In a significant move towards renewable energy, Egypt announced plans to establish two solar power stations, collectively valued at 1 billion Egyptian pounds (approximately $20.60 million). The projects, which are to be financed by the European Union, underscore Egypt’s commitment to increasing its renewable energy capacity. The first project, costing 550 million Egyptian pounds ($11.46 million), will be situated at the Assiut Oil Refining Company. This facility is designed to generate 10 megawatts of power and is expected to be operational within 11 months. The second initiative, located at the Egyptian General Petroleum Corporation (EGPC), will produce 6.5 megawatts from a 500 million Egyptian pound ($10.42 million) investment. Both ventures are part of a strategic effort to harness Egypt’s high solar irradiation levels and vast desert landscapes, making them ideal for solar energy production. These developments are part of Egypt’s broader strategy to boost its renewable energy output. The government recently accelerated its renewable energy goals, aiming to produce 42% of its total power generation from renewable sources by 2030, advancing the timeline from the previously set goal of 2035. As the North African nation works to become a renewable energy hub, it faces stiff competition from neighboring regions in North Africa and the Middle East. However, with continued investment and strategic partnerships, Egypt is poised to lead in the transition to sustainable energy sources . Continue Reading Full Article By Author Name Author Name Home Comment Apr 15, 2024 May 15, 2026 2 min read Copy link Facebook X (Twitter) WhatsApp Published Updated: In a significant move towards renewable energy, Egypt announced plans to establish two solar power stations, collectively valued at 1 billion Egyptian pounds (approximately $20.60 million). The projects, which are to be financed by the European Union, underscore Egypt’s commitment to increasing its renewable energy capacity. The first project, costing 550 million Egyptian pounds ($11.46 million), will be situated at the Assiut Oil Refining Company. This facility is designed to generate 10 megawatts of power and is expected to be operational within 11 months. The second initiative, located at the Egyptian General Petroleum Corporation (EGPC), will produce 6.5 megawatts from a 500 million Egyptian pound ($10.42 million) investment. Both ventures are part of a strategic effort to harness Egypt’s high solar irradiation levels and vast desert landscapes, making them ideal for solar energy production. ADVERTISEMENT These developments are part of Egypt’s broader strategy to boost its renewable energy output. The government recently accelerated its renewable energy goals, aiming to produce 42% of its total power generation from renewable sources by 2030, advancing the timeline from the previously set goal of 2035. As the North African nation works to become a renewable energy hub, it faces stiff competition from neighboring regions in North Africa and the Middle East. However, with continued investment and strategic partnerships, Egypt is poised to lead in the transition to sustainable energy sources . ADVERTISEMENT ADVERTISEMENT TRENDING NOW How to Check if You Must Submit a SARS Tax Return . Tax and Revenue How to Book a SARS Appointment Online . Tax and Revenue Niger TV Shows Soldiers Detained After Niamey Mutiny . Justice & Crime KAA Warns of Flight Delays at Kenyan Airports . Transport and Airlines POPULAR TODAY ADVERTISEMENT RELATED ARTICLE Tags

Kenya erupts again as youth protest police brutality and poor governance. 16 dead, 400 injured. Read the full story on XTRAfrica. Nairobi, Kenya – June 27, 2025 Thousands of young Kenyans are back on the streets protesting police brutality, poor governance, and economic struggles. The demonstrations began early Wednesday in Nairobi’s central business district and quickly spread to Mombasa and other towns. Why are Kenyans Protesting Again? The protests come exactly one year after deadly demonstrations against tax hikes in June 2024 that left 60 people dead and 20 missing. This week’s anger follows the death of a Kenyan blogger in police custody, which sparked outrage among Generation Z. “Not a single officer has been held to account,” said human rights activist Hussein Khaled.“People are demanding justice, compensation, and police reforms because too many Kenyans are losing their lives.” During last week’s protests, a street hawker was shot dead. Kenyan courts have now given detectives 15 days to investigate two police officers linked to the shooting. Many young people flooded social media, remembering protesters killed in past rallies. President William Ruto had promised to end police brutality after last year’s bloodshed. But activists say nothing has changed. Unemployment and rising living costs remain top frustrations. Last year’s protests forced Ruto to cancel a controversial finance bill. But new tax proposals have angered youth again, especially after a new healthcare levy shifted premiums to a progressive tax. “Both health and education are sinking due to bad policies,” said Prof. Macharia Munene of USIU Africa.“At the same time, state officials spend money on luxuries while people suffer.” Continue Reading Full Article By Author Name Author Name Home Comment Jun 27, 2025 May 15, 2026 3 min read Copy link Facebook X (Twitter) WhatsApp Published Updated: Nairobi, Kenya – June 27, 2025 Thousands of young Kenyans are back on the streets protesting police brutality, poor governance, and economic struggles. The demonstrations began early Wednesday in Nairobi’s central business district and quickly spread to Mombasa and other towns. Why are Kenyans Protesting Again? The protests come exactly one year after deadly demonstrations against tax hikes in June 2024 that left 60 people dead and 20 missing. This week’s anger follows the death of a Kenyan blogger in police custody, which sparked outrage among Generation Z. “Not a single officer has been held to account,” said human rights activist Hussein Khaled.“People are demanding justice, compensation, and police reforms because too many Kenyans are losing their lives.” During last week’s protests, a street hawker was shot dead. Kenyan courts have now given detectives 15 days to investigate two police officers linked to the shooting. Many young people flooded social media, remembering protesters killed in past rallies. ADVERTISEMENT President William Ruto had promised to end police brutality after last year’s bloodshed. But activists say nothing has changed. Unemployment and rising living costs remain top frustrations. Last year’s protests forced Ruto to cancel a controversial finance bill. But new tax proposals have angered youth again, especially after a new healthcare levy shifted premiums to a progressive tax. “Both health and education are sinking due to bad policies,” said Prof. Macharia Munene of USIU Africa.“At the same time, state officials spend money on luxuries while people suffer.” Ruto has been criticised for using a private jet to the US before last year’s protests and for ministers’ lavish lifestyles. Though he later apologised and dismissed some cabinet members, public trust continues to fall. Meanwhile, opposition leaders are criticised for staying silent after some were appointed to Ruto’s new cabinet. ADVERTISEMENT Bloodshed in the Streets According to Amnesty International Kenya, at least 16 people have died and 400 were injured in Wednesday’s protests. CNN reported police fired live bullets at peaceful protesters in Nairobi as the Communications Authority ordered TV and radio stations to stop live coverage of the marches. Roads near Parliament and the president’s office were barricaded. Police used teargas and water cannons to disperse crowds – scenes that reminded many of last year’s violence. ADVERTISEMENT TRENDING NOW How to Check if You Must Submit a SARS Tax Return . Tax and Revenue How to Book a SARS Appointment Online . Tax and Revenue Niger TV Shows Soldiers Detained After Niamey Mutiny . Justice & Crime KAA Warns of Flight Delays at Kenyan Airports . Transport and Airlines POPULAR TODAY Transport and Airlines KAA Warns of Flight Delays at Kenyan Airports . Justice & Crime Three More Arrested in Dr Victoria Mutiso Murder Probe . Technology and Innovation How to Reverse an M-Pesa Transaction . Protests and Movements Kenya Traders Face Tear Gas in KRA Cargo Protest . Business Trends KRA Explains KSh3.2m Rule as Traders Plan Protest . “Enough is enough. We are here for change. The blood we have shed is enough,” said protester Sevelina Mwihaki. What’s Next for Kenya? As frustration grows among Kenya’s youth, especially Generation Z, calls for accountability, economic reforms, and better governance are rising louder than ever. ADVERTISEMENT RELATED ARTICLE Transport and Airlines KAA Warns of Flight Delays at Kenyan Airports Passengers should confirm departing flights with airlines as KAA manages disruptions . Justice & Crime Three More Arrested in Dr Victoria Mutiso Murder Probe A Kenyan police officer is among three suspects held after a coordinated Nairobi–Kampala operation. . Technology and Innovation How to Reverse an M-Pesa Transaction Forward the M-PESA SMS to 456 within 24 hours, or use the app or Zuri. . Protests and Movements Kenya Traders Face Tear Gas in KRA Cargo Protest Nairobi traders closed shops and marched over KRA's KSh3.2m consolidated-cargo benchmark. . Tags Kenya Kenya

See the latest ANC Cape Town mayoral candidates, how the party selects its nominee, previous candidates and how the city’s mayor is elected ANC Cape Town Mayoral Candidates: History, Selection Process and Latest Updates Last updated: 15 July 2026 South Africans searching for the latest ANC Cape Town mayoral candidates are usually trying to answer two different questions: who will lead the ANC’s campaign in the city, and whether that person could actually become mayor. The distinction matters. Political parties may present a mayoral candidate to voters, but Cape Town residents do not elect the mayor directly. Residents elect councillors, and the new City Council elects the executive mayor from among its members. Cape Town is a major political prize. It is South Africa’s legislative capital, one of its largest economic centres and home to 4,772,846 people according to Statistics South Africa’s Census 2022 municipal factsheet . It is also the political and economic centre of the Western Cape, a province governed by the DA since 2009. Who is the ANC’s Cape Town mayoral candidate? The ANC has not yet officially announced its Cape Town mayoral candidate for the 4 November 2026 local government election. National ANC officials interviewed Cape Metro hopefuls on 11 July 2026, but the party has not published their names or confirmed a final nominee. Any individual described as the candidate before an official ANC announcement remains unconfirmed. Table of contents Latest ANC Cape Town mayoral candidate update Latest candidates and reported contenders Continue Reading Full Article LOCAL GOVERNMENT ANC Cape Town Mayoral Candidates: Complete Guide By Wilson Munezero Government Services & Opportunities Expert Wilson Munezero Home Comment Jul 15, 2026 Jul 15, 2026 40 min read Copy link Facebook X (Twitter) WhatsApp Published Updated: ANC Cape Town Mayoral Candidates: History, Selection Process and Latest Updates Last updated: 15 July 2026 South Africans searching for the latest ANC Cape Town mayoral candidates are usually trying to answer two different questions: who will lead the ANC’s campaign in the city, and whether that person could actually become mayor. The distinction matters. Political parties may present a mayoral candidate to voters, but Cape Town residents do not elect the mayor directly. Residents elect councillors, and the new City Council elects the executive mayor from among its members. Cape Town is a major political prize. It is South Africa’s legislative capital, one of its largest economic centres and home to 4,772,846 people according to Statistics South Africa’s Census 2022 municipal factsheet . It is also the political and economic centre of the Western Cape, a province governed by the DA since 2009. Who is the ANC’s Cape Town mayoral candidate? The ANC has not yet officially announced its Cape Town mayoral candidate for the 4 November 2026 local government election. National ANC officials interviewed Cape Metro hopefuls on 11 July 2026, but the party has not published their names or confirmed a final nominee. Any individual described as the candidate before an official ANC announcement remains unconfirmed. Table of contents Latest ANC Cape Town mayoral candidate update Latest candidates and reported contenders How the ANC selects its Cape Town mayoral candidate Who makes the final decision? Previous ANC Cape Town mayoral candidates Has the ANC ever governed Cape Town? Why Cape Town matters to the ANC How the mayor of Cape Town is elected Could a coalition decide the mayor? Candidate profiles ANC support in Cape Town ANC strongholds and weak areas Myth versus fact Latest ANC Cape Town mayoral candidate update Detail Information Confirmed candidate None announced Announcement date Not applicable Current role Not applicable until a candidate is confirmed Election South African local government election, 4 November 2026 Status Not yet officially confirmed Official source No final ANC confirmation has been published. See the ANC’s public nomination statement and candidate-selection rules . Latest important development ANC national officials interviewed Cape Metro candidates on 11 July 2026. The party said an announcement would follow after the process was completed. he Electoral Commission confirmed 4 November 2026 as election day. On 11 July, ANC Western Cape Provincial Task Team convener Jeremiah Thuynsma told SABC News that national leaders were interviewing the Cape Metro candidates. He did not name the interviewees. This means there is a selection process, but no publicly verified shortlist. Until the ANC issues a formal statement naming the successful person, the correct answer is that the candidate is not yet officially confirmed. Latest candidates and reported contenders Name Current or previous position Candidate status Source No individual names officially released Undisclosed candidates were interviewed for the Cape Metro position on 11 July 2026 Unconfirmed SABC News No individual should be added to this table simply because their name appears on social media or in private ANC discussion. As of 15 July 2026, reliable public reporting confirms the interviews but does not identify the people interviewed. What the different candidate labels mean Nominee: A person whose name has been submitted through an authorised ANC nomination channel. Nomination does not guarantee an interview or final selection. Contender: A general media description for a person believed to be competing for the position. It has no formal status unless supported by evidence. Shortlisted candidate: A nominee formally selected to proceed to the next stage, normally an interview or further vetting. Final mayoral candidate: The person formally selected and publicly announced by the authorised ANC structure. Council nominee: A councillor formally nominated during the council meeting at which the mayor is elected. This person may be the party’s campaign candidate, but the two roles are not automatically identical. How the ANC selects its Cape Town mayoral candidate The ANC can change its selection rules between election cycles. The following explanation is based on the party’s NEC-approved rules for the 2026 local government elections and its May 2026 public-nomination announcement. 1. Names enter through authorised nomination channels For 2026, the ANC opened six nomination streams. These included nominations from provincial and regional structures, alliance partners, ANC leagues, sectoral structures and the public. The public process was unusually broad. An ANC member, organisation or ordinary South African could nominate someone. Non-members could also nominate themselves. The ANC’s statement said membership would be addressed later and before a name was publicly announced. 2. Applications and eligibility are checked The party checks whether applicants meet its stated requirements. For mayoral, speaker and chief-whip candidates, the 2026 rules require, among other things: a tertiary qualification from an accredited institution; at least three years’ experience as an MP, MPL or councillor; South African citizenship; a minimum age of 24; no criminal conviction that disqualifies the person from public office; and ANC membership in good standing before final selection. The wider councillor-selection rules also include screening, performance reviews for existing representatives and restrictions relating to adverse ANC Integrity Commission findings. 3. A shortlist is prepared The ANC’s public statement says the National Officials shortlist, interview and select mayoral candidates from the widened nomination pool. The party has not published the Cape Town shortlist. 4. Candidates are vetted and interviewed The rules require candidates to undergo the same interview process. Interview panels may include national or provincial officials and NEC or PEC members. The ANC Electoral Committee’s chair or representative has observer status during mayoral interviews. In the Western Cape, the ANC classified Cape Town as one of five strategic municipalities in which national leaders directly supervised interviews. The Cape Metro interviews took place on 11 July 2026. Reported checks included qualification verification, criminal-record screening and assessments of experience and community leadership. These checks are consistent with the party’s published emphasis on competence and integrity. 5. National Officials select the metro candidate Cape Town is a metropolitan municipality. The 2026 rules state that mayoral candidates for all metropolitan municipalities and secondary cities are appointed exclusively by the ANC’s National Officials, with gender representation taken into account. This is the key difference between Cape Town and an ordinary local municipality. 6. The ANC publicly announces the successful candidate Only the formal announcement turns a nominee or interviewee into the official ANC Cape Town mayoral candidate. A media report naming a possible contender is not a substitute for this step. Does the process differ by municipality? Yes. Municipality type Main 2026 ANC process Metropolitan municipalities, including Cape Town Centralised selection; National Officials appoint the mayoral candidate after shortlisting, vetting and interviews. Secondary cities The published rules also place the final appointment with National Officials. Local and district municipalities The relevant Regional Executive Committee recommends three candidates from the nominated councillor pool to Provincial Officials. At least two of the three recommended candidates must be women. Interviews are required before a final decision. Specially designated strategic municipalities National leadership may supervise interviews directly, as it did for five Western Cape municipalities in 2026. These arrangements describe the 2026 cycle. They should be checked again before later elections because the ANC may adopt new rules. Who makes the final decision? Several ANC structures contribute, but they do not all have equal authority. ANC branches Branches identify and nominate ward and proportional-representation candidates, mobilise voters and provide local knowledge. They may also feed names or views into broader nomination processes. However, a branch cannot on its own declare someone the Cape Town mayoral candidate. ANC Western Cape and provincial structures The provincial structure helps coordinate the campaign, recommends or comments on candidates and provides information about Western Cape political conditions. In 2026 the province was run by a Provincial Task Team rather than an elected PEC. Its public representatives confirmed that interviews were under way, but national officials supervised Cape Town’s process. Provincial Executive Committee Where a PEC is in place, it has roles in the wider councillor-list process and in recommendations for local municipalities. It does not hold the exclusive final authority over a metropolitan mayoral candidate under the 2026 rules. ANC Electoral Committee The Electoral Committee oversees rules, screening, disputes and the integrity of the selection system. It reports to the NEC. It also has an observer role in mayoral interviews and hears disputes relating to selection. ADVERTISEMENT National Executive Committee The NEC approved the 2026 candidate-selection rules and has final organisational authority over the broader election framework. However, the specific rule for metro and secondary-city mayoral candidates gives the appointment power to the National Officials. National Officials For Cape Town, this is the decisive body under the published 2026 rules. National Officials shortlist, interview and select from the authorised nomination pool. Deployment committee The ANC’s deployment structures are often discussed when public positions are allocated. However, the published 2026 mayoral-selection chapter does not give a separate deployment committee the final Cape Town selection power. It names the National Officials, interview panels and Electoral Committee. The Electoral Committee and a deployment committee should not be treated as the same body. Election campaign structures Campaign structures organise messaging, rallies, ward work and voter mobilisation. They help the candidate campaign but do not replace the formal selection authority. The internal process is not completely visible to the public. The ANC has published rules and general stages, but it has not released the Cape Town applicants, shortlist, interview scores or panel recommendations. Previous ANC Cape Town mayoral candidates The modern City of Cape Town metropolitan municipality was created in December 2000. Earlier Cape municipal structures were different and should not be treated as directly comparable. Election year ANC mayoral candidate or campaign face ANC result Final mayor Governing party or coalition 2000 Nomaindia Mfeketo was the outgoing mayor of the former central Cape Town structure and became ANC opposition leader in the new metro. Available records do not show a modern-style national announcement comparable to later cycles. About 37.7%; 77 of 200 seats Peter Marais DA majority 2006 Nomaindia Mfeketo About 37.9%; 81 of 210 seats Helen Zille DA-led seven-party coalition 2011 Tony Ehrenreich 33.03%; 73 of 221 seats Patricia de Lille DA majority 2016 Xolani Sotashe 24.36%; 57 of 231 seats Patricia de Lille DA majority 2021 Cameron Dugmore was widely presented as the ANC campaign’s mayoral face; councillor Noluthando Makasi became the ANC nominee in the council mayoral vote 18.59%; 43 of 231 seats Geordin Hill-Lewis DA majority The vote shares and seat totals were checked against the IEC historical results portal , including its official 2021 Cape Town results summary and 2011 Cape Town report . Older percentages are rounded because the historical reporting formats differ. The candidate record is supported by contemporary reporting: the ANC formally named Mfeketo in 2006 , Tony Ehrenreich in 2011 and Xolani Sotashe in 2016 . In 2021, campaign coverage described Cameron Dugmore as the ANC candidate , while reporting from the inaugural council meeting confirms that Noluthando Makasi was nominated during the actual mayoral election. This 2021 distinction demonstrates why a campaign candidate, council caucus leader and formal council nominee should not automatically be treated as the same thing. Has the ANC ever governed Cape Town? Yes, but the answer needs historical context. Before the unified metro Nomaindia Mfeketo served as mayor of the former central City of Cape Town structure from 1998 to 2000. That municipality covered only part of today’s metropolitan area. It was replaced when several metropolitan local councils were combined into the present City of Cape Town in December 2000. The 2000 election and DA government The DA won 107 of 200 seats in the first unified-city election on 5 December 2000. Peter Marais became the new metro’s first mayor. Gerald Morkel succeeded him in 2001. Floor-crossing changed control in 2002 South Africa’s former floor-crossing system allowed councillors to change parties during specified periods without losing their seats. After the New National Party broke from the DA, the balance in Cape Town’s council changed. On 29 October 2002, ANC councillor Nomaindia Mfeketo was elected mayor, replacing Gerald Morkel. The ANC governed through an alliance that emerged from the changed council numbers rather than through an outright ANC victory in the 2000 municipal election. The ANC-led administration remained in office until the 2006 election. The DA returned in 2006 In 2006 no party won a majority. The DA secured 90 of 210 seats and the ANC 81. Helen Zille assembled a multiparty coalition and won the council’s mayoral vote. The coalition was initially narrow, but it established the DA’s return to city government. The DA won an outright majority in 2011 and retained majorities in 2016 and 2021. The DA has therefore controlled the modern City of Cape Town continuously since March 2006, first through a coalition and then through outright council majorities. Why Cape Town matters to the ANC Cape Town matters for reasons that go beyond the mayor’s office. It governs a large and fast-growing population Stats SA counted 4,772,846 residents in 2022, up from about 3.74 million in 2011. Rapid growth increases demand for housing, water, sanitation, electricity, roads and public transport. It is a major economic centre Cape Town contains the province’s largest concentration of businesses, workers, infrastructure and tax-paying households. It includes the Port of Cape Town, Cape Town International Airport, tourism assets, financial and professional services, manufacturing and a growing technology sector. The City publishes regular Economic Performance Indicators for Cape Town . It has national symbolic importance Parliament sits in Cape Town. Control of the city gives a party a national platform and a large, visible example of how it governs. It is central to the Western Cape contest The City contains most of the Western Cape’s population. A party seeking to become more competitive in the province cannot ignore the metro. It contains sharp social and spatial divisions Cape Town’s political debate is shaped by the distance between well-served suburbs and communities facing overcrowding, informal housing, long commutes, unemployment, crime and uneven access to opportunity. These patterns are rooted partly in apartheid-era spatial planning and continue to influence arguments over land, housing, transport and municipal spending. For the ANC, stronger performance in townships, informal settlements and working-class Cape Flats communities is necessary but not sufficient. It would also need to gain support in areas where it has historically struggled. ADVERTISEMENT How is the mayor of Cape Town elected? Cape Town residents do not vote directly for the mayor. The process works as follows: Residents cast two municipal ballots. In a metropolitan municipality, each voter receives a ward ballot and a proportional-representation ballot. The IEC explains the two-ballot metro system . Ward councillors are elected. The candidate receiving the most valid votes in a ward wins that ward’s seat. PR seats are calculated. Proportional-representation seats are used to make the overall council composition broadly reflect each party’s share of the combined ward and PR vote, according to the statutory formula. The IEC declares the council elected. Successful ward and PR candidates become councillors. Councillors are sworn in and the council holds its first meeting. The council elects its office-bearers, including the speaker and executive mayor. Candidates are nominated in council. A mayor must be elected from among the council’s members. This requirement appears in section 55 of the Municipal Structures Act . Councillors vote. A candidate must secure majority support through the council’s voting procedure. If no party controls more than half the seats, parties may negotiate a coalition or support agreement. Important terms explained Term Simple meaning Ward vote A vote for the individual candidate contesting the voter’s local ward. PR vote A vote for a political party. It helps determine the party’s overall representation in council. Council seat One position in the City Council, occupied by an elected ward or PR councillor. Mayoral candidate The person a party presents as its preferred leader of the city. Executive mayor The councillor elected by the council to lead the municipal executive. What does a Cape Town mayoral candidate actually do? Before election day, a mayoral candidate normally: leads the party’s city campaign; explains its municipal programme; debates rival candidates; represents the party in interviews and public meetings; campaigns in competitive wards; helps recruit volunteers and mobilise turnout; communicates positions on housing, transport, safety and services; and builds relationships that could matter in a hung council. The title does not guarantee the office. The party must win enough council seats, or assemble enough coalition support, for its nominee to win the council vote. The person must also be a councillor when the mayor is elected. A party may promote an outsider during a campaign, but that person would need to enter council legally through a ward or PR seat before being elected executive mayor. What issues will shape the Cape Town election? The priorities vary across communities. A resident in Khayelitsha may experience the city differently from a resident in the southern suburbs, Atlantis or the central business district. The City’s State of Cape Town Report and Integrated Development Plan show the scale and range of the metro’s development pressures. Housing and informal settlements Population growth, land costs, informal settlement expansion and a large housing need make housing a central issue. Voters will judge parties on access to serviced land, affordable housing, upgrading, title deeds and the location of new developments. Gang violence and safety Gang violence, shootings, extortion and other serious crimes remain major concerns in parts of the Cape Flats. Policing is primarily a national and provincial function, while the City operates metro police, traffic and law-enforcement services. Elections often produce arguments about where responsibility begins and ends. Public transport Residents depend on rail, taxis, buses and MyCiTi. Reliability, cost, safety and long commuting times affect access to jobs and education. Transport responsibilities are divided among municipal, provincial and national institutions. Water security The 2017–2018 drought made water resilience a permanent political issue. The debate now includes supply diversification, infrastructure maintenance, tariffs, leaks and support for lower-income households. Electricity Voters are concerned about prices, outages, informal connections, infrastructure theft and the transition to alternative energy. The City and Eskom serve different parts of the metro, so the responsible provider depends on the area. Waste collection and sanitation Refuse removal, illegal dumping, blocked drains and sanitation in informal settlements are highly local service-delivery concerns. Performance can differ from one neighbourhood to another. Employment and the cost of living Municipal government does not control the whole economy, but it influences building approvals, infrastructure, local regulation, public transport and investment conditions. Parties will be expected to explain how their plans could expand opportunity without overstating the mayor’s powers. Spatial inequality Many low-income residents live far from major job centres. Housing location, public land, transport investment and mixed-income development will remain politically contested. Governance and corruption Parties will campaign on audit results, procurement, transparency and the conduct of councillors and officials. Claims should be assessed against formal investigations, court findings and Auditor-General reports rather than campaign allegations alone. Migration into the city Cape Town continues to attract people seeking work, education and services. Population growth creates planning pressure, but migrants are not a single political group and should not be blamed collectively for service-delivery failures. Relations between spheres of government The City, Western Cape government and national government are controlled by different parties. Disputes over rail, policing, housing, ports, energy and funding can affect delivery. Voters must decide whether political competition improves accountability or produces damaging delays. What would the ANC need to win Cape Town? Analysis: The ANC faces a difficult path based on the last municipal result. In 2021, the ANC won 18.59% and 43 of 231 seats. The DA won 58.26% and 135 seats. A majority in that council required 116 seats. The DA therefore governed without coalition partners. The 2026 council size and final seat threshold will depend on the legally determined council composition and election result. The 2021 numbers should be used only to show the size of the previous gap. For the ANC to govern, it would likely need several developments: Retain and expand its ward base. Losing existing wards would make any citywide recovery harder. Raise its PR vote. Ward victories alone are not enough; overall party support determines the broad balance of council. Improve turnout in supportive communities. Registration, election-day organisation and voter enthusiasm matter. Gain support beyond traditional areas. The ANC cannot reach a council majority by relying only on its strongest township wards. Present a credible city candidate and team. Voters assess the proposed mayor together with ward candidates, PR candidates and the party’s record elsewhere. Build trust on municipal delivery. The campaign must persuade voters that the party can manage budgets, infrastructure and administration. Reduce the DA below a council majority. A coalition route becomes relevant only if no party wins more than half the seats. Negotiate viable coalition support if the council is hung. The combined parties would need enough councillors to elect and sustain a mayor. There was no credible, publicly available Cape Town-specific 2026 poll verified for this article. It would be misleading to predict an ANC victory or defeat from national polling because national and municipal voting behaviour can differ substantially. Could a coalition decide the mayor? Yes—but only if no party wins a majority of council seats. In a hung council, parties usually negotiate over a programme, leadership positions, budgets and rules for resolving disputes. A coalition may be a formal governing agreement, while a confidence-and-supply arrangement may provide support for key votes without creating a full coalition. Smaller parties can hold balance-of-power seats when the two largest blocs are short of a majority. Which parties could play that role in Cape Town cannot be known until the election results and seat allocations are final. Councillors then vote for the mayor. A party that finishes first in the popular vote does not automatically receive the mayoralty if another grouping can assemble majority support in council. Coalitions can change when parties withdraw, councillors defect where legally permitted, or confidence motions succeed. Unstable agreements can delay budgets, appointments and service-delivery decisions. A durable agreement therefore requires more than dividing positions among parties. Cape Town’s own history shows both sides of coalition politics. The ANC returned to power after the 2002 floor-crossing changed the council balance, while a multiparty coalition elected Helen Zille after the hung 2006 election. Candidate profiles Current-cycle profile status No current ANC Cape Town candidate profile can be published responsibly as of 15 July 2026 because the party has not named its candidate or released the interview list. ADVERTISEMENT TRENDING NOW How to Check if You Must Submit a SARS Tax Return . Tax and Revenue How to Book a SARS Appointment Online . Tax and Revenue Niger TV Shows Soldiers Detained After Niamey Mutiny . Justice & Crime KAA Warns of Flight Delays at Kenyan Airports . Transport and Airlines POPULAR TODAY Tax and Revenue How to Check if You Must Submit a SARS Tax Return . Tax and Revenue How to Book a SARS Appointment Online . Social Service How to Check UIF Claim Status Online . Local Government How to Replace a Lost South African ID . Local Government How to Check Your South African Passport Status . No biography, age, education record, policy position or controversy should be attached to an unnamed or speculative contender. This section should be updated only after: an official ANC announcement; a formal ANC shortlist; a candidate’s public declaration acknowledged by the party; or consistent reporting from reputable organisations supported by named sources. When a candidate is confirmed, the profile should record the person’s full name, verified age, current position, political background, verified education, previous public offices, Cape Town experience, policy positions, relevant criticism and exact candidate status. What qualities does the ANC say it wants? The 2026 rules list both formal requirements and leadership abilities. The party says mayoral candidates should demonstrate: proven leadership and decision-making ability; strong communication and public-speaking skills; understanding of ANC policy and local-government processes; strategic planning and problem-solving ability; capacity to build relationships with stakeholders; financial-management, budgeting and governance skills; team leadership; negotiation and conflict-resolution skills; and knowledge of municipal legislation. The rules specifically refer to the Constitution, Municipal Systems Act, Municipal Finance Management Act, Municipal Structures Act, Municipal Electoral Act and other laws affecting municipal government. The ANC has also publicly emphasised integrity, competence, community support and the ability to restore basic services. Its Western Cape representatives described the desired candidates as ethical, capable and community-centred. These are the party’s stated standards. Whether the final candidate meets them is a matter for evidence-based scrutiny after the announcement. ANC support in Cape Town Election year ANC vote share ANC council seats DA vote share Final governing arrangement 2000 About 37.7% 77 of 200 About 52.3% DA majority 2006 About 37.9% 81 of 210 About 41.9% DA-led multiparty coalition 2011 33.03% 73 of 221 60.92% DA majority 2016 24.36% 57 of 231 66.61% DA majority 2021 18.59% 43 of 231 58.26% DA majority Sources: IEC historical election-results portal , official 2021 Cape Town results , official 2011 Cape Town results and the IEC’s archived municipal reports. Percentages for 2000 and 2006 are rounded. The broad trend is clear: ANC support declined across every municipal election from 2006 to 2021. The DA’s share also fell between 2016 and 2021, but it retained a majority of council seats. This table compares local elections with local elections. National or provincial results in Cape Town can provide political context, but they should not be inserted into the same trend line without explaining the different candidates, issues, turnout and electoral choices. ANC strongholds and weak areas IEC ward and voting-district results show that party support is geographically uneven. The IEC election atlas allows readers to inspect these patterns without assuming that every voter in an area supports the same party. Areas of relative ANC strength The ANC has historically performed more strongly in parts of Khayelitsha and in several predominantly working-class communities around Gugulethu, Nyanga and Langa. It has also retained support in some informal-settlement voting districts elsewhere in the metro. Even within these areas, results vary by ward and voting district. Turnout and support for the EFF or smaller parties can change the result. Competitive Cape Flats communities Mitchells Plain, Delft, Bonteheuwel, Bishop Lavis and other Cape Flats communities cannot be treated as one political bloc. The DA, ANC, Patriotic Alliance, GOOD, National Coloured Congress and other parties may perform differently from one neighbourhood or election to another. Areas of relative ANC weakness The ANC has generally struggled in much of the southern suburbs, northern suburban growth areas, Atlantic seaboard and central-city electorate, where the DA has often led. Again, ward-level data is more reliable than a broad suburb label. For the ANC, the electoral challenge is twofold: protect its strongest wards while becoming competitive in communities where its support has been low or declining. Common questions about ANC Cape Town candidates Who is the ANC Cape Town mayoral candidate? No candidate had been officially announced by 15 July 2026. Cape Metro candidates were interviewed on 11 July, but their names were not published. Has the ANC announced its candidate? No. The ANC has said an announcement will follow after the selection process is completed. How does the ANC choose mayoral candidates? For the 2026 cycle, names came through several nomination channels, including a public process. Applicants were shortlisted, vetted and interviewed. National Officials make the final appointment for metros such as Cape Town. Who was the ANC candidate in the previous election? Cameron Dugmore was presented in 2021 campaign coverage as the ANC’s Cape Town mayoral face. When the new council formally elected the mayor, ANC councillor Noluthando Makasi was the party’s nominated candidate. Geordin Hill-Lewis won the vote. Has the ANC ever governed Cape Town? Yes. Under the present metro structure, an ANC-led administration governed from October 2002 until March 2006, with Nomaindia Mfeketo as mayor. The change followed floor-crossing and a new council alliance, not an outright ANC election victory. Is the Cape Town mayor directly elected? No. Residents elect councillors. The councillors then elect the executive mayor from among themselves. Can the ANC form a coalition to govern Cape Town? Yes, if no party wins a council majority and the ANC can assemble majority support with other parties. In 2021 the DA held its own majority, so an opposition coalition could not replace it. When will the ANC announce its candidate? The party has said it will announce successful candidates after interviews and vetting, but no exact Cape Town announcement date had been published by 15 July 2026. Can more than one person seek the ANC nomination? Yes. Multiple people can be nominated, shortlisted and interviewed. Only the formally selected person becomes the final candidate. Does ANC national leadership make the final decision? Yes for Cape Town under the 2026 rules. Metropolitan and secondary-city mayoral candidates are appointed exclusively by the National Officials. Can the candidate change before the election? Yes, in exceptional circumstances such as withdrawal, disqualification or a successful internal objection. Any replacement should be confirmed through an official ANC announcement. What happens if the ANC candidate does not become mayor? If elected as a councillor, the person may serve in council, lead the opposition caucus or hold another council role. A party may also appoint someone else as caucus leader. The mayoral-candidate title does not itself create a municipal office. Myth versus fact Myth 1: Cape Town residents vote directly for a mayor Fact: Residents vote for a ward candidate and a political party. The elected council chooses the mayor. Myth 2: The party with the most votes automatically gets the mayor Fact: Its nominee must win the council vote. In a hung council, a coalition of other parties may elect a different candidate. Myth 3: Every reported contender is an official candidate Fact: A person becomes official only after confirmation by the authorised party structure. Myth 4: A mayoral candidate must already be a councillor when campaigning Fact: A party can market a person as its preferred mayor before election day. However, the Municipal Structures Act requires the council to elect the executive mayor from among its members, so the person must be a councillor when the mayoral election occurs. Myth 5: The ANC Western Cape leadership alone chooses the Cape Town candidate Fact: Provincial structures contribute, but the ANC’s 2026 rules reserve the final appointment of metro candidates for the National Officials. Myth 6: Winning the most wards guarantees control of the city Fact: The final balance includes ward and PR seats. Overall council numbers determine who can elect the mayor. Myth 7: The ANC has never governed Cape Town Fact: An ANC-led administration governed the unified metro between October 2002 and March 2006. The ANC also led the former central-city structure before the unified metro was created. Myth 8: A national-election result tells us who will win Cape Town Fact: Municipal elections use different ballots, candidates, turnout patterns and local issues. National results may offer context but are not a direct forecast. Conclusion The ANC had not officially announced its Cape Town mayoral candidate by 15 July 2026. National officials interviewed the Cape Metro candidates on 11 July, but the shortlist and interviewees remained undisclosed. The announcement matters because the chosen person will lead the ANC’s campaign in South Africa’s legislative capital and explain how the party intends to reverse a long decline in its municipal support. The candidate alone cannot deliver the mayoralty. Cape Town voters elect a council, and council arithmetic decides who becomes mayor. The ANC would need a major increase in wards and proportional support, or a route to a majority coalition after a hung result. This article will be updated when the ANC publishes a confirmed candidate, official shortlist, candidate profile, polling or coalition position. After the election, the update section should record the final vote shares, council seats, mayoral vote, winning mayor and any coalition agreement without removing the historical record. Official external sources ANC 2026 Local Government Election candidate-selection rules ANC public mayoral nomination statement IEC confirmation of the 4 November 2026 election date IEC municipal election results portal IEC guide to contesting municipal elections and metro ballots City of Cape Town: City Council Local Government: Municipal Structures Act Stats SA Census 2022 municipal factsheet City of Cape Town State of Cape Town Report ADVERTISEMENT RELATED ARTICLE Tax and Revenue How to Check if You Must Submit a SARS Tax Return Use the official SARS checker and 2026 rules to see if you must file an ITR12. . Tax and Revenue How to Book a SARS Appointment Online Book a SARS branch, video or phone slot on eBooking, MobiApp, SMS or 0800 00 7277. . Social Service How to Check UIF Claim Status Online Use UIF Online, free USSD *134*843#, or call 0800 030 007 to track your claim. . Local Government How to Replace a Lost South African ID Report loss at SAPS, then reissue a Smart ID at Home Affairs or a bank for R140. . Tags South Africa Gov Services South Africa Gov Services South Africa South Africa

Read Thukuthela’s biography, including his real name, Daveyton background, songs, latest album, awards and rise in South Africa’s 3-step sound. Thukuthela , born Kgotso Dube, is a South African vocalist whose emotionally weighted delivery became one of the defining voices of the country’s 3-step movement. Raised in Daveyton on Gauteng’s East Rand, he built his breakthrough partnership with producer JAZZWRLD and moved from sleeping in studios to national charts in little more than a year. “Vuka,” “Isaka (6am),” “Bengicela,” “Uzizwa Kanjan,” “Tholukuthi” and “uValo” established his range across Afro-house, Afro-tech and amapiano-influenced dance music. The pair’s 2025 album The Most Wanted turned that singles run into a complete body of work, while three Metro FM Music Awards in 2026 confirmed their rapid rise. Who is Thukuthela? Thukuthela is South African singer Kgotso Dube, a Daveyton-born 3-step and Afro-house vocalist best known for his work with JAZZWRLD. His expressive voice powers hits including “Vuka,” “Isaka (6am)” and “Uzizwa Kanjan,” while The Most Wanted became the duo’s breakthrough album. Early Life and Creative Roots Thukuthela’s real name is Kgotso Dube. A 2026 profile from Daveyton-based Say It Again Media identifies him as a son of the township on Johannesburg’s East Rand. Daveyton has produced an important line of dance-music artists, but Thukuthela has said that many musicians from his own area did not initially know he came from there. Reliable public sources have not established his date of birth, current age, parents, siblings or school history. Those details should therefore not be filled with estimates. What the available interviews do show is a musician who worked for years before the wider public saw the result. His life story enters the documented record most clearly through studio sessions, local performances and the partnership that changed his career. The name Thukuthela belongs to Kgotso Dube as an individual artist; it is not the name of his duo. He frequently works beside JAZZWRLD, born Kamohelo Monese, but both retain their own artist identities. That distinction matters because Dube’s role is centred on voice, melody and emotionally direct writing, while JAZZWRLD shapes much of the production architecture around him. Breakthrough and Rise to Fame Thukuthela and JAZZWRLD met through management after pursuing music separately. In an OkayAfrica interview , Thukuthela described the immediate creative fit: Continue Reading Full Article AFRICAN CULTURE Thukuthela Biography: Real Name, Songs, Album & 3-Step Rise By Neema Asha Mwakalinga Travel & Culture Expert Neema Asha Mwakalinga Home Comment Jul 24, 2026 Jul 24, 2026 13 min read Copy link Facebook X (Twitter) WhatsApp Published Updated: Thukuthela , born Kgotso Dube, is a South African vocalist whose emotionally weighted delivery became one of the defining voices of the country’s 3-step movement. Raised in Daveyton on Gauteng’s East Rand, he built his breakthrough partnership with producer JAZZWRLD and moved from sleeping in studios to national charts in little more than a year. “Vuka,” “Isaka (6am),” “Bengicela,” “Uzizwa Kanjan,” “Tholukuthi” and “uValo” established his range across Afro-house, Afro-tech and amapiano-influenced dance music. The pair’s 2025 album The Most Wanted turned that singles run into a complete body of work, while three Metro FM Music Awards in 2026 confirmed their rapid rise. Who is Thukuthela? Thukuthela is South African singer Kgotso Dube, a Daveyton-born 3-step and Afro-house vocalist best known for his work with JAZZWRLD. His expressive voice powers hits including “Vuka,” “Isaka (6am)” and “Uzizwa Kanjan,” while The Most Wanted became the duo’s breakthrough album. Early Life and Creative Roots Thukuthela’s real name is Kgotso Dube. A 2026 profile from Daveyton-based Say It Again Media identifies him as a son of the township on Johannesburg’s East Rand. Daveyton has produced an important line of dance-music artists, but Thukuthela has said that many musicians from his own area did not initially know he came from there. Reliable public sources have not established his date of birth, current age, parents, siblings or school history. Those details should therefore not be filled with estimates. What the available interviews do show is a musician who worked for years before the wider public saw the result. His life story enters the documented record most clearly through studio sessions, local performances and the partnership that changed his career. The name Thukuthela belongs to Kgotso Dube as an individual artist; it is not the name of his duo. He frequently works beside JAZZWRLD, born Kamohelo Monese, but both retain their own artist identities. That distinction matters because Dube’s role is centred on voice, melody and emotionally direct writing, while JAZZWRLD shapes much of the production architecture around him. Breakthrough and Rise to Fame Thukuthela and JAZZWRLD met through management after pursuing music separately. In an OkayAfrica interview , Thukuthela described the immediate creative fit: “I liked the way he produces, how he designs his sounds. Everything made sense when we met.” Their first widely documented release together was “Vuka,” a 2024 collaboration with Oscar Mbo. Apple Music’s Thukuthela catalogue places the song at the beginning of his verified professional discography. Its importance was personal as well as commercial. Speaking to Drum through News24 , he connected it to the hardship behind the breakthrough: “Vuka is very personal. Every time we listen to that song, we remember where we come from.” The pace accelerated in 2025. “Isaka (6am)” with Ciza travelled across African streaming markets. “Bengicela” and “Uzizwa Kanjan” paired the duo with MaWhoo and GL_Ceejay, while “Tholukuthi (Clap Song),” “uMA weNGANE” and “uValo” extended their reach. XTRAfrica’s verified Thukuthela songs page brings his available catalogue together under the correct artist-level music tag. ADVERTISEMENT This was not simply a succession of features. The records established a working system: JAZZWRLD’s layered, spacious production created room for Thukuthela’s voice to carry longing, fear, prayer and romantic uncertainty without losing the dance-floor pulse. Achievements and Artistic Innovation Thukuthela’s music sits inside the expanding 3-step movement, a South African dance form built around a three-kick rhythmic pattern and drawing from Afro-house, Afro-tech, amapiano, Afro-pop and jazz-informed textures. He does not approach the music as a vocalist placed on top of a beat. His restrained delivery, repeated melodic phrases and spiritual tone help determine how the production develops. In a Sunday World interview about the duo’s creative ambitions , he summarised the flexibility of their sound: “It’s versatile, making you feel and move at the same time.” That range became clear on The Most Wanted . Apple Music records the 13-track dance album as a JAZZWRLD and Thukuthela release issued on 19 September 2025 through Waltz Music Group, EMPIRE and the artists. Its guests include MaWhoo, Dlala Thukzin, Sykes and Major League DJz, but its centre is the contrast between detailed production and emotionally open vocals. His verified achievements include: “Vuka” beginning his documented breakout run in 2024. Five records associated with Thukuthela and JAZZWRLD reaching number one across Southern African markets by the end of 2025, according to OkayAfrica. The Most Wanted turning a run of singles into a full collaborative album. Best Produced Album, Best Dance and Best Duo or Group at the 2026 Metro FM Music Awards . A 2026 appearance at the Cape Town International Jazz Festival, bringing 3-step onto one of Africa’s major live-music platforms. Heritage, Identity, and Vision Thukuthela’s public identity is firmly South African and specifically connected to Daveyton. His story reflects an East Rand creative network where townships separated by distance are joined through studios, managers, producers and digital releases. Rather than presenting Daveyton as a decorative hometown label, he speaks about it as the place whose people saw him emerge before they fully understood the work happening behind the scenes. His music also carries local identity through language and emotional structure. Titles such as “Vuka,” “Bengicela,” “uValo” and “uMA weNGANE” place South African-language expression at the centre of contemporary electronic production. The songs do not need to abandon that foundation to travel. Their rhythms, repeated vocal phrases and collaborative casts have allowed them to reach audiences in Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Botswana, Namibia, Zimbabwe and beyond. The partnership with JAZZWRLD adds another Southern African layer. JAZZWRLD’s path from Lesotho to South Africa meets Thukuthela’s East Rand upbringing in music that is regional without becoming culturally vague. Their strongest work treats local voice, dance rhythm and studio experimentation as parts of the same modern African language. ADVERTISEMENT Personal Life and Confidence Journey Thukuthela has not made a verified marriage, partner or children part of his public biography. His interviews focus instead on work, brotherhood, financial discipline and the difficult period before success. That is the more responsible centre of his personal story. He and JAZZWRLD told Drum that their early partnership involved sleeping in the studio and waking with the hunger to make the work succeed. The experience shaped “Vuka” and gave later success a clear emotional origin. Their bond also matters professionally: the two speak about lifting each other when one loses hope, a form of mutual discipline that helped them move through an unusually fast rise. Thukuthela has also warned that artists must plan beyond the excitement of a hit. In Sunday World, he argued for saving and building a career that can survive changing attention. That practical message sits beside the ambition to take 3-step internationally: success is treated as something to manage, not merely celebrate. Key Events in Thukuthela’s Journey Year Event Significance 2024 Released “Vuka” with Oscar Mbo and JAZZWRLD Began his verified discography and gave the partnership its first major breakthrough. 2025 Appeared on “Isaka (6am)” with Ciza Expanded his audience across African streaming and dance markets. 2025 Released “Bengicela,” “Uzizwa Kanjan” and “Tholukuthi” Established his voice across several of the year’s defining 3-step records. 2025 Released The Most Wanted with JAZZWRLD Converted their singles momentum into a 13-track collaborative statement. 2026 Performed at the Cape Town International Jazz Festival Placed their emerging dance sound on a major cross-genre African stage. 2026 Won three Metro FM Music Awards with JAZZWRLD Confirmed industry recognition for the album, duo and “Uzizwa Kanjan.” Legacy and Emerging Impact Thukuthela’s career is too young for a closed verdict, but his emerging impact is already visible. He helped give 3-step a recognisable human voice at the moment when the sound moved from specialist dance circles into mainstream South African listening. His vocals make emotionally serious writing compatible with club-focused production. His partnership with JAZZWRLD shows how a vocalist-producer unit can retain individual identities. Their collaborative model creates room for artists such as GL_Ceejay, MaWhoo, Ciza, Dlala Thukzin and Sykes. Their live-band presentation has helped 3-step travel beyond playlists and DJ sets. Songs such as “uValo” on XTRAfrica demonstrate the sound’s movement between Afro-house depth and mainstream accessibility. The strongest measure of that impact is not one label or chart claim. It is the speed with which his voice became identifiable across multiple records while remaining connected to a specific place and partnership. Looking Ahead Thukuthela entered 2026 with a larger stage, three Metro FM awards and continuing work beside JAZZWRLD. Their Cape Town International Jazz Festival appearance signalled that 3-step could participate in a live programme reaching beyond its usual dance categories. The duo’s catalogue also continued circulating across African charts months after The Most Wanted was released. JAZZWRLD’s Secrets of the WRLD was listed by Apple Music as a 30 July 2026 pre-release , showing that their wider creative circle remained active after the debut album cycle. Thukuthela’s next challenge is therefore not proving that the breakthrough happened. It is building an individual catalogue and a durable collaborative identity without flattening the sound that made him recognisable. Thukuthela FAQs What is Thukuthela’s real name? Thukuthela’s real name is Kgotso Dube. Reliable interviews and profiles consistently identify the South African vocalist by that name ADVERTISEMENT TRENDING NOW How to Check if You Must Submit a SARS Tax Return . Tax and Revenue How to Book a SARS Appointment Online . Tax and Revenue Niger TV Shows Soldiers Detained After Niamey Mutiny . Justice & Crime KAA Warns of Flight Delays at Kenyan Airports . Transport and Airlines POPULAR TODAY Justice & Crime Brian Mundubile and Makebi Zulu Charged With Treason . Jobs and Employment How to Apply for SAPS Jobs Online in 2026 . Tax and Revenue SARS Auto Assessment 2026: How to Check and What to Do . Scholarships UCT Mastercard Foundation Scholarship 2027 Opens to Africans . Entertainment Jub Jub Arrest Warrant Issued After Missed Court Appearance . How old is Thukuthela? Thukuthela’s date of birth and current age have not been reliably established in accessible primary or reputable biographical sources. XTRAfrica should not publish an estimated age as fact. Where is Thukuthela from? He is from Daveyton, a township on Gauteng’s East Rand in South Africa. What is Thukuthela’s nationality? Thukuthela is South African. His professional story and public identity are rooted in Daveyton and South Africa’s dance-music scene. What genre does Thukuthela make? He is associated mainly with 3-step, Afro-house, Afro-tech and contemporary South African dance music, with influences from amapiano and Afro-pop. Is Thukuthela part of JAZZWRLD? No. Thukuthela and JAZZWRLD are individual artists who work closely as a vocalist-producer partnership and release joint projects. What song made Thukuthela famous? “Vuka” began his documented breakthrough in 2024. “Isaka (6am),” “Bengicela,” “Uzizwa Kanjan,” “Tholukuthi” and “uValo” then expanded his fame in 2025. What is Thukuthela’s latest album? His latest studio album is The Most Wanted , a collaborative 13-track project with JAZZWRLD released on 19 September 2025. What awards has Thukuthela won? Thukuthela and JAZZWRLD won three 2026 Metro FM Music Awards: Best Produced Album, Best Dance and Best Duo or Group. Who are Thukuthela’s parents? The names of Thukuthela’s parents have not been reliably verified in strong public sources. Is Thukuthela married? No reliable public source reviewed for this biography confirms that Thukuthela is married. His private relationships should not be inferred from rumours or social posts. ADVERTISEMENT RELATED ARTICLE Justice & Crime Brian Mundubile and Makebi Zulu Charged With Treason Lawyers confirm formal charges after the opposition leaders were questioned and detained in Lusaka. . Jobs and Employment How to Apply for SAPS Jobs Online in 2026 Use the official SAPS e-Recruitment portal to register, complete your profile, and apply. . Tax and Revenue SARS Auto Assessment 2026: How to Check and What to Do Check if SARS auto-assessed you, review the ITA34, and fix errors before the deadline. . Scholarships UCT Mastercard Foundation Scholarship 2027 Opens to Africans UCT Mastercard Foundation Scholars Program 2027 is open to African students with ... . Tags South Africa South Africa Thukuthela Thukuthela African Culture African Culture

Ibrahim Gusau has confirmed his resignation as NFF president. Here is what is verified, what remains unclear and what comes next. ABUJA, Nigeria — 27 August 2026: Ibrahim Musa Gusau has confirmed his resignation as president of the Nigeria Football Federation, ending hours of uncertainty after journalists and Nigerian outlets reported a wider leadership exit. His announcement creates immediate questions about who is running the federation, whether other resignations are complete and how the proposed NFF election will proceed. Has Ibrahim Gusau resigned as NFF president? Yes. Gusau announced his decision at a press conference at NFF headquarters in Abuja on 27 August 2026. Reports also say Executive Committee members and General Secretary Mohammed Sanusi stepped down, but the federation must still clarify the complete list of departures, interim authority and election timetable. Gusau confirms the resignation himself Gusau announced the decision at a press conference at the NFF’s Sunday Dankaro House headquarters in Abuja. Premium Times reported that he said pressure from football stakeholders and consultations with family and other stakeholders preceded his decision. He also said he had informed members of the board and advised those willing to follow him to resign. His remarks pointed to a breakdown in communication between the presidency, the Executive Committee and other NFF structures. The personal announcement resolves the central uncertainty that shaped the morning news cycle. Before the press conference, multiple outlets reported that Gusau and other officials had resigned, while the NFF’s public website carried no matching statement. Later reports said the Executive Committee and General Secretary Mohammed Sanusi had also stepped down. Sports Village Square described the development as an en masse board resignation. The precise status of every elected member, however, still needs a formal federation list. Why the NFF leadership came under pressure The transition follows a difficult period for Nigeria’s national teams. The Super Eagles missed the 2026 FIFA World Cup, while the Super Falcons failed to qualify for the 2027 Women’s World Cup after losing their play-off against South Africa. Those results intensified calls for accountability in the federation. Premium Times also reported scrutiny of a federal intervention fund and uncertainty around the administration’s relationship with the board. Any claims of financial wrongdoing remain allegations unless established by the responsible agencies or a court. Continue Reading Full Article SPORTS TRENDS Ibrahim Gusau Resigns: What Happens Next at the NFF? By Serge Kitoko Tshibanda Political Analyst Serge Kitoko Tshibanda Home Comment Aug 28, 2026 Aug 28, 2026 4 min read Copy link Facebook X (Twitter) WhatsApp Published Updated: ABUJA, Nigeria — 27 August 2026: Ibrahim Musa Gusau has confirmed his resignation as president of the Nigeria Football Federation, ending hours of uncertainty after journalists and Nigerian outlets reported a wider leadership exit. His announcement creates immediate questions about who is running the federation, whether other resignations are complete and how the proposed NFF election will proceed. Has Ibrahim Gusau resigned as NFF president? Yes. Gusau announced his decision at a press conference at NFF headquarters in Abuja on 27 August 2026. Reports also say Executive Committee members and General Secretary Mohammed Sanusi stepped down, but the federation must still clarify the complete list of departures, interim authority and election timetable. Gusau confirms the resignation himself Gusau announced the decision at a press conference at the NFF’s Sunday Dankaro House headquarters in Abuja. Premium Times reported that he said pressure from football stakeholders and consultations with family and other stakeholders preceded his decision. He also said he had informed members of the board and advised those willing to follow him to resign. His remarks pointed to a breakdown in communication between the presidency, the Executive Committee and other NFF structures. The personal announcement resolves the central uncertainty that shaped the morning news cycle. Before the press conference, multiple outlets reported that Gusau and other officials had resigned, while the NFF’s public website carried no matching statement. ADVERTISEMENT Later reports said the Executive Committee and General Secretary Mohammed Sanusi had also stepped down. Sports Village Square described the development as an en masse board resignation. The precise status of every elected member, however, still needs a formal federation list. Why the NFF leadership came under pressure The transition follows a difficult period for Nigeria’s national teams. The Super Eagles missed the 2026 FIFA World Cup, while the Super Falcons failed to qualify for the 2027 Women’s World Cup after losing their play-off against South Africa. Those results intensified calls for accountability in the federation. Premium Times also reported scrutiny of a federal intervention fund and uncertainty around the administration’s relationship with the board. Any claims of financial wrongdoing remain allegations unless established by the responsible agencies or a court. ADVERTISEMENT Gusau was elected in September 2022 after defeating Peterside Idah in the final round of the NFF presidential vote. His tenure included Nigeria’s 2025 Women’s Africa Cup of Nations title, but the later World Cup failures shifted public focus toward governance, team planning and leadership responsibility. What happens next at the Nigeria Football Federation The immediate issue is continuity. The NFF must identify who can exercise day-to-day authority, communicate with FIFA and CAF, manage national teams and oversee contracts while the leadership transition is resolved. The federation had been preparing for an elective congress scheduled for 27 September in Lafia, Nasarawa State, according to Premium Times. A full-board resignation could affect the body authorised to convene that process, approve an electoral timetable or make interim decisions. The next reliable update should come through an NFF circular, congress decision or official communication identifying the officials who have resigned and the constitutional mechanism for replacing them. Until then, individual names promoted online as an “acting NFF president” should be treated as unconfirmed. ADVERTISEMENT TRENDING NOW How to Check if You Must Submit a SARS Tax Return . Tax and Revenue How to Book a SARS Appointment Online . Tax and Revenue Niger TV Shows Soldiers Detained After Niamey Mutiny . Justice & Crime KAA Warns of Flight Delays at Kenyan Airports . Transport and Airlines POPULAR TODAY International Justice FBI Sends Tinubu Records to US Judge for Private Review . Transport and Logistics Nigeria Targets Lower Transport Fares From October 1 . Sports Trends Ibrahim Gusau Resigns: What Happens Next at the NFF? . Terrorism and Security Nigeria Kidnapping Ransoms Triple to ₦7.78 Billion . Biography Ayyoub Bouaddi Biography: Age, Parents and Man City Move . There is also a FIFA-governance question. National football associations must operate without improper outside interference, but domestic authorities still have a legitimate interest in public funding and accountability. Any interim arrangement will need to respect both Nigerian law and football statutes. How this differs from the Ibrahim Gusau biography XTRAfrica’s completed person profile explains Gusau’s background, earlier football-administration roles and rise to the NFF presidency. This report serves a different search need: it documents the official resignation and the unresolved governance steps that follow. For broader context on the national team, XTRAfrica has also covered Nigeria’s coaching transition and previous NFF operational challenges, including visa problems affecting a Nigerian youth team . The story should be updated when the NFF publishes the complete resignation list, names interim leadership or changes the proposed election schedule. ADVERTISEMENT RELATED ARTICLE International Justice FBI Sends Tinubu Records to US Judge for Private Review The sealed FOIA filing is not public and makes no new finding against Nigeria’s president. . Transport and Logistics Nigeria Targets Lower Transport Fares From October 1 Tinubu orders 500 more CNG stations, but fare cuts depend on state implementation. . Sports Trends Ibrahim Gusau Resigns: What Happens Next at the NFF? The NFF president confirmed his exit in Abuja, opening a leadership transition. . Terrorism and Security Nigeria Kidnapping Ransoms Triple to ₦7.78 Billion A new SBM Intelligence report says 7,825 people were abducted as mass kidnappings reshaped the crisis. . Tags Nigeria News Nigeria News Breaking News Breaking News Nigeria Nigeria

DRC Finance Minister Doudou Fwamba Likunde says $1.25B Eurobond funds will be invested in energy and transport to diversify the economy The Democratic Republic of Congo will channel the proceeds from its $1.25 billion debut Eurobond issuance, raised earlier this month, into hydropower and transport infrastructure, Finance Minister Doudou Fwamba Likunde said, outlining a strategy aimed at diversifying the country’s resource-driven economy. Speaking on the sidelines of the IMF Spring Meetings in Washington, Fwamba Likunde said the investment marks a shift from reliance on extractive industries toward broader economic development. “Critical minerals are strategic assets for the DRC, but resilience comes from what we build around these critical mineral resources,” he said. “We are bringing balance between mining and non-mining growth.” The bond sale, Congo’s first-ever issuance on international capital markets, follows years of macroeconomic reforms and efforts to restore investor confidence. The government has worked closely with the International Monetary Fund, completing a key program in 2024, which helped underpin the country’s return to global finance. Demand for the five- and ten-year bonds was four times the amount on offer, reflecting strong investor appetite despite ongoing security concerns in the country’s east. Even after the issuance, Congo’s debt levels remain relatively low, at around 20% of GDP, according to the finance minister. The DRC’s economy remains heavily dependent on mining, with copper and cobalt accounting for more than 90% of export revenues. However, authorities are now seeking to leverage this position to build long-term economic stability. The Eurobond proceeds will complement rising foreign direct investment, which has increased by 60% since 2019, largely concentrated in the mining sector. By directing funds into energy and transport, the government aims to address structural bottlenecks, particularly electricity shortages that force mining companies to rely on diesel generators. Alongside infrastructure investment, Kinshasa is advancing fiscal reforms to strengthen public finances. These include the rollout of an electronic VAT invoicing system, expected to generate more than $200 million in additional revenue this year. Continue Reading Full Article ECONOMIC REPORTS DRC to Invest $1.25B Eurobond Proceeds in Energy and Infrastructure By Neema Asha Mwakalinga Travel & Culture Expert Neema Asha Mwakalinga Home Comment Apr 20, 2026 May 15, 2026 4 min read Copy link Facebook X (Twitter) WhatsApp Published Updated: The Democratic Republic of Congo will channel the proceeds from its $1.25 billion debut Eurobond issuance, raised earlier this month, into hydropower and transport infrastructure, Finance Minister Doudou Fwamba Likunde said, outlining a strategy aimed at diversifying the country’s resource-driven economy. Speaking on the sidelines of the IMF Spring Meetings in Washington, Fwamba Likunde said the investment marks a shift from reliance on extractive industries toward broader economic development. “Critical minerals are strategic assets for the DRC, but resilience comes from what we build around these critical mineral resources,” he said. “We are bringing balance between mining and non-mining growth.” The bond sale, Congo’s first-ever issuance on international capital markets, follows years of macroeconomic reforms and efforts to restore investor confidence. The government has worked closely with the International Monetary Fund, completing a key program in 2024, which helped underpin the country’s return to global finance. ADVERTISEMENT Demand for the five- and ten-year bonds was four times the amount on offer, reflecting strong investor appetite despite ongoing security concerns in the country’s east. Even after the issuance, Congo’s debt levels remain relatively low, at around 20% of GDP, according to the finance minister. The DRC’s economy remains heavily dependent on mining, with copper and cobalt accounting for more than 90% of export revenues. However, authorities are now seeking to leverage this position to build long-term economic stability. The Eurobond proceeds will complement rising foreign direct investment, which has increased by 60% since 2019, largely concentrated in the mining sector. ADVERTISEMENT By directing funds into energy and transport, the government aims to address structural bottlenecks, particularly electricity shortages that force mining companies to rely on diesel generators. Alongside infrastructure investment, Kinshasa is advancing fiscal reforms to strengthen public finances. These include the rollout of an electronic VAT invoicing system, expected to generate more than $200 million in additional revenue this year. The government has also significantly reduced fuel subsidies, cutting costs from around $500 million annually to less than $70 million in 2025, while removing support for mining companies to free up resources for development. ADVERTISEMENT TRENDING NOW How to Check if You Must Submit a SARS Tax Return . Tax and Revenue How to Book a SARS Appointment Online . Tax and Revenue Niger TV Shows Soldiers Detained After Niamey Mutiny . Justice & Crime KAA Warns of Flight Delays at Kenyan Airports . Transport and Airlines POPULAR TODAY Infrastructure DRC Opens Lonshi Border Post to Expand Zambia Trade . Infrastructure DRC Prepares $1.258 Billion Lobito Corridor Railway Contract . Regional Economy DRC and Tanzania Advance Central Corridor Plan to Cut Trade Costs . Regional Economy Tanzania and DRC Move to Deepen Trade, Mining and Infrastructure Ties . Business & Investment DRC Advances $491.3M Package for Education, Health and Businesses . “We want to be a regular sovereign issuer,” Fwamba Likunde said, signaling a long-term approach to engaging international markets, while adding that there is “no rush” for a second issuance despite earlier plans to raise more funds this year. Security spending remains a key pressure point. The government allocated about 882 billion francs ($386 million) in the final quarter of last year alone to address instability in eastern Congo, where a Rwanda-backed rebellion continues to affect parts of the territory. Still, the minister emphasized that investors are looking beyond short-term challenges. “What is more relevant for investors is the perspective of the country for the next 10 years,” he said. “They know there are security concerns, but they also see what the government is doing to improve the situation.” ADVERTISEMENT RELATED ARTICLE Infrastructure DRC Opens Lonshi Border Post to Expand Zambia Trade New facility strengthens migration control, security and formal cross-border commerce . Infrastructure DRC Prepares $1.258 Billion Lobito Corridor Railway Contract The $1.258 billion project would modernize 1,004.5 km of railway linking Grand Katanga . Regional Economy DRC and Tanzania Advance Central Corridor Plan to Cut Trade Costs Ports, rail, lake transport, fibre and a planned Congolese dry port could strengthen regional trade. . Regional Economy Tanzania and DRC Move to Deepen Trade, Mining and Infrastructure Ties Samia Suluhu Hassan and Félix Tshisekedi push for stronger trade, connectivity and mining ties. . Tags DRC Economy DRC Economy DR.Congo DR.Congo Invest In Congo Invest In Congo

Kagame implies that Goma is a leverage in Rwanda's conflict with the DRC. Kinshasa hits back, affirming sovereignty and calling out Kigali’s manipulation via M23. Tensions between Kinshasa and Kigali remain high despite the peace agreement signed in Washington under U.S. mediation. A recent press conference held on November 27, 2025, by Rwandan President Paul Kagame has reignited controversy after he doubled down on Rwanda’s position, conditioning peace in the region on the neutralization of the FDLR, which he claims is backed by Kinshasa. Kagame Endorses M23 as "Authority" in Goma Kagame explicitly backed the AFC/M23's control of Goma and linked any potential reopening of Goma airport to negotiations with the rebels. He framed Goma as a bargaining chip: "If I were the one controlling Goma, and you come to use it, I’d say fine, but only if you address my problems." He further downplayed the ongoing humanitarian crisis, suggesting suffering was greater before the rebels took control, and questioned the international community's narrative: "We cannot talk about a humanitarian crisis without highlighting its root cause." Kinshasa Condemns Kagame's Remarks The Congolese government responded swiftly. Government Spokesperson Patrick Muyaya condemned Kagame's statements as an open admission of Rwanda's command over M23 and its interference in Congolese territory. "The father is taking responsibility for the son's actions," Muyaya stated. "There is absolutely no ambiguity. We expect Kagame to respect his commitments." Muyaya also denounced Kagame’s attempt to deny the humanitarian emergency in eastern Congo. He emphasized that Goma and other territories are under partial rebel occupation and reaffirmed that the government is working tirelessly to restore full sovereignty. He noted that 30% of the 2026 national budget has been allocated to defense and security. "It is not those denying the crisis who can present themselves as the solution. They are the problem. They killed, attacked schools, and blocked humanitarian access. They will be held accountable," he added. U.S.-Led Peace Monitoring Moves Ahead Continue Reading Full Article DRC PEACE EFFORT Muyaya to Kagame: “The Father Now Owns the Son’s Actions” By Serge Kitoko Tshibanda Political Analyst Serge Kitoko Tshibanda Home Comment Nov 28, 2025 May 15, 2026 3 min read Copy link Facebook X (Twitter) WhatsApp Published Updated: Tensions between Kinshasa and Kigali remain high despite the peace agreement signed in Washington under U.S. mediation. A recent press conference held on November 27, 2025, by Rwandan President Paul Kagame has reignited controversy after he doubled down on Rwanda’s position, conditioning peace in the region on the neutralization of the FDLR, which he claims is backed by Kinshasa. Kagame Endorses M23 as "Authority" in Goma Kagame explicitly backed the AFC/M23's control of Goma and linked any potential reopening of Goma airport to negotiations with the rebels. He framed Goma as a bargaining chip: "If I were the one controlling Goma, and you come to use it, I’d say fine, but only if you address my problems." He further downplayed the ongoing humanitarian crisis, suggesting suffering was greater before the rebels took control, and questioned the international community's narrative: "We cannot talk about a humanitarian crisis without highlighting its root cause." Kinshasa Condemns Kagame's Remarks The Congolese government responded swiftly. Government Spokesperson Patrick Muyaya condemned Kagame's statements as an open admission of Rwanda's command over M23 and its interference in Congolese territory. ADVERTISEMENT "The father is taking responsibility for the son's actions," Muyaya stated. "There is absolutely no ambiguity. We expect Kagame to respect his commitments." Muyaya also denounced Kagame’s attempt to deny the humanitarian emergency in eastern Congo. He emphasized that Goma and other territories are under partial rebel occupation and reaffirmed that the government is working tirelessly to restore full sovereignty. He noted that 30% of the 2026 national budget has been allocated to defense and security. "It is not those denying the crisis who can present themselves as the solution. They are the problem. They killed, attacked schools, and blocked humanitarian access. They will be held accountable," he added. ADVERTISEMENT U.S.-Led Peace Monitoring Moves Ahead Despite the rhetoric, the Washington peace process continues. The Joint Security Coordination Mechanism (JSCM) convened in Washington on November 19-20 with delegates from the DRC, Rwanda, the U.S., Qatar, Togo, and the African Union. The parties reviewed the implementation of the Order of Operations (OPORD) and the Concept of Operations (CONOPS) to neutralize the FDLR and ensure Rwanda lifts its "defensive measures." Progress was noted in intelligence-sharing and sensitization campaigns to demobilize FDLR fighters. Discussions also began on the second phase: neutralization and repatriation of FDLR elements and Rwanda's military withdrawal from Congolese territory. ADVERTISEMENT TRENDING NOW How to Check if You Must Submit a SARS Tax Return . Tax and Revenue How to Book a SARS Appointment Online . Tax and Revenue Niger TV Shows Soldiers Detained After Niamey Mutiny . Justice & Crime KAA Warns of Flight Delays at Kenyan Airports . Transport and Airlines POPULAR TODAY Justice & Crime Tshisekedi: No Military Conquest Will Become Political Legitimacy" . War in Eastern DRC Rwanda Raises Interest Rate to 8.75% as Inflation Hits 14.5% . Peace For DRC Now Tshisekedi Launches DRC National Dialogue for Peace and Reform . PRESS RELEASE DRC Protects Students, Diplomas in AFC/M23-Held Areas . Infrastructure DRC and Angola Accelerate Joint Oil and Power Projects . Conclusion: A Fragile Process Under Fire While Washington and Doha efforts offer a diplomatic pathway, Kagame’s latest remarks expose the enduring contradictions. By framing the occupation of Goma as conditional leverage, Kagame positions himself not as a peace partner but as a power broker. Kinshasa, on the other hand, asserts its sovereign right to reclaim every inch of its territory. The road to peace will not be dictated by those who fuel the crisis. Congo's message is clear: sovereignty is non-negotiable, and justice will prevail. ADVERTISEMENT RELATED ARTICLE Justice & Crime Tshisekedi: No Military Conquest Will Become Political Legitimacy" Tshisekedi says armed groups cannot turn military conquest into political legitimacy, . War in Eastern DRC Rwanda Raises Interest Rate to 8.75% as Inflation Hits 14.5% Rwanda faces surging prices at home as US sanctions and tighter external financing add pressure abroad. . Peace For DRC Now Tshisekedi Launches DRC National Dialogue for Peace and Reform The three-month process will reach all 26 provinces and seek consensus on peace, cohesion and . PRESS RELEASE DRC Protects Students, Diplomas in AFC/M23-Held Areas Kinshasa says students will not restart their studies as temporary measures protect academic records, . Tags DR.Congo DR.Congo Rwanda Rwanda

In a remarkable feat of endurance and skill, Nigerian chess champion Tunde Onakoya has set a new world record for the longest continuous chess game. Playing nonstop for 60 hours, Onakoya surpassed the previous record of 56 hours, 9 minutes, and 37 seconds set in 2018. This historic event took place in New York City's iconic Times Square, drawing spectators from around the globe and raising significant funds for underprivileged children's education in Africa. A Marathon for a Cause 29-year-old Onakoya, a staunch advocate for child education, embarked on this chess marathon with a dual purpose: to break a world record and to raise awareness and funds for educational initiatives. His project, Chess in Slums, aims to empower marginalized youths in Nigeria through chess, providing them with the skills to build a brighter future. Record-Breaking Game Details The record-breaking attempt began on a Wednesday and concluded early Saturday morning at approximately 12:40 AM GMT. Onakoya faced off against American chess champion Shawn Martinez, adhering to strict guidelines set by the Guinness World Records. Each player was allowed a mere five minutes of break per hour, which they could accumulate and use strategically. Community and Global Support The event not only showcased Onakoya's formidable chess prowess but also highlighted the strong community support he received. "At 3 AM last night, I was ready to give up... but Nigerians from all over the world were with me overnight. We were singing and dancing together, and I couldn't just give up on them," Onakoya shared with the AFP news agency. The challenge raised over $22,000 within the first 20 hours, with contributions pouring in from Nigerians in the US, global leaders, celebrities, and hundreds of bystanders. Nigerian President Bola Tinubu praised Onakoya, celebrating his achievement as a testament to the resilience and ingenuity of Nigeria’s youth. The Impact of Chess in Slums Continue Reading Full Article By Author Name Author Name Home Comment Apr 21, 2024 May 15, 2026 3 min read Copy link Facebook X (Twitter) WhatsApp Published Updated: Nigerian chess champion Tunde Onakoya with people cheering him in the background In a remarkable feat of endurance and skill, Nigerian chess champion Tunde Onakoya has set a new world record for the longest continuous chess game. Playing nonstop for 60 hours, Onakoya surpassed the previous record of 56 hours, 9 minutes, and 37 seconds set in 2018. This historic event took place in New York City's iconic Times Square, drawing spectators from around the globe and raising significant funds for underprivileged children's education in Africa. A Marathon for a Cause 29-year-old Onakoya, a staunch advocate for child education, embarked on this chess marathon with a dual purpose: to break a world record and to raise awareness and funds for educational initiatives. His project, Chess in Slums, aims to empower marginalized youths in Nigeria through chess, providing them with the skills to build a brighter future. ADVERTISEMENT Record-Breaking Game Details The record-breaking attempt began on a Wednesday and concluded early Saturday morning at approximately 12:40 AM GMT. Onakoya faced off against American chess champion Shawn Martinez, adhering to strict guidelines set by the Guinness World Records. Each player was allowed a mere five minutes of break per hour, which they could accumulate and use strategically. Community and Global Support The event not only showcased Onakoya's formidable chess prowess but also highlighted the strong community support he received. "At 3 AM last night, I was ready to give up... but Nigerians from all over the world were with me overnight. We were singing and dancing together, and I couldn't just give up on them," Onakoya shared with the AFP news agency. ADVERTISEMENT The challenge raised over $22,000 within the first 20 hours, with contributions pouring in from Nigerians in the US, global leaders, celebrities, and hundreds of bystanders. Nigerian President Bola Tinubu praised Onakoya, celebrating his achievement as a testament to the resilience and ingenuity of Nigeria’s youth. The Impact of Chess in Slums Launched in 2018 in Ikorodu, on the outskirts of Lagos, Chess in Slums has become a transformative platform for many young Nigerians. Over 10 million school-age children in Nigeria are not attending school, placing the nation among the highest in the world for non-enrolled children. Onakoya's initiative provides a crucial opportunity for these children to engage in educational activities outside the traditional classroom setting. ADVERTISEMENT TRENDING NOW How to Check if You Must Submit a SARS Tax Return . Tax and Revenue How to Book a SARS Appointment Online . Tax and Revenue Niger TV Shows Soldiers Detained After Niamey Mutiny . Justice & Crime KAA Warns of Flight Delays at Kenyan Airports . Transport and Airlines POPULAR TODAY Guinness World Records' Review While the Guinness World Records organization has yet to officially confirm the new record, the validation process is underway and could take several weeks. Meanwhile, Onakoya's extraordinary achievement continues to inspire and resonate, demonstrating the profound impact that passion and perseverance can have on communities and beyond. Tunde Onakoya's record-setting chess marathon not only highlights his personal dedication and skill but also casts a spotlight on broader societal issues. By merging his love for chess with his commitment to social change, Onakoya is paving the way for future generations, proving that even the game of kings can be a powerful tool for education and empowerment. ADVERTISEMENT RELATED ARTICLE Tags

BLord breaks silence after release from Kuje prison, thanking supporters amid ongoing dispute linked to VeryDarkMan case. Popular Nigerian entrepreneur Linus Williams Ifejirika, known as BLord , has spoken publicly following his release from the Kuje Correctional Facility in Abuja. BLord was freed on Monday evening after fulfilling the bail conditions set by the court in connection with a dispute involving social media personality VeryDarkMan. In a video shared on social media shortly after his release, the entrepreneur expressed appreciation to those who supported him during his detention. He specifically acknowledged human rights activist Omoyele Sowore and members of his team for their efforts. “I’m out, I’m good, and I’m going home,” BLord said in the video, thanking individuals who contributed their time, resources, and support. He added that he was grateful for the collective efforts that led to his release. BLord had been remanded in custody following an online feud linked to allegations involving VeryDarkMan . The matter remains part of an ongoing legal process. Source: The Sun Nigeria ENTERTAINMENT BLord Speaks After Release From Kuje Prison By Witty Pascal Entertainment Editor Witty Pascal Home Comment Apr 21, 2026 May 15, 2026 1 min read Copy link Facebook X (Twitter) WhatsApp Published Updated: Popular Nigerian entrepreneur Linus Williams Ifejirika, known as BLord , has spoken publicly following his release from the Kuje Correctional Facility in Abuja. BLord was freed on Monday evening after fulfilling the bail conditions set by the court in connection with a dispute involving social media personality VeryDarkMan. ADVERTISEMENT In a video shared on social media shortly after his release, the entrepreneur expressed appreciation to those who supported him during his detention. He specifically acknowledged human rights activist Omoyele Sowore and members of his team for their efforts. “I’m out, I’m good, and I’m going home,” BLord said in the video, thanking individuals who contributed their time, resources, and support. He added that he was grateful for the collective efforts that led to his release. ADVERTISEMENT BLord had been remanded in custody following an online feud linked to allegations involving VeryDarkMan . The matter remains part of an ongoing legal process. Source: The Sun Nigeria ADVERTISEMENT TRENDING NOW How to Check if You Must Submit a SARS Tax Return . Tax and Revenue How to Book a SARS Appointment Online . Tax and Revenue Niger TV Shows Soldiers Detained After Niamey Mutiny . Justice & Crime KAA Warns of Flight Delays at Kenyan Airports . Transport and Airlines POPULAR TODAY Entertainment Poco Lee UK Case Sparks Consent Debate Among Nigerian Stars . Entertainment FOLA Leads 2026 Headies Nominations Ahead of Toronto . Entertainment Jub Jub Arrest Warrant Issued After Missed Court Appearance . Entertainment Black Coffee Wins R7 Million Court Battle Against Maserati . Entertainment Funke Akindele Faces Mixed Reactions Over Birthday Post . ADVERTISEMENT RELATED ARTICLE Entertainment Poco Lee UK Case Sparks Consent Debate Among Nigerian Stars The dancer faces five sexual offence charges and returns to court on September 15. . Entertainment FOLA Leads 2026 Headies Nominations Ahead of Toronto FOLA earned 10 nominations as The Headies prepares its October ceremony in Toronto . Entertainment Jub Jub Arrest Warrant Issued After Missed Court Appearance The warrant was held over after Jub Jub missed court citing illness and will not be enforced yet. . Entertainment Black Coffee Wins R7 Million Court Battle Against Maserati The High Court ordered Maserati to repay Soulistic Music over an undelivered customised MC20 Cielo. . Tags Entertainment Entertainment Nigerian Entertainment Nigerian Entertainment Nigeria Nigeria

UN officials reaffirm support for Faure Gnassingbé's mediation as efforts continue to resolve the eastern DRC conflict. African Union mediator Faure Essozimna Gnassingbé has intensified efforts to coordinate peace initiatives aimed at resolving the conflict in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo , following a high-level meeting with senior United Nations officials in Lomé. According to a report by Actualité.cd , the UN reaffirmed its support for the Togolese leader's mediation role during talks held on June 8. The discussions brought together James Swan, the UN Secretary-General's Special Representative in the DRC and head of MONUSCO, and Huang Xia, the UN Special Envoy for the Great Lakes Region. The meeting focused on the progress of ongoing diplomatic initiatives and ways the United Nations can support African Union-led efforts toward a lasting settlement of the crisis in eastern Congo. According to the Togolese presidency, both UN officials welcomed Togo's commitment to promoting peace, stability and the peaceful resolution of conflicts across Africa. They also pledged continued support for Gnassingbé's role as the African Union's designated mediator, a position he assumed after succeeding Angolan President João Lourenço in the regional peace process. The meeting took place alongside a biannual review of mediation efforts in the Great Lakes region, reflecting growing international efforts to align diplomatic initiatives. Togo has increasingly emerged as a central platform for consultations involving the African Union, the United Nations and regional stakeholders seeking a coordinated approach to the conflict. Despite these diplomatic efforts, the security and humanitarian situation in eastern DRC remains fragile. The implementation of agreements reached through various initiatives, including the Washington process and talks facilitated by Qatar in Doha, continues to face obstacles as key parties remain divided over major provisions and commitments. Kinshasa continues to accuse Rwanda of supporting the AFC/M23 rebellion, an allegation Kigali denies and accepts sometimes . Meanwhile, mediators face the challenge of narrowing the gap between diplomatic commitments and realities on the ground, where violence and displacement continue to affect communities across eastern Congo. The renewed backing from the United Nations is expected to strengthen ongoing African Union efforts as regional and international actors seek to revive momentum toward a durable political and security solution. Continue Reading Full Article DRC PEACE EFFORT UN Reaffirms Support for Faure Gnassingbé's Mediation in Eastern DRC By Serge Kitoko Tshibanda Political Analyst Serge Kitoko Tshibanda Home Comment Jun 9, 2026 Jun 9, 2026 3 min read Copy link Facebook X (Twitter) WhatsApp Published Updated: African Union mediator Faure Essozimna Gnassingbé has intensified efforts to coordinate peace initiatives aimed at resolving the conflict in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo , following a high-level meeting with senior United Nations officials in Lomé. According to a report by Actualité.cd , the UN reaffirmed its support for the Togolese leader's mediation role during talks held on June 8. The discussions brought together James Swan, the UN Secretary-General's Special Representative in the DRC and head of MONUSCO, and Huang Xia, the UN Special Envoy for the Great Lakes Region. The meeting focused on the progress of ongoing diplomatic initiatives and ways the United Nations can support African Union-led efforts toward a lasting settlement of the crisis in eastern Congo. ADVERTISEMENT According to the Togolese presidency, both UN officials welcomed Togo's commitment to promoting peace, stability and the peaceful resolution of conflicts across Africa. They also pledged continued support for Gnassingbé's role as the African Union's designated mediator, a position he assumed after succeeding Angolan President João Lourenço in the regional peace process. The meeting took place alongside a biannual review of mediation efforts in the Great Lakes region, reflecting growing international efforts to align diplomatic initiatives. ADVERTISEMENT Togo has increasingly emerged as a central platform for consultations involving the African Union, the United Nations and regional stakeholders seeking a coordinated approach to the conflict. Despite these diplomatic efforts, the security and humanitarian situation in eastern DRC remains fragile. The implementation of agreements reached through various initiatives, including the Washington process and talks facilitated by Qatar in Doha, continues to face obstacles as key parties remain divided over major provisions and commitments. ADVERTISEMENT TRENDING NOW How to Check if You Must Submit a SARS Tax Return . Tax and Revenue How to Book a SARS Appointment Online . Tax and Revenue Niger TV Shows Soldiers Detained After Niamey Mutiny . Justice & Crime KAA Warns of Flight Delays at Kenyan Airports . Transport and Airlines POPULAR TODAY Scholarships 120 EAC Master’s Scholarships Open to EAC Students — How to Apply . Scholarships UCT Mastercard Foundation Scholarship 2027 Opens to Africans . Scholarships Chevening Scholarships 2027–2028 Open Across Africa — How to Apply . African Culture Himba Clothing and Adornment: Meaning of Traditional Dress . International Relations Ndayishimiye Backs Leopards After Historic Draw With Portugal . Kinshasa continues to accuse Rwanda of supporting the AFC/M23 rebellion, an allegation Kigali denies and accepts sometimes . Meanwhile, mediators face the challenge of narrowing the gap between diplomatic commitments and realities on the ground, where violence and displacement continue to affect communities across eastern Congo. The renewed backing from the United Nations is expected to strengthen ongoing African Union efforts as regional and international actors seek to revive momentum toward a durable political and security solution. ADVERTISEMENT RELATED ARTICLE Scholarships 120 EAC Master’s Scholarships Open to EAC Students — How to Apply Up to 120 EAC Master’s scholarships are open to nationals of eight East African countries, . Scholarships UCT Mastercard Foundation Scholarship 2027 Opens to Africans UCT Mastercard Foundation Scholars Program 2027 is open to African students with ... . Scholarships Chevening Scholarships 2027–2028 Open Across Africa — How to Apply Chevening Scholarships 2027–2028 are open to eligible African applicants. See funding, . African Culture Himba Clothing and Adornment: Meaning of Traditional Dress What otjize, jewelry, hairstyles, and clothing represent in Himba culture . Tags Africa Africa DR.Congo DR.Congo African Union African Union DRC Politics DRC Politics DR Congo News DR Congo News African Union African Union

Rwanda’s new terror list naming 25 exiled figures sparks debate over due process, political motives, and Kigali’s regional strategy KIGALI — October 15, 2025. Rwanda’s government has published its most extensive domestic terrorism sanctions list to date, naming 25 individuals accused of financing or coordinating acts of terror. The announcement, made by the National Counter Terrorism Committee (NCTC), is presented as part of a broader effort to disrupt networks behind anti-Rwanda armed groups. Yet observers and analysts are questioning the timing, process, and political undertones of the move. An Expansive List Across Continents The individuals listed are spread across Africa, Europe, and North America. According to the official statement, they face travel bans, asset freezes, and financial restrictions under Rwanda’s jurisdiction. However, many of those named are long-time political exiles, opposition figures, or critics of the current government. Critics argue that the designations could blur the line between legitimate political dissent and terrorism. Below is the full list published by the NCTC: Lt Gen Gaston Iyamuremye (Victor Byiringiro / Rumuri) – President of FDLR, accused of directing operations from eastern DRC. Maj Gen Pacifique Ntawunguka (Omega) – FDLR armed wing commander, alleged to run illicit funding networks. Col Sylvestre Sebahinzi (Zinga Zinga ZZ) – Based in Zambia, accused of coordinating FDLR finances in southern Africa. Maj Alphonse Munyarugendo (Monaco Dollar) – Resident in Mozambique, alleged SADC regional coordinator for FDLR. Faustin Ntirikina (Zigabe Pacifique) – French national, convicted in Rwanda for recruiting youth into FLN and planning the 2019 Kinigi attack. Maj Gen Antoine Hakizimana (Jeva) – Based in Burundi, identified as CNRD–FLN’s military chief. Continue Reading Full Article POLITICS & DIPLOMACY Rwanda’s New Terror List Raises Concerns Over Political Motives By Serge Kitoko Tshibanda Political Analyst Serge Kitoko Tshibanda Home Comment Oct 15, 2025 May 15, 2026 5 min read Copy link Facebook X (Twitter) WhatsApp Published Updated: KIGALI — October 15, 2025. Rwanda’s government has published its most extensive domestic terrorism sanctions list to date, naming 25 individuals accused of financing or coordinating acts of terror. The announcement, made by the National Counter Terrorism Committee (NCTC), is presented as part of a broader effort to disrupt networks behind anti-Rwanda armed groups. Yet observers and analysts are questioning the timing, process, and political undertones of the move. An Expansive List Across Continents The individuals listed are spread across Africa, Europe, and North America. According to the official statement, they face travel bans, asset freezes, and financial restrictions under Rwanda’s jurisdiction. However, many of those named are long-time political exiles, opposition figures, or critics of the current government. Critics argue that the designations could blur the line between legitimate political dissent and terrorism. Below is the full list published by the NCTC: ADVERTISEMENT Lt Gen Gaston Iyamuremye (Victor Byiringiro / Rumuri) – President of FDLR, accused of directing operations from eastern DRC. Maj Gen Pacifique Ntawunguka (Omega) – FDLR armed wing commander, alleged to run illicit funding networks. Col Sylvestre Sebahinzi (Zinga Zinga ZZ) – Based in Zambia, accused of coordinating FDLR finances in southern Africa. Maj Alphonse Munyarugendo (Monaco Dollar) – Resident in Mozambique, alleged SADC regional coordinator for FDLR. Faustin Ntirikina (Zigabe Pacifique) – French national, convicted in Rwanda for recruiting youth into FLN and planning the 2019 Kinigi attack. Maj Gen Antoine Hakizimana (Jeva) – Based in Burundi, identified as CNRD–FLN’s military chief. Eric Munyemana – Belgian citizen, accused of FLN fundraising in Europe. Dr Innocent Biruka (Mitali) – Secretary-General of CNRD–FLN, alleged recruiter and financier. Gen Faustin Kayumba Nyamwasa – Ex-Rwandan general living in South Africa, founding member of RNC. Dr Emmanuel Hakizimana – Co-founder of RNC, based in Montreal, accused of online financing and recruitment. Abdulkarim Ali Nyarwaya (Dick Nyarwaya) – British national, alleged financial coordinator for P5 coalition. Maj Robert Higiro (Gasisi) – Based in Kenya, accused of RNC recruitment and training. Frank Ntwali – RNC representative in southern Africa, alleged liaison between RNC and FDLR. Ignace Rusagara – RNC spokesperson, resident in the United States, accused of incitement. Jean Paul Turayishimiye – Based in Washington D.C., alleged founder of RNC and financier of terror activities. Gaspard Musabyimana – Journalist and media operator in Belgium, accused of supporting FDLR and P5 propaganda. Placide Kayumba – Based in Namur, Belgium, alleged to link FDU-Inkingi to FDLR operations. Augustin Munyaneza – Brussels-based taxi driver, accused of fundraising for FDLR and P5. Michel Niyibizi – Belgian teacher, described as a fundraiser for FDLR and P5. Jonathan Musonera – London-based activist, accused of mobilizing funds for NEW-RNC. Dr Theogene Rudasingwa – Former Rwandan ambassador to the U.S., accused of coordinating RNC–FDLR collaboration. Maj Jacques Kanyamibwa – Former military pilot, accused of financing the 2019 Kinigi attack. Thomas Nahimana – Ishema Party president in France, accused of inciting violence through online platforms. Christine Coleman Uwizera – U.S.-based pastor, accused of promoting incitement through social media. Sylvestre Nduwayezu (Jet Lee) – Resident of Uganda, accused of recruiting and financing regional attacks. Critics Say the List Blurs Security and Politics While Kigali describes the list as a “preventive security measure,” regional analysts and human rights advocates view it as part of a long-standing pattern of conflating political opposition with terrorism. Most of the groups cited, including the RNC and the Ishema Party, have political wings operating legally abroad, often calling for democratic reforms and dialogue rather than armed struggle. Several names on the list, such as Gen Kayumba Nyamwasa and Dr Theogene Rudasingwa , are well-known former insiders of the ruling Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) who became critics after exile. They have previously denied involvement in violent acts and accuse Kigali of orchestrating politically motivated charges to silence dissent. ADVERTISEMENT International Context Rwanda’s announcement comes amid renewed scrutiny of its regional military operations, particularly in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, where UN reports continue to document the presence of Rwandan troops and their support for armed groups. Observers note that such lists often appear at moments when Kigali faces diplomatic criticism or pressure from international partners. Due Process and Transparency Questions While the NCTC says individuals can appeal their designation through procedures under the Prime Minister’s Order, no details have been made public about independent oversight, evidence review, or legal representation. Rights groups argue that, without transparency, the list risks becoming a political tool rather than a genuine counterterrorism mechanism. ADVERTISEMENT TRENDING NOW How to Check if You Must Submit a SARS Tax Return . Tax and Revenue How to Book a SARS Appointment Online . Tax and Revenue Niger TV Shows Soldiers Detained After Niamey Mutiny . Justice & Crime KAA Warns of Flight Delays at Kenyan Airports . Transport and Airlines POPULAR TODAY Justice & Crime Tshisekedi: No Military Conquest Will Become Political Legitimacy" . War in Eastern DRC Rwanda Raises Interest Rate to 8.75% as Inflation Hits 14.5% . Scholarships 120 EAC Master’s Scholarships Open to EAC Students — How to Apply . Rwanda Politics Kagame Sides With Journalist Against His Own Foreign Minister . War in DR Congo DRC Accuses RDF and AFC/M23 of Killings, Torture and Abductions . ADVERTISEMENT RELATED ARTICLE Justice & Crime Tshisekedi: No Military Conquest Will Become Political Legitimacy" Tshisekedi says armed groups cannot turn military conquest into political legitimacy, . War in Eastern DRC Rwanda Raises Interest Rate to 8.75% as Inflation Hits 14.5% Rwanda faces surging prices at home as US sanctions and tighter external financing add pressure abroad. . 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How the 1904 and 1911 agreements dispossessed Maasai communities and why their 1913 court challenge failed without the facts being tried. The Maasai land case of 1913 was not an isolated courtroom defeat. It was the final stage of a colonial sequence: an agreement that divided Maasai communities into two reserves, a second agreement that removed the northern reserve, and a legal doctrine that protected the British government from having its conduct examined in its own colonial court. Calling this history “the stolen highlands” does not mean that every part of Kenya’s highlands belonged only to one people. It refers specifically to documented Maasai loss in the central Rift Valley and Laikipia, where British policy converted pastoral country into land for European settlement. The paper trail survives and so does the contradiction at its centre. How did the Maasai lose land and why did their 1913 case fail? British officials used the 1904 and 1911 agreements to move Maasai communities from the central Rift Valley and Laikipia. When Maasai plaintiffs sued, the court classified the agreements as treaties and the removals as Acts of State beyond a colonial court’s power to remedy. Who Are the Maasai? The Maasai are an Indigenous East African people whose homeland crosses southern Kenya and northern Tanzania. They speak Maa and have long organised social and economic life around cattle, kinship, age sets, mobility and access to seasonal grazing. Today, Maasai people are also farmers, professionals, traders, conservation workers and urban residents. XTRAfrica’s broader guide to Maasai culture, history and modern life explains this diversity. This article concerns particular Maasai sections in what became colonial Kenya, especially communities moved from the central Rift Valley and later from Laikipia. It should not be read as a single history of every Maasai community in Kenya and Tanzania. Before the Agreements: An Alliance Under Pressure The British did not enter Maasailand as an all-powerful administration confronting a politically passive population. Historian Richard Waller’s study of Maasai-British relations from 1895 to 1905 describes an informal alliance shaped by mutual need. Maasai communities were recovering from devastating human and livestock disasters of the late nineteenth century, while the British lacked enough troops and money to control their new protectorate securely (Waller, 1976, p. 529). That relationship changed as settler demand for fertile land grew. Pastoral mobility did not fit the colonial preference for surveyed boundaries, fixed reserves and private holdings. The result was not merely a change of maps. Restricting movement affected access to water, dry-season pasture, livestock health, ritual sites and communication between communities. The 1904 Agreement: “Final” Reserves and an Open Rift Valley Continue Reading Full Article AFRICAN CULTURE The Stolen Highlands: Maasai Land Loss and the 1913 Court Case By Neema Asha Mwakalinga Travel & Culture Expert Neema Asha Mwakalinga Home Comment Jul 19, 2026 Jul 20, 2026 18 min read Copy link Facebook X (Twitter) WhatsApp Published Updated: The Maasai land case of 1913 was not an isolated courtroom defeat. It was the final stage of a colonial sequence: an agreement that divided Maasai communities into two reserves, a second agreement that removed the northern reserve, and a legal doctrine that protected the British government from having its conduct examined in its own colonial court. A contemporary view across the Rift Valley toward the Laikipia highlands, part of the wider landscape transformed by colonial settlement and Maasai displacement. Photograph by Daniel Case, CC BY-SA 4.0, via Wikimedia Commons. Calling this history “the stolen highlands” does not mean that every part of Kenya’s highlands belonged only to one people. It refers specifically to documented Maasai loss in the central Rift Valley and Laikipia, where British policy converted pastoral country into land for European settlement. The paper trail survives and so does the contradiction at its centre. How did the Maasai lose land and why did their 1913 case fail? British officials used the 1904 and 1911 agreements to move Maasai communities from the central Rift Valley and Laikipia. When Maasai plaintiffs sued, the court classified the agreements as treaties and the removals as Acts of State beyond a colonial court’s power to remedy. Who Are the Maasai? Members of a Maasai community in Narok County, Kenya. Photograph by Kandukuru Nagarjun, CC BY 2.0, via Wikimedia Commons. The Maasai are an Indigenous East African people whose homeland crosses southern Kenya and northern Tanzania. They speak Maa and have long organised social and economic life around cattle, kinship, age sets, mobility and access to seasonal grazing. Today, Maasai people are also farmers, professionals, traders, conservation workers and urban residents. XTRAfrica’s broader guide to Maasai culture, history and modern life explains this diversity. This article concerns particular Maasai sections in what became colonial Kenya, especially communities moved from the central Rift Valley and later from Laikipia. It should not be read as a single history of every Maasai community in Kenya and Tanzania. Before the Agreements: An Alliance Under Pressure The British did not enter Maasailand as an all-powerful administration confronting a politically passive population. Historian Richard Waller’s study of Maasai-British relations from 1895 to 1905 describes an informal alliance shaped by mutual need. Maasai communities were recovering from devastating human and livestock disasters of the late nineteenth century, while the British lacked enough troops and money to control their new protectorate securely (Waller, 1976, p. 529). Four Maasai men beside a train, circa 1900, during the expansion of colonial infrastructure in British East Africa. Wellcome Collection, Public Domain. That relationship changed as settler demand for fertile land grew. Pastoral mobility did not fit the colonial preference for surveyed boundaries, fixed reserves and private holdings. The result was not merely a change of maps. Restricting movement affected access to water, dry-season pasture, livestock health, ritual sites and communication between communities. The 1904 Agreement: “Final” Reserves and an Open Rift Valley Credit: Lenana et al., Agreement of 10 and 15 August 1904, edited by Ng’ang’a Wahu-Mũchiri and Adrian S. Wisnicki, One More Voice/The Ardhi Initiative, CC BY 4.0. The surviving text of the 1904 agreement , signed in stages on 10 and 15 August, divided Maasai communities between northern and southern reserves. Certain sections were directed to Laikipia; others were assigned land south of the railway. In exchange, Maasai representatives undertook to vacate the Rift Valley so that it could be used for European settlement. The document also requested a route, including water access, between the two reserves and protected land on the Kinangop slopes for ceremonies. Most importantly, it described the settlement as enduring “so long as the Masai as a race shall exist” and said settlers should not take land inside the reserves (Judgment, 1914, pp. 382–383). Those words matter. The 1904 document was not a 100-year lease, despite a persistent modern myth that the land was supposed to “revert” in 2004. Historian Lotte Hughes has directly corrected that claim : the agreement contained no 100-year expiry date. Its promise was framed as permanent, not temporary. The removals of 1904–05 pushed communities from favoured grazing country around Naivasha and Nakuru into the two reserves. In her Oxford research based on archives and Maasai oral testimony , Hughes argues that white settlement was the primary reason for the displacement (Hughes, 2002, pp. 8–9). The 1911 Agreement: Laikipia Is Taken Back Only seven years later, the northern reserve became an obstacle to settler expansion. The 1911 agreement preserved by the One More Voice and Ardhi Initiative project stated that the Maasai should live in one area rather than remain divided. Representatives marked the document in Nairobi on 4 April and at Rumuruti on 13 April; Governor Percy Girouard signed on 26 April. ADVERTISEMENT The Uganda Railway and surrounding territories in British East Africa, circa 1903. Public domain, via Wikimedia Commons. It helps readers understand why land near the railway became so valuable to settlers. Its practical effect was clear: residents were to vacate the Northern Maasai Reserve and move with their herds and flocks to land south of the Uganda Railway. The government promised a southern reserve for Maasai use, subject to exceptions for mining and public purposes (Judgment, 1914, pp. 383–385). The language of “free will” in both agreements cannot settle whether consent was genuine. The later plaintiffs said the 1911 agreement had been obtained under duress and lacked valid approval from the people it purported to bind. The unequal setting also matters: colonial officials controlled the administration, the movement orders and the written record used to describe consent. Credit: Segi et al., Agreement of 4 and 13 April 1911, edited by Ng’ang’a Wahu-Mũchiri and Adrian S. Wisnicki, One More Voice/The Ardhi Initiative, CC BY 4.0. The northern removal continued over the next two years and was completed on 26 March 1913. Hughes estimates that the moves, together with related later removals, cost Maasai communities in British East Africa at least half the land they had previously used; she notes that a precise percentage is impossible because pastoral use before 1904 had not been surveyed in colonial terms (Hughes, 2002, p. 9). Land loss also narrowed the physical base of the cattle-centred economy discussed in XTRAfrica’s account of Maasai food and changing diets . Resistance Through Law The British expected violent resistance. Instead, Maasai challengers hired lawyers and used the colonial legal system. This was organised, non-violent resistance not evidence that communities quietly accepted the removal. Maasai people moving with their belongings near Rumuruti in Laikipia, 1909–1911. Photographed during the period in which the Northern Maasai Reserve was dismantled, the image conveys the upheaval surrounding the 1911 removal, although the archive does not identify this particular journey as part of the colonial relocation. Photograph by Carl Ethan Akeley/AMNH, Asset 212346. Parsaloi Ole Gilisho, an influential Purko age-set spokesman, helped initiate the challenge. By the High Court hearing, his son-in-law Murket Ole Nchoko recorded by British officials as “Ol le Njogo” was the first of eight plaintiffs. The final arrangement of plaintiffs and defendants was complicated because some Maasai leaders, including Ole Gilisho, had marked earlier documents. That complexity should not erase Maasai authorship of the resistance. Civil Case No. 91 of 1912 asked the court to recognise the 1904 settlement as binding, declare that the 1911 agreement did not bind the plaintiffs and other Maasai who had not validly approved it, and allow return to Laikipia. The claim also sought £5,000 over the promised road and an inquiry into livestock deaths and depreciation caused by the removal (Judgment, 1914, pp. 387–388). Shortly before the case was heard, an injunction was issued to stop further removal. It arrived on 10 April 1913 about two weeks after the last Maasai had already left Laikipia (Hughes, 2006, p. 89). The legal protection came after the physical result it was supposed to prevent. The 1913 Judgment: A Court That Would Not Hear the Wrong On 26 May 1913, the High Court at Mombasa addressed a preliminary jurisdiction question rather than conducting a full trial of the plaintiffs’ evidence. The published text of the colonial judgment shows how the trap worked. The Old Law Courts in Mombasa, part of the colonial judicial setting in which the Maasai case was decided. Photograph by Zahra Abdulmajid, CC BY-SA 3.0, via Wikimedia Commons. Avoid claiming that the case was heard in the exact room pictured. Judge R. W. Hamilton held that the Maasai were not British subjects but “protected foreigners” living in a protectorate. From that premise, he treated the 1904 and 1911 instruments not as enforceable contracts but as treaties between the Crown and representatives of a foreign people (Judgment, 1914, pp. 385–387). That classification turned the agreements and removals into Acts of State. The court therefore said it had no authority to determine whether the 1911 signatures had been obtained through duress, whether the signatories could bind other Maasai, or whether the government had wrongfully destroyed the 1904 arrangement. It dismissed the action with costs, stating that even if a wrong had occurred, no municipal court could provide a remedy (Judgment, 1914, pp. 388–389). ADVERTISEMENT The plaintiffs appealed. In December 1913, the Court of Appeal for Eastern Africa upheld the barrier: the matter remained outside the jurisdiction of the local courts. In plain language, the Crown could exercise power over Maasai people while describing them as foreigners when they asked the Crown’s court to enforce its promise. What the Case Did—and Did Not—Decide The courts did not conduct a factual trial proving that the 1911 move was freely accepted, fair or harmless. They did not calculate livestock losses or decide the moral justice of removing communities from Laikipia. They decided that colonial courts could not grant the requested remedy because the conduct was classified as an Act of State. A Maasai man overlooks a highland landscape, illustrating the enduring connection between Maasai communities, land and pastoral identity. That distinction is essential. Saying simply “the Maasai lost the case” can sound as if judges examined the evidence and found the removals lawful on their merits. They did not. The jurisdiction ruling prevented the central claims from being tested. Nor should the story be reduced to the idea that “the chiefs sold the land.” Maasai political authority was distributed, the agreements named many representatives, and the challengers disputed whether those who marked the 1911 document could bind everyone. Colonial officials also selected the people they were prepared to recognise as representatives. The documents record marks and official assurances, but they cannot by themselves establish informed, community-wide consent. Why the Stolen Highlands Still Matter The 1913 case records an early attempt by Indigenous East Africans to turn the coloniser’s law against colonial dispossession. Its defeat exposed how legal categories could recognise Maasai political personality for the purpose of making a treaty, then deny an effective forum when that treaty was challenged. Other images of regional atmosphere in the 1909–1911. Its material legacy reaches beyond court history. Land determines mobility, water access, grazing options, household security and the room in which culture can be practised and changed. It also shapes the markets through which cultural work from livestock products to Maasai beadwork and modern craft supports families today. The case also belongs in a wider East African conversation about Indigenous land systems. XTRAfrica’s examination of Hadza communal land rights in Tanzania shows a different community and legal history, but a related problem: mobile ways of using land are repeatedly forced to defend themselves through institutions built around surveyed boundaries and written titles. Reconstructing the Maasai case accurately does not produce an easy modern court remedy, and it does not settle every present-day ownership dispute. It does something more basic: it restores the sequence of promise, removal and legal exclusion. The highlands were not simply “empty” land waiting for development. They were used landscapes whose conversion created winners, displaced communities and a claim for justice that the colonial court refused to hear. ADVERTISEMENT TRENDING NOW How to Check if You Must Submit a SARS Tax Return . Tax and Revenue How to Book a SARS Appointment Online . Tax and Revenue Niger TV Shows Soldiers Detained After Niamey Mutiny . Justice & Crime KAA Warns of Flight Delays at Kenyan Airports . Transport and Airlines POPULAR TODAY African Culture Disability-Selective Infanticide: The Hidden History in Maasailand . African Culture Zee Nxumalo Biography: Age, Real Name, Songs & Amapiano Rise . African Culture Wendy Shay Biography: Age, Nursing Career, Songs & AFRIMA Win . African Culture Vinka Biography: Real Name, Songs, Family & Music Career . African Culture Vestine & Dorcas Biography: Ages, Family, Songs & Career . One of Masai leader available in the the 1904 and 1911 Maasai Agreements Olonana, commonly known as Lenana, was the Maasai laibon who forged a strategic alliance with the British and signed the 1904 Maasai Agreement. Intended to protect his authority and people during a period of crisis, the alliance was later exploited by colonial officials as Maasai lands were transferred to settler control. Image: National Museums of Kenya/Shujaa Stories. He sought British support against his rival brother Senteu and other threats during a period of war, drought and devastating human and livestock disease. The British needed Maasai cooperation, soldiers and secure communication routes. Lenana consequently became their intermediary and a salaried colonial “Paramount Chief,” an office that did not previously exist in Maasai political organization. After 1904, their interests diverged and the colonial government exploited the alliance to acquire Maasai land. Historian Richard Waller describes it as an alliance serving mutual interests . Lenana signed the 1904 agreement, but he did not sign the formal 1911 agreement. He died in March 1911; the April agreement bears the marks of his young son Segi, two regents and other Maasai representatives. Colonial officials nevertheless used Lenana’s reported final wishes to support the relocation. Compare the 1904 agreement with the 1911 signatories . Frequently Asked Questions What were the 1904 and 1911 Maasai Agreements? The 1904 agreement divided Maasai communities between northern and southern reserves and opened much of the central Rift Valley to European settlement. The 1911 agreement required the northern communities to leave Laikipia and move to an enlarged southern reserve. Who brought the 1913 Maasai land case? Parsaloi Ole Gilisho helped organise the challenge. In the High Court judgment, Murket Ole Nchoko recorded as Ol le Njogo appeared as lead plaintiff with seven other plaintiffs from the Purko and Keekonyokie sections. Why did the Maasai plaintiffs lose? The court classified the agreements as treaties and the government’s conduct as Acts of State. It therefore ruled that a municipal court could not hear the plaintiffs’ claims, including their arguments about duress, authority, breach and loss. Did the 1904 agreement expire after 100 years? No. The surviving text contains no 100-year lease or 2004 expiry date. It said the reserve settlement should endure for as long as the Maasai existed. Sources and Further Reading High Court of the East Africa Protectorate. 1914. “ Judgment in the Case Brought by the Masai Tribe Against the Attorney-General .” American Journal of International Law 8(2): 380–389. Judgment delivered May 26, 1913. Hughes, Lotte. 2002. “ Moving the Maasai: A Colonial Misadventure .” DPhil thesis, University of Oxford. Hughes, Lotte. 2006. “ The Court Case .” In Moving the Maasai: A Colonial Misadventure , pp. 89–104. Palgrave Macmillan. Hughes, Lotte. 2023. “ 2023 Marks 110 Years Since the Maasai Case 1913: Does It Still Matter? .” The Elephant . Lenana et al. (1914) 2023. “ Treaty/Agreement of 10 and 15 August 1904 .” One More Voice and The Ardhi Initiative. Segi et al. (1914) 2023. “ Treaty/Agreement of 4 and 13 April 1911 .” One More Voice and The Ardhi Initiative. Wahu-Mũchiri, Ng’ang’a, Chao Tayiana Maina and Adrian S. Wisnicki. 2024. “ The 1904 and 1911 Maa-British Land Agreements .” The Ardhi Initiative and One More Voice. Waller, Richard. 1976. “ The Maasai and the British 1895–1905: The Origins of an Alliance .” Journal of African History 17(4): 529–553. ADVERTISEMENT RELATED ARTICLE African Culture Disability-Selective Infanticide: The Hidden History in Maasailand Field evidence exposes a history of killing, abandonment and neglect and the Maasai resisting it . 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