Adama Barrow biography covering his age, education, business career, 2016 victory, presidency, wife, children and 2026 election campaign. Adama Barrow is a Gambian politician, businessman and real-estate developer who has served as the third president of The Gambia since 19 January 2017. Born in Mankamang Kunda in 1965, he worked in commerce, studied real estate in the United Kingdom and founded Majum Real Estate before entering national politics. Barrow became the consensus candidate of an opposition coalition in 2016 and defeated Yahya Jammeh, ending 22 years of authoritarian rule. He won a second term in 2021 and is campaigning again in 2026, with his record now judged against unfinished democratic reforms, economic pressures and public demands for reliable electricity. Who is Adama Barrow? Adama Barrow is the president of The Gambia and leader of the National People’s Party. A former real-estate businessman, he won the historic 2016 election that removed Yahya Jammeh, survived the resulting constitutional crisis and was re-elected in 2021. He is 61 years old as of September 2026. Early Life in Mankamang Kunda Adama Barrow was born on 15 February 1965 in Mankamang Kunda, a village in the Jimara district of The Gambia’s Upper River Region. His birth came three days before the country gained independence from Britain, a coincidence that has often been used in official accounts to connect his life with the modern history of the Gambian state. A separate 2026 presidential archive gives 16 February, but the Office of the President’s published birthday account supports 15 February, the date used here. Barrow grew up far from the political centre of Banjul. The surviving biographical record describes a rural childhood followed by a move toward the capital for further schooling. He attended Koba Kunda Primary School, Crab Island Secondary School and Muslim High School. An Office of the President profile confirms his birthplace and 15 February 1965 birth date, although the page itself is an openly supportive commentary rather than an independent assessment of his presidency. His early life did not resemble the usual path of a future head of state. Barrow was not raised inside a famous political dynasty, did not begin as a senior civil servant and did not first become known through the military. His public identity was shaped by commerce. After school, he joined Alhagie Musa Njie & Sons, a Gambian business, and rose to become a sales manager. The experience introduced him to retail operations, customer relationships and the practical discipline of building a career without inherited national influence. Those beginnings later became central to his political image. In the 2016 campaign, supporters presented him as a calm, ordinary businessman capable of bringing divided opposition groups together. The contrast with Jammeh an army officer who had seized power in a 1994 coup—was one of the campaign’s clearest themes. London, Real-Estate Studies and Majum Real Estate Barrow moved to Europe in the early 2000s. He spent time in the United Kingdom, where he studied toward real-estate qualifications and worked while supporting himself. Contemporary international profiles reported that he worked as a security guard or supervisor at an Argos store in London. The detail became widely known after his election because it captured the distance between his earlier working life and the presidency. Continue Reading Full Article BIOGRAPHY Adama Barrow Biography: From Businessman to Gambia President By Truce Elikia Art & Culture Journalist Truce Elikia Home Comment Sep 9, 2026 Sep 9, 2026 23 min read Copy link Facebook X (Twitter) WhatsApp Published Updated: Adama Barrow is a Gambian politician, businessman and real-estate developer who has served as the third president of The Gambia since 19 January 2017. Born in Mankamang Kunda in 1965, he worked in commerce, studied real estate in the United Kingdom and founded Majum Real Estate before entering national politics. Barrow became the consensus candidate of an opposition coalition in 2016 and defeated Yahya Jammeh, ending 22 years of authoritarian rule. He won a second term in 2021 and is campaigning again in 2026, with his record now judged against unfinished democratic reforms, economic pressures and public demands for reliable electricity. Who is Adama Barrow? Adama Barrow is the president of The Gambia and leader of the National People’s Party. A former real-estate businessman, he won the historic 2016 election that removed Yahya Jammeh, survived the resulting constitutional crisis and was re-elected in 2021. He is 61 years old as of September 2026. Early Life in Mankamang Kunda Adama Barrow was born on 15 February 1965 in Mankamang Kunda, a village in the Jimara district of The Gambia’s Upper River Region. His birth came three days before the country gained independence from Britain, a coincidence that has often been used in official accounts to connect his life with the modern history of the Gambian state. A separate 2026 presidential archive gives 16 February, but the Office of the President’s published birthday account supports 15 February, the date used here. Barrow grew up far from the political centre of Banjul. The surviving biographical record describes a rural childhood followed by a move toward the capital for further schooling. He attended Koba Kunda Primary School, Crab Island Secondary School and Muslim High School. An Office of the President profile confirms his birthplace and 15 February 1965 birth date, although the page itself is an openly supportive commentary rather than an independent assessment of his presidency. His early life did not resemble the usual path of a future head of state. Barrow was not raised inside a famous political dynasty, did not begin as a senior civil servant and did not first become known through the military. His public identity was shaped by commerce. After school, he joined Alhagie Musa Njie & Sons, a Gambian business, and rose to become a sales manager. The experience introduced him to retail operations, customer relationships and the practical discipline of building a career without inherited national influence. Those beginnings later became central to his political image. In the 2016 campaign, supporters presented him as a calm, ordinary businessman capable of bringing divided opposition groups together. The contrast with Jammeh an army officer who had seized power in a 1994 coup—was one of the campaign’s clearest themes. London, Real-Estate Studies and Majum Real Estate Barrow moved to Europe in the early 2000s. He spent time in the United Kingdom, where he studied toward real-estate qualifications and worked while supporting himself. Contemporary international profiles reported that he worked as a security guard or supervisor at an Argos store in London. The detail became widely known after his election because it captured the distance between his earlier working life and the presidency. The London years should not be reduced to the novelty of a future president working in retail security. They formed part of a deliberate professional transition. Barrow was studying property while earning a living, then returned to The Gambia with a business plan. In 2006, he founded Majum Real Estate and became its chief executive. Majum placed him in a sector closely connected to land, housing, urban growth and the Gambian diaspora. Property businesses in The Gambia often serve citizens abroad who want to build homes or invest at home, so the work required trust across borders as well as knowledge of local transactions. Barrow ran the company until politics became his full-time occupation in 2016. His commercial record did not make him nationally famous before that campaign. It did, however, give him managerial experience and an independent livelihood at a time when openly opposing Jammeh could carry significant personal risk. Barrow joined the United Democratic Party and eventually served as its treasurer, a role suited to a businessman whose political influence was initially organisational rather than theatrical. From UDP Treasurer to Coalition Candidate The political opening that changed Barrow’s life came during a severe crackdown on the opposition in 2016. UDP leader Ousainou Darboe and other senior party figures were imprisoned after protests over the death in custody of activist Solo Sandeng. With much of the recognised leadership unavailable, Barrow emerged as the UDP’s presidential candidate. His larger breakthrough came when opposition parties and civic groups formed Coalition 2016. On 30 October, the alliance chose Barrow as its standard-bearer. He resigned from the UDP days later so that he could contest as an independent candidate backed by the coalition rather than as the nominee of one party. That arrangement was both his greatest political strength and the source of later conflict. Barrow was chosen because the opposition needed a unifying figure against a deeply entrenched president. The coalition brought together groups with different histories, ideologies and ambitions. Its central agreement was regime change, not a permanent shared programme. During the campaign, Barrow promised democratic reform, an independent judiciary, greater freedom for the media and civil society, security-sector change and renewed engagement with international institutions. He also supported the coalition plan for a transitional presidency lasting three years. The promise would later become one of the most consequential disputes of his first term. The 2016 Election That Ended Jammeh’s Rule Gambians voted on 1 December 2016 using the country’s distinctive marble-and-drum electoral system. The result was historic. The Independent Electoral Commission’s final record shows Barrow with 227,708 votes, or about 43 percent. Jammeh received 208,487, while Mama Kandeh received 89,768. Turnout was about 59 percent. Jammeh initially conceded, creating the expectation of The Gambia’s first transfer of presidential power through the ballot box. He reversed himself days later and challenged the result, setting off a constitutional crisis. Regional leaders insisted that the declared outcome had to stand. Barrow left for Senegal amid security concerns while negotiations continued. On 19 January 2017, the day Jammeh’s term expired, Barrow took the oath at the Gambian embassy in Dakar. Al Jazeera’s contemporaneous account recorded the extraordinary inauguration while Jammeh still refused to leave office. ECOWAS forces entered The Gambia to support the constitutional transfer, although diplomacy remained central to resolving the standoff. Jammeh departed for exile in Equatorial Guinea on 21 January. Barrow returned home on 26 January to crowds, military officials and members of the coalition government. A later inauguration ceremony took place on Gambian soil in February. The transition made Barrow internationally significant before he had governed for a day. He had become the civilian face of an electoral revolt against a ruler who had controlled the country for more than two decades. In an early TIME interview , Barrow presented the change as a return to equal citizenship, responsible government and national unity. ADVERTISEMENT The victory remains the defining achievement of his political life. It also created expectations that no subsequent administration could easily satisfy. Barrow was judged not only on roads, electricity, jobs and public services but on whether he would build institutions strong enough to prevent another presidency from accumulating Jammeh-like power. Opening The Gambia After 22 Years of Authoritarian Rule Barrow’s first years brought an unmistakable expansion of political and civic space. Exiled Gambians returned. Political detainees were released. Opposition activity, private broadcasting and public criticism became more visible than they had been under Jammeh. The government established or supported institutions intended to investigate abuses and rebuild public trust. The Gambia also reversed parts of Jammeh’s diplomatic isolation. It halted withdrawal from the International Criminal Court and rejoined the Commonwealth on 8 February 2018 after almost five years outside the organisation. The Commonwealth’s account of the return says all existing member states backed the application. One of Barrow’s most important promises was a truth process. The Truth, Reconciliation and Reparations Commission began work in 2018 and heard testimony about killings, torture, enforced disappearances, sexual violence and other abuses committed during the Jammeh era. Its public hearings transformed national understanding of how the former system had operated. The commission submitted its final report in 2021 and recommended prosecutions, reparations and institutional reforms. Implementation has been slower than many victims and campaigners wanted, but the process did advance. In December 2024, ECOWAS approved a Special Tribunal for The Gambia to prosecute serious crimes from the former regime. The Point’s report on the decision explains that the tribunal’s jurisdiction covers gross human-rights violations committed between July 1994 and January 2017. Barrow’s record on democratic opening is therefore substantial but incomplete. The country is freer than it was under Jammeh, yet the transition has not produced all the constitutional and accountability safeguards promised in 2016. The Three-Year Promise and the Break With Coalition 2016 The first major rupture came over the length of Barrow’s stay in office. Coalition 2016 had presented its administration as a three-year transition. By 2019, Barrow argued that the constitution gave him a five-year mandate and refused calls to resign after three years. His legal position and his political promise were not the same issue. The 1997 Constitution provided a five-year presidential term, so remaining in office did not by itself violate that term. But critics argued that he had broken the compact that made him the coalition candidate. The Three Years Jotna movement organised demonstrations demanding that he step down. The dispute changed Gambian politics. Former allies became opponents, and Barrow’s relationship with the UDP deteriorated. On 31 December 2019, the Independent Electoral Commission registered the National People’s Party, with Barrow as its leader. The new party gave him a political organisation that answered to his own programme rather than to the coalition that had brought him to power. The formation of the NPP also revealed Barrow’s evolution from compromise candidate to incumbent party leader. He built alliances with politicians from different camps, including figures associated with the former ruling APRC. Supporters called the approach pragmatic and unifying. Critics saw it as a retreat from the clean break with Jammeh-era politics that voters had expected. The argument over the three-year promise remains essential to understanding Barrow. It was the moment when his presidency stopped being viewed simply as the democratic alternative to Jammeh and began to be judged as a power structure of its own. Re-election in 2021 Barrow entered the 2021 election as the candidate of the NPP, no longer an independent unity figure. His principal opponent was Ousainou Darboe, the veteran UDP leader whose imprisonment had helped create the circumstances for Barrow’s rise five years earlier. The Independent Electoral Commission’s 2021 results gave Barrow 457,519 votes, or 53.23 percent. Darboe received 238,253, or 27.72 percent. Turnout exceeded 89 percent, demonstrating both the competitiveness of the election and the intensity of public engagement. Opposition candidates disputed aspects of the process, but the official result stood. The victory gave Barrow a clear popular mandate for a second five-year term. It also weakened the argument that his authority still depended mainly on the 2016 coalition. By 2021, he had won nationally under his own party label. His second term shifted the central political question. The issue was no longer whether The Gambia would move away from Jammeh’s personal rule. It was whether Barrow’s government could convert political stability into durable institutions, stronger public services and economic opportunity. Constitutional Reform: The Largest Unfinished Promise Constitutional reform has been one of the clearest tests of the post-Jammeh transition. A Constitutional Review Commission conducted consultations and produced a draft intended to replace the 1997 Constitution. The proposed charter addressed presidential term limits, executive power and the architecture of public institutions. The first draft failed in the National Assembly in 2020. A later version also encountered strong criticism and parliamentary rejection. The World Bank’s country overview identifies the repeated failure to replace the 1997 Constitution as a major feature of The Gambia’s political transition and notes that the next presidential election is scheduled for December 2026. The term-limit debate is especially sensitive because of Barrow’s original campaign promises and his decision to remain beyond three years. Critics want a constitutional settlement that prevents indefinite presidential tenure and limits executive control over appointments. Government supporters argue that a new constitution must command broad national and parliamentary support rather than merely reproduce the preferences of one political bloc. Whatever the explanation, the outcome is plain: nearly a decade after the 2016 election, The Gambia still operates under the constitution inherited from the Jammeh era. That does not erase other reforms, but it leaves the most important structural promise unfinished. ADVERTISEMENT Trending Now Sanna Manjang Faces Gambia Court Martial for Desertion . Justice & Crime Gambia Blackout Protests Push Barrow to Promise Power Boost . Protests and Movements The 8 Top Attractions in Kunta Kinteh Island & New Jetty Right Now . Travel Guide The 10 Best Attractions in Gambia Right Now . Popular Today Justice & Crime Sanna Manjang Faces Gambia Court Martial for Desertion . Biography Adama Barrow Biography: From Businessman to Gambia President . Protests and Movements Gambia Blackout Protests Push Barrow to Promise Power Boost . Travel Guide The 8 Top Attractions in Kunta Kinteh Island & New Jetty Right Now . The 10 Best Attractions in Gambia Right Now . Economy, Infrastructure and the Development Record Barrow has placed roads, electricity, agriculture, health, education and international investment at the centre of his development message. His administration’s supporters point to major road programmes, new connections to regional power infrastructure, tourism recovery and increased engagement with lenders and development partners. The national economy has shown periods of solid growth. According to the World Bank, growth reached 5.3 percent in 2024, supported by industry and services, especially tourism and construction. The same assessment recorded a decline in extreme poverty to 20.7 percent in 2024 and projected further growth, while warning that public debt remained high and The Gambia continued to face a high risk of debt distress. Those figures explain both the government’s confidence and public frustration. National growth does not automatically create reliable services or affordable living conditions. Many households remain exposed to food prices, unemployment, irregular income and weak infrastructure. Remittances and tourism are important, but they also leave the country vulnerable to international shocks. Electricity has become the sharpest example of the gap between access and reliability. Barrow’s government says national access rose dramatically during his presidency, supported by domestic and regional projects. Yet repeated outages have affected homes, businesses and public confidence. XTRAfrica’s report on the September 2026 blackout protests covers the unrest and the president’s response without turning disputed casualty or arrest claims into fact. In his 8 September 2026 address , Barrow acknowledged failures in planning, generation and maintenance. He said an additional 24-megawatt unit at Brikama Power Station would be commissioned by the end of October and that a contract had been awarded for a separate 50-megawatt solar plant in Soma. He also created a presidential task force expected to issue public updates every two weeks. The commitments now provide measurable tests. Electricity supply should improve by the stated deadline; the Brikama unit and Soma project should be judged separately; and rising access rates should not be confused with uninterrupted power. For voters, these distinctions are more important than broad claims of success or failure. Agriculture remains another development priority in a country where rural livelihoods are vulnerable to poor weather and limited value-chain infrastructure. XTRAfrica has also reported on the African Development Bank’s support for Gambian agriculture , part of the wider effort to improve food production, resilience and rural incomes. Human Rights, Media Freedom and Governance Criticism Any fair assessment of Barrow must compare his government with the Jammeh era without allowing that comparison to become a permanent exemption from criticism. The political environment improved markedly after 2017. Independent media expanded, opposition parties operated openly and citizens exercised freedoms that had been severely restricted. At the same time, journalists and civil-society groups have continued to report pressure, arrests and legal threats. Freedom House’s 2026 assessment classifies The Gambia as “Partly Free.” It credits improvements after Jammeh while citing corruption concerns, pressure on media and civic actors, weaknesses in transparency and shortcomings in the rule of law. The debate over female genital mutilation also tested Barrow’s leadership and the independence of public institutions. In 2024, legislators rejected a bill that would have repealed the country’s ban on FGM. XTRAfrica followed the national debate over the proposed repeal , a dispute involving religious arguments, women’s rights, criminal law and party politics. Barrow’s supporters say his tolerance of criticism, competitive elections and transitional-justice initiatives distinguish his rule fundamentally from Jammeh’s. Critics answer that a post-dictatorship government should be measured against constitutional democracy, not only against the abuses of its predecessor. Both points matter. The opening after 2017 was real. So are the concerns about stalled reform, corruption safeguards, executive influence and restrictions affecting some journalists and protesters. Barrow’s long-term legacy will depend on whether democratic space becomes institutional practice rather than a favour associated with one leader. Adama Barrow’s Political Style Barrow’s public manner has often been described as calm and understated. That style helped him become the 2016 coalition candidate: he was less polarising than several veteran opposition leaders and could serve as a common platform for groups that did not fully trust one another. In office, calmness has coexisted with political adaptability. Barrow survived the collapse of the original coalition, built the NPP, won re-election and formed alliances across old dividing lines. His rise demonstrates a strong instinct for organisation and coalition management, even if he is not generally known as an ideological theorist or charismatic orator. His governing language emphasises peace, stability, national unity and visible development. Critics sometimes interpret those themes as arguments for continuity and caution when more aggressive reform is required. Supporters see them as appropriate for a small country that emerged from an authoritarian crisis without descending into wider violence. Barrow’s business background also shapes his image. He tends to present development as a sequence of practical projects roads, power plants, water systems, schools and investment rather than as an abstract political programme. The success of that approach depends on delivery, maintenance and public accountability. A commissioned project creates value only if citizens can use it reliably. Wife, Family and Children Adama Barrow is Muslim and is publicly reported to have two wives: Fatoumatta Bah-Barrow and Sarjo Mballow-Barrow. The Office of the President identifies Fatoumatta Bah-Barrow as First Lady. She has appeared in official programmes involving health, women, children and education. Barrow’s family entered the international news during the 2017 transition for a tragic reason. His eight-year-old son, Habibou Barrow, died in January 2017 after being bitten by dogs while Barrow was in Senegal amid the constitutional crisis. An AFP report carried by Business Standard described Habibou as one of Barrow’s five children. The family has otherwise kept much of the children’s private lives outside official politics. ADVERTISEMENT This biography does not list the names or personal details of Barrow’s living children. Their existence is relevant to a public biography, but they do not hold elected office and their privacy should be respected. The 2026 Election and the Question of a Third Term Barrow is seeking another term in the presidential election scheduled for 5 December 2026. His campaign platform presents him as the candidate of peace, unity and continued development. The contest will determine whether Gambians still view stability and infrastructure as sufficient grounds for extending his presidency. The election also returns the country to the unresolved issue of term limits. Because a replacement constitution has not been adopted, Barrow’s candidacy is taking place under the existing constitutional framework. Opponents connect his third campaign to the abandoned three-year promise and the failure to complete constitutional reform. His supporters emphasise that he won both previous elections and has the same right as other qualified candidates to seek support under the law in force. The September electricity crisis gives the campaign an immediate public-service test. Barrow’s response is no longer only a political message: it includes deadlines, additional generating capacity and a reporting mechanism. Voters will be able to compare those promises with daily experience before election day. Adama Barrow’s Legacy So Far Adama Barrow’s place in Gambian history is already secure because of 2016. He was the candidate around whom a divided opposition united, and his victory ended one of West Africa’s longest authoritarian presidencies. The transfer also showed the importance of regional institutions: ECOWAS defended the declared result and helped prevent Jammeh’s refusal from becoming permanent. Barrow’s government reopened political space, restored international relationships and created mechanisms to document abuses from the previous era. The truth commission and the ECOWAS-backed tribunal are major parts of that record. His administration has also overseen economic growth, infrastructure investment and a significant expansion of electricity access. The unresolved side of the legacy is equally important. The new constitution has repeatedly failed. The three-year coalition promise was abandoned. Corruption and transparency remain concerns. Journalists, protesters and civil-society organisations still report pressure. Power shortages in 2026 have shown that expanded access means little when generation and maintenance cannot deliver reliable service. Barrow therefore cannot be understood simply as the man who defeated Jammeh or as another incumbent seeking to stay in power. He is both the symbol of The Gambia’s democratic opening and the leader responsible for the transition’s unfinished work. The 2026 election will be a verdict not only on his latest campaign but on whether Gambians believe he remains the safest custodian of the change they voted for ten years earlier. Adama Barrow Timeline Year Event Significance 1965 Born in Mankamang Kunda on 15 February Entered the world three days before Gambian independence Early 2000s Moved to the United Kingdom and studied real estate Built professional experience while working to support himself 2006 Founded Majum Real Estate Established the business career that preceded national politics 2016 Became UDP candidate and then Coalition 2016 standard-bearer United opposition parties behind one presidential challenger 2016 Won the 1 December presidential election Defeated Yahya Jammeh after 22 years of rule 2017 Sworn in at the Gambian embassy in Dakar on 19 January Assumed office during Jammeh’s refusal to leave power 2017 Returned to The Gambia after Jammeh went into exile Completed the country’s first democratic presidential transition 2018 The Gambia rejoined the Commonwealth Marked renewed international engagement after the Jammeh era 2018 Truth, Reconciliation and Reparations Commission began work Opened a national record of abuses under the former government 2019 Refused calls to honour the coalition’s three-year transition pledge Triggered a lasting break with former allies and public protests 2019 National People’s Party was registered on 31 December Gave Barrow his own political organisation 2021 Won re-election with 53.23 percent Secured a second term under the NPP banner 2024 ECOWAS approved a Special Tribunal for The Gambia Advanced the prosecution track recommended after the truth commission 2025 Another constitutional-reform effort failed in parliament Left the 1997 Constitution in force before the 2026 election 2026 Launched campaign for the 5 December presidential election Sought a further term amid a renewed term-limit debate 2026 Addressed nationwide anger over prolonged power cuts Promised improvement by late October and a 24 MW Brikama unit Frequently Asked Questions Who is Adama Barrow? Adama Barrow is a Gambian politician, real-estate developer and the third president of The Gambia. He became president after defeating Yahya Jammeh in the December 2016 election and took office on 19 January 2017. How old is Adama Barrow? Barrow was born on 15 February 1965. He is 61 years old as of 9 September 2026. Where is Adama Barrow from? He was born in Mankamang Kunda in the Jimara district of The Gambia’s Upper River Region. He later studied in Banjul and lived in the United Kingdom before returning home. What did Adama Barrow do before politics? Barrow worked in sales, studied real estate in the United Kingdom and founded Majum Real Estate in 2006. He ran the company before becoming a full-time presidential candidate in 2016. Which political party does Adama Barrow belong to? He leads the National People’s Party. Barrow previously belonged to the United Democratic Party, then contested the 2016 election as an independent candidate supported by Coalition 2016. How did Adama Barrow become president? Opposition parties selected him as their unity candidate in 2016. He won 227,708 votes, defeating incumbent Yahya Jammeh. When Jammeh refused to leave office, ECOWAS backed the election result, and Barrow was sworn in at the Gambian embassy in Senegal. Did Adama Barrow promise to serve only three years? Yes. The 2016 coalition plan called for a three-year transition. Barrow later remained for the full five-year constitutional term, arguing that the constitution governed his mandate. The decision broke his alliance with former coalition partners and prompted protests. Who is Adama Barrow’s wife? Barrow is publicly reported to have two wives, Fatoumatta Bah-Barrow and Sarjo Mballow-Barrow. Fatoumatta Bah-Barrow is officially recognised as First Lady of The Gambia. How many children does Adama Barrow have? Reliable reporting identified Barrow as the father of five children. His eight-year-old son Habibou died in January 2017. Public sources therefore support four living children, whose private details are not included here. Is Adama Barrow running in the 2026 election? Yes. Barrow is campaigning in the presidential election scheduled for 5 December 2026. He is seeking another term under the National People’s Party banner. ADVERTISEMENT Related Articles Justice & Crime Sanna Manjang Faces Gambia Court Martial for Desertion The military case concerns an alleged 2017 desertion and is separate from his High Court proceedings. . Protests and Movements Gambia Blackout Protests Push Barrow to Promise Power Boost The president says a 24 MW unit should be commissioned by late October after unrest over long outages. . Travel Guide The 8 Top Attractions in Kunta Kinteh Island & New Jetty Right Now Explore Gambia’s history, culture, and beaches around Kunta Kinteh Island & New Jetty . The 10 Best Attractions in Gambia Right Now Insider picks of beaches, wildlife & culture your playful guide to 2025 Gambia . 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Actress Omoseyin unveils Solene, a luxury wellness brand offering spa, therapy and lifestyle services. Nigerian actress and filmmaker Oluwadarasimi Oyindamola Omoseyin has officially entered the lifestyle and wellness industry with the launch of Solene, a luxury wellness brand focused on self-care and holistic wellbeing. The project was unveiled as a premium destination designed to combine aesthetic treatments with wellness experiences, reflecting a growing trend among Nigerian entertainers diversifying into lifestyle and wellness ventures. According to Omoseyin, Solene was created to provide a space where individuals can prioritise both physical appearance and emotional wellbeing while enjoying services tailored to modern wellness needs. At the brand reveal, organisers introduced Solene’s visual identity, featuring minimalist designs, warm neutral tones and soft lighting intended to create a calm and relaxing environment. The wellness brand is expected to offer services including advanced spa treatments, wellness therapies, yoga, Pilates and curated lifestyle programmes. Plans also include VIP experiences targeted at high-end clients. Industry observers say the launch reflects the increasing demand for premium wellness experiences in Lagos, driven by professionals, affluent residents and Nigeria’s creative sector. The move places Omoseyin among a growing number of public figures investing in wellness, beauty and lifestyle businesses as awareness around self-care and mental health continues to expand in Nigeria. Source: The Sun Nigeria Continue Reading Full Article NOLLYWOOD UPDATES Omoseyin Launches Solene Wellness Lifestyle Brand By Witty Pascal Entertainment Editor Witty Pascal Home Comment May 8, 2026 May 15, 2026 2 min read Copy link Facebook X (Twitter) WhatsApp Published Updated: Nigerian actress and filmmaker Oluwadarasimi Oyindamola Omoseyin has officially entered the lifestyle and wellness industry with the launch of Solene, a luxury wellness brand focused on self-care and holistic wellbeing. The project was unveiled as a premium destination designed to combine aesthetic treatments with wellness experiences, reflecting a growing trend among Nigerian entertainers diversifying into lifestyle and wellness ventures. According to Omoseyin, Solene was created to provide a space where individuals can prioritise both physical appearance and emotional wellbeing while enjoying services tailored to modern wellness needs. ADVERTISEMENT At the brand reveal, organisers introduced Solene’s visual identity, featuring minimalist designs, warm neutral tones and soft lighting intended to create a calm and relaxing environment. The wellness brand is expected to offer services including advanced spa treatments, wellness therapies, yoga, Pilates and curated lifestyle programmes. Plans also include VIP experiences targeted at high-end clients. ADVERTISEMENT Trending Now Kindu Nurses’ Strike Disrupts Care and Childhood Vaccination . Healthcare System EAC Preparedness Plan: What Must Be Ready Before Floods . Regional Blocs (AU, SADC, EAC, ECOWAS) DR Congo's Juliana Lumumba Seeks to Reshape the Francophonie . Francophone River Offin Girls’ Rights Decision: What Must Change? . Education Popular Today Biography Poco Lee Biography: Age, Real Name, Dance Career and Songs . Biography Eric Omondi Biography: Comedy, Activism and Public Life . Biography Who Is Snit Habteab, Eritrea’s Miss World Trailblazer? . Entertainment Poco Lee UK Case Sparks Consent Debate Among Nigerian Stars . Entertainment FOLA Leads 2026 Headies Nominations Ahead of Toronto . Industry observers say the launch reflects the increasing demand for premium wellness experiences in Lagos, driven by professionals, affluent residents and Nigeria’s creative sector. The move places Omoseyin among a growing number of public figures investing in wellness, beauty and lifestyle businesses as awareness around self-care and mental health continues to expand in Nigeria. ADVERTISEMENT Source: The Sun Nigeria ADVERTISEMENT Related Articles Biography Poco Lee Biography: Age, Real Name, Dance Career and Songs Inside the Nigerian dancer’s rise from Ojo street shows to Afrobeats stages, music and global fame. . Biography Eric Omondi Biography: Comedy, Activism and Public Life How Eric Omondi rose through Churchill Show and became a prominent Kenyan activist. . Biography Who Is Snit Habteab, Eritrea’s Miss World Trailblazer? The neuroscientist and educator became Eritrea’s first Miss World entrant and reached the Top 6 . Entertainment Poco Lee UK Case Sparks Consent Debate Among Nigerian Stars The dancer faces five sexual offence charges and returns to court on September 15. . Tags Entertainment Entertainment Nigerian Entertainment Nigerian Entertainment Nigeria Nigeria

DRC questions a sudden FDLR media surge in M23-held areas, warning it serves Kigali’s narrative and risks derailing fragile peace efforts. Who Benefits from the FDLR’s New “Jeremiads”? Kinshasa Questions Kigali’s Motives.. Kinshasa — A flurry of videos and statements attributed to a faction calling itself FDLR-FOCA has resurfaced online since early October, just as President Félix Tshisekedi intensified diplomacy to end Rwanda’s decades-long aggression in eastern DR Congo. Kinshasa officials and regional analysts say the timing is no coincidence: reviving the FDLR spectre helps Kigali justify a continued military footprint on Congolese soil despite international pressure. A familiar pretext returns For years, Rwanda has framed its security posture in North and South Kivu as a response to the FDLR, a Hutu-led group born in the DRC in 2000. The latest clips, featuring mostly young men claiming the FDLR-FOCA banner and filmed in areas currently controlled by M23/RDF, declare they will not disarm without an “inter-Rwandan dialogue.” Congolese officials call the spectacle incongruous: if M23/RDF controls the terrain, how do purported FDLR camps operate freely and post videos without interference? If the FDLR was historically composed of ex-FAR elements from the 1990s, why do these new faces appear to be 17–30 rather than septuagenarians? The contradictions, Kinshasa argues, point to staging designed to derail diplomacy. The wider diplomatic backdrop The resurgence of FDLR talk comes as DR Congo pushes for implementation of UNSCR 2773, regional de-escalation, and a political track via Washington/Doha/AU channels. In parallel, Congolese forces have urged communities to cut all links with the FDLR, support voluntary disarmament and repatriation, and end the cycles of proxy warfare. Within this context, Congolese voices say the sudden FDLR-FOCA media blitz serves one audience: Kigali. By amplifying an FDLR threat narrative, Rwanda can argue for sustained deployments in the Kivus while peace tracks gain traction — a tactic critics say has repeatedly sabotaged ceasefire efforts. Claims and counter-claims inside the FDLR universe Sources close to veteran FDLR figure Gen. Pacifique Ntabwunguka (“Omega”) insist the political branch is not involved with the new FOCA messaging and continues to advocate an AU-mediated inter-Rwandan dialogue. They also note past demobilisations: in the early 2000s, some FDLR tactical units reportedly laid down arms and were integrated into Rwandan structures — a reminder that the FDLR is not a monolith, and that today’s “FDLR” label is frequently misused in information wars. Continue Reading Full Article WAR IN EASTERN DRC Who Benefits from the FDLR’s Return to Headlines? By Guerson Nabushi Nyonkourou Political Analyst Guerson Nabushi Nyonkourou Home Comment Nov 13, 2025 May 15, 2026 6 min read Copy link Facebook X (Twitter) WhatsApp Published Updated: Who Benefits from the FDLR’s New “Jeremiads”? Kinshasa Questions Kigali’s Motives.. Kinshasa — A flurry of videos and statements attributed to a faction calling itself FDLR-FOCA has resurfaced online since early October, just as President Félix Tshisekedi intensified diplomacy to end Rwanda’s decades-long aggression in eastern DR Congo. Kinshasa officials and regional analysts say the timing is no coincidence: reviving the FDLR spectre helps Kigali justify a continued military footprint on Congolese soil despite international pressure. A familiar pretext returns For years, Rwanda has framed its security posture in North and South Kivu as a response to the FDLR, a Hutu-led group born in the DRC in 2000. The latest clips, featuring mostly young men claiming the FDLR-FOCA banner and filmed in areas currently controlled by M23/RDF, declare they will not disarm without an “inter-Rwandan dialogue.” Congolese officials call the spectacle incongruous: if M23/RDF controls the terrain, how do purported FDLR camps operate freely and post videos without interference? If the FDLR was historically composed of ex-FAR elements from the 1990s, why do these new faces appear to be 17–30 rather than septuagenarians? The contradictions, Kinshasa argues, point to staging designed to derail diplomacy. The wider diplomatic backdrop The resurgence of FDLR talk comes as DR Congo pushes for implementation of UNSCR 2773, regional de-escalation, and a political track via Washington/Doha/AU channels. In parallel, Congolese forces have urged communities to cut all links with the FDLR, support voluntary disarmament and repatriation, and end the cycles of proxy warfare. ADVERTISEMENT Within this context, Congolese voices say the sudden FDLR-FOCA media blitz serves one audience: Kigali. By amplifying an FDLR threat narrative, Rwanda can argue for sustained deployments in the Kivus while peace tracks gain traction — a tactic critics say has repeatedly sabotaged ceasefire efforts. Claims and counter-claims inside the FDLR universe Sources close to veteran FDLR figure Gen. Pacifique Ntabwunguka (“Omega”) insist the political branch is not involved with the new FOCA messaging and continues to advocate an AU-mediated inter-Rwandan dialogue. They also note past demobilisations: in the early 2000s, some FDLR tactical units reportedly laid down arms and were integrated into Rwandan structures — a reminder that the FDLR is not a monolith, and that today’s “FDLR” label is frequently misused in information wars. The political wing’s position paper (March 2025) urged: A non-military pathway to resolve intra-Rwandan tensions; Safe, voluntary, supervised return for Rwandan refugees in DRC; Inclusive dialogue under African and international mediation. ADVERTISEMENT Trending Now Kindu Nurses’ Strike Disrupts Care and Childhood Vaccination . Healthcare System EAC Preparedness Plan: What Must Be Ready Before Floods . Regional Blocs (AU, SADC, EAC, ECOWAS) DR Congo's Juliana Lumumba Seeks to Reshape the Francophonie . Francophone River Offin Girls’ Rights Decision: What Must Change? . Education Popular Today Healthcare System Kindu Nurses’ Strike Disrupts Care and Childhood Vaccination . Francophone DR Congo's Juliana Lumumba Seeks to Reshape the Francophonie . Policy and Reforms US Democrats' Rwanda Record: Peaceful Change and Congo Sovereignty . War in Eastern DRC Muyaya: Congo's War Has Nothing to Do With the Constitution . Infrastructure DRC Signs Contracts to Modernise 13 Airports, First Deliveries in 2028 . Whether one agrees with those demands or not, their stance contrasts with videos of youthful “FOCA” fighters posing in M23/RDF-held zones. Who gains from the noise? Kinshasa’s view is blunt: the louder the FDLR story, the easier it is to justify occupation and loot resources under the cover of “counter-insurgency.” Civil society researchers argue the fresh FOCA messaging: Normalises M23/RDF presence while talks proceed; Shifts headlines away from cross-border support to an ever-elastic FDLR threat; Raises doubts around the Doha/Luanda/Nairobi tracks at sensitive moments. Some analysts add that portraying a rejuvenated FDLR also internationalises Rwanda’s narrative before the UN Security Council and donor capitals — making it harder to sustain sanctions or a unified call for withdrawal. Context: what the FDLR is — and isn’t Founded in 2000, the FDLR emerged from earlier armed networks of Hutu refugees in Congo. Over time, the label has covered splinters, political and military wings, and defunct or rebranded units. Its size, cohesion, and activities have fluctuated with regional politics and Congolese operations. That fluidity makes the “FDLR threat” easy to inflate or conflate, particularly when new formations adopt old acronyms. ADVERTISEMENT Congolese authorities stress two points: Residual elements may exist, but do not justify the foreign occupation of two provinces. The peace track requires dealing with all armed actors through disarmament, reintegration, refugee solutions, and credible guarantees — not selective narratives that excuse proxy warfare. What Kinshasa wants next The DRC’s position remains consistent: Implement UNSCR 2773 and all regional communiqués fully and verifiably; Withdraw foreign forces and dismantle supply lines to proxies; Advance civilian protection, humanitarian access, and the return of displaced people; Pursue political solutions where appropriate, including safe returns for bona fide refugees; Ensure that natural-resource governance serves Congolese communities, not cross-border networks. Officials say the goal is not to “settle scores,” but to end the pretexts that have kept the Kivus in permanent crisis. Bottom line The sudden visibility of “FDLR-FOCA” videos in M23/RDF-held zones raises more questions than it answers. For Kinshasa, the episode underscores a familiar pattern: weaponising narratives to prolong a military status quo. As regional and international actors press for peace, the test is whether diplomacy can move faster than the propaganda, and whether the Great Lakes can finally pivot from pretexts to proof-based de-escalation. ADVERTISEMENT Related Articles Healthcare System Kindu Nurses’ Strike Disrupts Care and Childhood Vaccination Patients face interrupted services as the labour dispute continues in Maniema. . Francophone DR Congo's Juliana Lumumba Seeks to Reshape the Francophonie DR Congo's Juliana Lumumba proposes nine reforms for the Francophonie, challenging Rwanda's Louise . Policy and Reforms US Democrats' Rwanda Record: Peaceful Change and Congo Sovereignty Will Democrats support Kagame after the 2026 midterms? Blinken's statements, Biden's Rwanda policy . War in Eastern DRC Muyaya: Congo's War Has Nothing to Do With the Constitution In London, the DRC government spokesperson rejects constitutional politics as a cause of the eastern . Tags DR.Congo DR.Congo Rwanda Rwanda Paul Kagame Paul Kagame FDLR Militias FDLR Militias

Vietnam’s Vingroup and the Kinshasa government sign a deal to build a 6,300-ha riverfront city, advancing DRC’s green, modern, and sustainable vision. KINSHASA, DRC — In a historic partnership that underscores Congo’s growing international appeal, the government of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Vietnam’s leading conglomerate Vingroup have signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) to jointly develop a 6,300-hectare riverfront urban complex in Kinshasa, one of the largest planned city projects in Central Africa. Building a Modern Kinshasa The project, stretching between the southern bank of the Congo River and the northern area of N’djili International Airport, will transform Kinshasa’s skyline and serve as a symbol of President Félix Tshisekedi’s urban renewal and green economy vision. The mega-complex will include: Residential areas, villas, and apartment towers Hospitals, schools, and administrative zones Shopping malls, hotels, and entertainment centers According to the agreement, the city of Kinshasa will allocate land free of charge to facilitate development and accelerate progress. Green Mobility for a Cleaner Future The partnership also advances Congo’s green transport transition, with VinFast, Vingroup’s electric vehicle brand, and Green and Smart Mobility (GSM) set to introduce electric buses, taxis, and charging stations across Kinshasa. Continue Reading Full Article CONGO'S INVESTMENT Vingroup, Kinshasa Sign Deal for 6,300-Hectare Urban Mega-Project By Serge Kitoko Tshibanda Political Analyst Serge Kitoko Tshibanda Home Comment Oct 27, 2025 May 15, 2026 3 min read Copy link Facebook X (Twitter) WhatsApp Published Updated: KINSHASA, DRC — In a historic partnership that underscores Congo’s growing international appeal, the government of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Vietnam’s leading conglomerate Vingroup have signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) to jointly develop a 6,300-hectare riverfront urban complex in Kinshasa, one of the largest planned city projects in Central Africa. Building a Modern Kinshasa The project, stretching between the southern bank of the Congo River and the northern area of N’djili International Airport, will transform Kinshasa’s skyline and serve as a symbol of President Félix Tshisekedi’s urban renewal and green economy vision. The mega-complex will include: Residential areas, villas, and apartment towers Hospitals, schools, and administrative zones Shopping malls, hotels, and entertainment centers ADVERTISEMENT According to the agreement, the city of Kinshasa will allocate land free of charge to facilitate development and accelerate progress. Green Mobility for a Cleaner Future The partnership also advances Congo’s green transport transition, with VinFast, Vingroup’s electric vehicle brand, and Green and Smart Mobility (GSM) set to introduce electric buses, taxis, and charging stations across Kinshasa. The initiative aims to replace more than 300,000 fuel-powered vehicles with electric ones over time, supported by Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) systems and an expanding EV charging network. ADVERTISEMENT Trending Now Kindu Nurses’ Strike Disrupts Care and Childhood Vaccination . Healthcare System EAC Preparedness Plan: What Must Be Ready Before Floods . Regional Blocs (AU, SADC, EAC, ECOWAS) DR Congo's Juliana Lumumba Seeks to Reshape the Francophonie . Francophone River Offin Girls’ Rights Decision: What Must Change? . Education Popular Today Healthcare System Kindu Nurses’ Strike Disrupts Care and Childhood Vaccination . Francophone DR Congo's Juliana Lumumba Seeks to Reshape the Francophonie . Policy and Reforms US Democrats' Rwanda Record: Peaceful Change and Congo Sovereignty . War in Eastern DRC Muyaya: Congo's War Has Nothing to Do With the Constitution . Infrastructure DRC Signs Contracts to Modernise 13 Airports, First Deliveries in 2028 . Governor Daniel Bumba Lubaki hailed the collaboration as a turning point: “We have seen what Vingroup has achieved in Vietnam and globally. This partnership will help us build a modern, sustainable, and vibrant Kinshasa for our people.” A Landmark in Congo’s Global Partnerships For Kinshasa, the deal represents more than urban planning; it’s a statement of confidence and cooperation between Africa and Asia. The partnership signals the DRC’s determination to attract strategic investors under the leadership of President Tshisekedi and Prime Minister Judith Suminwa. ADVERTISEMENT Vingroup Vice Chairwoman Lê Thị Thu Thủy said: “We are confident this collaboration will help transform the city’s landscape, drive sustainable development, and create long-term benefits for Kinshasa and the DRC.” Shaping Congo’s Future The 6,300-hectare project is poised to redefine Kinshasa as a modern, inclusive, and green African metropolis, powered by innovation, international trust, and Congolese ambition. ADVERTISEMENT Related Articles Healthcare System Kindu Nurses’ Strike Disrupts Care and Childhood Vaccination Patients face interrupted services as the labour dispute continues in Maniema. . Francophone DR Congo's Juliana Lumumba Seeks to Reshape the Francophonie DR Congo's Juliana Lumumba proposes nine reforms for the Francophonie, challenging Rwanda's Louise . Policy and Reforms US Democrats' Rwanda Record: Peaceful Change and Congo Sovereignty Will Democrats support Kagame after the 2026 midterms? Blinken's statements, Biden's Rwanda policy . War in Eastern DRC Muyaya: Congo's War Has Nothing to Do With the Constitution In London, the DRC government spokesperson rejects constitutional politics as a cause of the eastern . Tags DR.Congo DR.Congo Vietnam Vietnam Invest In Congo Invest In Congo

In a heart-wrenching announcement made via X (formerly Twitter) on Monday, former UFC heavyweight champion Francis Ngannou shared the devastating news of his 15-month-old son Kobe's passing. Ngannou expressed his profound sorrow, stating, "Too soon to leave but yet he's gone. My little boy, my mate, my partner Kobe was full of life and joy. Now, he's laying without life. I shouted his name over and over but he's not responding." The Cameroonian fighter, known for his formidable presence in the ring, conveyed his emotional turmoil: "I was my best self next to him and now I have no clue of who I am. Life is so unfair to hit us where it hurts the most." The global sports community, including prominent figures like Conor McGregor, has rallied around Ngannou, offering condolences and support. McGregor responded to Ngannou's post, saying, "I am so sorry to hear of your loss Francis, my prayers are with you and your family at this time." Ngannou's manager, Marquel Martin, also expressed his grief online, noting that "millions of others" will be praying for the bereaved family. This tragic event follows Ngannou's recent defeat by Anthony Joshua in Saudi Arabia, a match that marked a significant moment in his career following his decision to move away from MMA. Francis Ngannou's journey has been one of incredible highs and devastating lows, both in his professional and personal life. As the sports world mourns with Ngannou, his resilience and strength remain at the forefront of conversations among fans and fellow athletes alike. Continue Reading Full Article By Author Name Author Name Home Comment May 1, 2024 May 15, 2026 2 min read Copy link Facebook X (Twitter) WhatsApp Published Updated: Ngannou expressed his profound sorrow In a heart-wrenching announcement made via X (formerly Twitter) on Monday, former UFC heavyweight champion Francis Ngannou shared the devastating news of his 15-month-old son Kobe's passing. Ngannou expressed his profound sorrow, stating, "Too soon to leave but yet he's gone. My little boy, my mate, my partner Kobe was full of life and joy. Now, he's laying without life. I shouted his name over and over but he's not responding." The Cameroonian fighter, known for his formidable presence in the ring, conveyed his emotional turmoil: "I was my best self next to him and now I have no clue of who I am. Life is so unfair to hit us where it hurts the most." ADVERTISEMENT The global sports community, including prominent figures like Conor McGregor, has rallied around Ngannou, offering condolences and support. McGregor responded to Ngannou's post, saying, "I am so sorry to hear of your loss Francis, my prayers are with you and your family at this time." Ngannou's manager, Marquel Martin, also expressed his grief online, noting that "millions of others" will be praying for the bereaved family. ADVERTISEMENT Trending Now Kindu Nurses’ Strike Disrupts Care and Childhood Vaccination . Healthcare System EAC Preparedness Plan: What Must Be Ready Before Floods . Regional Blocs (AU, SADC, EAC, ECOWAS) DR Congo's Juliana Lumumba Seeks to Reshape the Francophonie . Francophone River Offin Girls’ Rights Decision: What Must Change? . Education Popular Today This tragic event follows Ngannou's recent defeat by Anthony Joshua in Saudi Arabia, a match that marked a significant moment in his career following his decision to move away from MMA. Francis Ngannou's journey has been one of incredible highs and devastating lows, both in his professional and personal life. As the sports world mourns with Ngannou, his resilience and strength remain at the forefront of conversations among fans and fellow athletes alike. ADVERTISEMENT ADVERTISEMENT Related Articles Tags

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Examine Kagame's security arguments for Rwanda's role in eastern DRC against UN findings on M23, civilian abuses, mineral flows and the reported FRN launch Since M23 resumed major operations in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo in late 2021, President Paul Kagame's government has repeatedly placed two concerns at the center of its explanation for its involvement: the continued presence of the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) and threats facing Congolese Tutsi communities. Kigali maintains that its measures are defensive and that AFC/M23 has legitimate Congolese grievances. None of these realities, however, settles the separate question of whether Rwanda may deploy forces inside a neighboring sovereign country or assist an armed movement in taking and administering its towns. That distinction is central to Kinshasa's position: a state can have real security concerns without gaining an unlimited right to intervene militarily across an international border. The evidence collected by international investigators increasingly focuses not simply on rhetoric or grievances, but on Rwandan troop deployments in DRC, operational command, territorial administration, forced recruitment and revenue from minerals. The argument was dramatically sharpened on October 12, 2026, when former president Joseph Kabila was announced as leader of the Front pour la Refondation de la Nation (FRN), a new political-military coalition replacing the AFC/M23 arrangement. Rebel figures Corneille Nangaa, Bertrand Bisimwa, Freddy Kaniki and Sultani Makenga were named among its senior leadership. The FRN has openly connected a former head of state to the armed coalition seeking political change in Kinshasa. For critics of Kagame and Kabila, the question is unavoidable: if the original justification was protection from the FDLR, why has the armed movement's political mission expanded to changing who governs the DRC? 1. The FDLR argument: a real threat, but not a blank cheque Kigali's longest-running security argument concerns the FDLR, an armed group operating in eastern Congo whose origins are allegedly linked to forces responsible for the 1994 Rwandan genocide. Rwanda says Congolese military cooperation with FDLR elements has deepened the danger. In January 2026 testimony published by Rwanda's defence ministry, Ambassador Mathilde Mukantabana openly acknowledged security coordination with AFC/M23 and said it was intended to prevent renewed cross-border threats. She described the movement as an independent Congolese organization and argued that Rwanda's security measures would be reduced in line with verified FDLR disarmament. But the United States has sanctioned commanders from both FDLR and M23, reflecting a crucial point: one armed group's atrocities do not justify another armed group's violations. Under the Washington peace framework, the neutralization of the FDLR and the disengagement of Rwandan forces or removal of defensive measures are linked commitments, not substitutes for one another. Kinshasa's challenge to Kagame therefore rests on a question of proportionality, legality and accountability. Evidence of FDLR abuses must lead to lawful disarmament and protection of civilians, not to an indefinite transfer of Congolese territory into the hands of an armed coalition. Continue Reading Full Article JUSTICE & CRIME Kagame's Failed Justifications for His Military Presence in the DRC By Serge Kitoko Tshibanda Political Analyst Serge Kitoko Tshibanda Home Comment Oct 14, 2026 Oct 15, 2026 10 min read Copy link Facebook X (Twitter) WhatsApp Published Updated: Since M23 resumed major operations in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo in late 2021, President Paul Kagame's government has repeatedly placed two concerns at the center of its explanation for its involvement: the continued presence of the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) and threats facing Congolese Tutsi communities. Kigali maintains that its measures are defensive and that AFC/M23 has legitimate Congolese grievances. None of these realities, however, settles the separate question of whether Rwanda may deploy forces inside a neighboring sovereign country or assist an armed movement in taking and administering its towns. That distinction is central to Kinshasa's position: a state can have real security concerns without gaining an unlimited right to intervene militarily across an international border. The evidence collected by international investigators increasingly focuses not simply on rhetoric or grievances, but on Rwandan troop deployments in DRC, operational command, territorial administration, forced recruitment and revenue from minerals. The argument was dramatically sharpened on October 12, 2026, when former president Joseph Kabila was announced as leader of the Front pour la Refondation de la Nation (FRN), a new political-military coalition replacing the AFC/M23 arrangement. Rebel figures Corneille Nangaa, Bertrand Bisimwa, Freddy Kaniki and Sultani Makenga were named among its senior leadership. The FRN has openly connected a former head of state to the armed coalition seeking political change in Kinshasa. For critics of Kagame and Kabila, the question is unavoidable: if the original justification was protection from the FDLR, why has the armed movement's political mission expanded to changing who governs the DRC? 1. The FDLR argument: a real threat, but not a blank cheque Kigali's longest-running security argument concerns the FDLR, an armed group operating in eastern Congo whose origins are allegedly linked to forces responsible for the 1994 Rwandan genocide. Rwanda says Congolese military cooperation with FDLR elements has deepened the danger. In January 2026 testimony published by Rwanda's defence ministry, Ambassador Mathilde Mukantabana openly acknowledged security coordination with AFC/M23 and said it was intended to prevent renewed cross-border threats. She described the movement as an independent Congolese organization and argued that Rwanda's security measures would be reduced in line with verified FDLR disarmament. But the United States has sanctioned commanders from both FDLR and M23, reflecting a crucial point: one armed group's atrocities do not justify another armed group's violations. Under the Washington peace framework, the neutralization of the FDLR and the disengagement of Rwandan forces or removal of defensive measures are linked commitments, not substitutes for one another. ADVERTISEMENT Kinshasa's challenge to Kagame therefore rests on a question of proportionality, legality and accountability. Evidence of FDLR abuses must lead to lawful disarmament and protection of civilians, not to an indefinite transfer of Congolese territory into the hands of an armed coalition. 2. Protecting Congolese Tutsis cannot mean exposing other civilians to abuse Rwanda also invokes discrimination against Congolese Tutsi and other Rwandophone communities. Those grievances deserve serious attention. Citizenship rights, equal protection and freedom from ethnic violence are obligations of the Congolese state; protecting these communities should not be treated as a concession to Kigali. Yet independent investigations have documented extensive abuses by the very coalition Rwanda says shares its security concerns. In a June 2026 report, Human Rights Watch described mass roundups, arbitrary detention, coercion and forced recruitment by M23 and Rwandan forces in occupied parts of eastern Congo. The report documented the treatment of civilians, including young men and boys, after the fall of Goma and Bukavu. This creates a fundamental contradiction in the public narrative. An operation presented as the defence of threatened populations must still answer for the rights of everyone living under the control of its forces. No community's security can be built on the arbitrary imprisonment, forced recruitment or displacement of another. 3. 'Defensive measures' versus the facts on the ground The biggest challenge to Kigali's description of its presence came from international findings about the scale and character of operations in 2025 and 2026. The UN Group of Experts' 2025 final report found that AFC/M23 and the Rwanda Defence Force jointly captured strategic areas, including Goma and Bukavu. It concluded that RDF support was critical to the rebels' territorial expansion and identified sophisticated military systems, active operations and a Rwandan role in securing AFC/M23 leadership. In March 2026, the U.S. Treasury sanctioned the Rwanda Defence Force and senior officers, stating that the RDF was actively supporting, training and fighting alongside M23. Washington said M23's offensives would not have been possible without the RDF's support. These findings matter because they move the debate away from a simple argument over whether Rwanda has legitimate fears. They ask what Rwanda's armed forces were doing inside the DRC, whom they were fighting alongside and what territories they helped seize. A military presence associated with offensives and control of major cities cannot be assessed solely through a government's preferred label of 'defence.' ADVERTISEMENT Trending Now Kindu Nurses’ Strike Disrupts Care and Childhood Vaccination . Healthcare System EAC Preparedness Plan: What Must Be Ready Before Floods . Regional Blocs (AU, SADC, EAC, ECOWAS) DR Congo's Juliana Lumumba Seeks to Reshape the Francophonie . Francophone River Offin Girls’ Rights Decision: What Must Change? . Education Popular Today Policy and Reforms US Democrats' Rwanda Record: Peaceful Change and Congo Sovereignty . War in Eastern DRC Muyaya: Congo's War Has Nothing to Do With the Constitution . Justice & Crime Trump Moves to Remove Rwanda and South Africa From AGOA . Justice & Crime Rwanda Accused of Deporting Congolese Civilians in South Kivu . Diplomacy Tshisekedi, Putin Seal Three DRC- Russia Cooperation Deals . Rwanda disputes accusations that it directs M23 as a proxy and says it does not seek to determine Congo's political future. The contradiction between that position and international findings is at the center of the diplomatic confrontation. 4. The mineral question is no longer just a slogan Congolese critics have long argued that the conflict cannot be understood without eastern Congo's mineral wealth, The UN investigators have identified specific economic networks that make the question impossible to dismiss. The UN Group of Experts' 2025 report documented minerals from the AFC/M23-controlled Rubaya area being smuggled into Rwanda, mixed with Rwandan production and exported through downstream supply chains. Reporting on the 2026 UN findings described continued integration of mineral production from rebel-controlled territory into Rwanda-linked markets. The pattern matters: military control gives an armed movement access to mines, transport corridors, trading centers and tax revenue. That revenue can help sustain a war while depriving the Congolese state and communities of resources and public accountability. President Kagame has rejected claims that Rwanda's actions are driven by mineral extraction. But a denial of motive does not erase documented mineral flows. For Kinshasa, one of the most consequential fronts of the conflict is therefore financial: trace the minerals, identify beneficiaries and enforce responsible supply-chain controls. 5. Kabila's FRN: a new political label over an established armed coalition The October 12 FRN announcement is the clearest new political development. according to them, Kabila would lead a replacement for the AFC/M23 alliance, with senior positions for figures already associated with the rebellion. The new structure describes its purpose in terms of changing the government in Kinshasa, not merely addressing cross-border security concerns. There is an important history behind this announcement. The UN experts had been informed of an impending AFC/M23 leadership restructuring, including a possible name change and a prominent role for Kabila. The UN Group of Experts report also described the possibility that a more visibly Congolese leadership could obscure Rwanda's role in the rebellion. Those findings make the October development particularly significant. The appearance of FRN was not simply a fresh acronym arriving without context; a possible restructuring had been discussed in UN reporting months earlier. ADVERTISEMENT For Congolese officials and other critics, Kabila has become the public political face of a coalition whose military strength was built with major Rwandan support. The U.S. Treasury sanctioned Kabila for supporting M23 and AFC; Kabila contests the accusations against him. His public leadership of FRN now places his relationship with the armed movement in a new light. The change of name does not erase the records of the constituent movements. Nor does it transform a coalition that includes armed commanders into an ordinary opposition party. For civilians in Goma, Bukavu, Rutshuru, Masisi and elsewhere, the essential questions concern who exercises coercive power, whether residents can move freely, and whether violations are investigated and punished. The real test for FRN is not its name, but its conduct There is a long history of armed movements, shifting alliances and political realignments in eastern Congo. Some had Rwandan backing; they were not all one organization simply changing its letterhead. The AFDL helped overthrow Mobutu in 1997; the RCD emerged in a different war; the CNDP later became influential; M23 was defeated in 2013 before resurging in the 2020s. Each period had different leaders, circumstances and outcomes. Nevertheless, the repeated use of armed coalitions to seek political power has imposed a familiar burden on Congolese civilians. The FRN's launch raises the same basic questions that past rebellions raised: who is supplying weapons, who benefits from territorial control, who is accountable for attacks on civilians, and who has the authority to decide Congo's government? For all the attention surrounding Kabila's return to the center of the rebellion, those questions matter more than the new organization's branding. A political movement seeking public legitimacy cannot acquire it simply by changing its name or presenting a former president as its leader. Sources and further reading Reuters, October 12, 2026 — Kabila forms new group to replace AFC/M23 Associated Press, October 2026 — Kabila launches FRN with M23-linked rebels UN Group of Experts on the DRC, 2025 final report (S/2025/446) U.S. Treasury, March 2, 2026 — Sanctions on Rwanda Defence Force U.S. Treasury, April 30, 2026 — Sanctions on Joseph Kabila U.S. Treasury, June 2, 2026 — Sanctions on FDLR and M23 commanders Human Rights Watch, June 10, 2026 — Arbitrary detention, killings and forced recruitment by M23 and the RDF Rwanda Ministry of Defence, January 23, 2026 — Ambassador Mukantabana's statement Actualite.cd , July 1, 2026 — UN experts on possible AFC/M23 restructuring and Kabila's role Actualite.cd , July 2, 2026 — Rubaya coltan and Rwanda-linked mineral supply chains Qatar Ministry of Foreign Affairs, July 2026 — DRC–Rwanda security mechanism and Washington Accords The New Humanitarian, September 14, 2026 — How Rwanda-backed M23 finances its war ADVERTISEMENT Related Articles Policy and Reforms US Democrats' Rwanda Record: Peaceful Change and Congo Sovereignty Will Democrats support Kagame after the 2026 midterms? Blinken's statements, Biden's Rwanda policy . War in Eastern DRC Muyaya: Congo's War Has Nothing to Do With the Constitution In London, the DRC government spokesperson rejects constitutional politics as a cause of the eastern . Justice & Crime Trump Moves to Remove Rwanda and South Africa From AGOA Trump plans to remove Rwanda and South Africa from AGOA trade benefits starting January 1, 2027 . Justice & Crime Rwanda Accused of Deporting Congolese Civilians in South Kivu South Kivu accuses Rwandan forces and M23 of forcibly displacing civilians in Katogota, . Tags DRC Conflict & Security DRC Conflict & Security Rwanda Rwanda Featured News Featured News DR.Congo DR.Congo

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In Goma, the capital of North Kivu province in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), crime and violence have surged as M23 rebels besiege the city. On April 16, three armed men robbed a city center mobile phone shop, stealing goods worth about £700 and fleeing on a motorbike. This incident occurred near the city hall, highlighting the growing lawlessness since the rebels blocked main roads into Goma in February. The city's residents, like the unnamed shop manager, have adapted to this dangerous new normal, with many accepting death and robberies as part of daily life. In April alone, at least 29 people were killed and 22 wounded in Goma, marking a record high in violence. The resurgence of the Tutsi-led M23 militia, backed by Rwanda according to UN and US reports, has trapped thousands of Congolese soldiers and pro-government fighters, known as Wazalendo, around Goma. The rebels renewed their insurgency in late 2021, capturing significant territory in North Kivu. The militia cut off Goma’s last overland supply route from Rwanda in February. Amid the chaos, armed men, including unpaid militias and Congolese soldiers, have resorted to crime, including robberies, extortion, and rape, both inside the city and in displacement camps housing 700,000 people. The Wazalendo, formed after President Félix Tshisekedi's call for vigilante groups, are among those accused of abuses. Despite efforts to curb the crime wave, such as a ban on Wazalendo carrying weapons in the city, violence remains rampant, especially in displacement camps where state control is weak. Médecins Sans Frontières reported 700 cases of rape per week in March, likely underestimating the true extent of the crisis. Gaspar Ndagijamana, a displaced taxi driver in the Kanyaruchinya camp, was shot for refusing to surrender his phone and later, his pregnant wife was also shot for refusing a demand for money. Both survived, though Laetitia has had pregnancy complications. As Goma grapples with this crisis, the international community continues to scrutinize Rwanda's alleged role in the conflict, while the city's residents endure relentless violence and insecurity. Continue Reading Full Article By Author Name Author Name Home Comment May 19, 2024 May 15, 2026 3 min read Copy link Facebook X (Twitter) WhatsApp Published Updated: Demonstrators denounce international silence on the crisis in DRC, and to show their support for the Congolese army in February. Photograph: Guerchom Ndebo/AFP/Getty In Goma, the capital of North Kivu province in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), crime and violence have surged as M23 rebels besiege the city. On April 16, three armed men robbed a city center mobile phone shop, stealing goods worth about £700 and fleeing on a motorbike. This incident occurred near the city hall, highlighting the growing lawlessness since the rebels blocked main roads into Goma in February. The city's residents, like the unnamed shop manager, have adapted to this dangerous new normal, with many accepting death and robberies as part of daily life. In April alone, at least 29 people were killed and 22 wounded in Goma, marking a record high in violence. ADVERTISEMENT The resurgence of the Tutsi-led M23 militia, backed by Rwanda according to UN and US reports, has trapped thousands of Congolese soldiers and pro-government fighters, known as Wazalendo, around Goma. The rebels renewed their insurgency in late 2021, capturing significant territory in North Kivu. The militia cut off Goma’s last overland supply route from Rwanda in February. Amid the chaos, armed men, including unpaid militias and Congolese soldiers, have resorted to crime, including robberies, extortion, and rape, both inside the city and in displacement camps housing 700,000 people. The Wazalendo, formed after President Félix Tshisekedi's call for vigilante groups, are among those accused of abuses. Despite efforts to curb the crime wave, such as a ban on Wazalendo carrying weapons in the city, violence remains rampant, especially in displacement camps where state control is weak. Médecins Sans Frontières reported 700 cases of rape per week in March, likely underestimating the true extent of the crisis. ADVERTISEMENT Trending Now Kindu Nurses’ Strike Disrupts Care and Childhood Vaccination . Healthcare System EAC Preparedness Plan: What Must Be Ready Before Floods . Regional Blocs (AU, SADC, EAC, ECOWAS) DR Congo's Juliana Lumumba Seeks to Reshape the Francophonie . Francophone River Offin Girls’ Rights Decision: What Must Change? . Education Popular Today Gaspar Ndagijamana, a displaced taxi driver in the Kanyaruchinya camp, was shot for refusing to surrender his phone and later, his pregnant wife was also shot for refusing a demand for money. Both survived, though Laetitia has had pregnancy complications. As Goma grapples with this crisis, the international community continues to scrutinize Rwanda's alleged role in the conflict, while the city's residents endure relentless violence and insecurity. ADVERTISEMENT ADVERTISEMENT Related Articles Tags

DRC launches a Pepper Task Force to help farmers and exporters meet Chinese standards and sell pepper, cocoa, coffee, soy and sesame. The Democratic Republic of the Congo has launched a new strategic group to help Congolese farmers and businesses prepare agricultural products for export to China. Known as the Task Force Piments , or Pepper Task Force, the initiative was created by the National Agency for the Promotion of Exports, commonly known by its French acronym ANAPEX . Despite its name, the group will not focus only on chilli peppers. It also targets cocoa, coffee, soy and sesame, products that could give the DRC a broader export base beyond copper, cobalt and other minerals. According to the Congolese Press Agency , ANAPEX director-general Mike Tambwe announced the task force at the end of a two-day export workshop in Kinshasa on Friday, July 24. The group is intended to bring public institutions, producers, exporters, technical partners and investors together to solve the problems preventing Congolese products from entering major international markets. What the Pepper Task Force is expected to do The task force is intended to help Congolese producers move from having crops with export potential to supplying products that can legally, consistently and competitively enter China. That requires more than growing pepper, coffee or cocoa. Exporters must be able to supply the required quantity and quality, prove where the product came from, meet food-safety rules, obtain the necessary certificates, package and label the goods correctly, and deliver them at a price that remains competitive after processing and transport. Reporting by DeskEco identifies three main objectives: Continue Reading Full Article IMPORT AND EXPORT DRC Launches Pepper Task Force for China Exports By Serge Kitoko Tshibanda Political Analyst Serge Kitoko Tshibanda Home Comment Jul 25, 2026 Aug 5, 2026 10 min read Copy link Facebook X (Twitter) WhatsApp Published Updated: The Democratic Republic of the Congo has launched a new strategic group to help Congolese farmers and businesses prepare agricultural products for export to China. Known as the Task Force Piments , or Pepper Task Force, the initiative was created by the National Agency for the Promotion of Exports, commonly known by its French acronym ANAPEX . Despite its name, the group will not focus only on chilli peppers. It also targets cocoa, coffee, soy and sesame, products that could give the DRC a broader export base beyond copper, cobalt and other minerals. According to the Congolese Press Agency , ANAPEX director-general Mike Tambwe announced the task force at the end of a two-day export workshop in Kinshasa on Friday, July 24. The group is intended to bring public institutions, producers, exporters, technical partners and investors together to solve the problems preventing Congolese products from entering major international markets. What the Pepper Task Force is expected to do The task force is intended to help Congolese producers move from having crops with export potential to supplying products that can legally, consistently and competitively enter China. That requires more than growing pepper, coffee or cocoa. Exporters must be able to supply the required quantity and quality, prove where the product came from, meet food-safety rules, obtain the necessary certificates, package and label the goods correctly, and deliver them at a price that remains competitive after processing and transport. Reporting by DeskEco identifies three main objectives: Promote the export of Congolese pepper, cocoa, coffee, soy and sesame; Help producers use the tariff preferences available in China; and Assist businesses in meeting Chinese registration, quality and compliance requirements. ANAPEX says the task force will also serve as a permanent framework through which government departments, the private sector and technical partners can follow the recommendations from the workshop and assess progress. That coordination will be important. A farmer may produce a high-quality crop but still be unable to export without an organised buyer, an approved processing facility, laboratory results, documents proving origin, reliable transport and sufficient working capital. China has removed tariffs, but standards still apply China has opened its market more widely to African goods by granting zero-tariff treatment across all tariff lines to the 53 African countries with which it has diplomatic relations. For the DRC and other least-developed countries with diplomatic ties to Beijing, China’s treatment covering 100 percent of tariff lines took effect on December 1, 2024. China extended equivalent coverage to the remaining 20 eligible African economies from May 1, 2026, creating continent-wide access except for Eswatini, which does not have diplomatic relations with Beijing. ADVERTISEMENT The tariff policy can make eligible Congolese products more competitive because the importer does not have to pay the normal customs duty. However, zero tariff does not mean automatic entry. Products must still satisfy Chinese customs, food-safety, plant-health, traceability, registration, packaging and labelling requirements. China’s revised rules for overseas food producers took effect on June 1, 2026. They require overseas companies producing, processing or storing food for export to China to be registered with the General Administration of Customs of China, or GACC , under the applicable procedure. Depending on the product and its risk category, a business may apply through the registration system or require review and recommendation from a competent authority in its home country. Registered producers must continue meeting Chinese food-safety requirements, and qualifying products must carry the appropriate registration information when exported. For Congolese businesses, that means the task force’s most valuable work may be technical: identifying the correct requirements for each product, helping companies prepare applications, improving testing capacity and preventing exporters from spending money on shipments that will be rejected at the border. The main recommendations from the Kinshasa workshop Participants at the two-day meeting proposed several measures intended to make Congolese exporters more competitive. 1. Create dedicated export financing Farmers, cooperatives and small businesses may need money long before a buyer pays for the final shipment. They must purchase crops, operate processing equipment, pay for testing, buy packaging, transport goods and complete export documentation. The workshop therefore recommended a financing mechanism dedicated to exporters, particularly those investing in processing, packaging and certification. No bank, public fund, interest rate, eligibility rule or amount was announced. Until such a mechanism is funded and accessible, financing will remain a recommendation rather than an available service. 2. Invest in processing and packaging Selling cleaned, dried, graded, roasted, ground or packaged products can create more value than exporting untreated crops. ADVERTISEMENT Trending Now Kindu Nurses’ Strike Disrupts Care and Childhood Vaccination . Healthcare System EAC Preparedness Plan: What Must Be Ready Before Floods . Regional Blocs (AU, SADC, EAC, ECOWAS) DR Congo's Juliana Lumumba Seeks to Reshape the Francophonie . Francophone River Offin Girls’ Rights Decision: What Must Change? . Education Popular Today Import and Export DRC Launches Pepper Task Force for China Exports . Mining and Minerals DRC Certifies Its First Manono Lithium Cargo . Science and Environment New Monkey Species Discovered in the DRC’s Congo Rainforest . War in Eastern DRC How Rwanda Keeps the FDLR Narrative Alive to Stay in Congo . Geopolitics Africa Biya’s Appointment of His Son Marks Nepotism at the Highest Level . A pepper producer, for example, may earn more from a consistent, safely dried and properly packaged product than from loose peppers sold without grading or traceability. The same principle applies to roasted or packaged coffee, processed cocoa products and cleaned sesame. Local processing can also create jobs in sorting, quality control, machinery maintenance, packaging, design, warehousing and logistics. 3. Strengthen certification and laboratories Exporters need credible evidence that their goods satisfy the buyer’s specifications and the destination country’s health and safety requirements. That may include testing for pesticide residues, contaminants, moisture, microbiological risks or other product-specific standards. Participants called for stronger national quality-control laboratories so that more testing and certification can be completed reliably inside the DRC. Without sufficient laboratory capacity, businesses may face delays, additional costs or the need to send samples abroad. 4. Train producers and first-time exporters ANAPEX wants more practical training for small and medium-sized enterprises, cooperatives and businesses attempting to export for the first time. The proposed training covers origin procedures, market-research platforms, Chinese registration systems, digital trade tools and geolocation. Geolocation and farm-level records can help exporters trace a shipment back to the production area. This becomes increasingly important when buyers need proof of origin, production practices or supply-chain control. 5. Attract technology and investment Workshop participants also called for public-private partnerships and foreign investment to modernise processing units, transfer technology and develop agricultural value chains. Investment could help producers overcome a common problem: having a marketable crop without the machinery or infrastructure needed to supply it in the form, volume and quality demanded by international buyers. ADVERTISEMENT However, future partnerships will need clear rules so that farmers receive fair prices and Congolese businesses participate meaningfully in processing and distribution. GACC and REX are not the same system The workshop discussed both GACC and REX , but exporters should understand that they serve different markets and purposes. GACC is China’s customs authority. Its registration and import-control systems are directly relevant to food businesses that want to sell into China. REX, the Registered Exporter system, is a European Union system that allows registered businesses to make statements on the origin of goods under applicable preferential trade arrangements. REX can therefore help qualifying Congolese exporters prove origin when using certain European trade preferences, but it is not the registration system for entering China. The broader message from ANAPEX is that Congolese businesses need the correct market-access tools for each destination rather than treating every export market as if it follows the same rules. Why agricultural exports so important for the DRC China is already the DRC’s largest export destination, but the relationship is dominated by minerals. World Trade Organization data show that China received 57.6 percent of Congolese exports in 2023. Refined copper cathodes, cobalt products and copper ores accounted for the overwhelming majority of the DRC’s exports worldwide. Cocoa beans represented only 0.5 percent of total exports in the same dataset. This concentration makes the new task force economically significant. The DRC is not trying to find a completely new trading partner; it is trying to sell a more diverse group of products to a country that already buys large volumes of Congolese goods. Expanding agricultural exports could: create income for farmers and cooperatives; generate rural and processing jobs; increase demand for transport, storage and packaging; help small businesses enter international supply chains; earn foreign currency outside the mining sector; and reduce the economy’s dependence on a narrow group of mineral exports. The benefits will be greater if products are processed inside the DRC before export. Shipping raw crops can create farm income, but local transformation allows more of the product’s final value to remain in the country. ADVERTISEMENT Related Articles Import and Export DRC Launches Pepper Task Force for China Exports ANAPEX targets pepper, cocoa, coffee, soy and sesame, but no export deal is signed yet . Mining and Minerals DRC Certifies Its First Manono Lithium Cargo First CEEC-certified lots leave Kalemie as Congo opens a new battery-mineral export trade . Science and Environment New Monkey Species Discovered in the DRC’s Congo Rainforest a rare orange-lipped monkey species found in Lomami National Park in the Democratic Republic of Congo . War in Eastern DRC How Rwanda Keeps the FDLR Narrative Alive to Stay in Congo Rwanda cites the FDLR threat to justify its presence in eastern Congo, but past operations...... . Tags Must Read Must Read DRC Economy DRC Economy DR.Congo DR.Congo

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