Rwanda Admits M23 Collaboration: A Scandal of State‑Sponsored Rebellion

Rwanda’s Ambassador Admits Coordination With AFC/M23

On 22 January 2026, Rwanda’s ambassador to the United States, Mathilde Mukantabana, submitted a statement to the U.S. House Foreign Affairs Committee. In the written testimony, she thanked the Trump administration for brokering the Washington Accords between Kigali and Kinshasa and described Rwanda’s long‑held fear of genocidal insurgencies operating from eastern Congo. In a brief section titled “Rwanda’s Defensive Measures and Transparency,” the ambassador made a startling admission: she acknowledged that Rwanda “does engage in security coordination with AFC/M23” and claimed that this cooperation is intended to protect Congolese Tutsi communities from extremist militias. She emphasised that Rwanda and the Alliance Fleuve Congo/March 23 Movement (AFC/M23) share an interest in defending Tutsi and preventing another cross‑border genocide.

Coming after years of Kigali’s public denials, the admission marked a turning point. How can a sovereign government enter into a defence agreement with a rebel group accused of massacres, sexual violence, and forced displacement? This exposé examines who M23 and its new alliance really are, catalogues the crimes committed under their banner, analyses the legal consequences of a state aligning with an armed group, and asks why parts of the international community have remained silent.

• A state aligning with a rebel group accused of war crimes is not diplomacy, it is complicity.”

• “This admission collapses Kigali’s denial narrative and opens the door to sanctions and prosecutions.”

Who are M23 and the Alliance Fleuve Congo (AFC)?

Roots in a broken peace

The March 23 Movement (M23) emerged from the collapse of a 23 March 2009 peace deal between the Congolese government and the National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP). In 2012, former CNDP fighters mutinied, took the name M23 in reference to that agreement, and seized Goma, a city of two million people, within 24 hours. Under regional pressure, M23 withdrew and signed a new accord in December 2013. The group went dormant for nearly a decade.

Re‑emergence and Rwandan support

M23 is a predominantly Tutsi‑led rebel organisation. According to eyewitness reports, it re‑emerged in late 2021 after years of dormancy. The U.S. Treasury notes that M23 reappeared with assistance from the Rwanda Defence Force (RDF). In February 2024, the group cut the last overland supply route to Goma, and in May 2024, it captured the coltan‑rich town of Rubaya. The M23 campaign displaced around 1.5 million people and was marked by killings, attacks on civilians, and sexual violence. In short, M23’s return to the battlefield was facilitated by logistical and military support from Kigali.

The Alliance Fleuve Congo (AFC)

On 15 December 2023, former Congolese election chief Corneille Nangaa launched the Alliance Fleuve Congo (AFC), also known as the Congo River Alliance. The new coalition invited armed groups and dissident Congolese officials to join its insurgency. The U.S. Treasury identifies AFC as a political‑military coalition whose principal member is M23; the coalition’s goal is to overthrow the Congolese government. Africanews reported that the movement was unveiled in Nairobi with M23 president Bertrand Bisimwa present, and that Nangaa openly allied himself with several rebel movements, including M23. AFC thus provides a political façade for M23’s military operations and seeks to expand its insurgency beyond eastern Congo.

Leadership and structure

According to EU sanctions documents, M23 is led by President Bertrand Bisimwa, head of recruitment Désiré Rukomera, Colonel John Imani Nzenze, deputy financial chief Jean‑Bosco Nzabonimpa Mupenzi, and Joseph Musanga Bahati, who served as governor of North Kivu under the group’s illegal administration. These leaders manage recruitment, propaganda, finances, and de facto governance in captured territories. The EU also sanctioned Rwandan special forces commander Ruki Karusisi, Major General Eugene Nkubito, and Brigadier General Pascal Muhizi for sustaining M23’s offensive. The U.S. Treasury further notes that former electoral commissioner Corneille Nangaa coordinates AFC and travels with Bisimwa to promote the alliance. These listings underscore that M23/AFC is both a rebel military force and a political network with support from elements of the Rwandan state.

M23 as a proxy force

Numerous investigations have concluded that Rwanda has used M23 as a proxy to project power into eastern DRC. The UN Group of Experts on the DRC found direct intervention of the Rwanda Defence Force to reinforce M23, including the provision of weapons, ammunition, and uniforms. Human Rights Watch similarly reported that M23 received logistical support and reinforcement from the RDF, including arms and troops. The U.S. Treasury states that M23 re‑emerged in 2021 with the help of the RDF and that the coalition operates under Rwanda’s command and control. These findings contradict Kigali’s past denials and show that M23 functions as a Rwandan proxy, deployed to secure mineral‑rich areas and pressure Kinshasa.

Documented M23 Crimes: Massacres, Rape, Displacement

The March 23 Movement has been responsible for a catalogue of war crimes and serious human rights violations documented by international organisations, independent investigators, and survivors. Kigali’s admission of “security coordination” with M23 implicates Rwanda in these abuses.

Massacres and killings

• Kishishe and Bambo massacres (Nov 2022). UN investigators reported that M23 fighters executed at least 131 villagers in the towns of Kishishe and Bambo between 29 and 30 November 2022. Victims were arbitrarily shot or hacked to death, women were raped, and property was looted. The Congolese government accused M23 of killing up to 272 people in the attacks.

  
  

• Kishishe summary executions (Nov 2022). Amnesty International documented that M23 fighters summarily killed at least 20 men and raped at least 66 women and girls in Kishishe between 21 and 30 November 2022. Survivors described gang rapes, house‑to‑house killings, and forced theft of livestock. Amnesty warned that these acts constitute war crimes and could amount to crimes against humanity.

  
  

• Forced execution and recruitment (Feb 2023). Human Rights Watch reported that M23 fighters summarily executed at least 22 civilians around Kishishe, including older men, and forcibly recruited civilians, some as young as 25, from Rwanda and Congo. Witnesses recounted being whipped and forced to scout Congolese army positions

Recruitment of child soldiers

M23 has been repeatedly accused of recruiting and using child soldiers. Human Rights Watch documented the forced recruitment of youths, some from Rwanda, who were transported to camps, given weapons, and pushed into battle. The U.S. Treasury’s sanctions designation notes that M23 was first sanctioned in 2013 for serious violations of international law involving the targeting of children, including killing, maiming, and abducting minors. The EU press release adds that Twirwaneho, an AFC‑affiliated group in South Kivu, forcibly recruits minors and has been sanctioned accordingly.

Sexual violence

Amnesty International recorded at least 66 rapes of women and girls during the November 2022 Kishishe massacre. Survivors described gang rapes accompanied by beatings and the killing of husbands and sons. The U.S. Treasury states that M23’s rebellion has been accompanied by sexual violence and that promoting accountability for conflict‑related sexual violence is a U.S. priority.

Forced displacement and looting

The resurgence of M23 has displaced around 1.5 million people in eastern Congo. The group routinely loots civilian property and imposes illegal taxes on goods, as noted by UN experts. Human Rights Watch reports that M23 fighters have fired on civilian vehicles and attacked displacement sites, causing further loss of life and terror. These crimes underline the humanitarian cost of M23’s operations and the complicity of its backers.

Rwanda’s Legal Exposure Under International Law

Under the Articles of State Responsibility, a state that aids or assists a non‑state armed group risks becoming internationally responsible for the group’s wrongful acts. Legal scholars Ryan Goodman and Vladyslav Lanovoy explain that a state “runs a high legal risk of violating international law in aiding or assisting an organised armed group’s commission of internationally wrongful acts”. The same article notes that aiding and abetting liability under international criminal law does not require the assisting officials to share the armed group’s purpose; knowledge that their support will facilitate offences suffices. In other words, Rwanda’s acknowledged coordination with M23 could expose it to legal claims for war crimes and crimes against humanity committed by its proxy.

EU and U.S. Sanctions Target M23 and Rwanda’s Network

The international community has begun to respond to M23’s resurgence and Rwanda’s role:

1. EU targeted sanctions (17 March 2025). The Council of the European Union imposed restrictive measures on nine individuals and one entity for sustaining the conflict in eastern DRC. Five of the listed individuals are senior M23 leaders, including Bisimwa and Rukomera; three are RDF commanders (Ruki Karusisi, Eugene Nkubito, and Pascal Muhizi) who support M23 operations. The EU also sanctioned Francis Kamanzi, CEO of Rwanda’s Mines, Petroleum and Gas Board, and Gasabo Gold Refinery for illicitly importing gold from M23‑controlled areas. Those designated face travel bans, asset freezes, and prohibitions on EU citizens providing funds.

   
   

2. U.S. Treasury sanctions (Jan 2026). The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control sanctioned Rwandan presidential adviser James Kabarebe and M23’s civilian president Bertrand Bisimwa. The sanctions note that Kabarebe orchestrates RDF support for M23 and manages the regime’s revenue from Congolese minerals, while Bisimwa facilitates rebel administrations and public outreach. These designations block property under U.S. jurisdiction and signal a willingness to hold Rwandan officials accountable.

   
   

3. UN arms embargo violations. The UN Group of Experts documented Rwanda’s direct intervention to reinforce M23 with arms and uniforms, acts that violate the UN arms embargo. Continued violations could trigger further Security Council measures.

   
   

4. Comparative precedent – Eritrea and al‑Shabaab. In 2011, the UN Security Council toughened sanctions against Eritrea for plotting terrorist attacks and supporting the al‑Shabaab insurgency in Somalia. The resolution authorised travel bans and asset freezes and demanded that Eritrea cease all direct or indirect efforts to destabilise neighbouring states. Kigali’s admission of cooperation with M23 mirrors the behaviour for which Eritrea was sanctioned, suggesting that similar measures against Rwanda are legally plausible.

Potential consequences

Should the international community recognise Rwanda’s admission as evidence of state support to M23, Rwanda could face:

• Expanded sanctions from the UN, EU, and U.S., including travel bans and asset freezes on senior officials and entities involved in the support network.

• Suspension of aid and peacekeeping roles, as Rwanda’s participation in UN peacekeeping could be reconsidered to prevent conflict of interest.

• Universal jurisdiction lawsuits brought by NGOs or survivors in countries with laws enabling the prosecution of foreign officials for war crimes.

• Heightened scrutiny of Rwanda’s economic partnerships; the EU has already targeted a Rwandan gold refinery.

Kagame’s Denials Collapse: From “No Link” to Admission

Until recently, Kigali consistently denied supporting M23. In January 2025, President Paul Kagame told Anadolu Agency that M23 fighters were Congolese and refugees from Uganda, insisting that Rwanda merely disarmed fighters who fled into its territory. Rwanda’s foreign minister repeated similar denials on France’s TV5 Monde just two months before the ambassador’s testimony. The ambassador’s statement to Congress, therefore, represents either a strategic shift or an inadvertent admission. Rwanda now frames its cooperation with AFC/M23 as defensive and temporary, contingent on the neutralisation of the Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda (FDLR). Yet by publicly acknowledging a relationship that Kigali has long denied, Rwanda has undermined its own narrative and opened itself to legal scrutiny.

What Justice Could Look Like for Congo’s Victims

For President Félix Tshisekedi and Congolese civil society, the ambassador’s admission is being hailed as a diplomatic triumph. Kinshasa has spent years presenting evidence of Rwandan involvement to the United Nations, African Union, European Union, and United States. The EU press release explicitly notes that the renewed offensive of M23/AFC is “supported by the Rwanda Defence Force (RDF)”. The ambassador’s testimony, coupled with the Washington Accords requiring phased drawdown of Rwanda’s defensive measures as the FDLR is neutralised, signals that Kigali is finally acknowledging the problem. Congolese diplomats have characterised the admission as “the mask falling.” With international awareness growing and sanctions expanding, Congo’s position that Rwanda is fuelling proxy warfare is gaining traction.

Will Governments, NGOs, and Brands Continue Their Silence?

Despite mounting evidence, several actors have remained conspicuously silent:

• Non‑governmental organisations (NGOs) and think tanks that once praised Rwanda’s post‑genocide recovery have been slow to criticise its cross‑border operations. Their reluctance to condemn Kigali’s support for M23 raises questions about impartiality and donor influence.

• Foreign governments – particularly those with strategic or economic ties to Rwanda – have hesitated to speak out. Some Western governments continue to supply aid and military training despite the evidence of proxy warfare.

• Corporate sponsors such as Paris Saint‑Germain and other brands involved in the “Visit Rwanda” marketing campaign have not publicly addressed Kigali’s alliance with M23. As more details emerge, pressure will grow on companies benefiting from Rwanda’s public‑relations spending to explain their silence and reconsider partnerships.

Conclusion: From ambiguity to accountability

Rwanda’s admission that it coordinates security with the AFC/M23 marks a watershed moment in the long‑running Congo conflict. For decades, Kigali exploited ambiguity, denying involvement while benefitting from M23’s military gains and the mineral wealth of eastern Congo. The ambassador’s testimony removes that ambiguity. International law is clear: states that aid armed groups committing atrocities face liability. M23’s catalogue of massacres, sexual violence, child recruitment, and forced displacement is well‑documented. By acknowledging cooperation, Rwanda has tied itself to these crimes.

The time for equivocation is over. Diplomatic euphemisms about “defensive measures” cannot mask the reality of a government working with a rebel group accused of war crimes. Accountability must be pursued on multiple fronts: through sanctions, legal action, suspension of aid and peacekeeping roles, and public pressure on corporate partners. Above all, justice demands recognition of the Congolese victims of M23’s violence. Without accountability, there can be no lasting peace in the Great Lakes region.

FAQ

Q1: Did Rwanda officially admit working with M23?

Yes, Rwanda’s ambassador referenced “security coordination with AFC/M23,” which marks a major shift from previous denials.

Q2: What crimes has M23 been accused of?

M23 has been linked to massacres, sexual violence, forced displacement, looting, and child recruitment, according to human rights organizations and international investigations.

Q3: Can Rwanda face sanctions for supporting M23?

Yes. The EU and U.S. have already sanctioned M23-linked figures, and Rwanda’s admission may increase pressure for deeper restrictions.

Q4: What does this mean for justice in eastern Congo?

It strengthens calls for accountability, political, legal, and financial, against networks enabling armed violence in the DRC.