The Endgame? How Tshisekedi Has Narrowed Kagame’s Diplomatic Space

Introduction: A Shifting Landscape in the Great Lakes

The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Rwanda have long been locked in a cycle of insecurity. Since the late‐1990s Rwandan troops have justified incursions into eastern Congo as necessary to pursue ex‑Rwandan Hutu militias, while Congolese leaders accuse Kigali of sponsoring rebellions to extract minerals.

President Félix Tshisekedi’s term has coincided with the resurgence of the March 23 Movement (M23), an armed group originally made up of Congolese Tutsi rebels. M23’s battlefield gains in 2024-25, widely attributed by United Nations experts to systematic support from the Rwanda Defence Force (RDF) and advanced Rwandan military technology, brought Goma, Bukavu, and Uvira to the brink. Facing a stronger Rwanda‑backed insurgency, Kinshasa has chosen diplomatic pressure and global partnerships rather than direct talks with M23. This article examines how Tshisekedi has narrowed Rwanda’s diplomatic space – through U.S. and UN pressure, refusal to legitimise rebels, soft‑power contests and economic realignment – and asks whether this strategy is approaching an endgame.

U.S. Policy Recalibration: Sanctions and Warnings

Washington has long maintained security cooperation with Rwanda while funding peacekeeping in the DRC. In recent years, however, U.S. policy has shifted. In 2023, Rwanda was placed on the Child Soldiers Prevention Act list because the United States concluded that Kigali supported M23, which recruits child soldiers, triggering restrictions on security assistance. Over the past two years, the U.S. has imposed targeted sanctions on M23 commanders and Rwandan officials, including M23 spokesperson Willy Ngoma (December 2023) and deputy commander Bernard Byamungu (August 2023). In February 2025, the State Department went further, sanctioning Rwanda’s minister of state for regional integration, James Kabareb,e and M23 spokesperson Lawrence Kanyuka. The statement described M23 as “Rwanda‑backed” and noted that the group’s offensives had seized territory and threatened civilians; Washington called on Rwanda to withdraw its forces and end support for M23.

U.S. diplomats reinforced these measures at the United Nations. In October 2023, the U.S. representative reminded the Security Council that Rwanda had been listed under the Child Soldiers Prevention Act and urged Kigali to stop supporting M23. After M23’s lightning offensive on the strategic city of Uvira in December 2025, U.S. ambassador Mike Waltz warned that Kigali was violating a U.S.‑brokered peace agreement, noting that more than 400 civilians had been killed and that Rwandan special forces were in Uvira; he vowed that the United States would use “the tools at our disposal” to hold spoilers accountable. Such remarks signalled that Washington was prepared to expand sanctions or curb aid if Rwanda continued to flout ceasefire commitments. This policy recalibration contrasts with earlier U.S. ambivalence and undercuts Rwanda’s image as a reliable security partner.

UN Scrutiny and Resolutions

The UN Security Council has increasingly framed the conflict around sovereignty rather than rebel grievances. Resolution 2773, adopted in February 2025, condemned M23’s offensives, demanded that the group cease hostilities and withdraw from occupied areas, called on the RDF to immediately withdraw from Congolese territory without preconditions, and urged Kinshasa and Kigali to resume diplomatic talks. By explicitly naming Rwanda’s support to M23, the resolution shifted the narrative from a “Tutsi rebel grievance” to an inter‑state violation of sovereignty.

Meanwhile, the UN Group of Experts reports have provided detailed evidence of Rwanda’s involvement. The 2024 mid‑term report concluded that a ceasefire failed because the M23‑AFC coalition was “systematically supported by the Rwanda Defence Force”, which provided advanced military technology to ensure the rebels’ dominance. The report documented the capture of the coltan‑rich Rubaya mine and the export of 150 tonnes of coltan to Rwanda, highlighting how the insurgency feeds regional smuggling networks. It also noted that a proposed concept of operations (CONOPS) to neutralise the FDLR and disengage Rwandan forces faltered because of mutual mistrust between Kinshasa and Kigali. Such findings bolstered Tshisekedi’s diplomatic arguments that Rwanda, not M23 grievances, is the engine of instability.

Narrative Shift: M23 as Proxy, Not Partner

Tshisekedi’s government has consistently refused to treat M23 as a legitimate interlocutor. While his predecessor Joseph Kabila negotiated the 2013 Nairobi Accord with M23, Tshisekedi declined to meet rebel leaders during the 2023–25 offensives. U.S. and UN statements echoed this posture, characterising M23 as a proxy. For instance, an official U.S. fact‑check noted that the United States had sanctioned M23 and urged Rwanda to end its support. In the mid‑term UN report, analysts described the coalition’s success as a direct result of RDF support. By framing M23 as Rwanda’s instrument rather than as a Congolese movement, Kinshasa and its partners delegitimised calls for political concessions.

Rwandan officials nevertheless sought to justify cooperation with M23 on security grounds. In January 2026, Rwanda’s ambassador to Washington, Mathilde Mukantabana, acknowledged that Kigali engages in “security coordination” with the M23‑aligned Alliance Fleuve Congo (AFC). She said this cooperation is meant to protect vulnerable Tutsi communities, is time‑bound and conditional, and will cease when the FDLR is neutralised. She emphasised that Rwanda does not seek to dictate DRC politics and would draw down its defensive measures once Congolese authorities address cross‑border threats. While this admission clarifies Rwanda’s rationale, it also reinforces the narrative of Rwanda’s direct involvement and gives Kinshasa grounds to insist on withdrawal.

Refusal to Legitimize M23 Diplomatically

The Washington Peace Agreement, signed in June 2025 under U.S. mediation, formalised Tshisekedi’s refusal to engage M23 as an equal. The agreement reaffirmed mutual respect for sovereignty and explicitly prohibited state support to armed groups, committing DRC and Rwanda not to conduct or condone military incursions into each other’s territory. It also endorsed a joint security coordination mechanism to implement the CONOPS for FDLR neutralisation and Rwandan disengagement, but importantly, it did not include M23 representatives. Subsequent meetings of the joint mechanism in Washington reviewed progress and emphasised the implementation of the CONOPS to neutralise the FDLR and lift Rwanda’s defensive measures. By sidelining M23, the agreement signalled that the conflict must be resolved through state‑to‑state arrangements rather than through negotiations with rebels.

In December 2025, M23 captured Uvira with significant Rwandan military support, then withdrew after U.S. pressure. Analysts described the offensive as a breach of the Washington Accords and noted that the UN assessed that Rwanda maintained command and control over M23 operations. U.S. officials threatened further sanctions, and the episode underscored the fragility of the peace mechanism. Tshisekedi’s insistence that M23 be excluded from political talks remains controversial; however, the siege of Uvira and the high civilian death toll (over 400 people) make it unlikely that Kinshasa will alter its stance.

Soft‑Power Contest: Francophonie Leadership

Diplomatic pressure has also extended to cultural institutions. In February 2026, the DRC announced it would field a candidate to challenge Rwandan incumbent Louise Mushikiwabo for the secretary‑general position at the Organisation internationale de la Francophonie (OIF). The move signalled Kinshasa’s bid to contest Rwanda’s soft‑power influence: Congolese officials criticised the paradox of an English‑speaking Commonwealth member leading the French‑language organisation and argued that the DRC, with its large francophone population, should head the OIF. Kinshasa had even considered leaving the OIF but opted instead to stay and lobby for leadership. By targeting Rwanda’s diplomatic prestige, Tshisekedi is widening the field of confrontation beyond the battlefield.

Economic Realignment: Minerals and the Lobito Corridor

Another pillar of Tshisekedi’s strategy is to deepen partnerships that bypass Rwanda’s informal mineral networks. In December 2025, the DRC andthe United States signed a Strategic Partnership Agreement to cooperate on security, critical minerals, and infrastructure. The accord identifies the Sakania–Lobito Corridor – a rail corridor linking the DRC’s copperbelt to Angola’s Atlantic port – as a priority project and commits to increasing U.S. private investment while strengthening governance in Congo’s mining sector. It aims to ensure responsible mining and local value addition so that U.S. companies gain long‑term access to critical minerals.

The inaugural meeting of the partnership’s Joint Steering Committee in February 2026 designated strategic mineral assets and promised preferential access for U.S. firms. Participants underscored that peace and security are prerequisites and encouraged private investment to accelerate the Sakania–Lobito corridor. A report by the Atlantic Council notes that the Lobito Corridor has already connected Zambia and the DRC to Angola’s port and demonstrates how collaborative partnerships can unlock mineral wealth and promote regional integration. By aligning with U.S. and international investors, Kinshasa seeks to reduce reliance on supply chains that pass through Rwanda and to build leverage in diplomatic disputes.

Uvira Incident and Conditional Diplomacy

The Uvira offensive illustrates both the risks and the efficacy of Tshisekedi’s approach. M23’s capture of Uvira triggered fierce U.S. condemnation and threatened to derail the Washington Accords. The Guardian reported that the offensive left more than 400 people dead and that Rwandan special forces were present in the city; ambassador Waltz warned that Rwanda risked drawing the region into a broader war. Under U.S. pressure, M23 withdrew within days. Yet the incident showed that the peace mechanism still allows Rwanda to calibrate violence. Rwanda’s ambassador later justified “security coordination” with M23 as a defence against genocidal threats and insisted that coordination would end once the FDLR is dismantled. This conditional diplomacy – linking Rwanda’s disengagement to DRC’s progress against the FDLR – is built into the Washington Accord’s CONOPS. Tshisekedi must therefore balance pressure on Rwanda with credible steps to address the FDLR and other Congolese militias, lest Kigali invoke security clauses to prolong its presence.

Conclusion: An Endgame

By leveraging U.S. sanctions, UN resolutions, and new economic partnerships, Tshisekedi has narrowed Rwanda’s diplomatic and economic manoeuvring space. He has re‑framed M23 not as a legitimate Tutsi movement but as a Rwandan proxy; refused direct talks with rebels; challenged Rwanda’s leadership in francophone institutions; and aligned with Washington on infrastructure and mineral projects that skirt Rwandan transit routes. These moves have yielded tangible results: U.S. sanctions have targeted Rwandan officials, UN resolutions now name Rwanda as a spoiler, and M23’s withdrawal from Uvira demonstrates the leverage of coordinated pressure.