Since M23 resumed major operations in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo in late 2021, President Paul Kagame's government has repeatedly placed two concerns at the center of its explanation for its involvement: the continued presence of the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) and threats facing Congolese Tutsi communities. Kigali maintains that its measures are defensive and that AFC/M23 has legitimate Congolese grievances.

None of these realities, however, settles the separate question of whether Rwanda may deploy forces inside a neighboring sovereign country or assist an armed movement in taking and administering its towns.

That distinction is central to Kinshasa's position: a state can have real security concerns without gaining an unlimited right to intervene militarily across an international border. The evidence collected by international investigators increasingly focuses not simply on rhetoric or grievances, but on Rwandan troop deployments in DRC, operational command, territorial administration, forced recruitment and revenue from minerals.

The argument was dramatically sharpened on October 12, 2026, when former president Joseph Kabila was announced as leader of the Front pour la Refondation de la Nation (FRN), a new political-military coalition replacing the AFC/M23 arrangement. Rebel figures Corneille Nangaa, Bertrand Bisimwa, Freddy Kaniki and Sultani Makenga were named among its senior leadership. The FRN has openly connected a former head of state to the armed coalition seeking political change in Kinshasa.

For critics of Kagame and Kabila, the question is unavoidable: if the original justification was protection from the FDLR, why has the armed movement's political mission expanded to changing who governs the DRC?

1. The FDLR argument: a real threat, but not a blank cheque

Kigali's longest-running security argument concerns the FDLR, an armed group operating in eastern Congo whose origins are allegedly linked to forces responsible for the 1994 Rwandan genocide.

Rwanda says Congolese military cooperation with FDLR elements has deepened the danger. In January 2026 testimony published by Rwanda's defence ministry, Ambassador Mathilde Mukantabana openly acknowledged security coordination with AFC/M23 and said it was intended to prevent renewed cross-border threats. She described the movement as an independent Congolese organization and argued that Rwanda's security measures would be reduced in line with verified FDLR disarmament.

But the United States has sanctioned commanders from both FDLR and M23, reflecting a crucial point: one armed group's atrocities do not justify another armed group's violations. Under the Washington peace framework, the neutralization of the FDLR and the disengagement of Rwandan forces or removal of defensive measures are linked commitments, not substitutes for one another.

Kinshasa's challenge to Kagame therefore rests on a question of proportionality, legality and accountability. Evidence of FDLR abuses must lead to lawful disarmament and protection of civilians, not to an indefinite transfer of Congolese territory into the hands of an armed coalition.