atlantic rail architecture. Israel receives a Congolese president for talks across security, water, agriculture, energy and technology. At home, freight documentation goes digital, a treasury reform becomes operational, a deep-water port rises and a 1,004.5-kilometre rail concession is signed. Some of those facts are completed acts. Some are mechanisms in operation. Some are contracts whose worth remains to be proved. Together they answer the central question cautiously but clearly: the Democratic Republic of the Congo is becoming more difficult to bypass because Kinshasa is building more places where outsiders must encounter a Congolese decision. For decades, Congo’s size and mineral wealth made it a prize for others. Tshisekedi’s larger gamble is that those same assets—combined with diplomacy, institutions, infrastructure and strategic partnerships—can finally make the Republic a power in its own right. “Wherever you are in the world, justice will reach you,” Muyaya said of one arrest. In the larger story, the line expresses the image Kinshasa wants to project. Congo is no longer content simply to protest when its interests are violated. It wants the legal, diplomatic and economic reach to answer. Timeline: the evidence of reach Date Development Meaning 8 April 2022 DRC signs the East African Community treaty of accession An eastern regional trade and political platform becomes available to Kinshasa. 21 August 2023 DRC files an interstate case against Rwanda at the African Court Kinshasa converts sovereignty allegations into a continental judicial claim. 27 June 2024 World Bank approves the DRC Digital Transformation Project $400 million is committed; financing becomes effective in June 2025. 20–21 February 2025 US sanctions announced; UN Security Council adopts Resolution 2773 External support for M23 and the territorial-integrity question acquire named international consequences and binding demands. 3 June 2025 DRC elected to the Security Council for 2026–27 with 183 votes Kinshasa gains an active seat in global peace-and-security deliberations. 26 June 2025 African Court rejects Rwanda’s preliminary objections Jurisdiction and admissibility are upheld; merits are not yet decided. 27 June 2025 DRC and Rwanda sign a US-facilitated peace agreement A formal Washington track is established; implementation remains ongoing. 15 November 2025 Kinshasa and AFC/M23 sign the Doha Framework A direct political-security negotiation framework is established. 4 December 2025 US–DRC Strategic Partnership Agreement enters into force Critical minerals, security, infrastructure and local value addition are joined in a bilateral implementation mechanism. February 2026 Joint US–DRC steering committee first meets; Congolese treasury directorate becomes operational Two institutional mechanisms move beyond announcement. April 2026 Virtus receives approvals for the Chemaf acquisition First approved mining transaction associated with the new US partnership; restart work remains preparatory. 22 July 2026 CEEC certifies initial Manono lithium export lots Congo’s certification authority enters a new strategic-mineral chain. 20–26 August 2026 Doha verification mechanism advances; Dilolo–Sakania concession is signed Ceasefire monitoring gains an operational structure; the Congolese Lobito rail leg gains a contracted framework. 30 August–2 September 2026 Dusauchoy is arrested in Tanzania, transferred and placed under a provisional warrant in Kinshasa A Congolese judicial request produces cross-border action; guilt is not established. 1 September 2026 Tshisekedi meets Netanyahu and Herzog in Jerusalem Congo broadens high-level security, technology and investment diplomacy; delivery plans remain to be specified. Key numbers 112.8 million: DRC population in 2025, according to the World Bank. 2.35 million km²: approximate national territory. 5.7%: IMF estimate of real GDP growth in 2025. 5.6%: IMF projection for 2026 real GDP growth. 230,000 tonnes: USGS estimate of DRC cobalt mine production in 2025—about three quarters of global output. 3.2 million tonnes: USGS estimate of DRC copper mine production in 2025, the world’s second-largest national output. 1,004.5 km: Dilolo–Sakania railway covered by the signed concession. $1.258 billion: announced investment estimate for that rail modernisation. Up to $553 million: DFC commitment for the Angolan Lobito rail-and-port spine. $400 million: IDA credit for the DRC Digital Transformation Project. $250 million: World Bank financing for the first, preparatory phase of the Grand Inga programme. 183 of 187 votes: DRC’s election result for its 2026–27 UN Security Council seat. 450,000 TEU a year: planned first-phase container capacity at the Port of Banana. 96,600 tonnes: annual cobalt export ceiling announced for each of 2026 and 2027. ADVERTISEMENT Related Articles Economic Policies DR Congo and Russia Establish Permanent Economic Commission A new bilateral commission will coordinate trade, technology, technical cooperation... . Politics & Diplomacy Tshisekedi Champions Peace, Jobs and Africa’s Voice in Moscow At the 2026 Russia–Africa Summit in Moscow, Tshisekedi calls for peace in eastern Congo... . Investment Deals DRC Creates Task Force to Accelerate U.S. Minerals Deal The new DRC–USA Task Force will coordinate implementation as copper sales to U.S. markets expand . Peace For DRC Now Congo’s Minerals Are Global Power and Kinshasa should set the terms The DRC can use global demand for cobalt, copper, lithium and tantalum to secure peace, investment . Tags DRC Diplomacy & Peace DRC Diplomacy & Peace DR.Congo DR.Congo DRC Conflict & Security DRC Conflict & Security Featured News Featured News Felix Tshisekedi Felix Tshisekedi

Macron ended his Africa trip in Ethiopia after Kenya summit backlash, with talks on UN reform and African representation. French President Emmanuel Macron ended his Africa visit in Ethiopia on Wednesday after facing backlash during the Kenya leg of the trip, with talks in Addis Ababa focused on U.N. Security Council reform and inclusive global governance . Macron met Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed before holding discussions with African Union Commission Chairperson Mahamoud Ali Youssouf and U.N. Secretary-General António Guterres. The leaders recognized the need for stronger African representation in international decision-making, according to a readout cited by AP . The Ethiopia stop followed Macron’s appearance at the Africa Forward Summit in Kenya, where he drew criticism after interrupting a panel to rebuke a noisy audience. The moment spread on social media and added to wider debate over France’s effort to recast its relationship with African countries. During the summit, Macron called for permanent African seats on the U.N. Security Council and announced that France’s public and private sectors would mobilize $27 billion for investment across the continent. The Africa Forward Summit was co-hosted by France and Kenya and framed around a new partnership model. Guterres also backed reform, saying the current Security Council does not reflect global realities because Africa and Latin America lack permanent representation. After Macron’s meeting with Abiy, officials announced a $63.9 million loan funding agreement for Ethiopia’s green energy investment and digitalization program. Source: Associted Press GEOPOLITICS AFRICA Macron Ends Africa Visit in Ethiopia After Kenya Backlash By Serge Kitoko Tshibanda Political Analyst Serge Kitoko Tshibanda Home Comment May 14, 2026 May 15, 2026 2 min read Copy link Facebook X (Twitter) WhatsApp Published Updated: French President Emmanuel Macron ended his Africa visit in Ethiopia on Wednesday after facing backlash during the Kenya leg of the trip, with talks in Addis Ababa focused on U.N. Security Council reform and inclusive global governance . Macron met Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed before holding discussions with African Union Commission Chairperson Mahamoud Ali Youssouf and U.N. Secretary-General António Guterres. The leaders recognized the need for stronger African representation in international decision-making, according to a readout cited by AP . ADVERTISEMENT The Ethiopia stop followed Macron’s appearance at the Africa Forward Summit in Kenya, where he drew criticism after interrupting a panel to rebuke a noisy audience. The moment spread on social media and added to wider debate over France’s effort to recast its relationship with African countries. During the summit, Macron called for permanent African seats on the U.N. Security Council and announced that France’s public and private sectors would mobilize $27 billion for investment across the continent. ADVERTISEMENT The Africa Forward Summit was co-hosted by France and Kenya and framed around a new partnership model. Guterres also backed reform, saying the current Security Council does not reflect global realities because Africa and Latin America lack permanent representation. Trending Now Uganda HIV Self-Test Assembly: Prices, Jobs and Exports . Health News DR Congo and Russia Establish Permanent Economic Commission . Economic Policies DRC Exits FATF Grey List After Completing Reform Plan . Economic Reports Tshisekedi Champions Peace, Jobs and Africa’s Voice in Moscow . Politics & Diplomacy Popular Today Agriculture Kenya avocado rules: sea closure and oil-stock deadline . Agriculture Kenya–Nigeria Cattle Flight: How Livestock Air Cargo Works . Government Announcements Kenya eCitizen Oversight: Treasury’s Role and Payment Questions . Civil Society Yvonne Okwara Biography: Education, Career and Citizen TV Exit . Public Health Alerts Kenya Ebola Cases Reach Eight: Contacts Counted Separately . ADVERTISEMENT After Macron’s meeting with Abiy, officials announced a $63.9 million loan funding agreement for Ethiopia’s green energy investment and digitalization program. Source: Associted Press ADVERTISEMENT Related Articles Agriculture Kenya avocado rules: sea closure and oil-stock deadline Sea exports close on 30 October, with conditional air shipments and a separate oil-stock deadline. . Agriculture Kenya–Nigeria Cattle Flight: How Livestock Air Cargo Works A completed Nairobi–Lagos charter shows specialised capacity; costs and future services remain unclear. . Government Announcements Kenya eCitizen Oversight: Treasury’s Role and Payment Questions What established responsibilities and draft reforms mean for users seeking services and receipts. . Civil Society Yvonne Okwara Biography: Education, Career and Citizen TV Exit Her path from science and radio to political interviews, editorial leadership and public service. . Tags Kenya Kenya Ethiopia Ethiopia African Union African Union

UN holds talks with M23 rebels as DRC faces crisis; Rwanda-linked violence triggers deeper humanitarian emergency. In a delicate but important diplomatic step, the United Nations has opened a line of dialogue with leaders of the M23 rebel movement amid deepening humanitarian and security concerns in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). This development comes as the Congolese government continues to navigate a complex crisis worsened by foreign interference and rebel violence. Bintou Keita, the UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative and head of the UN Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO), personally traveled to North Kivu province last week to hold consultations with senior figures from M23 and their allied factions under the Congo River Alliance. The initiative, described as part of ongoing international efforts to restore peace, reflects the urgency of addressing the plight of civilians suffering from repeated displacements, insecurity, and instability. Keita noted that the engagement was intended to “listen and exchange” views with all relevant actors. While specific outcomes were not publicly disclosed, she emphasized the need for inclusive approaches at “a critical moment” when millions of Congolese remain at risk. The M23, which the Congolese government and several international observers have linked to direct support from Rwanda, has been responsible for major territorial gains and serious disruptions to civilian life, including attacks that have forced large-scale evacuations and humanitarian crises. The capture of key cities like Goma earlier this year dramatically escalated the conflict. “The pursuit of peace requires creative and committed diplomacy,” Keita stated, reinforcing the UN’s continued role in supporting the DRC’s sovereignty and civilian protection. Photos from the visit show Keita and her delegation engaging in a guarded yet hopeful exchange with rebel leaders. According to mission insiders, M23 representatives expressed interest in a peaceful resolution, a shift from previous patterns of military aggression and regional destabilization. However, challenges remain acute. Nearly a quarter of a million Congolese have been displaced in 2025 alone. Economic activities in Goma have nearly collapsed, airports remain non-operational, and social services are overwhelmed. Aid organizations continue to report severe shortages of food, medicine, and safe shelter, with insecurity making access increasingly difficult. In a related development, around 250 troops from South Africa began withdrawing from the region under SADC’s mandate following a tragic clash with M23 earlier this year, which resulted in the loss of 20 soldiers. MONUSCO acknowledged SADC’s efforts and reaffirmed cooperation during a follow-up meeting with regional commanders. This withdrawal highlights the ongoing strain on both regional and international efforts to protect civilians in eastern Congo, especially as armed groups, backed by foreign governments, maintain an aggressive posture. While the UN’s outreach to armed actors reflects a pragmatic effort to de-escalate tensions, there is understandable hesitation within Kinshasa and Congolese civil society. Many warn that negotiating with militias risks setting a dangerous precedent. Nevertheless, there is growing consensus that a sustainable solution must prioritize the Congolese people’s right to peace, dignity, and national sovereignty. Continue Reading Full Article By Author Name Author Name Home Comment Jun 14, 2025 May 15, 2026 3 min read Copy link Facebook X (Twitter) WhatsApp Published Updated: In a delicate but important diplomatic step, the United Nations has opened a line of dialogue with leaders of the M23 rebel movement amid deepening humanitarian and security concerns in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). This development comes as the Congolese government continues to navigate a complex crisis worsened by foreign interference and rebel violence. Bintou Keita, the UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative and head of the UN Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO), personally traveled to North Kivu province last week to hold consultations with senior figures from M23 and their allied factions under the Congo River Alliance. The initiative, described as part of ongoing international efforts to restore peace, reflects the urgency of addressing the plight of civilians suffering from repeated displacements, insecurity, and instability. Keita noted that the engagement was intended to “listen and exchange” views with all relevant actors. While specific outcomes were not publicly disclosed, she emphasized the need for inclusive approaches at “a critical moment” when millions of Congolese remain at risk. ADVERTISEMENT The M23, which the Congolese government and several international observers have linked to direct support from Rwanda, has been responsible for major territorial gains and serious disruptions to civilian life, including attacks that have forced large-scale evacuations and humanitarian crises. The capture of key cities like Goma earlier this year dramatically escalated the conflict. “The pursuit of peace requires creative and committed diplomacy,” Keita stated, reinforcing the UN’s continued role in supporting the DRC’s sovereignty and civilian protection. Photos from the visit show Keita and her delegation engaging in a guarded yet hopeful exchange with rebel leaders. According to mission insiders, M23 representatives expressed interest in a peaceful resolution, a shift from previous patterns of military aggression and regional destabilization. However, challenges remain acute. Nearly a quarter of a million Congolese have been displaced in 2025 alone. Economic activities in Goma have nearly collapsed, airports remain non-operational, and social services are overwhelmed. Aid organizations continue to report severe shortages of food, medicine, and safe shelter, with insecurity making access increasingly difficult. ADVERTISEMENT In a related development, around 250 troops from South Africa began withdrawing from the region under SADC’s mandate following a tragic clash with M23 earlier this year, which resulted in the loss of 20 soldiers. MONUSCO acknowledged SADC’s efforts and reaffirmed cooperation during a follow-up meeting with regional commanders. This withdrawal highlights the ongoing strain on both regional and international efforts to protect civilians in eastern Congo, especially as armed groups, backed by foreign governments, maintain an aggressive posture. Trending Now Uganda HIV Self-Test Assembly: Prices, Jobs and Exports . Health News DR Congo and Russia Establish Permanent Economic Commission . Economic Policies DRC Exits FATF Grey List After Completing Reform Plan . Economic Reports Tshisekedi Champions Peace, Jobs and Africa’s Voice in Moscow . Politics & Diplomacy Popular Today Economic Policies DR Congo and Russia Establish Permanent Economic Commission . Economic Reports DRC Exits FATF Grey List After Completing Reform Plan . Politics & Diplomacy Tshisekedi Champions Peace, Jobs and Africa’s Voice in Moscow . Infrastructure DRC: Three Universities Modernized Under Félix Tshisekedi . War in DR Congo Tshisekedi: Sanctions Forced Kagame to Pull Kabila From His Cave . ADVERTISEMENT While the UN’s outreach to armed actors reflects a pragmatic effort to de-escalate tensions, there is understandable hesitation within Kinshasa and Congolese civil society. Many warn that negotiating with militias risks setting a dangerous precedent. Nevertheless, there is growing consensus that a sustainable solution must prioritize the Congolese people’s right to peace, dignity, and national sovereignty. As the DRC prepares for critical national elections, the government remains focused on restoring territorial integrity and justice for victims of violence. The international community, particularly the African Union and UN Security Council, is being called upon to ensure that any peace process respects Congo’s rights, laws, and long-term stability. The Congolese people remain resilient and hopeful. For them, the path to peace must begin with the withdrawal of all foreign forces and a recommitment to dialogue that honors the country's sovereignty and the suffering endured by innocent civilians. ADVERTISEMENT Related Articles Economic Policies DR Congo and Russia Establish Permanent Economic Commission A new bilateral commission will coordinate trade, technology, technical cooperation... . Economic Reports DRC Exits FATF Grey List After Completing Reform Plan The October 30 decision recognizes reforms to combat money laundering and strengthen.... . Politics & Diplomacy Tshisekedi Champions Peace, Jobs and Africa’s Voice in Moscow At the 2026 Russia–Africa Summit in Moscow, Tshisekedi calls for peace in eastern Congo... . Infrastructure DRC: Three Universities Modernized Under Félix Tshisekedi New and renovated campuses in Kinshasa, Kananga and Mbuji-Mayi aim to improve higher education . Tags DR.Congo DR.Congo Rwanda Rwanda RwandanTroops in DRC RwandanTroops in DRC M23 Rebels News M23 Rebels News M23 Conflict Updates M23 Conflict Updates DRC Peace Efforts DRC Peace Efforts

Explore top pressure groups in Nigeria and how they influence politics, education, and national policy. Summary: Pressure groups in Nigeria play a major role in pushing for political, social, and economic reforms. From student unions to trade associations, they give voice to citizens and shape government policies. What is a Pressure Group? A pressure group is an organized body that seeks to influence public policy and decision-making without directly seeking political power. They don’t run for elections, but they influence those who do. These groups use lobbying, protests, media campaigns, petitions, and stakeholder meetings to press their demands. Top Examples of Pressure Groups in Nigeria Here are the most recognized and impactful pressure groups in Nigeria today: 1. Academic Staff Union of Universities (ASUU) Sector: Education Impact: Known for frequent strikes to push for better funding and conditions in public universities. Continue Reading Full Article By Author Name Author Name Home Comment May 28, 2025 May 15, 2026 4 min read Copy link Facebook X (Twitter) WhatsApp Published Updated: Summary: Pressure groups in Nigeria play a major role in pushing for political, social, and economic reforms. From student unions to trade associations, they give voice to citizens and shape government policies. What is a Pressure Group? A pressure group is an organized body that seeks to influence public policy and decision-making without directly seeking political power. They don’t run for elections, but they influence those who do. These groups use lobbying, protests, media campaigns, petitions, and stakeholder meetings to press their demands. ADVERTISEMENT Top Examples of Pressure Groups in Nigeria Here are the most recognized and impactful pressure groups in Nigeria today: 1. Academic Staff Union of Universities (ASUU) Sector: Education Impact: Known for frequent strikes to push for better funding and conditions in public universities. Influence: Directly shapes national conversations about education reform. 2. Nigeria Labour Congress (NLC) Sector: Labour/Workers' Rights Impact: Nigeria’s biggest trade union umbrella group. Fights for fair wages, pension reforms, and working conditions. Influence: Can shut down national activities through strikes. 3. Trade Union Congress (TUC) Sector: Trade & Industry Impact: Represents senior civil servants and professionals. Coordinates with NLC on major national labour issues. Influence: Engages in policy lobbying and economic pressure actions. ADVERTISEMENT 4. National Association of Nigerian Students (NANS) Sector: Education/Youth Impact: A student body that advocates for student rights, better campus welfare, and educational policies. Influence: Mobilizes protests and media campaigns during student crises. 5. Campaign for Democracy (CD) Sector: Civil Rights Impact: Fights for democracy, free elections, and human rights in Nigeria. Influence: Played a key role in Nigeria’s return to democracy in 1999. 6. Arewa Consultative Forum (ACF) Sector: Regional Advocacy Impact: Represents Northern Nigeria’s interests in national debates. Influence: Influences northern bloc voting patterns and national policy debates. 7. Ohanaeze Ndigbo Sector: Regional Advocacy Impact: Represents Igbo interests in national issues. Influence: A strong voice in debates around restructuring and marginalization. 8. Ijaw Youth Council (IYC) Sector: Resource Control/Minority Rights Impact: Defends Niger Delta interests and calls for oil revenue justice. Influence: Vocal in national discussions on environmental justice and amnesty programs. Trending Now Uganda HIV Self-Test Assembly: Prices, Jobs and Exports . Health News DR Congo and Russia Establish Permanent Economic Commission . Economic Policies DRC Exits FATF Grey List After Completing Reform Plan . Economic Reports Tshisekedi Champions Peace, Jobs and Africa’s Voice in Moscow . Politics & Diplomacy Popular Today Banking and Finance UBEC Funds: Unspent Grants and Nigeria’s Classroom Delivery . Banking and Finance Nigeria Borrowing Proposal: Projects, Approval and Loan Terms . Social Service Enugu Power Outage Guide: November Dates, Hours and Affected Feeders . Technology and Innovation Don Jazzy Tech Scholarship 2027: Apply, Deadline and Fees . Economic Reports Nigeria Public-Assets Bill: Proposed Commission Explained . ADVERTISEMENT 📢 Why They Matter Pressure groups play a vital role in any democratic society. In Nigeria: They give citizens a collective voice. They hold the government accountable. They promote transparency and reforms. They raise awareness on neglected issues like climate change, corruption, or police reform. 🧾 Quote Highlight Without pressure groups, many of our leaders would forget the voices of the people.” Adebayo Ojo, Civil Rights Advocate 🔚 Final Thought As Nigeria faces tough economic, political, and social challenges, pressure groups remain essential watchdogs. Whether you agree with their methods or not, their role in shaping Nigeria's future cannot be ignored. ADVERTISEMENT Related Articles Banking and Finance UBEC Funds: Unspent Grants and Nigeria’s Classroom Delivery The reported ₦264.12bn balance dates to July 2025; today’s classroom-delivery position needs updating. . Banking and Finance Nigeria Borrowing Proposal: Projects, Approval and Loan Terms Tinubu seeks dollar and euro financing, while project allocations and repayment terms need scrutiny. . 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XTRAfrica examines Joseph Kabila's leadership of the FRN, its continuity with AFC/M23 and the unresolved questions surrounding Rwanda's involvement. Joseph Kabila's emergence as leader of the newly announced Front pour la Refondation de la Nation raises a fundamental question: Has the rebellion in eastern DR Congo genuinely changed, or has its political identity simply been repackaged while its military structure and external alliances remain intact? On October 12, 2026, in Goma, the Alliance Fleuve Congo (AFC) and its associated M23 rebel movement announced a new politico-military structure: the Front pour la Refondation de la Nation (FRN). Former Democratic Republic of Congo President Joseph Kabila emerged as its leader, while familiar figures, including Bertrand Bisimwa, Corneille Nangaa and Sultani Makenga, retained prominent roles. The movement subsequently declared that it would inherit the AFC's previous commitments, including those associated with the Qatar-mediated Doha peace negotiations. At first glance, the announcement presents a new political organization with a former head of state at its helm. But a closer examination reveals a more troubling continuity. XTRAfrica's editorial assessment is that the creation of the FRN represents a political repositioning of the AFC/M23 rebellion rather than convincing evidence of a fundamental transformation. A new acronym cannot, by itself, change the identity of an armed movement, erase its history or resolve questions about the foreign military support that has sustained it. A New Name Does Not Create a New Rebellion Eastern Congo has experienced repeated cycles in which armed movements emerge, reorganize, fragment or adopt new political identities. The historical sequence is familiar: AFDL, RCD, CNDP, M23, AFC/M23 and now FRN. These organizations were not identical, nor did each simply change its name into the next. Their origins, leadership structures and political circumstances differed. Nevertheless, several operated within a broader history of Rwandan military intervention, regional power struggles and armed competition over eastern Congo. Continue Reading Full Article JUSTICE & CRIME M23 → AFC → FRN: Has Anything Really Changed? By Neema Asha Mwakalinga Travel & Culture Expert Neema Asha Mwakalinga Home Comment Oct 15, 2026 Oct 15, 2026 9 min read Copy link Facebook X (Twitter) WhatsApp Published Updated: Joseph Kabila's emergence as leader of the newly announced Front pour la Refondation de la Nation raises a fundamental question: Has the rebellion in eastern DR Congo genuinely changed, or has its political identity simply been repackaged while its military structure and external alliances remain intact? On October 12, 2026, in Goma, the Alliance Fleuve Congo (AFC) and its associated M23 rebel movement announced a new politico-military structure: the Front pour la Refondation de la Nation (FRN). Former Democratic Republic of Congo President Joseph Kabila emerged as its leader, while familiar figures, including Bertrand Bisimwa, Corneille Nangaa and Sultani Makenga, retained prominent roles. The movement subsequently declared that it would inherit the AFC's previous commitments, including those associated with the Qatar-mediated Doha peace negotiations. At first glance, the announcement presents a new political organization with a former head of state at its helm. But a closer examination reveals a more troubling continuity. XTRAfrica's editorial assessment is that the creation of the FRN represents a political repositioning of the AFC/M23 rebellion rather than convincing evidence of a fundamental transformation. A new acronym cannot, by itself, change the identity of an armed movement, erase its history or resolve questions about the foreign military support that has sustained it. A New Name Does Not Create a New Rebellion Eastern Congo has experienced repeated cycles in which armed movements emerge, reorganize, fragment or adopt new political identities. The historical sequence is familiar: AFDL, RCD, CNDP, M23, AFC/M23 and now FRN. These organizations were not identical, nor did each simply change its name into the next. Their origins, leadership structures and political circumstances differed. Nevertheless, several operated within a broader history of Rwandan military intervention, regional power struggles and armed competition over eastern Congo. That history matters because it provides a framework for examining the latest transformation. The central question is not what the FRN calls itself. It is whether the movement has substantially changed its command structure, military operations, territorial ambitions and external relationships. The available information about its formation offers little evidence of such a break. Senior figures associated with the AFC/M23 remain prominent. The armed forces previously operating under the movement's banner have not been shown to have dissolved. Nor has the announcement established that the organization has abandoned its military objectives or relinquished territory under its control. Indeed, the FRN's own declaration that it is assuming the AFC's commitments reinforces the argument that the new organization considers itself a continuation of the previous structure. ADVERTISEMENT A genuine political transformation requires more than a new name. It requires demonstrable changes in conduct, accountability and command. Joseph Kabila: A New Political Face for an Existing Armed Structure The most consequential development is not the acronym FRN. It is Joseph Kabila's emergence as the movement's leader. As a former president who governed the Democratic Republic of Congo for 18 years, Kabila brings a degree of national political recognition that the AFC/M23 leadership previously lacked. His presence potentially changes how the rebellion presents itself to domestic audiences, regional governments and international mediators. An organization previously identified primarily with armed commanders and rebel administrators can now place a former Congolese head of state at the center of its political messaging. From XTRAfrica's perspective, this is the most significant strategic purpose of the restructuring. Kabila's leadership offers the movement an opportunity to present a military rebellion as a broader Congolese political struggle. That distinction is important. For years, Rwanda has faced accusations of providing military support to M23. United Nations expert investigations have documented Rwandan military involvement and support for the movement, while Kigali has disputed accusations against it and emphasized its security concerns. Introducing a former Congolese president as the movement's principal political figure may help shift public debate away from external military involvement and toward an internal dispute over political power in Kinshasa. This does establish that Kigali orchestrated Kabila's appointment and the political advantages of such a shift are clear. Instead of international attention concentrating exclusively on Rwanda's involvement, the movement can seek to frame the conflict as a confrontation between competing Congolese political authorities. That is a consequential change in presentation, even if the military realities remain largely unchanged. ADVERTISEMENT The Rwanda Question Cannot Be Removed Through Rebranding Any serious examination of the FRN must confront the central issue that has defined international scrutiny of M23: Rwanda's involvement in the conflict. The United Nations Group of Experts has repeatedly documented support from the Rwanda Defence Force to M23, including findings concerning military operations and cooperation. Rwanda has rejected allegations that it is responsible for the rebellion and has cited threats posed by the FDLR and insecurity along its border. Those competing positions cannot be resolved by announcing a new organization. If the FRN inherits the AFC/M23's military structure, leadership and territorial presence, then the questions raised by international investigations remain directly relevant. Who supplies the movement? Who provides military assistance? What operational relationships exist between its commanders and external forces? Has any documented foreign military involvement actually ended? These are the questions that matter. The creation of the FRN does not answer them. Changing the political identity of a rebellion does not automatically change the origin of its weapons, the structure of its command or the sources of its military support. Until credible evidence demonstrates otherwise, the international scrutiny applied to AFC/M23 should also apply to its successor. The Doha Peace Process: Continuity or Strategic Repositioning? The FRN's decision to inherit commitments associated with the Doha peace process introduces another important dimension. On one hand, acknowledging existing commitments could preserve a basis for negotiations and avoid formally abandoning previous understandings. On the other, the declaration strengthens the argument that the FRN is not an entirely new organization. Trending Now Uganda HIV Self-Test Assembly: Prices, Jobs and Exports . Health News DR Congo and Russia Establish Permanent Economic Commission . Economic Policies DRC Exits FATF Grey List After Completing Reform Plan . Economic Reports Tshisekedi Champions Peace, Jobs and Africa’s Voice in Moscow . Politics & Diplomacy Popular Today Politics & Diplomacy Tshisekedi Champions Peace, Jobs and Africa’s Voice in Moscow . War in DR Congo Tshisekedi: Sanctions Forced Kagame to Pull Kabila From His Cave . War in Eastern DRC US Senators Urge NBA to Review Rwanda Ties Over Congo War . Justice & Crime How FRN Cannot Repeat AFDL's Success | XTRAfrica . Justice & Crime Kabila Is Helping Rwanda Disguise Its Aggression, Says Muyaya . ADVERTISEMENT A movement cannot reasonably claim complete separation from its predecessor while simultaneously asserting continuity over that predecessor's political obligations. The more important question is whether the restructuring changes the movement's actual negotiating position. Will it accept meaningful security arrangements? Will its forces withdraw from occupied areas under an agreed settlement? Will it cooperate with accountability mechanisms? Will civilians be protected? These practical commitments will determine whether the FRN represents a genuine opening for peace or simply a new political framework for an unresolved armed confrontation. The appointment of Joseph Kabila does not answer those questions. Rebranding Cannot Erase Responsibility for Past Abuses The eastern Congo conflict has been accompanied by grave allegations of killings, sexual violence, forced displacement, arbitrary detention and other abuses. Human rights organizations and United Nations investigators have documented serious violations involving multiple armed actors, including M23. The establishment of a successor organization does not eliminate potential responsibility for crimes committed under an earlier name. If individuals, commanders or units implicated in abuses continue operating within the new structure, the relevant allegations and evidence must remain subject to independent investigation. Political reorganization cannot serve as a substitute for accountability. Nor should international mediators allow a new organizational identity to obscure the responsibilities of armed leaders or the rights of victims. For Congolese civilians who have lost relatives, homes and livelihoods, the decisive issue is not whether the armed movement is called M23, AFC or FRN. It is whether violence ends, displaced communities can return safely, and those responsible for serious abuses are held accountable. ADVERTISEMENT Related Articles Politics & Diplomacy Tshisekedi Champions Peace, Jobs and Africa’s Voice in Moscow At the 2026 Russia–Africa Summit in Moscow, Tshisekedi calls for peace in eastern Congo... . War in DR Congo Tshisekedi: Sanctions Forced Kagame to Pull Kabila From His Cave The DRC president accuses Kagame of using Kabila's new rebel leadership to disguise Rwanda's role in... . War in Eastern DRC US Senators Urge NBA to Review Rwanda Ties Over Congo War US Senators Jeff Merkley and Marsha Blackburn urge the NBA to review its Rwanda partnerships . Justice & Crime How FRN Cannot Repeat AFDL's Success | XTRAfrica Why Joseph Kabila's FRN cannot simply repeat AFDL's 1997 victory: Rwanda's role, rebel rebranding . Tags DRC Conflict & Security DRC Conflict & Security DR.Congo DR.Congo Peace For DRC Now Peace For DRC Now Rwanda Rwanda Featured News Featured News

Listen to Dizzy Mandjeku songs, MP3 downloads, lyrics, and classic Congolese rumba hits from the Congolese music artist. Dizzy Mandjeku Congolese Guitarist Congolese Congolese rumba, Soukous Dizzy Mandjeku s' Top Xtrafrica Songs

Download YoYo by Virusi Mbaya ft. SewerSydaa Mkadinali. Stream and enjoy this hard-hitting street anthem trending now. Download YoYo – Virusi Mbaya ft. SewerSydaa Mkadinali 4.8 Download YoYo by Virusi Mbaya ft. SewerSydaa Mkadinali. Stream and enjoy this hard-hitting street anthem trending now. DOWNLOAD MP3 VIEW LYRICS Facebook X (Twitter) WhatsApp Pinterest Copy link Share this song Artist Virusi Mbaya Release Date April 19, 2026 Genre Quality Downloads Audio Player YoYo Virusi Mbaya 00:00 / 03:00 Official Music Video Song Details Artist: Virusi Mbaya Title: YoYo Featured: Genre: Release Date: Apr 19, 2026 Format: About the Song If you’re searching to download YoYo , the latest release from Virusi Mbaya featuring SewerSydaa Mkadinali, you’re in the right place. This track is quickly making waves with its bold energy and raw street vibe. “YoYo”… More Songs By More By VIEW ALL SONGS Trending Downloads From Kenya Vile Mi Hupenda Joefes . Kamata Mtu Breeder LW . Time Toxic Lyrikali . Welcome to Kanairo Buruklyn Boyz . IDWBU Victoria Kimani . Lost & Found Bien . Latest News About More By ADVERTISEMENT ADVERTISEMENT ADVERTISEMENT Hip-hop Kenya

Nigerian rap sensation Emeka Akumefule, widely known by his stage name Blaqbonez, has attributed the global ascendancy of afrobeats to Wizkid's chart-topping single "Essence." During a candid discussion in Los Angeles, where Blaqbonez shed light on his meteoric rise in the music scene, he also revealed his anticipation for an upcoming performance at the Grammys. Despite his burgeoning fame, Blaqbonez shared his initial skepticism about achieving such heights in his career. The artist, best known for his hit "Back In Uni," lauded "Essence," which features Tems' captivating vocals, as a turning point for the afrobeats genre. Blaqbonez's comments underline the song's critical role in propelling afrobeats to the forefront of the global music industry, marking it as a genre that not only captivates audiences worldwide but also promises a vibrant future. Continue Reading Full Article By Author Name Author Name Home Comment Apr 4, 2024 May 15, 2026 1 min read Copy link Facebook X (Twitter) WhatsApp Published Updated: Nigerian rap sensation Emeka Akumefule, widely known by his stage name Blaqbonez, has attributed the global ascendancy of afrobeats to Wizkid's chart-topping single "Essence." During a candid discussion in Los Angeles, where Blaqbonez shed light on his meteoric rise in the music scene, he also revealed his anticipation for an upcoming performance at the Grammys. ADVERTISEMENT Despite his burgeoning fame, Blaqbonez shared his initial skepticism about achieving such heights in his career. The artist, best known for his hit "Back In Uni," lauded "Essence," which features Tems' captivating vocals, as a turning point for the afrobeats genre. Blaqbonez's comments underline the song's critical role in propelling afrobeats to the forefront of the global music industry, marking it as a genre that not only captivates audiences worldwide but also promises a vibrant future. ADVERTISEMENT Trending Now Uganda HIV Self-Test Assembly: Prices, Jobs and Exports . Health News DR Congo and Russia Establish Permanent Economic Commission . Economic Policies DRC Exits FATF Grey List After Completing Reform Plan . Economic Reports Tshisekedi Champions Peace, Jobs and Africa’s Voice in Moscow . Politics & Diplomacy Popular Today ADVERTISEMENT ADVERTISEMENT Related Articles Tags

Cardi B has denied claims about her father’s alleged conviction after an AI-generated screenshot shared online was later disputed. Rapper Cardi B has dismissed claims circulating online that her father previously served a prison sentence, describing the allegations as false. The claims emerged after a post on X alleged that her father, Carlos Almanzar, had been convicted in Nassau County in the early 1990s and served a five-year jail term. The post included a screenshot that was said to be generated by Grok, an artificial intelligence tool developed by Elon Musk’s company, xAI. In response, Cardi B stated that her father has never been arrested in Nassau County. She added that he is an immigrant from the Dominican Republic and would have faced deportation if such a conviction had occurred. Speaking during an X Spaces session, the rapper said she would not allow what she described as false information about her family to continue spreading. She stressed that no court records or mugshots exist to support the claim. Grok later addressed the controversy, stating that the screenshot circulating online was fabricated. The AI tool said it had not made any claims identifying Cardi B’s father as a convicted offender and noted that no verifiable court documents were found. The incident sparked mixed reactions on social media, with some users calling for accountability over the spread of unverified information, while others urged the rapper to ignore the allegations. Source: TNX Africa Continue Reading Full Article ENTERTAINMENT Cardi B Denies AI Claim About Father’s Alleged Jail Term By Witty Pascal Entertainment Editor Witty Pascal Home Comment Jan 6, 2026 May 15, 2026 2 min read Copy link Facebook X (Twitter) WhatsApp Published Updated: Rapper Cardi B has dismissed claims circulating online that her father previously served a prison sentence, describing the allegations as false. The claims emerged after a post on X alleged that her father, Carlos Almanzar, had been convicted in Nassau County in the early 1990s and served a five-year jail term. The post included a screenshot that was said to be generated by Grok, an artificial intelligence tool developed by Elon Musk’s company, xAI. ADVERTISEMENT In response, Cardi B stated that her father has never been arrested in Nassau County. She added that he is an immigrant from the Dominican Republic and would have faced deportation if such a conviction had occurred. Speaking during an X Spaces session, the rapper said she would not allow what she described as false information about her family to continue spreading. She stressed that no court records or mugshots exist to support the claim. ADVERTISEMENT Grok later addressed the controversy, stating that the screenshot circulating online was fabricated. The AI tool said it had not made any claims identifying Cardi B’s father as a convicted offender and noted that no verifiable court documents were found. The incident sparked mixed reactions on social media, with some users calling for accountability over the spread of unverified information, while others urged the rapper to ignore the allegations. Trending Now Uganda HIV Self-Test Assembly: Prices, Jobs and Exports . Health News DR Congo and Russia Establish Permanent Economic Commission . Economic Policies DRC Exits FATF Grey List After Completing Reform Plan . Economic Reports Tshisekedi Champions Peace, Jobs and Africa’s Voice in Moscow . Politics & Diplomacy Popular Today Biography Poco Lee Biography: Age, Real Name, Dance Career and Songs . Biography Eric Omondi Biography: Comedy, Activism and Public Life . Biography Who Is Snit Habteab, Eritrea’s Miss World Trailblazer? . Entertainment Poco Lee UK Case Sparks Consent Debate Among Nigerian Stars . Entertainment FOLA Leads 2026 Headies Nominations Ahead of Toronto . ADVERTISEMENT Source: TNX Africa ADVERTISEMENT Related Articles Biography Poco Lee Biography: Age, Real Name, Dance Career and Songs Inside the Nigerian dancer’s rise from Ojo street shows to Afrobeats stages, music and global fame. . Biography Eric Omondi Biography: Comedy, Activism and Public Life How Eric Omondi rose through Churchill Show and became a prominent Kenyan activist. . Biography Who Is Snit Habteab, Eritrea’s Miss World Trailblazer? The neuroscientist and educator became Eritrea’s first Miss World entrant and reached the Top 6 . Entertainment Poco Lee UK Case Sparks Consent Debate Among Nigerian Stars The dancer faces five sexual offence charges and returns to court on September 15. . Tags Entertainment Entertainment United States United States

Taiwan’s president cancels Eswatini trip after African states deny overflight access amid China tensions. Taiwan President Lai Ching-te has cancelled a planned visit to Eswatini after several African countries denied overflight access to his aircraft, according to a government statement on Tuesday. The trip, which was scheduled for this week, would have taken Lai to Eswatini one of the few countries that maintains formal diplomatic ties with Taiwan. Officials in Taipei said Seychelles, Mauritius and Madagascar withdrew previously granted permissions for the presidential aircraft to cross their airspace as cited by reuters . Taiwan’s government attributed the sudden change to pressure from China , which claims the island as part of its territory and opposes any official international engagement by Taiwanese leaders. A senior official said the alleged pressure included economic considerations, though these claims have not been independently verified. Authorities in Seychelles and Madagascar confirmed denying overflight clearance, citing adherence to the long-standing “One China” policy that recognises Beijing as the sole legitimate government of China. Mauritius had not issued an official response at the time of reporting. Lai, in a public statement, said the cancellation would not alter Taiwan’s commitment to engaging with international partners, adding that external pressure would not deter the island’s global outreach. His visit to Eswatini was intended to mark the 40th anniversary of King Mswati III’s accession. The incident underscores the diplomatic constraints Taiwan faces globally, particularly in regions where China maintains strong political and economic influence. Continue Reading Full Article INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS Taiwan Cancels Eswatini Trip After African Airspace Denials by china By Neema Asha Mwakalinga Travel & Culture Expert Neema Asha Mwakalinga Home Comment Apr 21, 2026 May 15, 2026 2 min read Copy link Facebook X (Twitter) WhatsApp Published Updated: Taiwan President Lai Ching-te has cancelled a planned visit to Eswatini after several African countries denied overflight access to his aircraft, according to a government statement on Tuesday. The trip, which was scheduled for this week, would have taken Lai to Eswatini one of the few countries that maintains formal diplomatic ties with Taiwan. Officials in Taipei said Seychelles, Mauritius and Madagascar withdrew previously granted permissions for the presidential aircraft to cross their airspace as cited by reuters . ADVERTISEMENT Taiwan’s government attributed the sudden change to pressure from China , which claims the island as part of its territory and opposes any official international engagement by Taiwanese leaders. A senior official said the alleged pressure included economic considerations, though these claims have not been independently verified. Authorities in Seychelles and Madagascar confirmed denying overflight clearance, citing adherence to the long-standing “One China” policy that recognises Beijing as the sole legitimate government of China. Mauritius had not issued an official response at the time of reporting. Lai, in a public statement, said the cancellation would not alter Taiwan’s commitment to engaging with international partners, adding that external pressure would not deter the island’s global outreach. His visit to Eswatini was intended to mark the 40th anniversary of King Mswati III’s accession. ADVERTISEMENT The incident underscores the diplomatic constraints Taiwan faces globally, particularly in regions where China maintains strong political and economic influence. Trending Now Uganda HIV Self-Test Assembly: Prices, Jobs and Exports . Health News DR Congo and Russia Establish Permanent Economic Commission . Economic Policies DRC Exits FATF Grey List After Completing Reform Plan . Economic Reports Tshisekedi Champions Peace, Jobs and Africa’s Voice in Moscow . Politics & Diplomacy Popular Today Health News Uganda HIV Self-Test Assembly: Prices, Jobs and Exports . Banking and Finance Absa Dubai Office: Services, Eligibility and Contacts . Business & Investment 5 Best Citizenship by Investment Programs for Africans . Scholarships 120 EAC Master’s Scholarships Open to EAC Students — How to Apply . Scholarships UCT Mastercard Foundation Scholarship 2027 Opens to Africans . ADVERTISEMENT ADVERTISEMENT Related Articles Health News Uganda HIV Self-Test Assembly: Prices, Jobs and Exports Mukono factory assembles OraQuick kits, but the UGX 7,000 price remains a target . Banking and Finance Absa Dubai Office: Services, Eligibility and Contacts What African businesses and Gulf investors need to know about Absa’s new DIFC office. . Business & Investment 5 Best Citizenship by Investment Programs for Africans Compare five Caribbean second-passport programs, their investment costs, family benefits.... . Scholarships 120 EAC Master’s Scholarships Open to EAC Students — How to Apply Up to 120 EAC Master’s scholarships are open to nationals of eight East African countries, . Tags Africa Africa China China Eswatini Eswatini Taiwan Taiwan Xtrafrica News Xtrafrica News South Africa News South Africa News China in Africa China in Africa