Kagame Refuses to Withdraw Troops from Congo, Defying U.S. Pressure

When Rwandan President Paul Kagame signed the Washington Accord with Congolese President Félix Tshisekedi at the White House on 4 December 2025, U.S. officials presented it as a breakthrough to end decades of conflict in eastern Congo, built on reciprocal commitments: Kinshasa would neutralise the FDLR, while Rwanda would relocate its so-called “defensive measures”, a term widely understood to include military deployments inside Congolese territory. Kigali signaled that once these conditions were met, its forces would withdraw, opening the way to normalized relations. Yet just four months later, the agreement is already under strain.

In late March, U.S. senior adviser for Africa Massad Boulos told the UN Security Council that Rwanda was failing to meet its obligations, calling for the immediate lifting of the so-called defensive measures and the withdrawal of Rwandan troops. The statement reflects growing frustration in Washington and among mediators, but in a recent interview with Jeune Afrique, Kagame openly rejected these demands, signaling no intention to pull back and exposing a widening gap between the commitments of the Washington Accord and the reality on the ground.

Rebranding an intervention

At the heart of Kagame’s defiance is a semantic sleight‑of‑hand. In the interview, he insisted that Rwanda’s presence in eastern Congo should be understood as a “defensive” response to threats emanating from the FDLR. “If I defend my border and for that it is necessary to address the threat five, ten, or twenty kilometres beyond, it remains a defensive measure,” he said. The Rwandan leader acknowledged that these measures include “troop deployments and operations beyond its territory”. He reiterated the point later: “We refuse to lift the defensive measures, whether it’s the troops or any other apparatus,” and challenged his critics by asking, “Why, when there is a threat against me, do you ask me to lift these measures without addressing that threat?”

The careful choice of words is crucial. By rebranding Rwandan forces as “defensive measures,” Kagame attempts to recast a military intervention as legitimate self‑defence. He knows that admitting to having troops in a neighbouring state would buttress accusations that Rwanda is backing the M23/Alliance Fleuve Congo (AFC) rebels, who seized Goma in January. Asked about those allegations, Kagame again deflected: the AFC, he said, “is not a proxy force of Rwanda but a Congolese movement” and even claimed the group is “associated with former Congolese President Joseph Kabila”, a provocative assertion that shifts blame from Kigali to internal Congolese rivals. In effect, Kagame is signalling that Rwandan forces will stay until Kinshasa deals with the FDLR and that responsibility for pacification lies primarily with the DRC.

A frontal attack on U.S. logic and sanctions

Kagame’s interview bristled with resentment toward Washington. He accused Western governments of selectively pressuring Rwanda while ignoring Congolese provocations. “Rwanda is presented as the problem, when that is not the case,” he told Jeune Afrique, criticising calls for Kigali to withdraw without equivalent obligations on Kinshasa. In his view, U.S. officials have adopted an “illogical” approach that singles out Kigali for sanctions while giving Congolese authorities a pass. The Rwandan president was unapologetic about defying Washington: “If I must choose between an existential threat and sanctions, I will choose to confront the threat”. He also dismissed U.S. sanctions against his generals as baseless and interest‑driven, saying he does not “accept sanctions whose basis I don’t understand”.

The barbed language underscores the deteriorating rapport between Kigali and its main external sponsor. While the Washington Accord required “balanced” implementation, Kigali now accuses the United States of imposing one‑sided obligations. At the Security Council, Massad Boulos argued that Rwanda’s continued presence “constitutes a direct violation of its obligations” and repeated the U.S. demand for immediate withdrawal. The back‑and‑forth reveals a fundamental disagreement: Washington sees Rwandan troops as an illegal occupation, whereas Kigali portrays them as a necessary shield against genocide perpetrators. The contradiction is sharpened by the fact that Rwanda’s own security coordination with M23/AFC officials tacitly acknowledges the presence of troops in Congo.

Comfortable with the status quo

Beyond semantics, Kagame suggested that Rwanda is quite content with the current military balance in eastern Congo. He boasted that Rwandan security is now assured because M23/AFC rebels control key border areas. “From a security standpoint, our entire border with the DRC is now secured,” he told his interviewer. The remark is significant: it implies that Kigali sees little incentive to relinquish a situation in which a friendly rebel group holds strategic positions, allowing Rwanda to insulate itself from the FDLR while exerting influence over mineral‑rich territories. For Congolese civilians caught in the crossfire, the claim that the situation has improved will ring hollow, but for Kagame, it is evidence that his strategy works.

This sense of comfort also explains his ambiguous position toward Joseph Kabila’s recent arrival in Goma. Kagame said he would not refuse passage to anyone who wants to contribute to peace, yet he simultaneously alleged that Kabila is linked to the AFC. By painting the former Congolese president as aligned with the rebels, Kagame positions himself as a bystander to their operations while casting doubt on Kinshasa’s narrative. It is a deft political manoeuvre: by appearing open to Kabila’s return, he maintains plausible deniability regarding Rwanda’s involvement, even as he benefits from the rebels’ control on the ground.

Contradiction at the heart of the Washington Accord

The interview exposes a glaring inconsistency between Rwanda’s commitments under the Washington Accord and Kagame’s current posture. The agreement stipulates that Rwanda will redeploy its “defensive measures” once the DRC neutralises the FDLR. Yet Kagame now argues that Rwanda alone cannot be expected to fulfil its obligations if Kinshasa does not fulfil its own. By reframing the accord as contingent on simultaneous action, he creates an excuse to maintain troops indefinitely. In practice, this transforms a reciprocal peace deal into a unilateral guarantee for Rwanda: Kigali will withdraw only when it judges that its security concerns have been fully resolved, a threshold that may never be met.

Washington’s strategy of carrots and sticks has so far failed to dislodge Kagame. The U.S. may hope that sanctions and diplomatic pressure will force Kigali to comply, but Kagame’s rhetoric indicates he is prepared to weather the fallout. He has turned the concept of “defensive measures” into a shield against criticism, admitted that those measures include troops, and declared he will not lift them until threats across the border are neutralised. The result is a deepening stalemate: the DRC accuses Rwanda of aggression, Rwanda insists it is the victim, and the Washington Accord hangs in the balance.

Conclusion: Will commitments be honoured?

Kagame’s interview with Jeune Afrique is more than a clash of words; it is a public repudiation of the very commitments his government signed in December. He openly refuses to remove “defensive measures,” tacitly admits they involve troops, rebrands an intervention as self‑defence, and mocks the logic of his U.S. partners. Meanwhile, Washington’s envoy Massad Boulos continues to press for withdrawal and warns of consequences for non‑compliance. The core question now is whether the Washington Accord, brokered with great fanfare, can survive Kagame’s defiance. If Rwanda solemnly promised to shift its forces once the FDLR was neutralised, why is its president now resisting the implementation of that promise? The answer will determine whether the Great Lakes region moves toward peace or remains trapped in cycles of mistrust and war.