Muyaya: FDLR is Used as Pretext in Eastern Congo Conflict

DRC government spokesperson Patrick Muyaya has again challenged Rwanda’s long-standing justification for military involvement in eastern Congo, describing the FDLR argument as “a recycled pretext.”

Speaking publicly, Muyaya revisited the history of the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) to question whether the group still represents a genuine security threat to Kigali.

“Can They Still Be a Threat 32 Years Later?”

The FDLR was formed by elements of the former Rwandan Armed Forces and militias who fled into what is now the Democratic Republic of Congo following the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi.

Muyaya posed a direct question:

“Can soldiers who left Rwanda in 1994 still represent a real threat to the Rwandan regime 32 years later?”

Muyaya added that the group no longer has the capacity to justify repeated cross-border interventions.

According to the Congolese government, the FDLR has been invoked over the years to rationalize cycles of military presence in eastern DRC.

A History of Operations Against the FDLR

Muyaya pointed to previous periods of control in eastern Congo, including the era of the RCD rebellion between 1998 and 2003, when large areas of North and South Kivu were under Rwanda-backed administration.

“If the real objective was to eliminate the FDLR,” he argued, “why wasn’t it done during those years of control?”

He also referenced joint military operations carried out in recent years.

FARDC Operations (2009–2020) data from ( WHITE BOOK )

According to official Congolese data :

Operation Umoja Wetu (2009) led to 153 FDLR fighters killed and over 100 repatriated, alongside thousands who voluntarily entered disarmament programs.

Operations Kimia II and Amani Leo (2009–2012) reportedly neutralized more than 1,200 FDLR combatants, with hundreds repatriated.

Operations between 2015 and 2018 recorded over 1,000 additional fighters killed and hundreds returned to Rwanda.

Joint FARDC–RDF Operations

Between 2019 and 2022, joint operations involving Congolese and Rwandan forces reportedly resulted in:

338 fighters from armed groups, including the FDLR, were killed or neutralized.

650 combatants repatriated.

More than 2,200 dependents returned, including children.

Congolese officials argue that these figures show sustained military action against the FDLR over more than a decade.

At one stage, Muyaya noted, even Rwanda’s former ambassador in Kinshasa publicly suggested that the FDLR no longer represented a major threat.

“Today They Are in Areas Controlled by Rwanda”

Muyaya went further, claiming that the remaining FDLR elements are now located in areas under M23 control, where Rwandan forces have acknowledged coordination with M23 rebels

He suggested that whenever Congolese forces regain territory, the FDLR argument resurfaces as justification for renewed intervention.

Reframing the Debate: Minerals and Control

In his most direct remarks, Muyaya reframed the issue:

“The FDLR is coltan. The FDLR is gold. The FDLR is all the resources we have there.”

For the Congolese government, the security narrative surrounding the FDLR obscures what it views as the central issue: competition over eastern Congo’s mineral wealth.

Eastern DRC holds significant reserves of coltan, gold and other strategic resources critical to global supply chains. Control of mining zones has long been intertwined with armed group activity.

A Competing Narrative

Rwanda maintains that its actions are guided by national security concerns, particularly regarding armed groups linked to the legacy of the 1994 genocide.

Kinshasa, however, argues that decades of military operations and repatriations weaken the claim that the FDLR remains an existential threat.