AU: African states urged to unite strategy or risk being left behind

African leaders meeting in Addis Ababa for the African Union’s annual summit are confronting a sharper strategic dilemma: how to protect national interests in a more transactional global environment where major powers increasingly prioritise selective partnerships and deal-by-deal bargaining.

The warning from Chatham House’s Tighisti Amare is blunt without an effective common strategy, African countries risk being “left behind” as global competition accelerates and leverage concentrates in the hands of the strongest actors.

The challenge is not new. African governments have long argued the continent deserves a stronger voice in global decision-making, including in multilateral forums and international financial institutions. What has changed is the intensity of the shift away from broad-based multilateralism toward narrower definitions of national interest among major powers especially in Washington paired with a growing appetite for bilateral arrangements that can be negotiated quickly and tailored to specific resources or security priorities.

In the article, that shift is framed through a phrase popularised in recent international discussions: countries are either “at the table” or “on the menu.” For many African states, the concern is that the global “menu” is expanding particularly where minerals and natural resources are involved at a moment when fragmented negotiating positions can produce weaker terms, fewer safeguards, and limited room to extract long-term industrial benefits.

A narrower US focus, and what it means in practice

This analysis notes that US policy messaging has evolved from expansive partnership language in the previous administration to a more selective approach under President Donald Trump’s second term. The White House’s posture emphasises prioritisation, arguing the United States cannot be equally attentive to every region and every challenge.

In practical terms, that implies reduced diplomatic bandwidth for Africa compared with other theatres while still leaving room for targeted engagement where US interests are clear, including trade, investment, and select security cooperation.

This is the context in which Amare’s argument lands: if the external environment is becoming more transactional, then African states may need stronger coordination mechanisms to avoid negotiating from a position of isolation especially when major powers can offer incentives to individual countries to strike separate agreements.

A central point in the original analysis is the growing appeal of bilateral deals particularly those tied to minerals and natural resources. These arrangements can move quickly, bypass regional consensus-building, and reduce opportunities for collective bargaining. For resource-rich states, the immediate gains can be attractive: investment pledges, security assistance, infrastructure commitments, or preferential market access.

But critics argue that bilateral bargaining can also narrow what is on the negotiating table. If the discussion centres on extraction and access, it can become harder to secure broader packages that support industrialisation, skills development, value addition, and stronger regulatory frameworks. In other words, a country may secure a deal, but not necessarily a development pathway.