Tshisekedi’s Rubaya Strategy: A Calculated Warning to Rwanda and M23

In late April 2024, the M23 insurgency, supported by the Rwanda Defence Force (RDF), seized the mining town of Rubaya in North Kivu and its adjoining coltan pits. United Nations experts later described how the rebels set up a parallel administration, controlling “mining, trade, transport and taxation” and monopolizing exports to Rwanda. By levying a $ 7-per-kilogram tax on coltan and enforcing exclusive trading routes, M23 collected at least $800 000 per month. Rubaya produces an estimated 15% of the world’s coltan, a tantalum-rich ore essential for electronics, and now funds a conflict that has displaced hundreds of thousands in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).

Kinshasa’s response has been to transform Rubaya from a revenue source for armed actors into a diplomatic trap for their backers. In February 2026, Reuters reported that President Félix Tshisekedi’s government quietly included the rebel‑held Rubaya coltan mine on a shortlist of strategic assets offered to the United States under a minerals‑cooperation framework. A senior Congolese official and a U.S. diplomat confirmed that the list was presented to a DRC‑U.S. meeting in Washington on 5 February 2026. By incorporating a mine he does not control into a bilateral partnership, Tshisekedi is asserting sovereignty, inviting American involvement, and raising the cost for Rwanda and M23 to hold the territory. In chess terms, it is not checkmate, but it is a forced sequence.

How control of Rubaya funds conflict

The UN Group of Experts on the DRC documented how the M23/RDF alliance transformed Rubaya into a revenue machine. After capturing the area on 30 April 2024, the rebels set up permits for miners and traders, doubled miners’ wages to keep production flowing, and imposed taxes on each kilogram of coltan or cassiterite. Convoys carrying up to 5 tons of coltan left twice a week, and UN investigators estimated that at least 120 tons per month were exported to Rwanda. Once across the border, Congolese ore was mixed with Rwandan production, creating “ the largest contamination of 3T mineral supply chains ” in the region. Reuters reporters who visited Rubaya in March 2025 were told by M23 officials that the group imposed a 15 % tax on coltan purchases. The UN concluded that M23 “levied at least $800 000 per month” from coltan and manganese.

The capture of Rubaya fits into a broader pattern. UN Security Council resolution 2773 (2025) condemned M23’s offensives, ordered the group to cease hostilities and withdraw, and called on the Rwanda Defence Force to cease support and immediately withdraw from the DRC. A U.S. statement to the Security Council reiterated that “ M23 must fully withdraw … Rwanda must cease support for M23 and withdraw all troops”. The EU, in a January 2025 statement, similarly urged “Rwanda’s military presence in the DRC [to] cease” and warned that those sustaining the conflict would face “all tools at its disposal”. Despite these admonitions, M23’s parallel administration has endured, financed by Rubaya’s ore and sheltered by Kigali’s denials.

The Washington Peace Agreement and renewed pressure on Kigali

In December 2025, the DRC and Rwanda signed the Washington Peace Agreement, brokered by the United States, Qatar, and the African Union. The pact is built on six pillars: respect for territorial integrity; cessation of hostilities; disarmament and conditional reintegration of non‑state armed groups; regional economic cooperation; protection of civilians; and a joint security mechanism. It requires the withdrawal of Rwandan troops, prohibits state support for armed groups, and establishes a joint oversight committee. Despite the agreement, M23 launched a major offensive in December 2025, seizing the city of Uvira. U.S. officials condemned the attack as a “clear violation” of the Washington Accords and warned that Rwanda’s military actions were a “grave mistake”. Lucy Tamlyn, U.S. ambassador to the DRC, said Washington was weighing “all possible tools” to uphold the framework. French media later reported that the United States considered sanctions on Rwandan officials and that withholding economic components of the Washington Accords could cost Kigali billions of dollars.

By including Rubaya in the strategic asset list, Tshisekedi is effectively tying the mine to the U.S.–DRC Strategic Partnership Agreement, signed in December 2025. The agreement’s objectives include facilitating increased investment by U.S. persons, ensuring durable supply chains for critical minerals, promoting responsible mining, and combating the use of minerals to finance conflict. It establishes a Strategic Asset Reserve (SAR): within 30 days, the DRC must designate priority mineral assets, and the list can only be updated in consultation with the United States. By placing Rubaya on this list, Kinshasa signals that any party obstructing its return to state control may jeopardize U.S. investment and invite sanctions.

Turning a contested mine into a diplomatic lever

Reuters reported that Kinshasa’s document emphasised that Rubaya could deliver a “fully traceable, conflict‑free” tantalum supply compliant with U.S. procurement rules. The DRC estimates the mine needs $50 million–$150 million to restart and ramp up commercial output, with rapid cost recovery expected due to soaring global demand. Rubaya’s ore, containing tantalum concentrations of 20-40 %, is essential for semiconductors and aerospace components. By offering this prize in a U.S. partnership, Tshisekedi internationalizes the conflict zone and invites American scrutiny of supply chains. It forces Rwanda to choose between maintaining M23’s occupation, risking U.S. sanctions, and exclusion from lucrative projects.

This strategy draws on precedents. In July 2024, the U.S. Treasury sanctioned PARECO‑FF and associated companies for illegal mining operations and taxation schemes in Rubaya, noting that minerals smuggled through Rwanda fuelled conflict. Under Secretary John K. Hurley warned that the Treasury “will not hesitate to take action against groups that deny the United States and our allies access to the critical minerals vital for our national defense”. These sanctions show Washington’s readiness to punish entities operating in Rubaya’s illicit supply chains. A senior M23 official acknowledged to Reuters that Kinshasa’s decision to list Rubaya “aims to draw the U.S. into recovering the area militarily,” a telling admission that the rebels view the minerals partnership as a threat.

Endgame logic: narrowing Kigali’s room to manoeuvre

The Rubaya illustrates the strategic contest between Presidents Félix Tshisekedi and Paul Kagame. Kigali’s advantage has long rested on plausible deniability: the ability to support M23 while claiming to protect Rwanda’s security and to profit from coltan without being held accountable. Tshisekedi’s Rubaya strategy seeks to raise the diplomatic and economic cost of this posture. By internationalizing a contested mine, tying its future to U.S. supply‑chain security and embedding it in a treaty that mandates responsible mining, Kinshasa is shaping the terms of engagement. The listing sends a message: if Rwanda continues to back M23, it risks losing access to U.S. investment and facing new sanctions, consequences that may weigh heavily as Kigali seeks to diversify its economy and maintain its global partnerships.

Ultimately, the move is less about selling what Kinshasa does not control and more about asserting sovereignty over its mineral wealth and leveraging Washington’s commitment to secure critical supplies. The UN, EU, and United States have all publicly connected Rwanda to M23 and denounced the illegal exploitation of Congolese resources. By drawing Rubaya into the U.S. partnership, Tshisekedi limits Kigali’s options. Rubaya’s listing forces a sequence in which continued occupation becomes increasingly costly, diplomacy becomes conditional on compliance, and the international spotlight intensifies on those profiting from Congo’s minerals.