How Tshisekedi Turned Rwanda’s Influence Into a Liability

Introduction: A bold shift in Congo‑Rwanda relations

For nearly three decades, Rwanda has been a major player in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), sometimes as a military partner, often as an aggressor. Since the 1996–1997 First Congo War, Rwandan forces and allied militias have repeatedly intervened in eastern Congo, citing security concerns but also pursuing economic interests in the region’s vast mineral wealth. This involvement came at a huge human cost; millions of Congolese died during the first and second Congo wars, and successive rebellions, such as the M23 uprising of 2012–2013, saw renewed Rwandan backing. By early 2019, when Félix Tshisekedi took office in Congo’s first peaceful transition of power, many Congolese believed Kigali had a stranglehold over their country.

Today, that perception has shifted dramatically. Under President Tshisekedi’s leadership, Rwanda’s influence is no longer seen as inevitable; it has become a political and economic liability. International sanctions, aid suspensions, and diplomatic isolation have eroded Kigali’s regional standing. This article investigates how Tshisekedi’s pro‑Congo diplomacy, public messaging, and alliances have exposed Rwanda’s human rights abuses and reduced its leverage in the DRC.

Historical background: Rwanda’s involvement in the DRC

To understand the magnitude of Tshisekedi’s shift, it is important to revisit Rwanda’s long history in eastern Congo. After the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, about two million Hutu refugees, including extremist militias, fled into Congolese provinces. The newly installed Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) sent troops into Zaire (now the DRC) in 1996, partnering with Laurent Kabila’s rebels to depose dictator Mobutu Sese Seko. During the First Congo War, Rwandan and allied Tutsi militias committed atrocities against Hutu civilians. Relations soured soon after; Kabila expelled foreign troops, and Rwanda invaded again in 1998, sparking the Second Congo War. Millions died from fighting and disease.

In the 2000s, Rwanda continued to back armed groups, most notably the M23 movement, which seized large swaths of territory in North Kivu in 2012–2013 before being defeated. Rwanda and proxy militias exploited Congolese minerals, particularly gold and coltan, which fuelled Kigali’s economy. By the time Tshisekedi came to power, DR Congo’s east remained under the shadow of Rwandan interference, and M23 had resurfaced in 2021.

Tshisekedi’s strategy: Turning influence into liability

1. Publicly exposing Rwandan aggression and calling for sanctions

One of Tshisekedi’s first moves was to speak openly about Rwanda’s role in supporting M23. In February 2025, DR Congo’s communications minister, Patrick Muyaya, said international sanctions were “the minimum necessary” to stop Rwanda’s actions, describing indiscriminate killings and calling for “concrete action” to protect Congolese citizens. Muyaya argued that sanctions pressure would force Rwanda into negotiations.

The government’s persistent messaging led to a flurry of punitive measures. In March 2025, Canada suspended export permits and new government-to-government business initiatives with Rwanda, denouncing Kigali’s support for M23 and condemning the presence of the Rwanda Defence Force (RDF) in the DRC. The statement by three Canadian ministers called these acts “flagrant violations” of Congo’s sovereignty. Canada also summoned Rwanda’s high commissioner and earmarked humanitarian aid for Congolese civilians.

The United Kingdom followed suit: on 25 February 2025, the Foreign Office announced that Britain would pause direct bilateral financial aid to Rwanda (except for support to the poorest), limit trade promotion activities, suspend defence training, and review export licences.

The UK government emphasised that there could be no military solution and demanded the withdrawal of all RDF forces from Congolese territory. These steps dramatically increased the cost of Rwanda’s interference. Rwanda, once seen as an indispensable security partner, became a target of coordinated Western sanctions, diminishing its diplomatic standing and constricting access to aid and investment.

2. Working with the United States to impose targeted sanctions

Tshisekedi’s government also cultivated relations with Washington. In February 2025, the United States sanctioned James Kabarebe, Rwanda’s minister of state for regional cooperation, and Lawrence Kanyuka, spokesperson for M23. U.S. State Department official Tammy Bruce said Rwanda’s actions undermined DRC’s territorial integrity and warned that the conflict risked escalating.

The U.S. Treasury noted that Kabarebe coordinated revenue generation from Congolese minerals to Rwanda, and that M23 collected taxes and smuggled minerals to finance its rebellion. The Congolese government welcomed the sanctions and called for further measures to compel Rwanda to withdraw troops. By securing U.S. backing, Tshisekedi signalled to Kigali that his administration had powerful allies willing to isolate Rwanda economically and diplomatically.

3. Mobilizing African and European partners

Beyond Western capitals, Tshisekedi leveraged continental and regional organisations. He championed African Union mediation processes led by Angola’s President João Lourenço, building African consensus against Rwanda’s incursion. In February 2025, the UK government noted that the Foreign Secretary had met Presidents Tshisekedi and Paul Kagame and urged them to engage in African-led peace processes. The statement emphasised that Rwanda’s capture of Goma and Bukavu by M23 and RDF was a breach of DRC sovereignty and called for a withdrawal of RDF forces.

In Europe, Germany suspended new development aid to Rwanda, while the European Parliament called for freezing budget support and suspending a critical minerals partnership until Kigali severed ties with M23 (according to the RFI report summarizing Germany’s actions and the European call). These moves undermined Rwanda’s reputation as a reliable partner and signalled that Kigali’s economic interests, including lucrative mineral and tourism deals, were at risk.

4. Pressuring commercial partners and tarnishing Rwanda’s brand

Tshisekedi’s government extended its campaign to the commercial sphere. Congolese officials urged football clubs Arsenal, Bayern Munich, and Paris Saint‑Germain to end their “Visit Rwanda” sponsorship deals, arguing that the brand was tarnished by human rights abuses and conflict minerals. While some clubs maintained the partnerships, the negative publicity prompted Bayern Munich to scale back its Rwanda branding. Activists launched petitions and protests, pushing companies to reconsider partnerships with Kigali. This grassroots pressure exposed Rwanda’s use of sports sponsorship as soft power and made the deals controversial.

5. Strengthening the national army and regional alliances

While fighting continues, Tshisekedi has invested in reinforcing the Armed Forces of the DRC (FARDC) and forging regional security alliances. The government recruited thousands of new soldiers, modernised equipment, and coordinated operations with SADC and EAC forces. Congolese troops, backed by regional allies, successfully retook some villages from M23. The SADC Mission in the DRC (SAMIDRC) extended its mandate, and some leaders praised Tshisekedi’s determination to defend national territory. These actions challenged Rwanda’s narrative that Congolese forces were weak and that external intervention was necessary.

6. Pursuing peace processes while insisting on sovereignty

Tshisekedi’s diplomacy balances pressure with dialogue. In July 2024 and January 2025, his government engaged in the Luanda and Nairobi peace processes, facilitated by Angola and the East African Community. Although negotiations stalled, Tshisekedi continued to advocate for a political solution. The UK statement noted that the Foreign Secretary urged both leaders to engage in good‑faith negotiations and emphasised humanitarian access. By championing African-led talks, Tshisekedi demonstrated a willingness to negotiate while firmly rejecting foreign occupation.

In June 2025, Rwanda and Congo signed a U.S.-brokered agreement in Washington. While negotiated under foreign auspices, Tshisekedi secured commitments requiring Rwanda to withdraw troops within ninety days, demobilise non-state armed groups, and create a joint security mechanism. The accord also called for an economic integration framework that would benefit Congo and involve U.S. investors, further constraining Rwanda’s unilateral exploitation.

7. Elevating Congo’s cultural and economic identity

Tshisekedi has countered Rwanda’s influence not only through sanctions but also by promoting Congolese pride. His government has invested in cultural preservation, including the National Museum and UNESCO-supported projects safeguarding intangible heritage. Demonstrations in Goma in 2022 saw thousands of Congolese honouring their armed forces and denouncing “Rwandan aggression”.

These public expressions of national unity strengthened the narrative that Congo’s sovereignty must be defended and that external interference is unacceptable. Tshisekedi also renegotiated mining contracts and infrastructure deals to ensure that mineral wealth benefits Congolese citizens, thereby reducing Rwanda’s economic leverage.

Evidence of Rwanda’s abuses and economic vulnerability

Tshisekedi’s campaign gained traction because credible reports documented Rwanda’s human rights violations and economic exploitation. A UN Group of Experts report released in July 2024 concluded that between 3,000 and 4,000 RDF soldiers were fighting alongside M23 in eastern DRC and that Rwanda exercised “direct and decisive involvement”.

The experts warned that these actions could prompt increased international sanctions. They also documented that M23 rebels smuggled 150 tonnes of coltan to Rwanda in 2024 and that gold and other minerals were transported into Rwanda and Uganda, enriching Kigali and funding the rebellion. The Egmont Institute noted that 34 % of Rwanda’s exports were gold, most of it smuggled from the DRC, highlighting Kigali’s dependence on illicit mineral flows. Human rights groups accused Rwandan forces and allies of massacres and sexual violence, contributing to the 7.2 million displaced Congolese.

These revelations fuelled anger inside Congo and among international partners. DRC Foreign Affairs Minister Thérèse Kayikwamba Wagner told Al Jazeera that the question countries should ask is “why Rwanda is not being sanctioned for violation of our territory.” Her statement underscored how Kinshasa’s diplomatic messaging reframed Kigali from a peacekeeper to a perpetrator. Analyst Valtino Omolo predicted the UN report could lead to increased economic and diplomatic sanctions against Rwanda. Canada’s statement similarly denounced RDF presence and called for Rwanda’s withdrawal

By anchoring its demands in independent investigations and multilateral voices, Tshisekedi’s administration drew global attention to Rwanda’s abuses.

Rwanda’s diminishing image and economic repercussions

As sanctions accumulated, Rwanda’s once‑polished image suffered. Visit Rwanda sponsorships with European football clubs faced boycotts and negative coverage, tarnishing a key pillar of Kigali’s soft‑power strategy. Canada, Germany, and the UK all suspended or reviewed business cooperation; the European Parliament urged the suspension of a minerals-for-infrastructure deal; and the United States signalled more sanctions were possible.

Even long‑time allies such as Belgium summoned Rwanda’s ambassadors to protest its actions. Rwanda’s economy, already dependent on re‑exporting Congolese minerals, now faced the risk of losing Western aid and investment. Opinion writers described Kigali’s sponsorship deals as “blood‑stained,” and protests outside football stadiums highlighted Congo’s suffering.

Before and after: Changing perceptions in Congo

In 2018, shortly after his inauguration, Tshisekedi attempted to normalise relations with Rwanda, meeting with Kagame and discussing joint economic projects. Some Congolese hoped for an end to decades of proxy wars. However, by 2025, public opinion had shifted decisively against Kigali. Mass protests in Goma and other cities denounced Rwandan aggression; social media campaigns amplified Congolese nationalism; and many citizens praised Tshisekedi for standing up to Kagame. The narrative changed from viewing Rwanda as an indispensable security partner to seeing it as a destabilising force whose influence must be curtailed.

Symbolic and substantive wins for Congo

While the conflict is far from over, Tshisekedi’s strategy has yielded tangible gains:

1. International condemnation and sanctions, Canada, UK, US, Germany, and the EU all imposed sanctions or aid suspensions on Rwanda, isolating Kigali diplomatically.

2. Public awareness and unity, Large demonstrations and cultural initiatives fostered national pride and unified Congolese citizens against external exploitation.

3. Peace negotiations under Congolese terms, the Luanda and Nairobi processes emphasise African-led solutions; the Washington accord requires Rwanda to withdraw troops and creates a joint monitoring mechanism.

4. Economic reforms, Tshisekedi renegotiated mining contracts and infrastructure deals, ensuring more revenue stays in Congo. The government also pursued U.S. partnerships that require Rwanda to curb its interference.

5. Cultural and infrastructural progress, despite war, projects like the National Museum and UNESCO-backed heritage programmes continued, highlighting Congo’s rich culture and resilience.

   
   

Conclusion: A new era of Congolese sovereignty

Through a combination of diplomacy, public pressure, alliance-building, and economic reform, President Félix Tshisekedi has transformed Rwanda’s longstanding influence in the DRC into a liability. By exposing war crimes, mobilising international partners, and insisting on Congolese sovereignty, he has forced Kigali to confront the consequences of its actions. Sanctions, aid suspensions, and damaged brand partnerships show that Rwanda’s strategy of supporting proxy rebels and profiting from Congo’s minerals now carries heavy costs. While peace remains elusive and millions are still displaced, Tshisekedi has shifted the narrative: DR Congo is no longer a passive victim but an assertive actor demanding respect and accountability.