The Endgame? How Tshisekedi Has Narrowed Kagame’s Diplomatic Space

Introduction: A Shifting Landscape in the Great Lakes

The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Rwanda have long been locked in a cycle of insecurity. Since the late‐1990s Rwandan troops have justified incursions into eastern Congo as necessary to pursue ex‑Rwandan Hutu militias, while Congolese leaders accuse Kigali of sponsoring rebellions to extract minerals.

President Félix Tshisekedi’s term has coincided with the resurgence of the March 23 Movement (M23), an armed group originally made up of Congolese Tutsi rebels. M23’s battlefield gains in 2024-25, widely attributed by United Nations experts to systematic support from the Rwanda Defence Force (RDF) and advanced Rwandan military technology, brought Goma, Bukavu, and Uvira to the brink. Facing a stronger Rwanda‑backed insurgency, Kinshasa has chosen diplomatic pressure and global partnerships rather than direct talks with M23. This article examines how Tshisekedi has narrowed Rwanda’s diplomatic space – through U.S. and UN pressure, refusal to legitimise rebels, soft‑power contests and economic realignment – and asks whether this strategy is approaching an endgame.

U.S. Policy Recalibration: Sanctions and Warnings

Washington has long maintained security cooperation with Rwanda while funding peacekeeping in the DRC. In recent years, however, U.S. policy has shifted. In 2023, Rwanda was placed on the Child Soldiers Prevention Act list because the United States concluded that Kigali supported M23, which recruits child soldiers, triggering restrictions on security assistance. Over the past two years, the U.S. has imposed targeted sanctions on M23 commanders and Rwandan officials, including M23 spokesperson Willy Ngoma (December 2023) and deputy commander Bernard Byamungu (August 2023). In February 2025, the State Department went further, sanctioning Rwanda’s minister of state for regional integration, James Kabareb,e and M23 spokesperson Lawrence Kanyuka. The statement described M23 as “Rwanda‑backed” and noted that the group’s offensives had seized territory and threatened civilians; Washington called on Rwanda to withdraw its forces and end support for M23.

U.S. diplomats reinforced these measures at the United Nations. In October 2023, the U.S. representative reminded the Security Council that Rwanda had been listed under the Child Soldiers Prevention Act and urged Kigali to stop supporting M23. After M23’s lightning offensive on the strategic city of Uvira in December 2025, U.S. ambassador Mike Waltz warned that Kigali was violating a U.S.‑brokered peace agreement, noting that more than 400 civilians had been killed and that Rwandan special forces were in Uvira; he vowed that the United States would use “the tools at our disposal” to hold spoilers accountable. Such remarks signalled that Washington was prepared to expand sanctions or curb aid if Rwanda continued to flout ceasefire commitments. This policy recalibration contrasts with earlier U.S. ambivalence and undercuts Rwanda’s image as a reliable security partner.

UN Scrutiny and Resolutions

The UN Security Council has increasingly framed the conflict around sovereignty rather than rebel grievances. Resolution 2773, adopted in February 2025, condemned M23’s offensives, demanded that the group cease hostilities and withdraw from occupied areas, called on the RDF to immediately withdraw from Congolese territory without preconditions, and urged Kinshasa and Kigali to resume diplomatic talks. By explicitly naming Rwanda’s support to M23, the resolution shifted the narrative from a “Tutsi rebel grievance” to an inter‑state violation of sovereignty.

Meanwhile, the UN Group of Experts reports have provided detailed evidence of Rwanda’s involvement. The 2024 mid‑term report concluded that a ceasefire failed because the M23‑AFC coalition was “systematically supported by the Rwanda Defence Force”, which provided advanced military technology to ensure the rebels’ dominance. The report documented the capture of the coltan‑rich Rubaya mine and the export of 150 tonnes of coltan to Rwanda, highlighting how the insurgency feeds regional smuggling networks. It also noted that a proposed concept of operations (CONOPS) to neutralise the FDLR and disengage Rwandan forces faltered because of mutual mistrust between Kinshasa and Kigali. Such findings bolstered Tshisekedi’s diplomatic arguments that Rwanda, not M23 grievances, is the engine of instability.