AU: African states urged to unite strategy or risk being left behind

African leaders meeting in Addis Ababa for the African Union’s annual summit are confronting a sharper strategic dilemma: how to protect national interests in a more transactional global environment where major powers increasingly prioritise selective partnerships and deal-by-deal bargaining.

The warning from Chatham House’s Tighisti Amare is blunt without an effective common strategy, African countries risk being “left behind” as global competition accelerates and leverage concentrates in the hands of the strongest actors.

The challenge is not new. African governments have long argued the continent deserves a stronger voice in global decision-making, including in multilateral forums and international financial institutions. What has changed is the intensity of the shift away from broad-based multilateralism toward narrower definitions of national interest among major powers especially in Washington paired with a growing appetite for bilateral arrangements that can be negotiated quickly and tailored to specific resources or security priorities.

In the article, that shift is framed through a phrase popularised in recent international discussions: countries are either “at the table” or “on the menu.” For many African states, the concern is that the global “menu” is expanding particularly where minerals and natural resources are involved at a moment when fragmented negotiating positions can produce weaker terms, fewer safeguards, and limited room to extract long-term industrial benefits.

A narrower US focus, and what it means in practice

This analysis notes that US policy messaging has evolved from expansive partnership language in the previous administration to a more selective approach under President Donald Trump’s second term. The White House’s posture emphasises prioritisation, arguing the United States cannot be equally attentive to every region and every challenge.

In practical terms, that implies reduced diplomatic bandwidth for Africa compared with other theatres while still leaving room for targeted engagement where US interests are clear, including trade, investment, and select security cooperation.

This is the context in which Amare’s argument lands: if the external environment is becoming more transactional, then African states may need stronger coordination mechanisms to avoid negotiating from a position of isolation especially when major powers can offer incentives to individual countries to strike separate agreements.

A central point in the original analysis is the growing appeal of bilateral deals particularly those tied to minerals and natural resources. These arrangements can move quickly, bypass regional consensus-building, and reduce opportunities for collective bargaining. For resource-rich states, the immediate gains can be attractive: investment pledges, security assistance, infrastructure commitments, or preferential market access.

But critics argue that bilateral bargaining can also narrow what is on the negotiating table. If the discussion centres on extraction and access, it can become harder to secure broader packages that support industrialisation, skills development, value addition, and stronger regulatory frameworks. In other words, a country may secure a deal, but not necessarily a development pathway.

This is where a “common strategy” becomes more than a diplomatic slogan. It can mean shared benchmarks for minerals deals, regional consultation norms, minimum transparency expectations, or coordinated negotiating positions that raise the floor on terms offered to any one country.

A realist argument without romantic assumptions

The analysis also includes a realist defence of the US approach, voiced by Peter Pham, who argues that no country even a superpower can be “all things to everyone.” From this perspective, prioritisation is not hostility; it is a recognition of limited resources and competing priorities.

For African policymakers, the lesson is not simply that external partners are unreliable, but that external attention is conditional and may be increasingly tied to specific strategic interests. That reality strengthens the case for coordination: if partners are selective, then African states may need to be more selective and more unified in defining what they want, what they will trade, and what standards must apply.

Amare’s warning does not prescribe a single model, but it points toward a practical question AU leaders face: what coordination is realistic now?

Shared negotiating principles for minerals and strategic infrastructure deals (value addition, local content, dispute resolution norms).

Greater regional consultation before signing high-impact agreements that affect cross-border supply chains or security dynamics.

Stronger collective messaging on financing and trade terms, especially where individual countries have limited leverage.

Investment readiness coordination, so external capital supports industrial goals rather than fragmented projects with limited spillover.

Longer-term coordination is harder because it runs into domestic politics, competing national interests, and uneven institutional capacity. But the direction of travel is clear in the analysis: fragmentation carries higher costs in a world of more assertive great-power bargaining.

The AU summit moment, as described in the original piece, is less about a single decision than about a mindset shift. If African states treat coordination as optional, bilateral deal-making may continue to erode collective leverage. If they treat it as a strategic asset used selectively, pragmatically, and in ways that respect national interests then coordination can become a bargaining tool rather than an abstract ideal.

The warning that Africa could be “left behind” is ultimately about pace: great powers are moving quickly, and the continent’s negotiating posture will matter most where decisions are made fastest security cooperation, critical minerals, and investment frameworks that shape development choices for years.