New U.S. Sanctions Expose Kagame’s Links to Congo’s Conflict

The Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has suffered almost three decades of war. Militia groups control valuable coltan and cassiterite mines, financing conflict through illegal taxation and forced labour. On 12 August 2025, the U.S. Treasury sanctioned the Congolese militia PARECO‑FF, the Hong Kong traders East Rise Corporation Limited and Star Dragon Corporation Limited, and the Congolese cooperative Cooperative des Artisanaux Miniers du Congo (CDMC).

The sanctions marked the first time Washington targeted a network linked directly to Rwanda’s President Paul Kagame. Drawing on the sanctions report, the United Nations’ 2025 Group of Experts final report, and other investigative sources, this article exposes how Rwanda-backed groups profit from conflict minerals, the human toll on Congolese communities, and why the sanctions matter.

1. Kagame-M23-PARECO‑FF Nexus: control of Rubaya’s coltan

M23 and PARECO‑FF take over the mines

Rubaya in North Kivu province produces roughly 15 % of the world’s coltan, a critical mineral used in smartphones and electric cars. PARECO‑FF (“Coalition des Patriotes Résistants Congolais‑Force de Frappe”) emerged in 2022 and quickly seized Rubaya’s mines. According to the U.S. Treasury, PARECO‑FF controlled the mining sites from 2022 to early 2024 and generated revenue by collecting illegal fees, imposing forced labour, and executing civilians. The militia imposed taxes on diggers and workers and smuggled minerals through “opportunistic relationships” with other armed groups, including the Rwanda-backed March 23 Movement (M23).

The United Nations’ Group of Experts report shows that in April 2024, M23 seized Rubaya from PARECO‑FF. M23’s political commissioner, Erasto Bahati, oversaw the site and instituted a complex taxation system, hand‑picking traders and expelling diggers who resisted. Local observers reported that M23 negotiated a share of coltan with PARECO‑FF before ousting them, indicating collusion rather than rivalry. M23 also used forced labour (called salongo) to build a road from Rubaya through Mushaki, Kitshanga, and Tongo to the Rwandan border; this road enabled smugglers to transport coltan to Rwanda.

Human rights abuses and tax schemes

Sources, including Al Jazeera and Global Witness, describe M23’s brutal governance. UN experts found that M23 taxed up to 120 tonnes of coltan per month, generating approximately USD 800,000. Traders interviewed by Global Witness said M23 demanded a 15 % tax on the selling price. The militia enforced forced labour at mining sites and executed civilians who defied orders.

The United Nations report documents large‑scale looting: M23 “systematically looted more than 500 tonnes of tagged and untagged 3T minerals,” smuggling 186 tonnes to Rwanda.

In March 2025, trucks moved 195 tonnes of minerals across the border at night. During the same period, an estimated 7,000-12,000 Rwandan troops fought alongside M23 in North and South Kivu, contributing to mass displacement. The human cost is staggering: the International Organization for Migration counted 6.9 million internally displaced people (IDPs) in DRC by 2023, with 5.6 million in the eastern provinces and up to one million in North Kivu alone.

2. Follow the money: from Rubaya to Hong Kong via Rwanda

CDMC and the Hong Kong front companies

The U.S. Treasury sanctions reveal a chain of custody: PARECO‑FF and then M23 exploited Rubaya’s minerals; the Cooperative des Artisanaux Miniers du Congo (CDMC) operated the largest concession and purchased minerals smuggled from armed‑group areas. CDMC then sold minerals to Hong Kong-based East Rise Corporation Limited and Star Dragon Corporation Limited. These companies were designated by the U.S. for materially assisting CDMC’s illicit trade; their owners remain unnamed.

Global Witness found that once minerals reach Rwanda, they are sold to Rwandan exporters such as African Panther Resources. In 2024, the company’s exports surged, and the Luxembourg-based trader Traxys became almost the exclusive buyer. Traders said African Panther purchased large quantities of smuggled coltan; M23 demanded a 15 % tax from sellers. Because Rwanda is an EAC member, its exports enjoy preferential access to European markets. The report notes that Rwanda’s official coltan exports doubled from about 1,000 tonnes in 2023 to 2,000 tonnes in 2024, far exceeding the country’s production, evidence of massive laundering.

Rwanda as a smuggling corridor

M23’s control of border cities such as Bunagana and Kitshanga gave it a monopoly over smuggling routes. The UN report noted that “smuggled minerals were laundered through Rwanda, mixed with local production and exported,” undermining legitimate trade.

Reuters quoted UN experts who observed 195 tonnes of coltan crossing into Rwanda in one week. Roads built with forced labour allowed M23 to move convoys of 4–5 vehicles carrying up to 5 tonnes each; locals described 120‑tonne convoys heading to Rwanda monthly. Once in Rwanda, minerals were re‑labelled and shipped to processing hubs in the United Arab Emirates and China before ending up in Western supply chains

3. Kagame’s corporate shield

Rwanda’s government denies any involvement. Yet, evidence shows that President Paul Kagame’s regime profits whether PARECO‑FF or M23 controls the mines. PARECO‑FF initially opposed M23, but both groups channelled minerals through Rwanda. The U.S. Treasury described PARECO‑FF’s “opportunistic relationships” with M23, and the IPIS article reports that M23 negotiated coltan shares with PARECO‑FF before seizing Rubaya.

Rwanda uses state-linked companies as a corporate shield. African Panther Resources, partly owned by Rwandan military figures, purchases coltan from CDMC and M23-affiliated traders; its exports soar when conflict intensifies. Through East Rise and Star Dragon in Hong Kong and Traxys in Luxembourg, the minerals enter global markets. Because Rwanda’s official exports appear legal, international buyers seldom ask questions. The sanctions signal that Washington intends to pierce this shield and cut off the revenue streams that finance Kagame’s regional dominance.

4. Human cost and global tech demand

A crisis measured in lives, not tonnes

The conflict has devastated communities across eastern Congo. Since the M23 offensive resumed in late 2023, more than 3,000 people have been killed and 2,800 injured, according to humanitarian agencies. Over 237,000 people were newly displaced in early 2025 alone, and by late 2023, the total number of internally displaced persons had reached 6.9 million. Many families live in makeshift camps or host communities, lacking food, shelter, or healthcare. Women and children face sexual violence and exploitation.

Tech supply chains soaked in blood

Coltan is essential for capacitors in smartphones, laptops, and electric vehicles. The DRC produced about 40 % of the world’s coltan in 2023, yet its people see little benefit. Miners often work under armed-group control, earning less than USD 2.15 per day. Rwanda’s export revenues help fund infrastructure and social services at home, while Congolese communities suffer. Meanwhile, Western consumers remain largely unaware that their devices may contain minerals taxed by militias. The supply chain’s opacity allows corporations to claim due diligence even when minerals originate in conflict zones.

5. U.S. sanctions as a turning point

The August 2025 sanctions are significant because they target not only an armed group but also the companies facilitating the trade. By sanctioning PARECO‑FF, CDMC, East Rise, and Star Dragon, the U.S. is sending a warning to Rwanda and international traders that the illicit coltan network is under scrutiny. Under the sanctions, any U.S. person or company that deals with these entities risks heavy penalties.

Although OFAC does not expressly name Rwanda, the designations implicitly acknowledge Kigali’s role. The sanctions may deter legitimate corporations from purchasing minerals through Rwanda and could encourage the Congolese government to regain control of its mining sector.

However, sanctions alone cannot end the conflict. The Great Lakes region has seen numerous peace deals and embargoes over the past three decades, yet armed groups continue to thrive. True change requires a combination of regional diplomacy, economic reform, and accountability for war profiteers. The UN‑facilitated peace agreement signed on 27 June 2025 between Rwanda and the DRC offers a framework, but its success depends on enforcement. Civil society organisations have called for mandatory supply‑chain transparency laws and for tech companies to support conflict‑free sourcing.

Conclusion

The U.S. sanctions of 12 August 2025 expose a complex network linking President Kagame’s government, M23 rebels, PARECO‑FF militia, Congolese cooperatives, and Hong Kong traders.

Control over Rubaya’s coltan has shifted from one militia to another, but the victims remain the same: Congolese miners forced to dig under threat of violence and communities uprooted by war. The minerals that power the world’s tech devices are soaked in their blood.

The sanctions are a step toward accountability, but only sustained international pressure and regional cooperation can dismantle the war‑profiteering machine and bring peace to the eastern Congo.