How Tshisekedi Turned Rwanda’s Influence Into a Liability

Introduction: A bold shift in Congo‑Rwanda relations

For nearly three decades, Rwanda has been a major player in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), sometimes as a military partner, often as an aggressor. Since the 1996–1997 First Congo War, Rwandan forces and allied militias have repeatedly intervened in eastern Congo, citing security concerns but also pursuing economic interests in the region’s vast mineral wealth. This involvement came at a huge human cost; millions of Congolese died during the first and second Congo wars, and successive rebellions, such as the M23 uprising of 2012–2013, saw renewed Rwandan backing. By early 2019, when Félix Tshisekedi took office in Congo’s first peaceful transition of power, many Congolese believed Kigali had a stranglehold over their country.

Today, that perception has shifted dramatically. Under President Tshisekedi’s leadership, Rwanda’s influence is no longer seen as inevitable; it has become a political and economic liability. International sanctions, aid suspensions, and diplomatic isolation have eroded Kigali’s regional standing. This article investigates how Tshisekedi’s pro‑Congo diplomacy, public messaging, and alliances have exposed Rwanda’s human rights abuses and reduced its leverage in the DRC.

Historical background: Rwanda’s involvement in the DRC

To understand the magnitude of Tshisekedi’s shift, it is important to revisit Rwanda’s long history in eastern Congo. After the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, about two million Hutu refugees, including extremist militias, fled into Congolese provinces. The newly installed Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) sent troops into Zaire (now the DRC) in 1996, partnering with Laurent Kabila’s rebels to depose dictator Mobutu Sese Seko. During the First Congo War, Rwandan and allied Tutsi militias committed atrocities against Hutu civilians. Relations soured soon after; Kabila expelled foreign troops, and Rwanda invaded again in 1998, sparking the Second Congo War. Millions died from fighting and disease.

In the 2000s, Rwanda continued to back armed groups, most notably the M23 movement, which seized large swaths of territory in North Kivu in 2012–2013 before being defeated. Rwanda and proxy militias exploited Congolese minerals, particularly gold and coltan, which fuelled Kigali’s economy. By the time Tshisekedi came to power, DR Congo’s east remained under the shadow of Rwandan interference, and M23 had resurfaced in 2021.

Tshisekedi’s strategy: Turning influence into liability

1. Publicly exposing Rwandan aggression and calling for sanctions

One of Tshisekedi’s first moves was to speak openly about Rwanda’s role in supporting M23. In February 2025, DR Congo’s communications minister, Patrick Muyaya, said international sanctions were “the minimum necessary” to stop Rwanda’s actions, describing indiscriminate killings and calling for “concrete action” to protect Congolese citizens. Muyaya argued that sanctions pressure would force Rwanda into negotiations.

The government’s persistent messaging led to a flurry of punitive measures. In March 2025, Canada suspended export permits and new government-to-government business initiatives with Rwanda, denouncing Kigali’s support for M23 and condemning the presence of the Rwanda Defence Force (RDF) in the DRC. The statement by three Canadian ministers called these acts “flagrant violations” of Congo’s sovereignty. Canada also summoned Rwanda’s high commissioner and earmarked humanitarian aid for Congolese civilians.